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ABSTRACT 
This study i s concerned with the application of key perspectives 
i n i n d u s t r i a l sociology to the proljlem of the social control of work i n 
i n d u s t r i a l organisations, a prolilem central to many issues aff e c t i n g 
the q u a l i t y of i n d u s t r i a l relations i n our society. I t i s argued that 
the achievement of effective plant systems of social control depends 
upon the compatahility of decisions taken hy management and trade unions 
with both the system recpiirements of i n d u s t r i a l organisations and the 
social requirements of employees vdiose consent to these decisions i s 
cr u c i a l . 
I n the f i r s t part of the work an attempt has "been made to 
demonstrate how a balanced treatment of systems, order, c o n f l i c t and 
social action perspectives i n i n d u s t r i a l sociology can "be used i n the 
consideration of what constitutes the concept of control. A model of 
control i s outlined which emphasises the necessity of exploring the nature 
of managerial and labour values and decisions as these define the scope 
and content of the control process over a period of time. The model also 
i l l u s t r a t e s the s e n s i t i v i t y of these values and decisions to system and 
social influences surrounding the organisation and i t s participants, and 
Tidiich set constraints within which the control process must move i f i t i s 
to remain stable. 
Aspects of the model are applied to the analysis of control i n an 
integrated steel plant. This analysis constitutes the second part of the 
thesis. The emphasis i s upon the determinants of stable control, but the 
model i s also applied to indicate the sources of i n s t a b i l i t y and s t r a i n . 
Ultimately the thesis draws together within one framework concepts 
derived from the separate but i n t e r - r e l a t e d analytical areas of systems 
and social integration. I n t h i s way, i t i s envisaged that the work as a 
whole makes some contribution to a more systematic study of social 
problems i n the world of work. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In d u s t r i a l Sociology as a disc i p l i n e has suffered from the absence 
of a suitable conceptual framework f o r the analysis of social problems 
i n the world of work. The tendency has been i n research to collect 
empirical material i n order to demonstrate the superiority of one 
theoretical position at the expense of another. I n consecjuence the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of developing explanatory models which u t i l i s e some of the 
complementary aspects of various theories now available to the i n d u s t r i a l 
sociologist has received only l i m i t e d attention. A primary concern of 
t h i s thesis i s to consider the case f o r , and the benefits of, theoretical 
u n i f i c a t i o n i n the f i e l d s of systems and social integration i n industry. '^''^  
The study: i s divided i n t o two parts. I n the f i r s t part, consisting 
of tliree chapters, ex i s t i n g theoretical approaches to the analysis of 
problems of integration i n i n d u s t r i a l organisations are considered. I n 
the f i r s t chapter a case i s outlined f o r the systematization of theory i n 
the consideration of the i n t e r r e l a t i o n s between systems ajid social 
integration i n large organisations. I n the second and t h i r d chapters the 
case f o r theoretical integration i s developed i n more de t a i l by ou t l i n i n g 
a model f o r the analysis of one particular organisational process of focal 
concern i n the investigation of systems and social integration - that of 
control. I n the second part of the stoidyi, which also consists of three 
chapters, some aspects of the model are applied to the exploration of the 
process of control i n one i n d u s t r i a l organisation - a medium sized steel 
plant situated i n the north of England. 
The selection of the control process f o r particular examination i s 
important. I f i n fact the case f o r theoretical integration i n Industrial 
Sociology rests upon a need to resolve current conceptual ambiguities i n 
the analysis of such problems as the relationships between order and 
( l ) "Systems" integration here refers to the integration of the functional 
and analytical elements of business organisations as social systems. 
Social i n t e g r a t i o n refers to the integration of actors within these 
organisations. 
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c o n f l i c t , s t a b i l i t y and change, shared values and opposed interests, 
system and actor, then the selection of a process which i l l u s t r a t e s 
the nature of these inter-relationships i s c r u c i a l . I n t h i s work, 
pa r t i c u l a r attention has been given to one particular aspect of control: 
the control of plant systems of i n d u s t r i a l relations between employers 
and employees (and between groups of employees) concerned with the 
process of job and work regulation. Consequently the major theoretical 
contribution of the f i r s t part of the study i s to demonstrate how a 
balanced treatment of order, c o n f l i c t and social action perspectives 
can be applied to the problem of what constitutes and what determines 
stable and effective patterns of plant systems of control. 
The concept of control i n i n d u s t r i a l organisations remains 
ambiguous. For some writers i t extends only to those well-defined 
aspects of i n d u s t r i a l relations regulated by collective agreements. 
Frec[uently, however, such an approach ignores the wider implications of 
the s i t u a t i o n and conditions i n which these agreements are made, 
including such questions as the attitudes of employees whose consent 
to the procedures and substance of work regulation i s essential. I n 
t h i s study the system of control i s taken to encompass those rules, 
whether formal or informal, which exist to regulate-the relationships 
between employers and employees arid between groups of employees i n 
i n d u s t r i a l plants. Whilst such rules are seen to r e f l e c t the influence 
of certain technical, f i n a n c i a l and marketing requirements of the enterprise, 
they also r e f l e c t the interests and requirements of participants at various 
levels i n the system. Judgements of the effectiveness of any plant system 
of control are made, therefore, i n terms of the extent to vfliich the system 
meets both the business objectives of the enterprise and the interests of 
participants, and the extent to which changes i n the pattern of rules and 
rule-making continue to meet changes i n the requirements of the enterprise 
and i t s participants. 
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A further c r i t e r i a f o r judging the effectiveness of plant control 
systems i s the extent to which participants legitimise the means of rule 
determination as well as the rules themselves. I n t h i s respect i t i s 
important to measure the expectations of rank and f i l e employees for 
involvement i n the making of decisions. L i t t l e i s known, f o r example, 
about the degree to which the existing span of j o i n t l y controlled areas 
of work i n p a r t i c u l a r industries i s acceptable to management and unions, 
or about t h e i r expectations f o r the future. Even less i s known about the 
actual areas of influence over work-control, experienced or s o u ^ t by the 
mass of rank and f i l e employees who are not d i r e c t l y associated with the 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d process of collective bargaining. Similarly, l i t t l e i s 
known about how employees perceive the d i s t r i b u t i o n of influence over 
control between di f f e r e n t levels of the plant hierarchy both i n the 
ex i s t i n g and i n an ideal s i t u a t i o n . Some of these questions which have 
an important bearing upon the s t a b i l i t y of i n d u s t r i a l relations are 
considered i n Part I I of the thesis concerned with the analysis of the 
control process i n the steel industry. 
A control system i s therefore most usefully understood as a process 
f o r the establishment of p o l i c i e s , rules and practices regulating the 
a c t i v i t i e s of the organisation and i t s members. I n order to understand 
what influences the effectiveness, character and direction of change of 
t h i s process, however, we need to be concerned not only with the contextual 
constraints imposed upon the system by organisational variables derived 
from the socio-technical system of the plant and i t s external environment, 
but also with such notions of influence, power and legitimate authority 
which derive from a consideration of the values of actors, as these axe shaped 
by t h e i r e x i s t i n g work situations and t h e i r wider community and social 
environments. I n important respects therefore the process of control i s best 
seen as the outcome of an interplay between the requirements of the organisaticnal 
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system f o r the optimisation of i t s resources on the one hand, and the 
requirements of the participants of these organisations f o r the 
optimisation of t h e i r interests on the other. The i n i t i a l steps i n 
building ai model of control are concerned with the location of the control 
process w i t h i n parameters set by the requirements of organisations and 
t h e i r members f o r effective systems and social integration. 
B^ond t h i s , as has already been suggested, the model seeks to provide 
broad c r i t e r i a f o r the assessment of what constitutes an effective control 
process. I n t h i s context, the concepts of "co-operation" and "coalition'' 
w i l l be introduced. Based upon the notion of the in d u s t r i a l organisation 
as a " p l u r a l " society and upon the manner i n which certain decisions 
governing the regulation of work are taken by i n d u s t r i a l coalitions of 
employers and employees, particular attention i s given to the co-operative 
process i n which groups of these participants seek' to secure t h e i r 
occupational and business objectives w i t h i n an interdependent working 
relationship. I t i s argued that the existence of co-operation so defined 
i s a necessary and indispensible basis of stable plant control systems. 
A stable state of the control system exists where the separate, and sometimes 
conflictinjg interests, of the members of i n d u s t r i a l coalitions are maximised 
through coToperation w i t h i n boundaries suggested by system and s o c i a l 
requirements. Fully developed the model directs attention to the need to 
explore the nature of both managerial and labour values as these define the 
scope and content of the control process over time, as well as the system 
and social factors surrounding the organisation and i t s participants 
functioning to set the constraints within which the control process must 
move i f i t ! i s to remain stable. 
i 
Certain aspects of t h i s model are applied to the case of an integrated 
steel plant and discussed i n the second Part of t h i s thesis. The plant and 
industry were selected i n the beli.ef that they would provide suitable sites 
f o r the exploration of factors contributing towards stable and effective plant 
systems of control. 
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Thus attention i s given i n Chapter IV to the nature of both systems 
and social factors operating to influence the s t a b i l i t y of control i n 
t h i s plant. I n the two subsecpient chapters particular emphasis i s placed 
upon the pattern of social integration within the plant, upon the 
orientations of both manual and non-manual employees there to work and 
control, and upon the ways i n which these orientations are structured by 
membership of d i s t i n c t i v e social categories both within and outside the 
plant. These include social class, residential coimnunity and occupation. 
One important aspect of the analysis i n these chapters concerns the ways 
i n which the perceptions of the respondents investigated towards both 
the e x i s t i n g and ideal d i s t r i b u t i o n of influence over control can be 
isolated and measured. With t h i s information i t becomes possible to 
consider the area of inter-occupational normative consensus within the 
labour force over the existing and ideal p r o f i l e of control i n the plant. 
At the same time, the analysis of respondents' attitudes to aspects of 
t h e i r job and work situations pemits some evaluation of the wider 
f a c i l i t a t i n g factors i n the plant's socio-technical system structuring 
i n d i v i d u a l and occupational attitudes towards control. 
I t i s our contention that the s t a b i l i t y and effectiveness of control 
i n t h i s plant results from a r e l a t i v e l y h i ^ degree of reciprocal influence 
between management and labour over the form and content of the system of 
work regulation, and that one important source of t h i s particular pattern 
of control i s to be found i n the high level of individual involvement i n 
decision-making accorded to manual workers i n steel. The p o s s i b i l i t i e s 
vdiich exist f o r involvement and self-advancement i n manual work are l i k e l y 
to reinforce the widely shared b e l i e f s of these steelworkers i n the 
i n t r i n s i c value of t h e i r work, and these values are l i k e l y to be s u f f i c i e n t l y 
strongly developed to counteract the development of a purely dichotomous 
social imagery directed against the employer, or a purely negative or neutral 
attachment to steelwork i t s e l f . 
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Whilst the main emphasis i n Part I I , therefore, i s upon the 
determinants of stable plant control systems i n one basic industry and i n 
one steel plant, the model i s also applied to indicate the sources of 
i n s t a b i l i t y and s t r a i n . This analysis i s undertaken pri n c i p a l l y at the 
level of social integration where the l i m i t s of labour consensus on the 
d e s i r a b i l i t y of co-operation with management are drawn i n occupational 
terms. The degree of heterogeneity amongst the major manual occupations 
on such subjects as work satis f a c t i o n , status and influence sets clear 
l i m i t s upon the s t a b i l i t y of control; t h i s question i s discussed i n 
Chapter V. Of equal in t e r e s t , however, i s the extent to which the members 
of one occupation legitimise the i n s t i t u t i o n s of control which exist and 
are available i n the plant. I n Chapter VI t h i s particular problem i s 
investigated with reference to c l e r i c a l employees who are also members of 
the same trade union, a union whose membership consists predominantly of- -
manual workers. I n t h i s analysis the implications f o r the control system 
are explored i n a s i t u a t i o n where c l e r i c a l opinions divide considerably on 
what constitutes an eff e c t i v e form of trade union representation, and on 
whether the par t i c u l a r occupational interests of thes,e'.workers can be met 
by membership of a steelworkers' trade union. I t follows that the 
effectiveness of control i s not merely a function of how:jf.ar actors 
legitimise management-union relationships at plant l e v e l , but how f a r also 
they leg i t i m i s e the formal trade union i n s t i t u t i o n s representing t h e i r 
interests i n the control system. 
Ultimately i t has to be admitted that the 'work J has several objectives. 
I t i s concerned with the building of a theoretical model of control ajid 
with i t s application. I t i s concerned also with the integration, albeit 
l i m i t e d integration, of sociological theories i n the study of organisations. 
I t i s concerned with the problem of a r t i c u l a t i n g the processes of systems 
and social integration w i t h i n complex organisations. I f the breadth of 
the study i s wide, i t i s no wider than that required to investigate i t s 
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focal concern: the determinants of effective plant systems of control. 
I n essence, the argument which follows i s addressed to one central 
proposition. This i s that the achievement of an effective system of 
control depends upon the compatibility of the decisions taken by members 
of i n d u s t r i a l coalitions with the systems requirements of the organisations 
i n which they are located, and with the social expectations of the actors 
who are required to legitimise the decisions of i n d u s t r i a l coalitions. 
To state the proposition i s one thing: i t s discussion, however, raises 
basic questions and problems which have serious implications f o r the future 
development of I n d u s t r i a l Sociology as a dis c i p l i n e . 
At the same time certain problems discussed i n the second part of the 
thesis raise issues of more topical concern. Over a period of some 80 
years and u n t i l recently the i r o n and steel industry of t h i s country has 
exhibited a comparatively low level of i n d u s t r i a l c o n f l i c t measured by the 
usual indicators of o f f i c i a l and u n o f f i c i a l strikes. L i t t l e i s known 
generally about the pattern of i n s t i t u t i o n s , i n d u s t r i a l relations practices 
and occupational ideologies contributing towards stable and effective 
systems of plant control. Even less i s known about the effects of the 
relationships between manual and non-manual employees within such systems. 
The case study provides some insights into these i n s t i t u t i o n a l arrangements 
and work practices i n steel and into the attitudes of both manual and non-
manual employees to work and control i n an industry whose i n d u s t r i a l 
relations h i s t o r y remains comparatively obscure. 
I f the f i r s t objective of the thesis, therefore, i s a cr i t i q u e of 
existing sociological perspectives of the theory of organisations, the 
second objective of no lesser importance i s a resume of an industry providing 
some notable i f overlooked examples of stable and effective plant systems of 
control. To t h i s discussion we shall now turn. 
PART I 
THE CONCEPT OF CONTROL 
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CHAPTER I 
THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO THE ANALYSIS OF PROBLEMS OF 
INTEGRATION IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANISATIONS 
What constitutes an appropriate sociological approach to the analysis 
of problems i n the world of work, and especially to the analysis of the 
relationship between management and labour i n i n d u s t r i a l organisations? 
This question, often raised, remains unresolved. Nowhere i s the 
fragmentation of ideas created by the absence of a coherent theoretical 
approach more v i v i d l y i l l u s t r a t e d than i n I n d u s t r i a l Sociology. Here the 
u t i l i s a t i o n of sociological theories as competitive rather than complementary 
perspectives has, from the very inception of the subject, i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d 
the existence of contending frameworks of analysis. The existence of a 
theoretical dualism has been recognised by many writers; but two writers may 
be mentioned b r i e f l y to indicate the nature of current concern. 
Stone, f o r example, writes: 
"The great tendency i n i n d u s t r i a l relations research i s to have the 
empirical evidence i l l u s t r a t e the frame of reference which i s being 
used rather than to test propositions." 
Whilst Lammer has noted: 
"The controversy i n I n d u s t r i a l Sociology about the degree to which 
the interests of labour, management and other (more or less) organised 
groups i n enterprises are compatible has gradually become 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d . Again and again i n the last twenty years the 
advocates of the " f u n c t i o n a l i s t " approach or the "human relations" 
philosophy, and usually both, have been castigated f o r neglecting 
power and income differences and c o n f l i c t and competition between 
contending parties wi t h i n industry. They are charged also as 
ultimately playing i n t o the hands of the "powers that be" 
( l ) R.C. Stone "Conflicting Approaches to the Study of Worker-Manager 
Relations". Social Forces Vol. XXXl(l952) P.122. 
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and 
" the arguments seem to lead to the conclusion that there are 
two irreconcilable theoretical models i n terms of which organisational 
(2) 
l i f e can be explained."^ 
Other writer s , however, take a more extreme view of the situation. 
Some deny the existence even of an elementary theoretical framework i n the 
analysis of i n d u s t r i a l relations. Dunlop, f o r example, claims that: 
"To date the study of i n d u s t r i a l relations has had l i t t l e theoretical 
content. At i t s origins and at i t s best i t has been largely 
h i s t o r i c a l and descriptive Although i n d u s t r i a l relations aspires 
to be a di s c i p l i n e ( i t ) has lacked any central analytical 
content."^^^ 
Conversely others see the problem not so much as one created by the absence 
of theory; rather, by the existence of a plethora of incomplete and 
inadequate explanations of i n d u s t r i a l behaviour. 
I f there i s disagreement about what constitutes an appropriate approach, 
there exists conversely a growing awareness of the implications of dissensus 
and ignorance i n t h i s f i e l d of enquiry. Fox believes that whilst the 
s t r u c t u r a l r e a l i t i e s of industry require a " p l u r c i l i s t i c " analysis, employers 
and sections of the public employ a "unitary" reference. He goes on to say: 
"Where t h i s i s the case, the perception and handling by employers of 
labour relations are prejudiced, and judgements by the public of 
i n d u s t r i a l relations issues are distorted."^^^ 
(2 ) C.J. Lammers "Power and Participation i n Decision-Making i n Formal 
Organisations", American Journal of Sociology, V.73 No.2 I967 p.201. 
(3) J.C. Dunlop " I n d u s t r i a l Relations Systems", Holt 1958, p.6. 
(4 ) H.A. Turner "Labour Relations i n the Motor Industry" Allen & Unwin, I967 
(5) A. Pox " I n d u s t r i a l Sociology and Ind u s t r i a l Relations" Research Paper 
No.3 Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Einployers' Associations 
H.M.S.O. 1966, p . l . 
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and 
"Many s t i l l see the i n d u s t r i a l f i l m as a unitary system whose "natural" 
pursuit of a common purpose i s w i l f u l l y disrupted by trade unionism. 
On such a view, trade unionism s t i l l bears the stigma of an alien and 
even s l i g h t l y disreputable force, acceptable enough outside the 
workplace i n i t s role of negotiating general wage rates and working 
hours, but of doubtful respectability when i t comes to challenging 
managerial authority w i t h i n the plant."^^^ 
One aim of the research i s to make a contribution to t h i s debate. 
I n t h i s chapter we shall examine the case f o r a more balanced approach to 
the analysis of social behaviour i n industry, u t i l i s i n g existing perspectives 
i n I n d u s t r i a l Sociology, but seeking points of integration between them. 
1. SYSTEMS INTEGRATION AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION 
In order to give dir e c t i o n to the chapter, however, i t i s proposed to 
concentrate i n p a r t i c u l a r upon an area of investigation of recurring 
interest to students of i n d u s t r i a l relations concerned with the problem of 
theoretical integration outlined above. This area, i n general terms, 
deals with the nature of system and social integration i n business enterprises. 
I t i s an area with diverse ramifications and one which has generated 
considerable enquiry. 
Two part i c u l a r problems are associated with the existence of contending 
frameworks of reference i n I n d u s t r i a l Sociology and with the propogation 
of i t s apparent dualism. The f i r s t concerns the problem of the integration 
of i n d u s t r i a l organisations as "open" social systems; the second with the 
problem of the integration of social action within these organisations. 
(6) I b i d p.32 
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(a) SYSTEMS INTEGRATION 
Organisational analysis, as Silverman points out, has been largely 
(7) associated with the Durkheimian view of organisations as "natural systems". 
The mode of analysis t y p i c a l l y invoked i n a "systems" approach i s functional, 
where orgajiisational processes are evaluated f o r t h e i r effectiveness i n 
subserving what are seen to be the commonly held goals of the enterprise, 
and where the enterprise i t s e l f functions to meet certain economic 
requirements of the society of which i t i s paxt. 
The f u n c t i o n a l i s t approach indeed illuminates many of the central problems 
of I n d u s t r i a l Sociology. I t has been u t i l i s e d by various writers to deal 
with the analysis of organisational change, where organisations are seen to 
change i n accordance with t h e i r environmentally determined needs; to deal 
with the nature of i n d u s t r i a l relations systems where such systems' are seen to 
be based upon a consensus of values; to deal with the problem of deviation i n 
terms of the concept of informal organisation and to offer remedial action to 
t h i s problem by advocating improvements i n the process of i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s a t i o n 
(8) 
or by making more e x p l i c i t the objectives of organisational a c t i v i t y . ^ 
(7) D. Silverman "Formal Organisations or Ind u s t r i a l Sociology: Towards a 
Social Action Analysis of Organisations". Sociology Vol.2 No.2 
May, 1968 pp.221-38. 
(8) -On the application of functionalism to aspects of organisation theory, 
see T. Parsons "Suggestions f o r a Sociological Approach to the 
Theory of Organisations" Parts I and I I Administrative Science 
Quarterly Vol.1 June & Sept. I956 pp.63-85 and pp.225-39 f o r a 
discussion of the process of organisational chajige. On the 
f u n c t i o n a l i s t analysis of i n d u s t r i a l relations systems, see Dunlop 
op.cit. On the concept of informal structure and social systems see 
N. Mouzelis "Organisation and Bureaucracy" Routledge, Kegan:.& Paul 
1967, Chapter 5, p.101. On the process of co-optation, see P. 
Selznick "Foundations of the Theory of Organisation" American 
Sociological Review Vol.13 Feb. I948 pp.25-35. 
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The d i s t i n c t i v e features of the functional approach to organisational 
analysis derive from the fact that, because the organisation i t s e l f i s selected 
as the u n i t of analysis, attention i s focused upon problems at that l e v e l : 
problems of the organisation i n r e l a t i o n to i t s environment; problems of 
organisational functioning and effectiveness. I n keeping with t h i s approach 
also the emphasis i s upon the adaptability of the organisation i n maintaining • 
i t s e l f over time to meet specific needs.and to achieve specific objectives. 
I t i s i n keeping with t h i s approach f i n a l l y that where the internal reference 
of organisation i s taken f o r analysis, the emphasis w i l l be upon the 
interdependencies of the parts of the organisational system i n subserving the 
functional requirements of the whole. • Indeed i n explaining the existence of 
social phenomena by reference to aspects of social structure, the approach i s 
characterised by an emphasis upon the; necessary constraints placed upon social 
action by external or i n s t i t u t i o n a l exigencies. Because, however, recent 
variants of functionalism adopt a socially harmonious view of the organisation, 
imputing to i t the existence of u n i f i e d goals, such constraints are seen as 
being both technically and s o c i a l l y acceptable. 
An alternative i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of organisations, however, i s based upon 
(9) 
the concept of "functional autonomy" as developed by Gtouldner . He writes: 
"Organisation not only serves to l i n k , control and i n t e r r e l a t e parts 
but also functions to separate them and to maintain and protect t h e i r 
functional autonomy. Organisation i s seen then as shaped by a c o n f l i c t , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y by the tensions between centripetal and centrifugal pressures, 
as l i m i t i n g control over the parts as well as imposing i t , as establishing 
a balance between t h e i r dependence and independence, and as separating as 
well, as connecting t h e i r parts." (Our i t a l i c s ) 
(9) A.W. Gouldner "Reciprocity and Autonomy i n Functional Theory". 
I n "Symposium on Sociological Theory" ed. Gross. Row, Peterson 
and Co. 1959- pp.241-270. 
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Van Doorn^ "''^ ^ has invoked t h i s concept i n a recent discussion of the 
int e r r e l a t i o n s h i p between patterns of organisation and patterns of c o n f l i c t . 
He writes: 
"Regarded i n t h i s l i g h t , the orgajiisation i s seen to consist of a 
combination of processes: the integration of the parts i n the t o t a l 
system and, at the same time, the separation of the parts to protect 
t h e i r r e l a t i v e independence of the system."^^'^^ (Our i t a l i c s ) 
I t w i l l be noted that, i n t h i s approach, the organisation remains defined 
as a social system. The emphasis here, however, i s upon the analysis of 
the business enterprise as a social system comprising r e l a t i v e l y autonomous 
sub-systems where, as Van Doorn notes: 
"Bargaining w i l l be renewed from time to time, so enabling the 
d i s t r i b u t i o n of resources to be adapted to the changed power relations 
(12) 
between the parts of the system."^ 
The approach i s u t i l i s e d by Van Doorn f o r the analysis of in d u s t r i a l 
organisations. Taking the model of the c o a l i t i o n i n p o l i t i c a l theory, 
i n d u s t r i a l organisations are seen to depend upon a process of i n s t i t u t i o n a l -
i s a t i o n which 
" never ends i n a fu l l y - i n t e g r a t e d and interdependent system, going 
no f u r t h e r than semi-permanent arrangements" ^'''"^^ 
Because the system i s imperfectly integrated, and because the process of 
bargaining represents the t y p i c a l mode of i n t e r r e l a t i n g r e l a t i v e l y autonomous 
sub-systems such as management and labour organisations, the power which 
each sub-system can bring to bear upon other contenders f o r the d i s t r i b u t i o n 
of resources becomes an important factor f o r analysis. Moreover, the 
(10) J.A.A. Van Doorn "Conflict i n Formal Organisations" Ch.7 
"Conflict i n Society" ed. A. de Reuck & J. Knight, Churchill I966 pp. 
111-132. 
(11) I b i d p . l l 6 
(12) I b i d p.118 
(13) I b i d p.118 
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extent t o which such a model f a c i l i t a t e s the development of c o n f l i c t as a 
rat i o n a l method f o r maximising the opportunities of one sub-system at the 
expense of another without permanently disrupting the organisation becomes 
a problem f o r investigation. Indeed the p o s s i b i l i t y of the development 
of criss-crossing patterns of c o n f l i c t between sub-groups which prevent the 
development of a major dichotomy between two key contenders f o r power i s a 
p a r t i c u l a r l y important factor suggested by the adoption of t h i s frame of 
reference i n any consideration of what contributes to the overall s t a b i l i t y 
of the system. 
I t w i l l be noted, however, that Van Doom's use of the concept of 
functional autonomy f a i l s to make an adequate d i s t i n c t i o n between "autonomy" 
as an aspect of systems as opposed to social integration. Quite clearly 
the emphasis i n his work i s upon the means of integrating r e l a t i v e l y 
autonomous groups ( i . e . trade union organisations) within the social 
organisation of the enterprise. What i s required i s some consideration of 
the ways i n which t h i s concept can be applied to the analysis of systems 
integration. Consequently i t i s necessary to suggest that i f i n d u s t r i a l 
organisational systems are simultaneously shaped by both unifying and 
di v e r s i f y i n g influences, we need to specify the interrelationships between 
the parts of such systems. What constitutes the "parts" i n t h i s context 
i s an analytical exercise; f o r our purposes we can delimit such functionally 
autonomous dimensions as the di v i s i o n of labour, the system of control, the 
type of technology, as well as the economic, legal and social environments 
i n which i n d u s t r i a l organisations are located. Inherent i n t h i s approach 
i s the notion that the attainment of optimum conditions i n any one of these 
dimensions may not produce optimum conditions i n the t o t a l system. I t 
follows also that whilst employers and employees possess the capability of 
mutually defining the p r o f i l e s of social organisation i n t h e i r enterprises 
i n important respects, the overall effectiveness of these social arrangements 
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depends also upon t h e i r compatability with the environmental and internal 
demands of the organisation as a technical sind economic system. I n the 
la s t analysis i t might well be that an effective pattern of social 
organisation, evaluated i n terms of the social uses of human resources, 
was i n e f f i c i e n t i n terms of i t s i n a b i l i t y to meet the business and 
technical objectives of the enterprise. For these reasons the analysis 
of s t a b i l i t y i n the organisation must take separate account of factors 
independently contributing to the development of systems and social 
integration. The possible deficiencies created by a f a i l u r e to do so 
are i l l u s t r a t e d i n our view i n the approach of Van Doorn. 
With regard then to current developments i n organisational analysis, 
a case can be argued at t h i s level f o r the modification of "open systems" 
analysis, i d e n t i f i e d with f u n c t i o n a l i s t theory, i n ways which permit the 
integration of perspectives derived from the concept of "functional 
autonomy". Such concepts f a c i l i t a t e the analysis of a phenomenon 
cruc i a l i n our enquiry: the w?ys i n which unif y i n g and diversifying 
influences co-exist w i t h i n i n d u s t r i a l organisations. At the level of the 
organisation, therefore, we seek a frame of reference which, by permitting 
some assessment of the effects of environment upon structure, together 
with an assessment of the nature of the functional imperatives which 
i n d u s t r i a l organisations must meet i n order to survive, requires some 
modification of f u n c t i o n a l i s t theory as i t i s currently used i n Ind u s t r i a l 
Sociology. 
(b) SOCIAL IHTEaRATION 
The second problem concerns the integration of social action within 
orgajiisational structures. This area of investigation i s extensive 
w i t h i n I n d u s t r i a l Sociology. I t i s one which has been i d e n t i f i e d 
with A v a r i e t y of d i s t i n c t i v e approaches, a l l of which can be located w i t h i n 
three major theoretical t r a d i t i o n s and which, f o r our purposes, can be 
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viewed as contending frameworks of analysis. These separate traditions 
are concerned with the analysis of consensus, c o n f l i c t and social action 
theories. 
( i ) Consensus and Conflict: towards a Theory of Co-operation 
The f i r s t of these t r a d i t i o n s i s related again to what has been 
called "consensus" theory i n current sociology. I t i s a t r a d i t i o n which 
i t s e l f embraces a variety of approaches, but one which, i n very general 
terms, i d e n t i f i e s consensus with p o l i t i c a l democracy, as opposed to the 
classical organisational model of "authoritarian-bureaucracy". I n 
connection with t h i s point, Davis claims that: 
" I t would be hard"to i d e n t i f y any major fi g u r e i n the f i e l d of American 
or B r i t i s h studies who f a i l e d to draw attention to the advantages 
of more democratic struc t u r a l arrangements and modus operandi by 
organisations faced with the task of maintaining t h e i r internal 
systems, co-ordinating human a c t i v i t i e s and adapting to a s h i f t i n g 
external environment."^'''^^ 
Democratisation of structure, i t i s claimed, enhances i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , 
collaboration and consensus, supportive relationships and patterns of 
reciprocal influence. The work of McGregor, Argyris, Lickert, Gouldner 
and Bennis are cited by Davis as the principal contributors i n t h i s f i e l d , 
but i n commenting on the sources of the approach, he mentions especially 
the contributions of Elton Mayo and other Human Relations theorists, 
together with the contributions of such social psychologists as Lewin, 
L i p p i t , White, Coch and .French. Such writers, Davis argues, are concerned 
with c l a r i f y i n g the struc t u r a l changes involved i n reconciling individual 
and organisational goals through processes of collaboration-consensus as 
opposed to those of collaboration-compromise. 
(14) B. Davis "Organisational Democracy" Journal of Management Studies 
Vol. 4, No.3, 1967. pp. 270-281. 
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I f the approach i s distinguished by a desire to see some reduction i n 
the " s p e c i f i c i t y of role prescription" by increasing the scope f o r s e l f -
(15) 
actualisation and employee determination^ i t i s one equally i d e n t i f i a b l e 
f o r i t s concern with pointing up the social bases of s o l i d a r i t y between 
management and workers and the i n s t i t u t i o n a l requirements f o r s t a b i l i t y i n 
i n d u s t r i a l organisations, at the expense of a similar consideration of 
the power-structure of the f i r m and the existence of divergent and 
c o n f l i c t i n g values of contending groups withi n such organisations. 
Modern consensus theory, therefore, i s an amalgam of two central and 
complementary schools of thought, r e f l e c t i n g i n part the perspectives of 
general and normative functionalism, and i n part the perspectives of 
consensual-democratic theory. Functionalist theory emphasises the re l a t i v e 
effectiveness of system properties i n meeting systems requisites: that i s , 
the integrative aspects of social st'ru'ctures. I t stresses the i n s t i t u t i o n a l 
determinants of order and s t a b i l i t y i n societies. Consensual-democratic 
theory stresses, i n d i f f e r e n t ways, the same preoccupation with the nature 
and conditions of s o l i d a r i t y among actors i n organisational systems, offering 
i t s own p a l l i a t i v e f o r the maladies of i n d u s t r i a l l i f e . Jessie Barnard, 
f o r example, w r i t i n g of the Human Relations School and i t s philosophy, 
summarises i t s position to be: 
" I f good human relations can be established by applying proper principles 
of organisation, then c o n f l i c t - i n the "tension" sense - w i l l be done 
away with. I t i s not a matter of one class p r o f i t i n g at the expense 
of another; i t i s rather a matter of one class paying an exorbitant 
price i n terms of f r u s t r a t i o n f o r ignorance on the part of the other."^''"^^ 
(15) D.J. Hickson "Convergence i n Organisational Theory" Administrative 
Science Quarterly Vol.11, No.2 September, 1966. pp.224-237. 
(16) J. Bernard et a l . "The Nature of Conflict". International Sociological 
Association, Paris UNESCO 1957 see p.78. 
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The second of these t r a d i t i o n s i s related to what i s termed " c o n f l i c t " 
theory i n current sociology. I n t h i s approach, one located i n the 
classical t r a d i t i o n of Hobbes and Marx, c o n f l i c t situations are i n t r i n s i c 
i n , and organic to , social structure: the central element of social 
organisation i s coercion. As Dahrendorf puts i t : 
" coherence and order i n society are founded upon force and 
constraint, on the domination of some and the subjection of 
others. "^•'•'^^ 
Conflict i s exhibited inevitably between the superordinated and 
subordinated, according to Dahrendorf, since integration i t s e l f i s 
established by the a b i l i t y of the superior group to impose i t s demands 
upon those who wield less power. To Marx, and l a t e r economic dfeterminists, 
the inequitable d i s t r i b u t i o n of scarce resources and the d i s t r i b u t i o n of 
power determined by c a p i t a l i s t i n s t i t u t i o n s are the primary causes of 
social c o n f l i c t i n the i n d u s t r i a l society which exploits i t s workers 
because of the power of a given group to expropriate surplus value. As 
Stone observes: 
" we can separate three basic aspects of Marxian thought. The-
f i r s t i s the conclusion that c o n f l i c t i s inevitable. The second i s 
that economic interests are the determinants of human action. The 
t h i r d conclusion i s that c o n f l i c t flows from the d i s t r i b u t i o n of 
power I t i s a concern with t h i s problem, the effects of power 
d i s t r i b u t i o n , that constitutes the i n t e l l e c t u a l legacy from Marxian 
theory u n i t i n g the Conflict of Interest school and giving rise to a 
(18) 
point of view or framework f o r the study of industry."^ ' 
(17) R. Dahrendorf "Class and Class Conflict i n Industrial Society" 
Routledge 1959, P.157. 
(18) R.C. Stone, op.cit. p. I I 9 . 
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Nowhere has t h i s type of approach received better treatment i n 
(19) 
recent years than i n the work of Baldamus^ ', I n his c o n f l i c t frame 
of reference, i t i s assumed that the source of contradiction between 
management and worker l i e s i n the nature of the employment contract 
i t s e l f , i n the regulation by managerial controls of the r e l a t i o n between 
e f f o r t and earnings. A key problem i n t h i s process i s the d i f f i c u l t y of 
c o n t r o l l i n g the wage-earner's e f f o r t to work i n spite of the existence 
of s t a b i l i t y and i n t e n s i t y controls, such as supervision and piece-work 
earnings. Thus the existence of social factors underpinning the w i l l to 
work produces a standardisation of e f f o r t , so that informal definitions 
of "good!', jobs are i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y defined and determinant of the level 
of e f f o r t to be expended f o r a given wage increment. Under stable 
conditions these standardised expectations influence the effectiveness of 
managerial controls. Under changing conditions, however, these e f f o r t 
values break down because changes i n wages and i n e f f o r t expectations 
need not move i n p a r a l l e l but i n opposition: t h i s constitutes the 
condition of wage-effort disparity. 
I n a s t r i k i n g passage, Baldamus states: 
"A moment's r e f l e c t i o n w i l l show that we have now located the very 
centre of i n d u s t r i a l c o n f l i c t . As wages are costs to the f i r m , and 
the deprivations inherent i n e f f o r t mean "costs" to the employee, 
the interests of management and wage earners are diametrically 
opposed i n terms of the disparity process: a r e l a t i v e lowering of 
e f f o r t value i s an advantage to management and a disadvantage to the 
workers, f o r i t implies that e f f o r t i n t e n s i t y per unit of wages i s 
increased. We reach the conclusion that not every, changing 
s i t u a t i o n i s fraught with c o n f l i c t , but only those which involve wage 
disp a r i t y . I t should also be evident that any s h i f t towards disparity 
(19) W. Baldamus "Efficiency and E f f o r t " - An Analysis of I n d u s t r i a l 
Administration" Tavistock Publications I96I. 
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amounts to a r e d i s t r i b u t i o n of the shares of the product between 
employer and worker i n favour of the employer."^ ' 
Clearly f o r Baldamus the condition of wage disparity represents the 
dominajit goal of management, whilst the condition of wage paxity represents 
the goal of the labour force. I t i s an approach which emphasises the 
i n e v i t a b i l i t y of i n d u s t r i a l c o n f l i c t , and the essential r a t i o n a l i t y of 
c o n f l i c t under certain conditions. Baldamus points diit the'-pi'6babj:'-lityitthat 
i f the desires of the parties are more or less unlimited whilst the means 
of s a t i s f a c t i o n are l i m i t e d , the question of d i s t r i b u t i o n , of who gets what, 
and when and how, i s problematical and po t e n t i a l l y c o n f l i c t f u l . 
I t i s an approach, however, which i s representative of much recent 
work i n the " c o n f l i c t " t r a d i t i o n i n that i t assumes the supply of income 
(and power) i n i n d u s t r i a l orgajiisations to be a scarce resource, a constant 
quantity which i s obtainable by one party only at the expense of another. 
I n t h i s sense the d i s t r i b u t i o n of incomes and power i s considered i n terms 
of a zero-sum model of the f i r m . This model has been the subject of 
(21) 
c r i t i c i s m , notably by Lammers^ ' drawing upon the recent work of Likert 
(22) 
and Tannenbaum^ '. Lammer's approach i s to regard distributable income 
and power not as f i x e d , but as p o t e n t i a l l y growing quantities and the 
enterprise as a p o t e n t i a l l y expanding system wherein the uses of power at 
the disposal of key i n t e r a c t i n g groups may be increasingly directed towards 
the solution of problems i n mutually rewarding ways. tr e a t i n g the 
income of an enterprise as a growing quantity,'wage increases may stimulate 
labour productivity and/or purchasing power and thus raise the level .of 
income of the enterprise; by t r e a t i n g power as a growing quantity i n ways 
which permit wage-earners to participate i n decision-making, the j o i n t power 
(20) I b i d . p.105 
(21) C.J. Lammers "Power and Participation i n Decision-making i n Formal 
Organisations" op.cit. 
(22) Lammers refers especially to R.Likert "New Patters of Management" 
McGraw H i l l I96I and C.G.Smith & A.S.Tannenbaum "Organisational 
Control Structure: a Comparative Analysis" Human Relations XVI I963 
pp.229-316. 
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of both management and labour may be increased. The effect of t h i s i s to 
suggest ways i n which potential c o n f l i c t s of interest are moderated by 
the mutual interest management and labour share i n increasing the t o t a l 
amounts of power and income i n t h e i r organisations. As Lamraer puts i t : 
"For one thing, a rapidly expanding econoniy seems both i n the United 
States and i n western Europe to have been such a precondition f o r 
labour and management to discover t h e i r j o i n t power. Perhaps, i n 
general, a high rate of social change i n society at large may foster 
organisational parties' awareness of the fact that j o i n t e f f o r t s 
(23) 
prove beneficial to a l l " . 
Certainly one may point to the emergence of plant "productivity-
bargaining" schemes as possible examples of the means by which j o i n t power 
might be extended. Such forms of bargaining not only secure the readier 
acceptance by workers of the need f o r change, but by raising the level of 
involvement of workers i n the policies of the f i r m , tend to produce a more 
responsible and a more e f f i c i e n t management. More responsible i n the sense 
that productivity bargaining can involve the extension of b i l a t e r a l 
rulemaking by management and labour to new areas; more e f f i c i e n t i n that 
both parties benefit by the changes i n practice and by. the increased 
productivity. Some writers believe that productivity bargaining may well 
constitute an addition to the forces reducing authoritarian management 
(24) 
and promoting the growth of i n d u s t r i a l democracy.^ ' 
With these q u a l i f i c a t i o n s i n mind, i t remains the case that the 
dominant perspectives of c o n f l i c t theory assume a p r i o r i the i n d u s t r i a l 
enterprise as a c o n f l i c t s i t u a t i o n i n which compromise v i a a process of 
bargaining may be achieved. Frequently such an argument i s levelled 
(23) C.J. Lammers op.cit. 
(24) See f o r example N. Ross "Workshop Bargaining: a new approach" Fabian 
Tract 366, 1966 and N. Stettner "Productivity Bargaining and 
I n d u s t r i a l Change". Pergamon Press, I969 , especially ch.8, 
pp.147-166. 
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against the goal-consensus models of the normative functionalists: models 
which assume either the primacy of an organisation's orientation to the 
(25) 
attainment of a specific goal^ ' or which define organisations as 
co-operative systems or adaptive social structures, made up of interacting 
individuals and groups.^^^^ 
Such explanations, which.'.subordinate the ends pursued by actors i n a 
social system to the overall goals of the system, and which seek to 
demonstrate that the goals of the organisation are l o g i c a l l y d i s t i n c t 
from the goals of any one group, are t y p i c a l l y rejected by the c o n f l i c t 
t h e o r i s t . Rex, f o r example, argues that the process of social interaction 
can be analysed i n terms of three categories. The f i r s t category describes 
a stable pattern of interaction. Here there i s an awareness by actor A 
that B's behaviour i s conditioned by the same norms as apply to himself. 
The second defines an anomic pattern of interaction where norms are 
imperfectly understood, and where i n s t a b i l i t y occurs through ignorance. 
The f i n a l category describes a c o n f l i c t i n g pattern of interaction where A 
violates the expectations of B, and where the possession of power by one 
actor i s directed towards the compliance of the other. Such conflict-; • 
situations arise i n the resolution of two central problems: the problem 
of economic order and the problem of p o l i t i c a l order. Thus societies are 
faced with the problem of both the allocation of scarce resources and 
property, and with l e g i t i m i s i n g the use of power i n support of certain 
actions. For Rex, the process of interaction i s more l i k e l y to create 
c o n f l i c t than value consensus. He writes: 
" I f there i s a c o n f l i c t of ends the behaviour of actors towards one 
another may not be determined by shared norms but by the success 
which each has i n compelling the other to act i n accordance with his 
(25) T. Parsons "Suggestions f o r a Sociological Approach to the Theory of 
Organisations" op.cit. 
(26) P. Selznick "Foundations of the Theory of Organisation" American 
Sociological Review Vol.13, Feb.1948, pp.23-25-
- 23 -
own interests. Power then becomes a crucial variable i n the study 
(27) 
of social ^sterns." ^ ' 
Given the p o s s i b i l i t y that societies are ordered and changed not only i n 
terms of c o n f l i c t s over means, but also i n terms of c o n f l i c t s over ends. 
Rex asserts that only a c o n f l i c t model i s capable of adequately explaining 
the r e a l i t y of society where, ultimately, the persistence of the normative 
system indicates an underlying persistence of c o n f l i c t i n g interests. 
The same insistence on the ubiquity of c o n f l i c t i s found i n the work 
of Dahrendorf whose c o n f l i c t model implies the t o t a l rejection of the 
f u n c t i o n a l i s t approach. For Dahrendorf, social change i s explained by 
the existence of c o n f l i c t between groups. Society i t s e l f i s organised 
solely on the basis of coercion, so that unity and coherence i s the result 
of constraint. The notion of value consensus i s impossible because 
social classes exist because of the domination of one group and the subjugation 
of another. The effect of cohesion i s to i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e class c o n f l i c t 
(28) 
i n t o group c o n f l i c t w i t h i n the i n d u s t r i a l relations system.^ ' 
Reduced to i t s amplest terms, then, the c o n f l i c t model rests upon 
the assumption that unity and coherence i n social systems is based upon 
the existence of constraint and coercion. This approach may be c r i t i c i s e d 
(29) 
as an over-simplification. Indeed, as Cohen^ suggests, the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of developing models which contain some of the predominant characteristics 
of the "integration" or "consensus" model on the one hand and some of those 
of the " c o n f l i c t " model seems to have been neglected by such writers as 
Dahrendorf, Rex and Lockwood. For: 
(27) J. Rex "Key Problems i n Sociological Theory". Routledge 1961 p . l l 2 
On t h i s point, see also Di Lockwood "Some Remarks on the Social 
System" B r i t i s h Journal of Sociology Vol.7, No.2, 1956. 
(28) R. Dahrendorf op.cit, 
(29) P.S. Cohen "Modem Social Theory" Heinemann 1968 pp. I66-172. 
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"Consensus does not necessarily mean persistence as opposed to change: 
there may be consensus on the direction and forms of change; while 
a lack of consensus, or a maxked expression of sectional interests 
may produce an impasse which i n h i b i t s planned change. Similarly a 
recognition of legitimate authority does not necessarily mean a lack 
of change; while the use of coercive authority may i n h i b i t or slow 
down the process of change. Conflict may be compatible with 
functional integration; and s o l i d a r i t y may be compatible with 
mal integration " ( - ^ ^ ^ 
What seems to be required, i f Cohen's argument i s to be accepted, i s 
a model which demonstrates the simultaneous existence of c o n f l i c t i n g and 
common interests, and an approach which combines both the processes of 
integra t i o n and d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , and the elements of co-operation, c o n f l i c t 
and consensus within the same explanatory frame of reference. As Mouzelis 
puts i t : 
"Of course these two ways of looking at organisations are neither 
contradictory nor clearly d i s t i n c t i n actual writings. I f f o r 
expository reasons we have contrasted Parson's highly abstract and 
harmonious image of the organisation with Dalton's more concrete and 
co n f l i c t - s t r i c k e n one, i t i s obvious that these two views refer to 
complementary aspects of aji organisation I t i s also evident that 
a general theory which could account equally well f o r both the 
integrative and the c o n f l i c t aspect of social systems i s one of the 
major requirements i n the study of organisations and of sociology i n 
general. "^ •^'"^  
(30) I b i d . p.171. 
(31) N. Mouzelis op.cit. p.l64. 
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The view taken here i s that neither the consensus nor the c o n f l i c t model 
alone adequately describes the r e a l i t y of social l i f e , f o r the characteristics 
which they seperately define are not mutually exclusive, but may coexist 
i n tension w i t h i n the same social system. Whilst i t i s true that the 
history of c o n f l i c t and consensus theory has been a dialogue between 
exclusive frames of reference seeking to. explain the same phenomenon -
human co-operation, i t has been the extreme situations of t o t a l harmony 
and t o t a l c o n f l i c t which have been most illuminated i n the l i t e r a t u r e . The 
s i t u a t i o n which we would regard as more ty p i c a l and which occupies a mid-
point between these two extremes has received less attention: t h i s i s the 
necessary process of co-operation between management and labour i n i n d u s t r i a l 
organisations. 
The kind of model required therefore i s one which defines the nature 
of systems, and social integration and d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n i n organisations. 
We have already suggested that, at the f i r s t level of systems integration, 
functional explanations of "open" systems analysis require amplification 
along the lines suggested by the concept of "functional autonomy" as the 
basis f o r any discussion of systems integration. At the complementary 
level of analysis of social.integration w i t h i n such systems we argue that 
a theory of co-operation i s required to integrate functionalist and c o n f l i c t 
perspectives of social behaviour i n i n d u s t r i a l organisations. What are 
the dimensions of such a theory? 
One approach to conceptualising the nature of co-operation as the 
characteristic process of management-union relationships i s by examining 
the inte r r e l a t i o n s h i p between power and the performance of functions i n 
i n d u s t r i a l organisations, where: 
"The action counterpart of functional interdependence i s the power 
relationship between people or groups caught up i n some system of 
(32) 
interdependence." 
(32) R. Dubin "Power and Union-Management Relations" Administrative Science 
Quarterly Vol.2 June 1957 PP. 6O-8I. 
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Power relations develop, as Dubin indicates, over the performance of 
functions, so that c o n f l i c t i s a characteristic feature of power relations. 
The actors involved i n the performance of functions recognise t h e i r 
interdependence, but need not agree upon i t s nature; therefore the control 
of functions establishing interdependence does not rest upon consensus 
between the parties concerned, but upon the outcomes of a bargaining process 
and compromise r e f l e c t i n g the r e l a t i v e power positions of these parties. 
Thus whilst the determination of functions i s inherently c o n f l i c t f u l 
and involves a power contest, t h i s process inevitably involves the 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s a t i o n of power relations between management and labour. For: 
"As each power contest i s resolved, the resultant agreement is.a form 
of consensus between the parties. Thus lack of consensus leading to 
c o n f l i c t i s converted i n t o specific consensus on given issues by the 
agreements reached through collective bargaining."^'^^^ 
I n t h i s sense co-operation i s s o l i d a r i s t i c i n that the collective bargaining 
system provides an integrating framework f o r the accommodation of c o n f l i c t i n g 
i n t e r e s t s . At the same time we can point i n other ways to the p l u r a l i s t i c 
nature of co-operation i n i n d u s t r i a l organisations by the fact that 
c o l l e c t i v e bargaining, as the i n s t i t u t i o n a l manifestation of a social system 
whose parts possess some degree of autonomy, depends f o r i t s existence 
upon the maintenance of differences of interests. 
Moreover, Dubin points out a mode of analysing the changing aspects of 
co-operation when he suggests that the i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s a t i o n of power 
relationships implies the standardisation of increasing areas of the 
employment relationship so that these areas become mutually defined by the 
parties concerned. But t h i s process i s unlikely to end i n consensus. He 
sees a d i a l e c t i c a l process at work whereby: 
(33) R. Dubin op.cit. p.62. 
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"At the same time that i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s a t i o n i s taking place new 
areas of c o n f l i c t are opening up From t h i s standpoint i t then 
•becomes clear that every union-management relationship i s always 
characterised by the simultaneous presence of c o n f l i c t and cooperation. 
Where emphasis i s placed upon the i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s a t i o n of the 
relationship, cooperation tends to overbalance the elements of c o n f l i c t . 
Where new issues are opening up i n collective bargaining, the elements 
of c o n f l i c t predominate. "^ "^ ^^  
Dubin's i l l u s t r a t i o n of the interrelationship between power and 
functional relations suggests an i n i t i a l premise of a theory of cooperation: 
that the i n t e r a c t i o n between employers and employees i s programmed on the 
basis that both parties share a common interest i n the survival of the 
organisation, and that " i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d cooperation" - cooperation i n 
terms of j o i n t l y defined rules - exists to permit the r e a l i s a t i o n of common 
interests and to resolve, al b e i t temporarily, issues arisin g from c o n f l i c t i n g 
i n t e r e s t s . ^"^ -^^  I n t h i s sense the enterprise i s held to encompass relations 
between employers and employees characterised by both c o n f l i c t i n g and common 
interests. Cooperation may re s u l t , therefore, either from the sit u a t i o n 
where employers and employees pursue divergent goals but compromise by making 
mutual adjustments t o obtain the best possible exiihange of contributions 
w i t h i n the constraints imposed by the other party; or from the situation 
(34) I b i d . p.80. 
(35) On t h i s point, see E. Rhenman "In d u s t r i a l Democracgr and In d u s t r i a l 
Management" Tavistock, I968 p.36. Rhenman's theory of co n f l i c t 
i s based upon the b e l i e f that: "situations characterised purely by 
c o n f l i c t very rarely occurs. Much more usual i s some kind of 
combination of c o n f l i c t and a need to cooperate: one party's 
chances of achieving his goals depend partly on the a b i l i t y to win 
over his opponent and pa r t l y on the a b i l i t y to cooperate with him". 
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where employers and employees shaxe the same interests and define a common 
strategy to a t t a i n similar goals. This last p o s s i b i l i t y , however, would 
allow f o r the contingency that i n the pursuit of a common goal, employers 
and employees may c o n f l i c t over the means used to achieve t h i s end, i n 
which case some form of accommodation w i l l he sought within the constraints 
imposed hy the power available to each party and "by the constraints imposed 
upon both parties by the environmental context of the enterprise. Given 
t h i s premise, i t follows that the analysis of union-management relations, 
or employer-employee relations, should be concerned with the investigation 
of both t h e i r unifying and di v e r s i f y i n g ingredients rather than with t h e i r 
characterisation i n terms of such polar concepts as c o n f l i c t or consensus. 
Moreover, the investigation of the balance of interests between 
employers and employed w i l l have regard both to the structural and to the 
normative conditions which permit cooperation to exist i n situations which 
t y p i c a l l y produce areas of agreement and disagreement between these groups. 
I n t h i s sense the pattern of cooperation w i l l be both a function of imperative 
conditions imposed by the s i t u a t i o n i n which behaviour takes place and by 
the normative conditions Jo i n t l y determined by reference to the respective 
power positions of both groups. 
A t h i r d premise of a theory of cooperation would refer to the r e l a t i o n -
ship between the d i s t r i b u t i o n of power and the mode of cooperation i n 
i n d u s t r i a l enterprises, recognising':that the style of cooperation varies 
with the pattern of power d i s t r i b u t i o n between the two groups. Consequently 
i n d u s t r i a l organisations which are t y p i f i e d by wide disparities i n power 
between employers and employed w i l l d i f f e r i n t h e i r modes of cooperation 
from organisations where the dis p a r i t y of power i s r e l a t i v e l y low. I n the 
l a t t e r the mode of cooperation governing the organisation of jobs, work and 
rewards i s seen as a process, and apparently an expanding process, of j o i n t 
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regulation and administration by the two groups. I n t h i s context the 
devolution of re s p o n s i b i l i t y to employees involved i n the process of 
j o i n t decision-making increases as the power disparity decreases, and 
i t s e l f accelerates the apparent movement towards an equalisation of power. 
Subsequently i t can be argued that i n i n d u s t r i a l organisations where 
the j o i n t power of the two groups i s either neutralised or j o i n t l y 
expanding, the character of co l l e c t i v e bargaining as the central process 
of cooperation w i l l change. Further, the factors making f o r a 
r e d i s t r i b u t i o n of power may be external to the organisation. Chamberlain 
has noted that under conditions of rapid i n d u s t r i a l change: 
".....the new corporate emphasis on maneuvaribility i s fundamentally 
incompatible with the union's emphasis on maintaining work practices, 
customs and job-rights." 
f o r : 
"by c o n f l i c t i n g with the company's a b i l i t y to adapt promptly and 
e f f e c t i v e l y to change, i t jeopardizes the p r o f i t a b i l i t y and even 
survival of the very i n s t i t u t i o n on which employees must r e l y f o r job 
income security." 
Subsequently: 
" I f t r a d i t i o n a l c o l l e c t i v e bargaining methods are inadecpiate i n the 
modern economy I f management wants f l e x i b i l i t y i n adapting to 
changes i n i t s plans i t must give the union a chance to be heard 
on a l l decisions a f f e c t i n g the interests of the workers on a 
continuing basis." 
and: 
" here i s where the jointness of the problem returns, the need 
f o r a new configuration to the union-management relationship: instead 
of a term contract, continuing j o i n t consultation and planning i n the 
f i e l d of manpower. Instead of a power stiniggle over rules and status 
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negotiation over the way i n which anticipated changes can be made 
to open up over new career opportunities."^"^^^ 
I t follows, f i n a l l y , that the fourth premise of a theory of 
cooperation, having defined the nature and modes of cooperation i n 
i n d u s t r i a l organisations, must be to predict the l i k e l y course of 
cooperation under conditions of change. I n t h i s context. Chamberlain's 
d e f i n i t i o n of the modern view of collective bargaining as an i n s t i t u t i o n 
not only f o r the regulation of labour markets but also f o r the regulation 
of labour management can be considered. Under conditions of economic 
expansion, f o r example, and under conditions of comparative labour 
scarcity, i t can be argued that these provide the preconditions f o r labour 
and management to discover a common interest i n generating t h e i r j o i n t 
power. And i t i s w i t h i n the ambit of what i s now termed "productivity 
bargaining" at plant level that a new locus of cooperation may be located. 
Here issues of labour u t i l i s a t i o n and deployment, issues of central 
i n t e r e s t to both groups, become negotiable i n ways which permit work groups 
to haye a direct involvement i n the regulation of t h e i r work and by: 
"so modifying work rules and organisation that the divergent work 
interests of the various groups involved, including management, are 
(37) 
reconciled at a higher level of practical cooperation than before." 
(36) N. W. Chamberlain "Unions and the Managerial Process" i n C. R. Walker 
"Technology, Industry and Man" McGraw-Hill, I968, pp.260-274-
(37) A. Pox "Labour U t i l i s a t i o n and I n d u s t r i a l Relations" i n D. Pym ed. 
" I n d u s t r i a l Society: Social <Sciences i n Management" pp. 4 I - 6 4 
see especially p.58. 
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The development of a theory of cooperation, therefore, seems 
appropriate as the basis of a more balanced approach to.the analysis of 
social integration. I t takes issue with those perspectives which 
characterise employment purely as a c o n f l i c t s i t u a t i o n where cooperation 
i s occasionally achieved, or as an organic s i t u a t i o n which occasionally 
becomes disrupted. I t emphasises the process of accommodation as the 
t y p i c a l process of int e r a c t i o n i n any complex social system characterised 
by the requirement f o r interdependency among parts possessing also some 
degree of functional autonomy, and by the requirement f o r some degree of 
normative consensus among i t s i n t e r a c t i n g groups who nevertheless 
i n t e r r e l a t e upon the basis of opposed interests. The conditions under 
which groups cooperate and the conditions which produce changes i n the 
pattern of cooperation over time,are, therefore, the central problems of 
the theory. 
( i i ) , , Social Action Theory 
We may now return to the main discussion of the three major theoretical 
approaches concerned with the integration of social action within i n d u s t r i a l 
organisations. So f a r t h i s discussion has concerned i t s e l f with the 
perspectives of "consensus" and " c o n f l i c t " theories, and i n the case of 
the l a t t e r we have suggested that a theory of cooperation m i ^ t provide 
the basis f o r a more balanced view of the nature of social integration i n 
i n d u s t r i a l enterprises. There i s , however, a t h i r d theoretical perspective 
to be considered: the action frame of reference. 
Derived from the work of Max Weber, i t i s an approach which: 
"attempts the in t e r p r e t i v e understanding of social action i n order 
thereby to arrive at a causal explanation of i t s course and effects. 
I n "action" i s included a l l human behaviour when and i n so.far as 
the acting individual attaches a subjective meaning to i t . " 
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but: 
"Action i s social i n so f a r as, by v i r t u e of the subjective meaning 
attached to i t by the acting individual (or individuals), i t takes 
account of the behaviour of others and i s thereby oriented i n i t s 
course." ' 
I n i t s application to I n d u s t r i a l Sociology, f o r example, Goldthorpe 
claims that i n d u s t r i a l research should commence at the level where: 
" actors' own d e f i n i t i o n s of the situations i n which they are 
engaged are taken as an i n i t i a l basis f o r the explanation of t h e i r 
social behaviour and relationships. I n contrast with approaches 
which begin with some general and normative psychology (or philosophy) 
of individual needs i n work, or with some conception of the "needs" of 
the e f f i c i e n t l y operating enterprise, an action frame of reference 
would direct attention systematically to the variety of meanings which 
(39) 
work may come to have f o r i n d u s t r i a l employees." 
I n t h i s sense the value of the approach i s held to be defined by i t s a b i l i t y 
t o indicate the sources of variations i n patterns of i n d u s t r i a l behaviour 
despite s i m i l a r i t i e s i n the socio-technical system of the workplace. As 
such, the action frame of reference i s invoked as a reaction to the 
determinism of the "technological implications" approach i n Industrial-
Sociology which assumes an association between technological and organisational 
processes and thereby a causal relationship between the constraints of work 
roles and the behaviour of individuals. 
I n wider context, social action analysis has been advocated by 
Silverman as an alternative to currently fashionable theories of organisation 
derived from Structural-Functional and Human Relations theory. For 
Silverman the emergence of the study of "Formal Organisations" i n recent 
(38) M. Weber "The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation" Ed. Talcott 
. Parsons: Free Press 1964i p.88. 
(39) J.H. Gtoldthorpe "The Affluent Worker: In d u s t r i a l Attitudes and Behaviour" 
Cambridge I968 , p .184. 
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years has been handicapped by the i m p l i c i t bias of functionalism to emphasise 
a type of sociological explanation which shows how social actions not only 
result from certain str u c t u r a l conditions, but how they contribute to t h e i r 
maintenance and, p a r t i c u l a r l y , to the s o l i d a r i t y of the social group as a 
whole. ^ ^^ ^ Typically as we saw ea r l i e r such structural-functional 
explajiations require the conceptualisation of the organisation as a system, 
and frequently u t i l i s e the organic analogy f o r purposes of i l l u s t r a t i n g the 
structure and processes of social organisation. Here organisations are 
defined as open systems engaged i n processes of energy exchange with, and 
through, an external environment. The relationship between the external 
and i n t e r n a l references of the organisation i s normally considered i n terms 
of "goals" inputed to the organisation (or "needs", or "imperatives"), so 
that analysis focusess upon both the transactions with the environment which 
function to maintain the system i n a "steady state" and upon the changes i n 
the i n t e r n a l structure of the system which may be necessary to maintain i t 
i n a constant relationship with i t s environment. I n these ways the 
effectiveness and adaptiveness of the system i s evaluated by i t s appropriate-
ness f o r the ends which are imputed to the system. I t i s within t h i s 
context that judgements of f u n c t i o n a l i t y are made concerning the integration 
of system elements and t h e i r u t i l i t y ; i r i - subserving the ends of the system. 
Various c r i t i c i s n s have been raised against t h i s kind of sociological 
explanation. The f i r s t concerns the ideological basis of much theorisation 
which i s based upon the use of a systems approach. The imputation of ends 
and needs a p r i o r i to organisations, and t h e i r consequent r e i f i c a t i o n , leads 
to the unwarranted assumption of a harmonious arrangement of parts of the 
system to ensure that such ends and needs are effe c t i v e l y met. Whilst some 
systems theorists emphasise the differences which exist between biological 
(40) D. Silverman op.cit. 
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and social systems, others t y p i f y organisational functioning as an impersonal 
process and impute to the enterprise a u n i f i e d set of gosils which are 
somehow established and maintained over and above the objectives of i t s 
members. For example, Selznick argues that: 
"Organisational behaviour must be analysed i n terms of organisational 
response to organisational need: needs are exjjerienced and a response 
maAe to them by the system i t s e l f - the organic character of the 
formal organisation must be recognised - organisations reach decisions, 
take action and make adjustments."^^•'•^ 
Where the problem of individual motivation i s raised, i t i s resolved i n ways 
which recognise the adaptiveness of human actionto the requirements of the 
social system i n which i t i s located. 
Thus, f o r example, withi n the context of funct i o n a l i s t theory, i t was 
l e f t f o r the normative f u n c t i o n a l i s t s , such as Parsons, to recognise that 
the consequences of functions cannot be adaptive without reference to some 
concept of motivation. For Parsons such a concept i s necessary to explain 
the motives of individuals i n terms of the requirements of social systems, 
by emphasising the ways i n which the aims of individuals a r t i c u l a t e with the 
norms of society. I n t h i s approach the maintenance of order depends upon 
the compatability of social actions w i t h i n the existing normative standards 
of society. But whilst recognising the necessity of introducing value into 
sociological explanation, and the d i s t i n c t i v e role of Sociology as a discipline 
to make the function of values i n social l i f e e x p l i c i t . Parsons takes as his 
paradigm case a society with consensus of commitment to existing social values, 
ajid gives undue emphasis i n his analysis to the determinants of social order 
and predicable patterns of behaviour. To the extent that he gives primary 
emphasis to the role of values as integrative elements i n systems functioning, 
(41) P. Selznick "T7A and the Grass Roots" Berkeley California U.P. 1949 
p. 259 
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the qniestion of how such values are maintained i n existence through the 
exercise of power and coercion by dominant groups i s ignored. 
I t i s i n these ways, therefore, that the func t i o n a l i s t concern with 
the treatment of organisations as goal-oriented systems, i n which the ends 
of the system have primacy over the ends of • individuals and groups, has 
been c r i t i c i s e d by social action theorists.- The fact that organisations 
exist with stable structures i n spite of recurrent c o n f l i c t over the 
nature of t h e i r goals i s ignored; the fact that stable patterns of social 
i n t e r a c t i o n can exist between groups who do not share agreement upon what 
constitutes a common goal i s not anticipated. I t i s to avoid the danger 
of r e i f i c a t i o n i m p l i c i t i n t h i s approach that the use of the action frame 
of reference has been advocated. I n t h i s respect the perspectives of 
c o n f l i c t and social action theories are very similar. 
The dimensions of the approach may be summeirised b r i e f l y . I n contrast 
to the organic model described above, the social action approach seeks to 
define organisational systems as r e l a t i v e to rparticular balances of interests 
pursued by individual or groups of participants, so that: 
" cooperation of these various parties i n pursuit of an enterprise's 
o f f i c i a l goals or "primary task" i s conditional upon t h i s arrangement 
s a t i s f y i n g t h e i r purposes bettfer than any available alternative. I n 
other words the permanent unity of constituent parts can by no means 
(42) 
be taken f o r granted." 
I n t h i s sense analysis commences at the level of human motivations and 
describes the state of an organisational system at any moment i n time simply 
as the resultant of the ends pursued by diff e r e n t groups. Subsequently 
analysis focuses upon the independent conseciuences of the orientations to 
work of these groups, and the struc t u r a l sources of these orientations 
(42) J. Child "The Business Enterprise i n Modern Indu s t r i a l Society" 
C o l l i e r Macmillan I969, p.30. ' 
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outside the organisation. Here the goals held by di f f e r e n t groups or 
individuals are i d e n t i f i e d and the sources of these goals which structure 
the d e f i n i t i o n s held of work are i d e n t i f i e d by reference to the social 
characteristics of the actor(s) concerned. Analysis i s then directed 
towards explaining the choice and efficacy of means selected by actors to 
achieve t h e i r objectives i n the l i g h t of t h e i r knowledge of the si t u a t i o n 
and w i t h i n the constraining or f a c i l i t a t i n g contexts of both t h e i r work 
and non-work milieux. 
I n general, the approach involves a r e d e f i n i t i o n of the concept of 
social r o l e . At one level of analysis i t i s assumed that social 
i n t e r a c t i o n may generate c o n f l i c t i n g as well as shared expectations 
between actors; at another level i t emphasises the importance of 
considering the actor's self-concept of his role as an element of analysis. 
Analysis i s thus directed i n the f i r s t instance towards the goals which 
individuals say they pursue, and the extent t o which these goals are 
compatible with those of other groups; i n the second instance, analysis i s 
directed towards an assessment of how much of the self-concept gets througji 
i n t o actual behaviour and how much i s blocked or changed by the constraints 
of the structures which surround him.^^^^ I n t h i s formulation, "role" i s 
seen to be the outcome of two variables; the actor's self-concept of (or 
orienta t i o n to) the role and the situational demands which "tone-down" the 
self-concept. 
Thus the action frame of reference has been u t i l i s e d i n i n d u s t r i a l 
research f o r a variety of purposes. F i r s t , as a crit i q u e of those theorists 
who have followed the "technological implications" approach by assuming a 
causal relationship between technology, organisation and the behaviour of 
(43) For aji account of t h i s approach to the elements of role theory, see 
P.G. Hollowell "The Lorry Driver" Routledge, I968. 
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employees - by assuming behaviour to be entir e l y role determined. 
Goldthorpe writes: 
" l i t t l e account has been taken of the orientations of workers 
towards t h e i r work or of their, own definitions of work situations: 
or i f these factors have been discussed then they have, f o r the most 
part, been treated as dependent variables - that i s , as being shaped 
or conditioned by aspects of the work si t u a t i o n objectively 
(44) 
considered." 
I t has been u t i l i s e d , secondly, to shed l i g h t upon the relationship between 
actor and his social environment, with particular reference to the consider-
ation of non-work factors i n explaining work behaviour. Thus Lockwood 
and Goldthorpe introduce the notion of the "privatised" worker to define 
an apparent movement towards the less class-conscious and more s e l f -
conscious employee. This process of the individualisation of the needs 
of workers i s accounted f o r p r i n c i p a l l y by reference to the increasing 
opportunities which exist outside the workplace f o r meaningful social 
experiences, and to changes i n l i f e chances and styles induced by the.V 
decline of s o l i d a r i s t i c and t r a d i t i o n a l working class residential 
communities. I n t h i s sense the process of "pri v a t i s a t i o n " , a style of 
l i f e based upon family-centredness, conspicuous consumption and an 
evaluation of self i n terms of impersonal pecuniary crUjeria i s seen to 
operate most f o r c i b l y i n d i s t i n c t i v e community settings and with 
s u f f i c i e n t strength to structure a highly instrumental and calculative 
o r i e n t a t i o n to work.^^^^ 
(44) J« Goldthorpe "Orientation to work and i n d u s t r i a l behaviour among 
assembly l i n e operatives" Unpublished paper, 1965* 
(45) Lockwood "Sources of Variation i n Working Class Images of Society". 
Sociological Review V0I . I 4 , 1966, pp.249-267. 
- 38 -
I t has been u t i l i s e d , t h i r d l y , to define the implications of 
d i s t i n c t i v e orientations to work f o r the problem of control i n i n d u s t r i a l 
organisations. Thus Gunnison's investigation of a group of garment 
workers indicated that the quality of "m i l i t a n t individualism" which 
characterised t h e i r behaviour could be explained by reference to both 
work and non-work (community) variables; the particular pattern of control 
found i n the shop, moreover, which involved an acceptance of managerial 
authority .to define rules governing job and wcjrrk, was explained by 
reference to the fact t h a t : 
"workers, managers and employers were connected by common membership 
i n a number of di f f e r e n t systems of social relations which were 
localised i n the same area the systems overlapped so that persons 
were related to one another i n a number of different a c t i v i t i e s and 
interests other than work."^^^^ 
Goldthorpe places a similar emphasis upon the relevance of non-work roles 
to actors', performance of work roles, and to the manner i n which \ 
orientations to work appear to delineate acceptable methods of control of 
job and work. The "instrumental" orientation of the Luton car assembly 
worker, f o r example, was associated with a willingness to legitimise 
management's planning and c o n t r o l l i n g functions i n exchange f o r a h i ^ and 
(47) 
sustained economic pay-off.^ 
Other writers make specific reference to t h i s association. Ingham, 
f o r example, refers to the r e l a t i v e homogeneity of a labour force resulting 
from individual choices of employment i n organisations of varying size, 
o f f e r i n g d i s t i n c t i v e rewards by v i r t u e of t h e i r size and structure. 
Following Etzioni^^^^, and u t i l i s i n g his theory of compliance, Ingham finds 
(46) S. Gunnison "Wages and Work Allocation" Tavistock, I966 p.33 
(47) J. Goldthorpe op.cit., I968. 
(48) A. Etzioni "The Comparative Analysis of Complex Organisations" 
Collier-Macmillan (Free Press), 196I. 
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that the degree of congruence i n the compliance structure of the enterprise 
i s a function both of organisational size and individual orientation to 
work where the effectiveness of the compliance structure i s measured by 
(49) 
the l e v e l of individual attachment to the enterprise. Stinchcombe 
has noted also that c r a f t workers- develop expectations f o r greater control 
over work and independence from management. Such expectations, acquired 
during the period of soc i a l i z a t i o n into the occupation, imply a high degree 
of involvement i n work, and, through the union, the demand to exercise 
(50) 
considerable control over the workplace . Cannon comments upon the 
instance of the cr a f t compositor i n t h i s context. Here the occupational 
ideology of the c r a f t informs the individual orientation of the compositor, 
inducing conformity and sustaining the allegiance to radical working class 
values; i n t h i s sense the forces maintaining the social consciousness 
of the individual euLso function to maintain a d i s t i n c t i v e system o"f job 
and work control where the scope f o r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n workplace decision-
making i s higher than i n many other i n d u s t r i a l situations. ^ '^''^  
I n general terms, therefore, the social action framework i s advocated 
by those who seek to counter what they see as the deficiencies of recent:', 
systems theory - the conceptualisation of the organisation as a goaJ. 
specific system, and the analysis of work roles purely i n terms of the 
exigencies of the work si t u a t i o n . I t follows from the description of 
the framework above that organisational structures are not here defined i n 
terms of t h e i r relations with specific organisational goals, as the 
embodiments of an organisational purpose. Rules i n an organisation may 
(49) Cr« Ingham "Organisational Size, Orientation to Work and Indu s t r i a l 
Behaviour" Sociology, Vol. No.3, 1967. pp.239-258. 
(50) A. Stinchcombe "Bureaucratic and Craft Administration of Production" 
Administrative Science Quarterly Vol.4, 1959» PP.I68-87. 
(51) I . e . Cannon "Ideology and Occupational Community , a study of 
compositors." Sociology Vol . 1 , No.l, 1967» pp.165-85. 
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subserve other requirements than the implementation of a "goal". 
Regulations' may derive not from the expression of any organisational 
purpose, but from the intervention of outside bodies, which, i n some cases, 
might be interpreted as constraints upon the implementation of that 
(52) 
purpose. Albrow expresses the sit u a t i o n clearly when he writes: 
"Certainly there i s no need to view formal rules and authority as 
determined by t h e i r r e l a t i o n to a specific goal. After a l l , 
formalised rules eind authority may develop i n a society and there i s 
no need to refer to an over-riding purpose to explain them. Usually 
sociologists attempt to explain such structues by reference to the 
demsinds of competing groups. There i s no rieason to think that 
organisational structure may not be interpreted i n the same way."^^^^ 
I t i s i n t h i s sense that organisations are p l u r a l i s t and conditional, and 
the organisational system i n t h i s context nothing more than: 
" the present outcomes of the ends sought by different groups and 
the actions which they have sought to pursue i n the l i g h t of the 
(54) 
means available to them."^ ' 
And i f organisation i s nothing more than the product of human ends, the 
primary problem of the social action theorist must be to explain how the 
existing structure of the system f a c i l i t a t e s or constrains the achievement 
of these ends, and how organisational systems change i n response to the 
various pressures which groups of stakeholders i n the enterprise bring 
to bear upon each other i n the pursuit of t h e i r own purposes. 
(52) See M. Albrow "The Study of Organisations - Objectivity or Bias?" 
Penguin Social Sciences Survey, I968, pp.146-167. See p.156. 
(53) Ibidpa'58. 
(54) D. Silverman op.cit.p,234. 
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To the extent that action theorists emphasise the importance of actors' 
orientations to the work si t u a t i o n , the approach i s generally seen .then as 
providing a necessary corrective to the goal-oriented conceptualisations of . 
organisations which we have described. I t s relevance f o r such considerations 
as open systems analysis i s apparant: i n t h i s context i t provides an 
important supplement to f u n c t i o n a l i s t , and, i n particular, socio-technical 
systems approaches wherein attitudes and behaviour are largely role 
determined and where technology i s held to determine the nature of work roles 
w i t h i n certain l i m i t s . 
I t i s unfortunate, therefore, that i n the development of the social 
action frame of reference w i t h i n I n d u s t r i a l Sociology, i t s advocates should 
have raised the concept of orientation to work i n such ways as to suggest 
that the subjective experience of work situations was exclusively derived 
from s t r u c t u r a l constraints operating outside the workplace, thus minimising 
the p o s s i b i l i t y that features of the work si t u a t i o n might generate pressures 
independently upon actors - to f a c i l i t a t e or to prevent the r e a l i s a t i o n of 
t h e i r objectives. This c r i t i c i s m has been sustained, f o r example, by 
Brown and Brannen i n t h e i r study of forces making f o r homogeneity and 
d i v e r s i t y among shipbuilding workers. Here i t was shown that whilst the 
work s i t u a t i o n of Tyneside shipyard workers contained such unifying features 
as the manufacture of a common product and shaxed employment experiences 
which, broadly, operatedto reinforce the predominantly s o l i d a r i s t i c 
o r i e n t a t i o n to work derived from membership of a working-class community, 
i t also contained d i v e r s i f y i n g features, such as the occupational and wages 
structure, which functioned^ produce and maintain c o n f l i c t between the groups 
concerned. The important point to emerge from t h i s investigation was that 
orientations to work may themselves be modified by the d i a t i n c t i v e 
organisation of, i n t h i s case, a predominantly craft-based industry. I n 
t h i s way a mucJi f u l l e r account of the nature of workplace and community 
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i n t e r a c t i o n was obtained by the selection of an approach which emphasised 
the factors making f o r homogeneity and diversity between them.^^^^ A 
more overt c r i t i c i s m of the approach, however, has been formulated by 
Daniel who argues that a major weakness l i e s i n the use of the concept of 
orienta t i o n to explain not only occupational choice but also: 
"sources of g r a t i f i c a t i o n and deprivation i n work, responses to different 
styles of supervision, relationships with other members of work groups 
determinsints of performance, and evaluations of the employer, a l l t h i s 
i n spite of strong evidence to the effect that the factors that 
a t t r a c t a person to a job are very di f f e r e n t from those that determine 
his satisfactions, performance and behaviour on the job. These i n 
t u r n are often very d i f f e r e n t from those that predispose him to leave 
the job Yet the type of measurement, development ajid application 
of orientation to work just described, completely ignores t h i s and 
b l i t h e l y generalises factors derived from job choice and attachment, 
projecting them onto the work situation."^^^^ 
Brown, Brannen and Daniel appear to reach similar conclusions from 
t h e i r respective studies of shipbuilders and o i l refinery operators i n the 
claim that orientation to work i s an i n s u f f i c i e n t variable, used 
exclusively, t o explain satisfactions and behaviour i n the work situation. 
For the f i r s t two writers i t was necessary to show how aspects of the 
occupational and wages stinicture induced inter-group c o n f l i c t i n such areas 
(55) R.K. Brown and P. Brannen "Social Relations and Social Perspectives 
Amongst Shipbuilding workers - A Preliminary Statement" Part I and 
Part I I , Sociology Vol.4 No.l, January 1970, pp.71-84 and Sociology 
Vol.4 No.2, May 1970, pp.197-211. 
(56) W.W. Daniel " I n d u s t r i a l Behaviour and Orientation to Work - A Critique" 
Journal of Management Studies Vol .6 No.3 October I969 pp.366-375» 
see p.367. 
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as demarcation •between spheres of compe'tence, a phenomenon d i f f i c u l t t o 
r e c o n c i l e w i t h the predominantly s o l i d a r i s t i c o r i e n t a t i o n t o work of 
s h i p b u i l d e r s . For the l a s t w r i t e r t h e contention o f Goldthorpe et a l 
t h a t t h e car assembler's s a t i s f a c t o r y r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h h i s supervisor, 
(based upon the supervisor's non-interference i n the d i r e c t i o n of 
assembly-line operations) was the product of an instrumental o r i e n t a t i o n 
t o work i s r e j e c t e d i n favour of an a l t e r n a t i v e explanation i n terms of 
the existence of a t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y determined r o l e s t r u c t u r e i n t h i s 
i n d u s t r y . Thus the desire t o be " l e f t alone" may be j u s t as much the 
product of t h e technology of the i n d u s t r y as i t i s of f a c t o r s outside the 
workplace. Because the r o l e s t r u c t u r e o f t h i s p a r t i c u l a r i n d u s t r y i s 
f r e q u e n t l y judged t o peimit l i t t l e scope f o r d i s c r e t i o n and t o su s t a i n 
supervisory r e l a t i o n s h i p s which are fundamentally coercive, Danieii argues 
t h a t : 
" I n such a s i t u a t i o n , where the s t r u c t u r e of task and r o l e r e l a t i o n s h i p s 
make any j o b - r e l a t e d contact p u n i t i v e , he (the assembler) wants t o be 
l e f t alone."^^^^ 
What i s being confused here, according t o t h i s w r i t e r are f a c t o r s responsible 
f o r s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h a job, w i t h f a c t o r s responsible f o r s a t i s f a c t i o n i n a 
job: the former i s associated w i t h sources of attachment t o the job, the 
l a t t e r w i t h sources of o p p o r t u n i t i e s provided by the job f o r p o s i t i v e 
s a t i s f a c t i o n a t work through i n t r i n s i c i n t e r e s t . Whilst i t may be t r u e 
t h a t the actor's i n i t i a l attachment to the work s i t u a t i o n may be prompted 
by cues d e r i v i n g from the non-work s i t u a t i o n , job s a t i s f a c t i o n i t s e l f i s 
l a r g e l y a product of t h e s t r u c t u r e of the working environment: the task 
and c o n t r o l s t r u c t u r e of the or g a n i s a t i o n . Daniel found i n h i s own 
research t h a t : 
"...^ , . i t i s pay, s e c u r i t y and.physical working conditions t h a t a t t r a c t 
people t o the job. A l t e r n a t i v e l y i t i s the opportunity t o use 
(57) W.W. D a n i e l o p . c i t . p.372 
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mental a b i l i t y and experience i n problem r e s o l u t i o n and l e a r n i n g 
t h a t are the main sources of s a t i s f a c t i o n i n the job; while i t i s 
t h e l a c k of o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r advancement t h a t predisposes those few 
who are not f i r m l y attached t o t h e i r jobs t o leave." 
The general conclusion t o emerge from t h i s b r i e f discussion of s o c i a l 
a c t i o n theory i s t h a t w h i l s t an understanding of the actor's imagery of 
work i s c r u c i a l as a l e v e l o f analysis i n the i n v e s t i g a t i o n of s o c i a l 
i n t e g r a t i o n i n i n d u s t r i a l organisations, the a v a i l a b l e evidence suggests 
t h a t both work;i,;ahd; non=^wqrk"'. v a r i a b l e s operate t o s t r u c t u r e the nature 
of work experiences, and t h a t these probably operate independently of each 
other. Moreover the range of i n t e r n a l cues may vary i n each concrete 
(59) 
case. Thus the e f f e c t s of occupational s t r u c t u r e and wage d i f f erentials^-^^', 
occupational ideology^^^^ and workplace reference groups^^'''^ technology^^^^ 
and i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s systems^^"^^ have been i s o l a t e d by various studies 
as s i g n i f i c a n t i n f l u e n c e s upon behaviour i n the workplace. These 
considerations alone i n d i c a t e a need f o r a m u l t i v a r i a t e approach i n seeking 
t o e x p l a i n i n d u s t r i a l behaviour. 
U l t i m a t e l y , the p o i n t we wish t o e s t a b l i s h i s t h a t w h i l s t the analysis 
o f e x t e r n a l l y s t r u c t u r e d o r i e n t a t i o n s t o work may provide valuable evidence 
as t o why employees approach work s i t u a t i o n s i n d i s t i n c t i v e ways, i t 
remains the case t h a t the o r g a n i s a t i o n of work, and d i f f e r e n c e s between 
p l a n t s and i n d u s t r i e s i n t h i s respect, w i l l f r e q u e n t l y f u n c t i o n t o d i v e r s i f y 
groups w i t h s i m i l a r o r i e n t a t i o n s and even w i t h s i m i l a r s k i l l l e v e l s i n ways 
(58) W.W. Daniel o p . c i t . p.367 
(59) R'K. Brown and P. Brannen o p . c i t . 
(60) I . e . Cannon o p . c i t . 
(61) M.A. Smith "Process Technology and Powerlessness" B r i t i s h Journal of 
Sociology Vol .19 No.l March 1968 pp. 76-88. 
(62) W.W. Daniel o p . c i t . 
(63) H.A.L. Turner o p . c i t . 
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which permit the development of a p l u r a l i t y of s e l f - d e f i n i t i o n s and, i n 
consequence, diverse p a t t e r n s of behaviour. I n t h i s sense we should 
expect t o f i n d c o n t i n u i t i e s and d i s c o n t i n u i t i e s between work and nonwork 
in f l u e n c e s c o - e x i s t i n g w i t h i n the same workplace context and c o n d i t i o n i n g 
behaviour w i t h i n i t . Nevertheless the u t i l i t y of s o c i a l a c t i o n analysis 
i n the i n v e s t i g a t i o n of how p a r t i c i p a n t s define and construe t h e i r 
involvement i n s o c i a l systems, and the extent of t h e i r c o n t r o l over them, 
i s of obvious importance. The opportunity t o explore the nature of 
employees' s e l f - d e f i n i t i o n s o f work and the s t r u c t u r a l sources of these 
perspectives i n t h e i r s o c i a l environments form a c e n t r a l element of the 
analysis of s o c i a l i n t e g r a t i o n i n i n d u s t r i a l organisations and an ess e n t i a l 
p a r t of the theory of cooperation o u t l i n e d i n the previous section.' 
2. CONCLUSION 
At t h i s p o i n t we may conclude the chapter by b r i e f l y r e s t a t i n g our 
argument i n the context of the '.preceding discussion. The attempt has 
been made t o consider the adequacy of e x i s t i n g t h e o r e t i c a l approaches t o 
two key problems of c e n t r a l i n t e r e s t t o i n d u s t r i a l s o c i o l o g i s t s : the 
i n t e g r a t i o n of the p a r t s of organisations conceptualised as s o c i a l systems 
and the i n t e g r a t i o n of s o c i a l a c t i o n w i t h i n such o r g a n i s a t i o n a l systems. 
Our conclusion i s t h a t w h i l s t these t h e o r i e s , taken together, provide an 
adequate range of conceptual t o o l s f o r the analysis of such problems, 
the development w i t h i n separate, and sometimes c o n f l i c t i n g , i n t e l l e c t u a l 
t r a d i t i o n s has magnified the exclusiveness of each approach at t h e expense 
f o t h e i r f o c a l concerns. I t i s our contention t h a t analysis should be 
d i r e c t e d towaj-ds the o b j e c t i v e of c r e a t i n g a more u n i f i e d frame of 
reference f o r the i n v e s t i g a t i o n of problems of i n t e g r a t i o n i n i n d u s t r i a l 
o r g a n i s a t i o n s , and not t o t h e c o n t i n u a t i o n of the a r i d exercise of 
j u s t i f y i n g p o i n t s of d i s t i n c t i o n between contending frameworks. 
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I t should be cl e a r from the preceding discussion t h a t so f a r as the 
f i r s t problem of "systems" i n t e g r a t i o n i s concerned, the development of 
the concept of " f u n c t i o n a l autonomy" i n i t s a p p l i c a t i o n s t o systems theory 
would be f r u i t f u l and would permit a more r e a l i s t i c analysis of the 
u n i f y i n g and d i v e r s i f y i n g f a c t o r s i n f l u e n c i n g systems i n t e g r a t i o n . 
Lockwood, f o r example, has argued t h a t current c o n f l i c t theory has been 
developed l a r g e l y i n response t o t h e d e f i c i e n c i e s o f normative f u n c t i o n a l i s m 
w i t h i t s emphasis upon e q u i l i b r i u m a n a l y s i s . ^^^^ 
I n consequence, i t ( c o n f l i c t t h e o r y ) : 
" i s e n t i r e l y confined t o t h e problem of s o c i a l i n t e g r a t i o n . What i s 
missing i s the system i n t e g r a t i o n focus of general f u n c t i o n a l i s m 
which by contrast w i t h normative f u n c t i o n a l i s m , involves no p r i o r 
commitment t o the study of system s t a b i l i t y . " ^ ^ ^ ^ 
Lockwood claims t h a t the concept of f u n c t i o n a l autonomy provides a model 
of system i n t e g r a t i o n which i s p a r t i c u l a r l y relevant t o c o n f l i c t theory 
w h i l s t also p r o v i d i n g a lin k a g e between the a n a l y t i c a l l y d i s t i n c t though 
i n t e r r e l a t e d problems of system and s o c i a l i n t e g r a t i o n . (e.g. the 
d i v i s i o n of labour ( r o l e s t r u c t u r e ) , technology and system of controL) 
The n o t i o n t h a t t h e p a r t s of a system are characterised by vary i n g degrees 
of interdependence suggests t h a t systems c o n f l i c t arises through s t r a i n s 
( o r c o n t r a d i c t i o n s ) between the key s t r u c t u r a l elements of the system. 
Because the o r g a n i s a t i o n of these v a r i a b l e s conditions the autonomy of the 
c o n s t i t u e n t groups p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n such systems, there i s moreover a 
necessary l i n k a g e between the nature of system i n t e g r a t i o n and the nature 
of s o c i a l i n t e g r a t i o n i n i n d u s t r i a l organisations. Lockwood's approach 
t o t h e problem he describes i s t o consider i n Marxist terms one p a t t e r n 
o f f u n c t i o n a l i n s t a b i l i t y which ar i s e s through a "lack of f i t " between 
(64) D. Lockwood "Social I n t e g r a t i o n and System I n t e g r a t i o n " Chapter 9 
G.K. Zollschan & W. Hirsch "Explorations i n Social Change" 
pp.244-257 Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
(65) D. Lockwood, I b i d p.249 
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the core i n s t i t u t i o n a l orders of a system and i t s m a t e r i a l substructure. 
Problems of s o c i a l i n t e g r a t i o n develop i n t h i s context i f groups w i t h a 
vested i n t e r e s t i n the maintenance of the system are unable t o devise 
compensating mechanisms t o counteract the dysfunctional tendencies he 
describes. 
Whether Lockwood's argument i s accepted or not, i t i s important t o 
s t r e s s t h a t organisations by d e f i n i t i o n consist of a combination of 
i n t e g r a t i v e and d i s i n t e g r a t i v e processes, c e n t r i p e t u a l and c e n t r i f u g a l 
pressures, and t h a t , i n t h i s context, we need t o look at the various s o c i a l , 
t e c h n i c a l and economic dimensions of the e n t e r p r i s e as a system i n order 
t o s p e c i f y t h e nature of i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s between them. Inherent i n 
t h i s approach i s the n o t i o n t h a t t h e attainment of optimiim conditions i n 
any one of these dimensions may not produce optimum conditions f o r the 
whole, and t h a t where s t r a i n s e x i s t between such s t r u c t u r a l elements as 
t h e economic, o r g a n i s a t i o n a l , budgetary and t e c h n i c a l contexts of the 
workplace, these w i l l have i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the p a t t e r n of s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n , 
since v a r i a t i o n s i n the s t r u c t u r e of c o n s t r a i n t s or rewards w i l l i n f l u e n c e 
t h e behaviour of i n d i v i d u a l s and groups. I n t h i s sense the i n v e s t i g a t i o n 
of the nature of system i n t e g r a t i o n i s c r u c i a l i n the determination of the 
l i m i t i n g f a c t o r s upon s o c i a l a c t i o n at any p a r t i c u l a r point i n time. The 
value o f open systems an a l y s i s thus described l i e s f i r s t i n d e f i n i n g the 
nature of interdependencies between the key s t r u c t u r a l dimensions of the 
o r g a n i s a t i o n , and t h e i r adaptiveness t o external change, and second, upon 
the manner i n which these s t r u c t u r a l arrangements have consequences f o r 
t h e q u a l i t y of i n d i v i d u a l work experience and group behaviour. At the 
same time the r e a c t i o n of r e l a t i v e l y autonomous work groups t o these 
systems i n f l u e n c e s w i l l be c o n d i t i o n a l ; power and value considerations must 
be considered t h e r e f o r e i n the determination of how the e n t e r p r i s e as a 
whole responds to the requirement f o r change. 
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The r e l a t e d problem of " s o c i a l i n t e g r a t i o n " i n i n d u s t r i a l organisations 
as we have seen can be approached also fromr.a v a r i e t y of t h e o r e t i c a l 
standpoints. B a s i c a l l y we have been concerned t o show t h a t the 
o r i e n t a t i o n s of consensus and c o n f l i c t t h e o r i e s i n t h i s area are not 
nec e s s a r i l y exclusive. I t has been suggested t h a t a theory of cooperation 
which emphasises the m u l t i l a t e r a l character of work r e g u l a t i o n and c o n t r o l 
provides the most r e a l j . s t i c basis f o r the analysis of how f u n c t i o n a l l y 
autonomous yet interrelatied.i":; groups pursue t h e i r various i n t e r e s t s i n ways 
which t y p i c a l l y ensure some c o n t i n u i t y i n the business of the en t e r p r i s e . 
A t t e n t i o n was drawn t o the existence of shared values governing the 
o r g a n i s a t i o n o f work and the processing of grievances, values which order 
the p u r s u i t of separate, and sometimes c o n f l i c t i n g i n t e r e s t s . Clearly, 
the problem of power resources at the disposal of contending groups may 
determine i n par t the s t r u c t u r e of values which are shared by a l l ; 
nevertheless i t has been suggested t h a t a reconsideration of the nature 
of power r e l a t i o n s as i n t e g r a l aspects of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s between 
interdependent groups would permit t h e analysis of the conditions under 
which power becomes an expanding resource at the disposal of a l l groups 
engaged i n the process of j o i n t l y c o n t r o l l i n g the organisation of work. 
F i n a l l y we have sought t.b.- i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e analysis of the nature 
of s o c i a l i n t e g r a t i o n would be s e r i o u s l y incomplete without reference t o 
the i n d i v i d u a l ' s o r d e r i n g of wants i n r e l a t i o n t o the work s i t u a t i o n : 
t h a t i s t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' s self-image of h i s work s i t u a t i o n . The 
s i g n i f i c a n c e of such considerations l e d t o the i n c l u s i o n of the s o c i a l 
a c t i o n frame o f reference w i t h i n our model f o r t h e purposes o f d i f f e r e n t -
i a t i n g between the r e a c t i o n s of groups t o s i m i l a r work r o l e s as..'determined 
o b j e c t i v e l y by the same co n d i t i o n s . The l i m i t a t i o n s of the approach, 
used independently of systems considerations, were noted. 
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What seems t o be r e q u i r e d t h e r e f o r e i s a model which a r t i c u l a t e s the 
t h r e e major p o i n t s of reference we have i s o l a t e d so f a r . F i r s t , a systems 
framework of the o r g a n i s a t i o n d e f i n i n g the environmental and o r g a n i s a t i o n a l 
and t e c h n i c a l v a r i a b l e s o p e r a t i n g t o delineate c e r t a i n f u n c t i o n a l 
requirements which must somehow be met by a l l p a r t i e s i f the e n t e r p r i s e 
i s t o s u r v i v e and be maintained. Second a s o c i a l framework of the 
p a r t i c i p a n t employee(s) d e f i n i n g the environmental, ( i n c l u d i n g s o c i a l 
class and community) and occupational v a r i a b l e s operating t o delineate 
i n d i v i d u a l o r i e n t a t i o n s t o the o r g a n i s a t i o n and t o show how established 
r u l e s and p r a c t i c e s of work may be changed by pressures from below. 
T h i r d , and f i n a l l y , a model of co-operation d e f i n i n g the nature, e f f e c t s and 
d i r e c t i o n of change of r e l a t i o n s between r e l a t i v e l y autonomous i n d u s t r i a l 
groups, each w i t h d i s t i n c t i v e occupational or business i n t e r e s t s , 
who are nevertheless i n t e r r e l a t e d w i t h i n the s o c i a l system of the 
o r g a n i s a t i o n . These three major t h e o r e t i c a l p o i n t s of reference, and the 
i n t e r r e l a t i o n s between them are discussed i n more d e t a i l i n the next two 
chapters i n the c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e i r a p p l i c a t i o n t o one p a r t i c u l a r 
problem - t h a t of s o c i a l c o n t r o l i n i n d u s t r i a l organisations. 
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CHAPTER 2 
ENTERPRISE AMD ACTOR: THE CONTEXTUAL FRAMEWORK OF COMTROL 
I n the previous chapter a case was o u t l i n e d f o r the systematization of 
theory i n t h e two i n t e r r e l a t e d a n a l y t i c a l areas of systems and s o c i a l 
i n t e g r a t i o n of organisations, where both problem areas were seen t o have 
I 
i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the i n v e s t i g a t i o n of a c e n t r a l problem of i n d u s t r i a l 
sociology: t h e nature of order and s t a b i l i t y i n i n d u s t r i a l enterprises. 
I n t h i s chapter i t i s intended t o develop the case f o r t h e o r e t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n 
i n more d e t a i l by o u t l i n i n g a contextual model f o r the analysis o f one 
p a r t i c u l a r o r g a n i s a t i o n a l process, t h a t of c o n t r o l . 
The s e l e c t i o n of t h i s p a r t i c u l a r process i s important. I f i n f a c t the 
case f o r t h e o r e t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n i n I n d u s t r i a l Sociology r e s t s upon the need 
t o r e s o l v e current conceptual ambiguities i n the analysis of order and 
c o n f l i c t , s t a b i l i t y and change, values and i n t e r e s t s , system and a c t o r -
problems r a i s e d i n t h e f i r s t chapter - then the s e l e c t i o n o f a process which 
i l l u s t r a t e s t h e i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s between these elements i s c r u c i a l . I t i s 
f e l t t h a t t h e process of c o n t r o l i n i n d u s t r i a l organisations provides a 
s u i t a b l e locus f o r the c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f these various part-problems r e l a t i n g , 
as they do, t o a wider and more general concern w i t h the nature of i n t e g r a t i o n 
i n i n d u s t r i a l organisations. 
1. THE 'GOJiTEXT OF COMTROL; SYSTEM AND CONTROL 
How can we define the nature of c o n t r o l i n i n d u s t r i a l organisations? 
Why i s the process problematical? The answers t o these questions depend, 
f i r s t , upon the establishment o f a s u i t a b l e contextual frame o f reference 
i n terms of which the process of c o n t r o l can be located and, second, upon the 
d e f i n i t i o n of key problems of c o n t r o l i n v o l v i n g some consideration of the 
major a n a l y t i c a l aspects o f the process and t h e i r i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s . Taken 
together these c o n s t i t u t e a s o c i o l o g i c a l approach t o a c e n t r a l problem of 
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i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s : who does what, when and how i n work. Consideration 
o f t h i s problem i n v o l v e s the ana l y s i s o f the c o n t r o l process w i t h i n 
parameters determined by the nature of systems c o n s t r a i n t s operating at the 
l e v e l of the e n t e r p r i s e and s o c i a l c o n s t r a i n t s operating a t the l e v e l 
o f a c t o r s w i t h i n t h e i r occupational groups. 
What do we mean by c o n t r o l ? Reference t o the l i t e r a t u r e on the 
meaning o f c o n t r o l provides a v a r i e t y o f answers t o t h i s questiono I n i t i a l l y , 
however, i t i s possible t o suggest t h a t the process may be i n v e s t i g a t e d a t 
the two l e v e l s o f an a l y s i s o u t l i n e d i n the f i r s t chapter: the l e v e l of 
systems i n t e g r a t i o n and the l e v e l of s o c i a l i n t e g r a t i o n w i t h i n i n d u s t r i a l 
o r g a n i s a t i o n s . 
Ati the f i r s t l e v e l " c o n t r o l " r e f e r s t o the system fi>r d i r e c t i n g and 
c o n t r o l l i n g the production task o f the e n t e r p r i s e . Here the s t a r t i n g point 
f o r a n a l y s i s i s the task t o which the organisation i s committed and the 
relevajice o f the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e mode of s e t t i n g o b j e c t i v e s , planning and 
executing p o l i c i e s and c o n t r o l l i n g a c t i v i t i e s f o r the achievement of the 
aims of the o r g a n i s a t i o n . I n t h i s context a "task analysis approach" i s 
f r e q u e n t l y u t i l i s e d based upon e i t h e r the open systems model of such 
normative f u n c t i o n a l i s t s as Parsons or upon the socio-technical systems 
approach o f the Tavistock I n s t i t u t e o f Human Relations. 
Parsons discussed the concept o f organisation i n systematic terms, 
t a k i n g as h i s a n a l y t i c a l p o i n t o f reference, primacy or o r i e n t a t i o n t o the 
attainment o f a s p e c i f i c goal: 
"An o r g a n i s a t i o n i s a system which, as the attainment o f i t s goal, 
produces an i d e n t i f i a b l e something which can be u t i l i s e d i n some way 
by another system; t h a t i s , the output of the organisation i s , f o r 
some other system, an i n p u t . " 
( l ) T.K. Reeves and J. Woodward "The Study of Managerial C o n t r o l " Chapter3 
" I n d u s t r i a l Organisation: Behaviour and C o n t r o l " Ed. by 
J. Woodward, Oxford, 197O, pp.37-56. 
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and 
" I t i s thus assumed t h a t i n the case of a l l organisations there i s 
something analogous t o a "market" f o r the output which c o n s t i t u t e s 
(2) 
t h e attainment of i t s goal."^ 
A t t e n t i o n i s drawn, t h e r e f o r e , at the outset t o t h e nature of the i n t e r a c t i o n 
between o r g a n i s a t i o n and environment, t o the adaptive f u n c t i o n which the 
i n d u s t r i a l o r g a n i s a t i o n i s h e l d t o perform and t o the f a c t t h a t the 
o b j e c t i v e s of the e n t e r p r i s e are l e g i t i m i s e d by reference t o more generalised 
values o f the wider s o c i e t y . Judgements concerning what c o n s t i t u t e s a 
s a t i s f a c t o r y l e v e l of goal attainment are made i n terms of the adequacy of 
o r g a n i s a t i o n a l adaptation t o the s i t u a t i o n i n which i t operates. Since 
goal attainment i s so c l e a r l y defined by Parsons as a r e l a t i o n between a 
system ajid i t s e x t e r n a l s i t u a t i o n i t . i s not s u r p r i s i n g t h a t h i s treatment 
of t h e c o n t r o l process r e f l e c t s t h i s primary concern w i t h the adaptiveness of 
the system as a whole. 
I t f o l l o w s t h a t f o r Parsons an important usage of open systems analysis 
i s found i n t h e e l u c i d a t i o n of the i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p between the value systems 
of the o r g a n i s a t i o n and those of the environing society. I n so doing he 
i l l u m i n a t e s an important general area of relevance f o r the study of c o n t r o l : 
t h e e f f e c t of environmental c o n t r o l s upon o r g a n i s a t i o n a l goal-attainment. 
Thus he proposes t h a t the value systems of organisations should be seen as 
subvalue systems of higher-order organisations ( e s p e c i a l l y the wider s o c i e t y ) , 
i m p l y i n g acceptance of i t s values and c o m p a t i b i l i t y w i t h them. Organisational 
values l e g i t i m i s e t h e goals of the o r g a n i s a t i o n by emphasising the system's 
c o n t r i b u t i o n t o the f u n c t i o n a l requirements of the l a r g e r system. Indeed 
the i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s a t i o n of a value system which l e g i t i m i s e s both the goal of 
(2) T a l c o t t Parsons "Suggestions f o r a S o c i o l o g i c a l Approach t o the Theory 
of Organisations" Vol . 1 Nos. I and I I , A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Science 
Quarterly, 1956, pp.63-85: 225-239-
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the o r g a n i s a t i o n and the patterns by which i t f u n c t i o n s t o achieve t h a t 
goal i s h e l d t o be an important c o n d i t i o n f o r the generation of power -
"the generalised capacity t o mobilise resources i n the i n t e r e s t of 
attainment of a system goal. " 
This approach, w i t h i t s emphasis upon the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of power w i t h 
goal attainment and upon power as the major means by which resources become 
mo b i l i s e d t o achieve o r g a n i s a t i o n a l o b j e c t i v e s , i s c l e a r l y f u n c t i o n a l i s t 
i n o r i e n t a t i o n . As such i t has been seen by some t o represent only a 
p a r t i a l statement of the process of c o n t r o l . Mouzelis, t o c i t e one recent 
example, argues t h a t the Parsonian "capacity f o r resource m o b i l i s a t i o n " 
theory: 
" i s more r e l e v a n t i n a context when a l l the subunits of the s o c i a l 
system have the same i n t e r e s t s and p r o f i t equally from the achievement 
of c o l l e c t i v e goals. On the other hand i n s o c i a l systems, as i n most 
organisations where i n t e r e s t s are . . c o n f l i c t i n g , where groups are 
h i e r a r c h i c a l l y s i t u a t e d , t o ignore the d i s t r i b u t i o n a l aspects of power 
tends t o gi v e an i l l u s o r y image t o a c o n f l i c t f u l s i t u a t i o n . " ^ ^ ^ 
These considerations b r i n g us t o a c e n t r a l problem i n the analysis of c o n t r o l , 
w i t h serious i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r t h e k i n d of explanatory framework which should 
e x i s t f o r the i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the c o n t r o l process. The problem i s one 
which i s recognised by Mouzelis and other w r i t e r s concerned t o point up the 
weaknesses of the f u n c t i o n a l i s t approach; yet i t i s not resolved by the 
(3) 
type of argument they use, and the q u o t a t i o n above serves as a good 
example o f t h i s . B r i e f l y the problem i s concerned w i t h t h e f a c t t h a t 
o r g a n i s a t ions may be i n v e s t i g a t e d at two d i s t i n c t l e v e l s of analysis: f i r s t 
at t h e l e v e l of the t o t a l o r g a n i s a t i o n where the focus f o r analysis i s upon 
the o r g a n i s a t i o n a l processes which cope w i t h the major f u n c t i o n a l problems 
of organisations or upon v a r i a b l e s which s t r u c t u r e systems of s o c i a l 
(3) N.P. Mouzelis o p . c i t . p.156. 
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r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h i n organisations and are seen t o e x i s t independently of 
those who occupy p o s i t i o n s w i t h i n these systems; second at the l e v e l of 
the organisation's s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e where the focus f o r analysis i s upon 
the a c t o r s ( o r groups o f ac t o r s ) who occupy o r g a n i s a t i o n a l r o l e s , and upon 
the i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s between these groups. D i f f i c u l t i e s a r i s e when 
attempts are made t o r e f u t e t h e o r i e s of systems i n t e g r a t i o n i n terms of 
t h e o r i e s of s o c i a l i n t e g r a t i o n . T y p i c a l l y , as Lockwood has pointed out, 
and as we have . •already.^ noted i n the previous c h a p t e r t h e development 
of c o n f l i c t theory as a r e a c t i o n t o normative f u n c t i o n a l i s m i s confined 
e n t i r e l y t o the problem of s o c i a l i n t e g r a t i o n . 
I t i s c l e a r t h a t the consideration which Parsons gives t o the i n t e r p l a y 
between norms and power i s incomplete. Nevertheless i n the context of h i s 
treatment of these processes which centres upon the ways i n which they 
subserve the main f u n c t i o n a l imperatives of organisations i t i s p e r f e c t l y 
l e g i t i m a t e t o t r e a t power as a generalised resource developed t o implement 
c o l l e c t i v e goals. The extent t o which there i s actual c o n f l i c t of ends 
between sets of actors i s a separate issue, and one located a t a d i f f e r e n t 
l e v e l o f a n a l y s i s . I t f o l l o w s t h a t the attempt made by Mouzelis t o r e f u t e 
Parson':s remarks on the production of power f o r e f f e c t i v e goal achievement 
on the grounds t h a t he has overlooked i t s d i s t r i b u t i o n a l aspects i s 
misleading; power as a generalised resource i s a f u n c t i o n of org a n i s a t i o n -
i t i s a necessary process of or g a n i s a t i o n ; power as a s e c t i o n a l resource i s 
a f u n c t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l groups and t h e i r a t t r i b u t e s . These two aspects of 
power may indeed i n t e r r e l a t e , but f o r a n a l y t i c a l purposes may be t r e a t e d 
separately. This a n a l y t i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n i s not always c l a r i f i e d , nor i s 
the nature of the i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p between f u n c t i o n a l i s t and c o n f l i c t 
approaches t o the analysis of systems and s o c i a l i n t e g r a t i o n . 
(4) See previous Chapter, page 46 
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Perhaps the most recent statement of a systems approach t o the problem 
of c o n t r o l l o c a t e d at the l e v e l of analysis of systems i n t e g r a t i o n i s 
contained i n the s o c i o - t e c h n i c a l system concept advanced by the Tavistock 
I n s t i t u t e of Human Relations. L i k e Parsons, the members of t h i s School 
are concerned p r i n c i p a l l y w i t h the adaptiveness of the t o t a l o r g a n i s a t i o n 
t o i t s r e l e v a n t e x t e r n a l environment and w i t h the adaptiveness of actors t o 
r o l e s whose dimensions are c h i e f l y determined by s t r u c t u r a l v a r i a b l e s which 
exert t h e i r e f f e c t s i r r e s p e c t i v e o f v a r i a t i o n s i n personal r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n 
work. 
The systemic q u a l i t y of the concept i s i l l u s t r a t e d by E m e r y w h o 
suggests t h a t the concept d i r e c t s a t t e n t i o n t o three necessary stages of 
analysis of e n t e r p r i s e s : -
(a) The analysis of the component p a r t s o f the e n t e r p r i s e t o reveal the 
nature of each i n s o f a r as i t c o n t r i b u t e s t o the performance of the 
e n t e r p r i s e and creates or meets the needs of other p a r t s . The 
f i r s t components t o be d i s t i n g u i s h e d are ( i ) the technological and 
( i i ) the "work r e l a t i o n s h i p s t r u c t u r e " and i t s constituent occupational 
r o l e s . 
(b) The an a l y s i s of the i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p of these parts w i t h p a r t i c u l a r 
reference t o the problems of i n t e r n a l c o n t r o l thus created f o r the 
e n t e r p r i s e . 
(c) The d e t e c t i o n and analysis of the relevant external environment of 
t h e e n t e r p r i s e and the manner i n which the en t e r p r i s e manages i t s 
r e l a t i o n s w i t h i t . 
I t w i l l be noted here t h a t w h i l s t the s t r u c t u r a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of the 
e n t e r p r i s e proceeds along l i n e s s i m i l a x i n some aspects t o t h a t of Parsons 
and the normative f u n c t i o n a l i s t s - , t h ere are some important d i s t i n c t i o n s . 
(5) F.E. Emery " C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of Socio-technical Systems" Tavistock 
I n s t i t u t e o f Hioman Relations Document No.527, see p.8. 
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The Parsonian scheme i s symetric a l w i t h the value system of the org a n i s a t i o n 
l e g i t i m i s i n g i t s goal, w i t h i t s adaptive, goal-attainment and i n t e g r a t i o n 
aspects r e g u l a t e d by c o n t r o l l i n g subvalues, w i t h i t s resource inputs 
r e g u l a t e d by c o n t r a c t u a l c o n t r o l s , such as employment and investment, and 
w i t h i t s o p e r a t i v e code governed by an aspect of a u t h o r i t y . The socio-
t e c h n i c a l scheme lacks t h i s formal symmetry: the s e l e c t i o n of v a r i a b l e s 
here i s f o r h e u r i s t i c reasons, and t h e r e f o r e less i n c l u s i v e . Moreover, 
w h i l s t t h e dimensions of the soc i o - t e c h n i c a l system are interdependent, each 
v a r i a b l e possesses the q u a l i t y of some degree of independence as the f o l l o w i n g 
passage i n d i c a t e s : 
"The concept of s o c i o - t e c h n i c a l system arose from the consideration t h a t 
any production system requires both a te c h n o l o g i c a l o r g a n i s a t i o n -
equipment and process layout - and a work o r g a n i s a t i o n r e l a t i n g t o each 
other those who carry out the necessary tasks. The t e c h n o l o g i c a l 
demands place l i m i t s on the type of work o r g a n i s a t i o n possible, but a 
work o r g a n i s a t i o n has s o c i a l and psychological p r o p e r t i e s of i t s own 
t h a t are independent o f technology A s o c i o - t e c l m i c a l system must 
also s a t i s f y the f i n a n c i a l conditions of the i n d u s t r y of which i t i s 
p a r t I t has i n f a c t s o c i a l , t e c h n o l o g i c a l and economic dimensions 
a l l o f which axe interdependent but a l l of which have independent values 
of t h e i r own."^^^ 
I n s p i t e of these d i f f e r e n c e s , s o c i o - t e c h n i c a l analysis provides a u s e f u l 
example of a predominantly f u n c t i o n a l i s t approach t o the problem of systems 
c o n t r o l . I t s broad parameters are set by ISnery who w r i t e s : 
" people w i t h i n an e n t e r p r i s e must come t o see t h a t : 
(a) they ( e n t e r p r i s e s ) cannot simply evolve along the l i n e s i t s members 
t h i n k they ought t o f o l l o w . 
(b) they must organise themselves i n ways appropriate t o the nature and 
order of the tasks r e q u i r e d by t h e i r environment. 
(6) E.L. T r i s t " O r g a n i s a t i o n a l Choice" Tavistock I963, p.6. 
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(c) they must evolve standards f o r judging human performance t h a t are i n 
some way o b j e c t i v e and not simply based upon l o y a l t y and a f f e c t i o n . 
(d) t h e i r i n s t i t u t i o n a l i deologies and s e l f perception must i n some way 
( 7 ^ ! t 
r e f l e c t t h e i r r e a l r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e i r environment.^ 
Hence the concept of c o n t r o l i s seen as a system-environmental 
r e l a t i o n s h i p . At the highest l e v e l of g e n e r a l i t y , c o n t r o l i mplies the 
management of resources t o permit primary task achievement (the task which 
the p r o d u c t i o n system of the e n t e r p r i s e was created t o perform) and t o 
f a i c i l i t a t e t h e achievement oT a "steady s t a t e " . Control i s d i r e c t e d , 
t h e r e f o r e , towards the p r e s e r v a t i o n of the i n t e g r i l y of the o r g a n i s a t i o n a l 
system i n the face of environmental change where the n o t i o n of a steady 
s t a t e r e f e r s t o a: 
"istate i n which the e n t e r p r i s e as a whole and i n i t s phases remains 
constant, w i t h a continuous "throughput", despite a considerable 
range o f e x t e r n a l changes."^ 
Elsewhere at t h i s l e v e l of g e n e r a l i t y t h e problem of c o n t r o l l i n g the steady 
s t a t e of t h e e n t e r p r i s e has been dealt w i t h more s p e c i f i c a l l y . F i r s t i t 
i s argued t h a t the t e c h n o l o g i c a l system plays a mediating r o l e d e f i n i n g the 
(9) 
boundary con d i t i o n s under which a steady s t a t e can be achieved^ , thus: 
"There i s an almost constant accommodati^on of stresses a r i s i n g from 
changes i n the e x t e r n a l environment, and. the technological component, 
by i t s nature, not only sets l i m i t s on what can be done, but also 
creates demands t h a t must be r e f l e c t e d i n the i n t e r n a l o r g a n i s a t i o n 
and ends of the e n t e r p r i s e . " 
(7) F.E. Bnery o p . c i t . p.4. 
(8) I b i d p.3. 
(9) I b i d p.6. 
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Secondly, i t i s assumed t h a t w h i l s t t e c h n i c a l demands place l i m i t s upon the 
type o f work o r g a n i s a t i o n possible, the work o r g a n i s a t i o n i t s e l f has 
independent p r o p e r t i e s ; f o r example, i t must s a t i s f y the f i n a n c i a l 
c o n d i t i o n s of the i n d u s t r y of which i t i s p a r t , Whilst the substantive 
dimensions of s o c i o - t e c h n i c a l systems are .socio-psychological and 
t e c h n o l o g i c a l , the economic dimension measures the effectiveness w i t h which 
human and t e c h n i c a l resources are used t o carry out the primary task. 
Inherent i n t h i s approach i s the n o t i o n t h a t the attainment of optimum 
c o n d i t i o n s i n any one dimension may not produce optimum conditions f o r the 
whole system. Op t i m i s a t i o n of conditions between these dimensions and i n 
ways which permit the achievement of the primary task of the e n t e r p r i s e 
would appear t o be a primary requirement of the c o n t r o l process. 
At a lower l e v e l of analysis the process of c o n t r o l i s analysed as an 
aspect of t h e "work r e l a t i o n s h i p ' s s t r u c t u r e c o n s i s t i n g of the occupational 
r o l e s created t o meet the needs of the t e c h n i c a l system. A t t e n t i o n here 
focusses upon the nature of task interdependences and upon the effectiveness 
of r o l e s t r u c t u r e s f o r the attainment of i n s t i t u t i o n a l goals. Analysis i s 
d i r e c t e d towards the measurement of "symbiotic" r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n v o l v i n g some 
assessment of the i m p l i c a t i o n s of over and under-structured r o l e s f o r goal 
achievement. I n t h i s context c o n t r o l i m p l i e s the promotion of desirable 
r o l e r e l a t i o n s h i p s along the f o l l o w i n g l i n e s : 
(a) i n ways which avoid the m u l t i p l i c a t i o n of r o l e s t o the point where 
ta s k interdependencies have been concealed. 
(b) i n ways which s t r u c t u r e the means by which i n d i v i d u a l s become more 
task adjusted and task-centred, where the w i l l t o help i s e l i c i t e d 
not by f r i e n d l i n e s s but by the r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t task performances 
are mutually supporting. Such means w i l l include amongst other 
t h i n g s the development of r e l a t i v e l y autonomous r o l e - s e t s : groupings 
of tasks which have "whole" c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s associated w i t h a w e l l 
developed r o l e c u l t u r e . 
- 59 -
Analysis of the work relationship structure i n these terms leads 
f i n a l l y to a t h i r d l e v e l of investigating the control process i n socio-
technical systems. This refers to the problem of control i n enterprises 
as i n t e r n a l l y d i f f e r e n t i a t e d e n t i t i e s ; here the emphasis i s upon the 
inte r n a l control and co-ordination of the enterprise rather than the 
management of i t s external relations. Control here i s directed towards 
meeting certain functional requirements of organisations i n order to 
assure the efficiency of t h e i r operation. As Hnery puts i t : 
"There remains an important set of problems concerning internal 
organisation that concern the social system as such (our i t a l i c s ) . 
Without implying the existence of some supra-organism we can recognise 
certain things that are s t r u c t u r a l l y and functionally required f o r 
the e f f i c i e n t and stable performance of an enterprise. "^''"^^ 
These requirements refer to the necessary existence of a stable method of 
allo c a t i n g roles, status and power to persons: the requirement of "optimal 
structuring". They refer also to the requirement of "optimum d i s t r i b u t i o n " : 
the a l l o c a t i o n of rewards and risks i n correspondence to the allocation of 
power and res p o n s i b i l i t y . A t h i r d requirement i s that of "maximum 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s a t i o n " where: 
"The effective operation of the social structure requires that i t s 
members be motivated by t h e i r commitments to the goals of the 
organisation and constrained by t h e i r l o y a l t i e s to observe a common 
set of behavioural norms The achievement of a shared articulated 
set of organisational goals depends very much upon the r e l a t i v e 
s o l i d a r i t y of the d i f f e r e n t role relations within the organisation."^•'•'^^ 
A f i n a l requirement i s that of effective communication between members 
as the means by which a c t i v i t i e s axe controlled and shared normative 
structures established. 
(10) P.E. Emery i b i d p.38.' 
(11) I b i d pp.40-41. 
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I t i s in t e r e s t i n g to note that although t h i s analysis of the control 
process i n socio-technical system theory i s overtly functionalist i n that 
i t i s directed primarily towcirds the problem of systems integration, i t 
nevertheless contains an important theoretical point of reference which 
might suggest a linkage with other key sociological perspectives. This 
(12) 
refers to the concept of "dilemma" as i t i s u t i l i z e d by Bnery to point 
out that the parts of a social system are reca l c i t r a n t , having a nature and 
reqpiirements of t h e i r own, i n spite of t h e i r interdependence. I t i s a 
concept which has close s i m i l a r i t i e s with that of Gouldener's notion of 
"functional autonomy" discussed i n the previous chapter as providing one 
basis of integrating consensus gmd c o n f l i c t theories within a theory of 
cooperation as well as permitting analysis at the levels of system and 
actor. For Bnery the concept arises within a general discussion of the 
enterprise and i t s external environment, at the level of systems integration, 
but his treatment of i t l i e s essentially at the level of social integration 
with important implications of how these two levels of analysis may be 
enjoined. 
Thus he argues that i n s u f f i c i e n t attention has been given by social 
scientists to the influence of external environmental variables upon 
internal social systems; of how, f o r example, such influences are reflected 
i n the determination of organisational goals by management. As the range 
of alternatives open to the system increases, due perhaps to increased 
variety i n the environment, so the problem of defining the primary task of 
the enterprise increases and the need to develop some d i s t i n c t i v e competence 
r e l a t i v e t o other competitors arises. At t h i s point Emery notes that the 
concept of primary task however does not permit consideration of ia-s "special 
problem" where the a c t i v i t i e s of a sub-system of the enterprise are directed 
(12) I b i d p.44 
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towards an end other than that f o r which i t was created, or pursues purposes 
which are dysfunctional f o r the enterprise. Because these recalcitrancies 
inevitably arise, they create dilemmas and thus pose problems of control f o r 
the enterprise. 
Emery's treatment of the concept of dilemma suggests that these occur 
at both the level of systems and social integration. At the level of 
systems integration i t i s acknowledged that interdependence entails dilemmas, 
that the goal of e f f i c i e n t operation depends upon various conditions and 
that measures taken to meet these conditions may be mutually incompatible. 
I n t h i s sense consideration of the conditions required f o r the optimum 
operation of a socio-technical system of production involves recognising 
the interdependencies but also the degree of independence between i t s socio-
I 
psychological, technical and economic dimensions. I t i s however at the 
level of the actor and his commitments, at the level of social integration, 
that the notion of dilemma i s p r i n c i p a l l y considered. 
Two sets of forces appear to operate upon the actor i n Bneiy's socio-
technical system. The f i r s t set are derived from the work relationship 
structure i t s e l f : 
"The -larger and more complex a production system, the more l i k e l y i t i s 
to contain systems of d i f f e r e n t orders and a number of components of 
the same order. Every succeeding d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n increases the possib-
i l i t y that agreement about the primary tasks of components may f a i l to 
add up to the primary task of the whole."^ ''"'"^ ^ 
The second set are derived :. from the attributes of the actor himself: 
" the drawing i n of social beings to carry the occupational role 
implies the introduction of di f f e r e n t and even contrary and social and 
personal forces, needs or interests. Thus the p o s s i b i l i t y arises of 
the ro l e occupants acting i n terms of t h e i r personal and social 
(14) 
influences to the detriment of the production process." 
(13) I b i d page 43 quoting from A.K. Rice "Productivity and Social Organisation: 
the Ahmedabad Experiment." Tavistock, 1958. 
(14) P.E. Emery op. c i t . p.33 
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Expressed i n these terms the existence of dilemmas i s seen to impede the 
effective operation of the social structure of the enterprise which 
depends, as we have seen, upon the motivation of members by t h e i r commitments 
to i t s goals and i n terms of shared behavioural norms. I t i s , of course, 
upon t h i s i m p l i c i t assumption that participants should share similar views 
about the nature of the primary goals of the organisation that the most 
serious cr i t i c i s m s of socio-technical theory have been made. 
I t i s true that Emery regards the s o l i d a r i t y of workers and management 
as a necessary condition f o r a high level of s o l i d a r i t y i n the enterprise 
as a whole and the existence of a high level of s o l i d a r i t y a necessary 
condition f o r the achievement of a shared set of organisational goals. But 
there i s no reason to suppose that Emery believes i n the existence of a 
permanent un i t y of constituent parts of the enterprise as a precondition of 
high mutual s o l i d a r i t y between mana^ent and workers, or that organisational 
goals are specific and exist a p r i o r i without- reference to the decisions of 
human actors. Indeed he seems acutely aware of the fact that the 
i n s t i t u t i o n s of the enterprise are not uniformly supported by a l l strata, 
and that the power of pa r t i c u l a r groups may be crucial i n the d e f i n i t i o n of 
goals f o r the enterprise when he writes: 
"Those related roles that have the greatest s o l i d a r i t y w i l l tend to, 
play the greatest part i n formulating the goals. I t i s f o r t h i s 
reason that the relations w i t h i n top management constitute the strategic 
s o l i d a r i t y f o r an enterprise.(his i t a l i c s ) Only at t h i s level i s 
there a good chance of selecting goals that are appropriate to the 
capabilities of the enterprise and the demands of the external 
environment, and i t i s only here that there i s s u f f i c i e n t power 
(potential authority) to embody these goals i n the structural arrangements 
(15) See, f o r example R.K. Brown "Research and Consultancy i n I n d u s t r i a l 
Enterprises." Sociology Vol.1 No.l, I967 p.46. 
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and norms of the enterprise."^'''^^ 
What has been said on the subject of "dilemmas" i s s u f f i c i e n t to suggest 
that socio-technical theory, as i t i s represented i n Eknery's work, i s 
capable of further refinement along lines which permit consideration of the 
effect of social and c u l t u r a l constraints upon the manner i n which the 
openness of the social system of the enterprise to i t s technology and i t s 
wider environment i s controlled. Hnery e x p l i c i t l y recognises t h i s need, 
but claims that problems involving the recalcitrance of individuals and 
groups i n the face of the "overall requirements of the enterprise" must 
depend upon other areas of social science f o r t h e i r solutions. The lack 
of theoretical development i n t h i s area, he notes, i s consistent with a 
primary concern with 
" c l a r i f y i n g the requirements of socio-technical systems up to, 
and including, whole enterprises. At the level of analysing 
ind i v i d u a l enterprises the conditions basically contributing to the 
above phenomena (these refer to human dilemmas) must be regarded as 
"givens"; they are rooted i n the broader human social, c u l t u r a l and 
economic context of the enterprise. Thus while i t i s quite correct 
to say that f a i l u r e to consider these environmental encroachments w i l l 
lead to certain kinds of errors, i t would be incorrect to damn socio-
technical or related system theories f o r t h e i r f a i l u r e theoretically 
to encompass such problems. ^''"'^^ 
I n t h i s way we are remindedlby Emery that his consideration of the 
" i n t e r n a l elaboration of the social system" of an enterprise - i t s structure, 
i t s norms and i t s values - i s subordinated i n importance and as a level of 
analysis to the wider problem of the relations of the enterprise to i t s 
(16) P.E. Emery op,cit., p.40 
(1.7) I b i d , p.48 
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environment. Indeed i t i s e x p l i c i t that the development and character of 
these i n t e r n a l relations are determined primarily by the manner i n which 
management controls the continual openness of the work relationship 
structure to i t s technology and wider environment. I t follows that an 
approach such as t h i s which i s concerned mainly with the process of t o t a l 
organisational adaptation to environmental constraints i s necessarily 
p a r t i a l , and Emery recognises t h i s . I t follows also that an approach 
which seeks to define the key components of the enterprise i n order to 
assess the contribution of each to the performance of the t o t a l enterprise 
i s necessarily selective. This, however, i n no way diminishes i t s u t i l i t y 
as a frame of reference f o r the investigation of certain types of control 
problem. 
We have considered the contributions of Parsons and 'Emery at some 
length. Taken together they provide some valuable insights into what w i l l 
constitute the f i r s t and most generalised level of analysis of our model of 
the control process i n i n d u s t r i a l organisations. The major points of 
reference f o r consideration at t h i s level may now be summarised. 
I t i s our contention that the f i r s t group of problems f o r analysis i n 
any discussion of the control process are located at the level of the 
t o t a l enterprise. I n t h i s context the focus i s upon the i n d u s t r i a l 
organisation as an open system and here the concept of socio-technical 
system with i t s f u n c t i o n a l i s t orientation provides the most effective 
theoretical framework. Analysis of the enterprise as a whole which, as 
we have seen , i s developed p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the work of Parsons ajid Einery 
draws attention to certain key problems as follows: 
(a) Both writers emphasise the systemic quality of the i n d u s t r i a l 
enterprise as an open system interacting and defined i n certain 
crucial respects by environmental influences. I n both, the notion 
of interdependence among the key analytical variables of the system 
i s recognised, and i n both the notion of structural constraint. 
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which implies that these properties cannot vary a r b i t r a r i l y , i s 
emphasised. 
(b) Both writers define the organisation as a goal-oriented system with 
problems of goal-setting. Here the structure of the organisation 
i s seen to be dependent primarily on i t s r e l a t i o n to goals which 
are majiagerially defined, .but whose scope i s constrained by 
environmental requirements. Goal achievement i s seen to be 
problematical and i n both cases the functional requirement of 
obtaining a high degree of s o l i d a r i t y between pa r t i c i p a t i n g groups 
i s recognised. The i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s a t i o n of a common value system 
f o r the enterprise i s seen to be an important condition f o r the 
generation of power i n terms of which resources become mobilised to 
achieve orgajiisational objectives. 
(c) Both writers are concerned with the problems of orgemisational 
effectiveness and organisational change. I n both cases the 
assumption i s made that the enterprise exists to maintain i t s 
commerce with the external environment. Attention i s then focused 
upon the i n s t i t u t i o n a l requirements which are functionally required 
to meet t h i s condition, with particular reference to the mechanisms 
of control which are elaborated to f a c i l i t a t e the achievement of a 
steady state, a state i n which the enterprise, as a whole remains 
constant i n spite of external change. I n t h i s context judgements of 
fu n c t i o n a l i t y are made upon each or a l l of the structural elements 
of the system whose interplay i s seen to condition the behaviour 
of i t s constituent groups. I n both cases analysis i s conducted 
prima r i l y at the level of system integration which implies a p r i o r 
concern with the overall response of the t o t a l enterprise to i t s 
task requirements rather than with the related problem of social 
integration - the interplay between the constituent groups of the 
organisation i n terms of t h e i r d i f f e r i n g interests and separate 
power resources. 
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(d) Given t h i s emphasis upon the systemic characteristics of the enterprise, 
both writers stress the independence of the social system from 
individual actors who happen to f i l l i t s occupational roles at any 
one time, as well as the constraining effects of the norms upon which 
these roles are based. Thus the structural features of the work 
system (as these axe delimited by the r a t i o n a l i t y of the work of 
organisation and the requirements of the technical system) are 
regarded as major determinants of individual work behaviour. At a 
higher and more generalised level of analysis the enterprise i t s e l f 
i s seen to be s i m i l a r l y constrained by economic, social and p o l i t i c a l 
influences whose existence may condition the objectives which the 
enterprise pursues as well as influencing the form which the social 
and technical systems of the enterprise may take. Thus both 
technical and social organisation may be constrained, by the general 
requirement to maintain the economic v i a b i l i t y of the enterprise. 
I t i s apparent that certain themes emerge from t h i s discussion which may 
be incorporated into the model of control which we seek to establish. I t 
i s our contention that the major point of reference to be considered i s 
embodied i n Emery's claim that enterprises cannot evolve simply along the 
lines i t s members think they ought to follow; that they must be organised 
i n ways appropriate t o t h e i r task requirements by participants whose 
ideologies and self-perception should r e f l e c t t h e i r real relations with t h e i r 
environment. Whilst we should avoid any suggestion that the character of the 
enterprise i s determined completely by the effects of technical, market, 
budgetary and normative constraints (enterprises may equally well establish 
dominance over aspects of t h e i r environments) i t i s the case that the effect of 
such constraints w i l l be to define broad requirements which must be met by a l l 
parties i f the organisation as an e n t i t y i s to survive. Moreover there i s 
no suggestion that the response of management and other groups within the 
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enterprise w i l l necessarily be an iden t i c a l one. Nevertheless i t i s argued 
that the analysis of the control process must have regard to the effects 
of these influences upon the performance of the enterprise and the structure 
of i t s formal organisation as well as upon the interactions between i t s 
constituent groups. I n t h i s sense the appropriateness of organisational 
goals to the demands of the external environment, demands which may 
themselves c o n f l i c t , and the implementation of these goals i n the normative 
structure of the enterprise become important considerations. The management 
of the response of the enterprise as a whole to i t s external requirements, 
the selection of goals by management i n the l i g h t of these requirements 
and the means determined to achieve these goals constitute major problem, 
areas at t h i s f i r s t l evel of analysis. 
2. THE COMTEXT OF COMTROL: ACTOR AND COMTROL 
The process of control can be approached, however, from a different 
contextual standpoint where the referent i s not so. much the enterprise but 
i t s actors: individual participants within t h e i r occupational groups. 
Here the focus of analysis i s less upon the systemic qualities of 
organisations; rather i t i s upon the social integration of groups of actors 
w i t h i n these organisations. 
At psychological levels of analysis the problem of control i s frequently 
posed i n terms of motivating participants to higher levels of performance 
by the reduction of power and status d i f f e r e n t i a l s between supervisors and 
subordinates. One example of the conceptual framework i n which t h i s type 
of analysis i s cast i s the "psychological contract" theory discussed by 
Schein.^^^) 
Schein argues that the notion of a psychological contract implies that 
individuals have a variety of expectations of the organisation i n which they 
(18) E. Schein "Organisational Psychology" Prentice Hall, 1965• 
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participate whilst organisations have a variety of expectations of them. 
The contract i s implemented from the organisation's point of view by 
securing the consent of i t s subordinated actors to the authority and 
directives of t h e i r superiors. The contract i s implemented from the 
subordinate's point of view by his perception that he can influence the 
organisation s u f f i c i e n t l y to ensure that he w i l l not be taken advantage of. 
Consent to the directives of the superior i s therefore conditional upon the 
subordinate's b e l i e f that the contract i s being met: that his expectations 
are being f u l f i l l e d . Schein points out that the process underlying t h i s 
contract i s one of reciprocity and d i s t r i b u t i v e j u s t i c e , a continuous process 
of exchange i n which the organisation meets the requirements of the 
individual f o r pay, status and security i n return f o r compliant role 
performance. One important aspect of t h i s process, therefore, i s the 
a b i l i t y of management to engage the par t i c i p a t i o n and commitment of employees 
by providing rewards and incentives i n l i n e with the requirements, and the 
changing requirements, of individual actors. 
The detection of possible incongruencies between the expectations which 
individual participants have of t h e i r occupational and organisational roles 
and the fprmal requirements of these roles as, one descends the organisational 
hierarchy provides an important point of reference f o r the in d u s t r i a l 
psychologist and managerial practitioner concerned with the improvement of 
morale and productivity. Argyris^ , f o r example, suggests that classical 
"mechanistic" methods of r a t i o n a l i s i n g production and administrative processes 
result i n the decline of opportunities f o r individuals to engage i n 
int e r e s t i n g work, making decisions, exercising responsibility and u t i l i s i n g 
capacities. I n as much as these constitute importajit components of work 
sat i s f a c t i o n , deprivations i n these respects i n v i t e maladaptive responses 
with dysfunctional consequences f o r the organisation. 
(19) C. Argyris "Personality and Organisation" New York: Harper, 1957. 
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I t would be no exaggeration to claim that the main theoretical 
developments i n the f i e l d of organisational behaviour have been directed 
towards the analysis of problems of t h i s type, problems of controlling 
individual performance i n work by seeking solutions to the problem of 
reconciling the interests of the individual with managerial requirements 
f o r efficiency and economy. Frequently these solutions to the problem 
of motivation i n work have been similar: towards a "consensual-democratic" 
model of the organisation and away from the classical model of "authoritarian-
bureaucracy". Strauss, f o r example, summarises the key dimensions of the 
Hijman Relations School which has contributed to the development of t h i s 
model on an extensive scale as those of hygienic supervision, delegation 
of authority by management, pa r t i c i p a t i o n , the pa r t i c i p a t i o n of subordinates 
i n managerial decision-making, and the introduction of a t t i t u d i n a l and 
behavioural changes along lines which presumably enhance cooperation with 
management. Such solutions, as Strauss puts i t , provide a common provision 
f o r reformulating organisational structures f o r effective integration of 
individual and organisational goals through p a r t i c i p a t i v e techniques i n a 
(20) 
s e t t i n g which i s non-authoritarian, supportive and person-centred. 
"By modifying organisational structures i n ways which permit increasing 
involvement, as indicated by Strauss, both the social needs of individuals 
f o r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , collaboration and support, and the psychological needs 
f o r s e l f actualisation are held to be met. I n various ways therefore the 
control of participants i s enhanced and compliance more effectively obtained 
either by changing aspects of structure to meet the requirements of actors 
or by changing the attitudes of actors to meet the requirements of the 
organisation. 
(20) See Gr. Strauss "Some Notes on Power-Equalisation" i n H.J. Leavitt (ed.) 
"The Social Science of Organisations", Prentice-Hall, 1963, pp.39-84-
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I n wider context, analysis of the problem of control at the r o l e -
(21) 
personal level has been performed by -Etzioni^ ' whose theory of compliance 
provides a basis f o r c l a s s i f y i n g both types of organisations and sets of 
actors i n terms of the type of power or authority deployed by the organisation 
as well as i n terms of the type of involvement which the participant holds 
with the organisation. Types of authority are defined as being " . ." 
predominantly coercive, u t i l i t a r i a n (where compliance i s secured through 
the exchange of ext r i n s i c economic rewards f o r adaquate performance) or 
normative (where compliance i s secured through the exchange of i n t r i n s i c 
rewards f o r performance). Types of involvement are defined as predominantly 
alienative, calculative or moral. Etzioni's paradigm encompasses three 
congruent relationships i n which compliance i s secured by suitable equations 
of authority and involvement. Thus coercive power i s equated with 
alienative involvement, u t i l i t a r i a n power with calculative involvement 
and normative power with moral involvement; these equations represent 
" j u s t " psychological contracts. I n terms of t h i s model, business organisations 
appear to be primarily u t i l i t a r i a n i n character, securing compliance mainly 
by o f f e r i n g adequate f i n a n c i a l rewards as the basis of a contractucil 
relationship with participants. At the same time the pattern of authority 
may be modified to include certain types of normative constraint where non-
economic expectations of participants f o r job and work involvement exist. 
The a b i l i t y of non-managerial participants to influence decisions concerning 
the orgajiisation of work and production i n ways which are formally recognised 
by management would be one example of such an authority pattern. Such 
changes i n patterns of authority over time suggest that the form and content 
of the contractual relationship w i l l be redefined, opening up new areas of 
the relationship f o r j o i n t regulation. I n t h i s sense the nature of the 
control process may well change as the bases of consent to authority by 
participants are redefined. 
(2:l) A. Etzioni "A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organisations" Free Press 
I96I; 
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Analysis of the control process at t h i s l e v e l , then, draws attention to 
the problem of assessing the influence of personal involvement i n work as a 
major variable a f f e c t i n g individual s e n s i t i v i t y to various types of rewards 
and satisfactions derived from employment. I n t h i s sense the d e f i n i t i o n 
of employee expectations of the.control system and some assessment of work 
as a source of individual self-esteem are seen as important components of work 
involvement influencing the style of i n d u s t r i a l relations i n a particular 
i n s t i t u t i o n . 
Not surprisingly the importance of determining variations i n patterns 
of involvement and the relevance of such variations f o r i n d u s t r i a l behaviour 
have been recognised increasingly by Indu s t r i a l Sociologists. The implicat-
ions of t h i s kind of investigation f o r the analysis of the process of 
compliance i n i n d u s t r i a l relations are important, suggesting some awareness 
that i n d u s t r i a l behaviour i s not merely a function of the socio-technical 
system of the plant but also a response to sources of work involvement 
located externally to the organisation. I t i s i n t h i s context that the 
social action approach outlined i n the previous chapter i s invoked. 
For our purposes the analysis of work involvement, u t i l i s i n g the action 
frame of reference, provides a necessary and d i s t i n c t i v e alternative to 
explanations of the control process as a system f o r directing and controlling 
the production task of the enterprise as a whole. Here the focus of analysis 
i s upon the expectations of part i c u l a r groups of participants regarding the 
organisation of job, work and employment ' opportunities, i n as much as 
changes i n these expectations relate t o , and influence, the pattern of control 
i n i n d u s t r i a l organisations. 
As Goldthorpe puts i t : 
"Operating from such a position, the f i r s t step must be that of 
establishing empirically the way i n which, i n any given case, the wants 
and expectations which men bring to t h e i r employment, and the 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n which they thus give to t h e i r work, shape the a t t i t u d i n a l 
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and behavioural patterns of t h e i r working l i v e s as a whole. And to 
be included herenot only t h e i r relationships with t h e i r mates, 
supervisors and managers i n the immediate work situation but also, 
f o r example, t h e i r stance towards t h e i r f i r m as an employer, t h e i r 
"image" of the i n d u s t r i a l enterprise, t h e i r style of trade unionism 
and the manner i n which they envisage, and plan f o r , the l i v e s ahead 
of them.''/^^^ 
However, by his assertion that actors' definitions of the situations i n 
which they are engaged should provide the i n i t i a l basis f o r the explanation 
of social behaviour, Goldthorpe seems to imply that explanations from the 
point of view of the system as a whole are i n v a l i d . This i s not the view 
taken here; rather that both f u n c t i o n a l i s t and social action perspectives 
provide complementary perspectives to the analysis of the control process. 
On the one hand the analysis of systems control highlights the functional 
requirements of the adaptation of the enterprise as a whole to i t s external 
environment and to the necessary l i m i t a t i o n s which these demands place upon 
the i n t e r n a l control of the organisation. On the other hand the analysis 
of social integration and the social control of participants emphasises 
the d i f f e r i n g interests of the constituent groups of the enterprise as 
well as the common values which these groups share. Ultimately the value 
of the social action perspective i s seen not so much as an alternative to 
the f u n c t i o n a l i s t approach; rather as a complementary perspective located 
at an e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t level of analysis of the control process. This 
becomes apparant when i t i s recognised that whilst enterprises adjust to 
external demands, the form which that adjustment takes depends i n part upon 
the outcome of what amounts to a continuous process of inter-group bargaining 
over what constitutes the legitimate goals of organisational a c t i v i t y at any 
one moment i n time. Moreover the extent to which the p a r t i c i p a t i n g groups 
(22) J.H. Goldthorpe et. a l . "The Affluent Worker: Indu s t r i a l Attitudes and 
Behaviour" Cambridge, I968. pp.l840l85. 
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share common percep.tions of the state of the enterprise at any one point 
i n time and hold similar views about the nature of the constraints imposed 
upon a l l groups by the demands of the environment of the enterprise w i l l 
obviously affect the overall adjustment which the t o t a l enterprise i s able 
to make. 
The implications of these remarks i s that the analysis of control i n 
i n d u s t r i a l organisations requires some consideration of the expectations 
and aspirations of the key groups of participants whose interactions define 
the nature of the enterprise's response to i t s environmental demands. 
Failure by management to consider the expectations of i t s subordinated 
groups i n the formulation of organisational goals may well complicate the 
control process. Turner provides one example i n his discussion of the 
growth of u n o f f i c i a l strikes i n t h i s country: 
"But on t h i s trend, the las t two years have superimposed another sharp' 
r i s e i n the frequency of u n o f f i c i a l strikes against dismissals and -
at l a s t - f o r wage increases. So f a r from reducing the frequency of 
u n o f f i c i a l disputes, recent unemployment and economic stagnation have 
increased i t by outraging now-established expectations - expectations 
of security and an automatic annual increase i n income, such as 
salaried employees commonly enjoy. Indeed one m i ^ t interpret recent 
stoppages as an implied protest against what constitutes perhaps the 
outstanding caste d i v i s i o n of contemporary society - the difference i n 
(23) 
status and treatment between the wage-earning and the salaried person."^ ' 
To examine the problem of social integration i n the enterprise, therefore, 
implies at the level of the role-person some assessment of the types of 
orie n t a t i o n of actors as well as some d e f i n i t i o n of the sources of orientations 
to work. I n part, as we saw i n the f i r s t chapter, the use of the social 
action approach requires some examination of the social situations of actors 
(23) H.A. Turner "The Trend of Strikes", an inaugural lecture, Leeds 
University Press, 1963, p.18 
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outside the workplace, as these structure definitions of the work situation, 
and i n part some consideration of the effects of occupational socialisation-
upon individual attitudes to work and employment. 
The examination of the influence of the external', environment of the 
actor i n the enterprise, that i s , of "community" factors was touched upon i n 
the previous chapter. Here we wish merely to stress the importance of 
considering these factors i n the context of the present discussion on the 
control process. I t i s the case, however, that the usage of the social 
action framework i n I n d u s t r i a l Sociology has encouraged the investigation 
of the normative characteristics of ideal types of working class communities 
and the social imagery which they are held to impart to t h e i r members. Two 
(24) 
polar types have been isolated i n the l i t e r a t u r e " . F i r s t l y , the 
"proletarian" worker type, located i n more t r a d i t i o n a l i n d u s t r i a l communities 
dominated by single industries, populated predominantly by manual workers 
with similar past ajid present experiences of housing, education and leisure, 
i s socialised to see work and society i n a d i s t i n c t i v e manner. Thus the 
effects of employment and residence i n close-knit work and community 
situations i s held to produce a s o l i d a r i s t i c , but from management's viewpoint, 
a negative orientation towards the f i r m . I t i s held to be an orientation 
which originates i n communities characterised by a high "resonance" factor 
created by the constraining influences of a homogeneous family and communal 
l i f e , and one which i s hardened i n the circumstances of the work situation 
i f the system of work organisation isolates the worker from involvement i n 
the organisation i n ways which p a r a l l e l his social " i s o l a t i o n " outside the 
f i r m as the member of a r e l a t i v e l y deprived and inward looking community. 
The work s i t u a t i o n of t h i s proletarian type has been summarised by 
Furstenberg as follows: 
"The "proletarian" worker type i s exposed to the extreme pressures 
of a work system, predetermining entirely the extent and intensity of 
(24) D. Lockwood op.cit. 
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his e f f o r t s . Social relationships hased upon the social framework 
of the plant are s t r i c t l y authoritarian. Thus working class memhers 
can express themselves as human heings by opposing the whole system, 
thereby creating a social dichotomy between the expropriated but 
s o l i d a r i s t i c workers and the expropriating members of the c a p i t a l i s t 
class. Alienation from work, r e l a t i v e deprivation of i t s results and 
(25) 
m i l i t a n t s o l i d a r i t y are the main attributes of t h i s type." 
At the other end of the spectrum the second type of working class 
consciousness i s associated with what has been defined as a predominantly 
"pecuniajy" conception of society and an instrumental orientation towards 
work and employment. The basis of the social imagery of the "privatised" 
worker i s a d e f i n i t i o n of work as a source of extrinsic (monetary) sati'sfactions 
only; i n t r i n s i c satisfactions are seen to be derived from non-work areas of 
family l i f e and leisure time a c t i v i t i e s . I n t h i s context work serves purely 
as a means to the self-advancement of the participant ctnd his immediate 
family. Such an orientation to work i s regarded by some writers as being 
cruciaJ. i n the explanation of the attitudes of the contemporary i n d u s t r i a l 
worker i n societies l i k e our own. Dubin, f o r example, suggests that work i s 
becoming less significant i n the l i f e interests of employees not only because 
of the i n c r e a s i n g r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n of the oiPganisation of production but a l s o 
because of the increasing opportunities existing outside the workplace f o r 
(26) 
meaningful social experiences.^ ' I n i t s community context, moreover, t h i s 
type of orientation to work has been associated with residence i n a qualitatively 
d i f f e r e n t form of local community; one which lacks the solidarism and 
shared deprivations of the t r a d i t i o n a l working class community. Consequently 
(25) P. Furstenburg "Structural Changes i n the Working Class" Ch.7 "Social 
S t r a t i f i c a t i o n s " ed. J.A. Jackson, Cambridge I968 pp.145-174, see 
especially p . l 4 8 
(26) R. Dubin " I n d u s t r i a l Workers' Worlds: A Study of the Central L i f e Interests 
of I n d u s t r i a l Workers' Social Problems, 3, Jan.1956 pp.131-142 
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the process of "privatisai;ion", a style of l i f e laased upon family centredness, 
conspicuous consumption and the evaluation of self i n terms of impersonal 
pecuniary c r i t e r i a , i s seen to operate most clearly i n new working class 
r e s i d e n t i a l areas divorced from the t r a d i t i o n a l constraints of older and 
more established communities. 
The implications f o r the control of i n d u s t r i a l organisations of such 
changes i n the elements of working class social imagery are important. 
Furstenhurg concludes that the substance of such changes involve a movement 
towards the "less class-conscious and more self-conscious'" social attitudes 
of the privatised worker. Two possible lines of development i n manaigement -
worker relations stem from such changes. F i r s t l y , worker involvement i n 
the organisation w i l l tend to become more narrowly calculative and t y p i f i e d 
by a low degree of aff e c t , so that the saliency of work w i l l tend to decline. 
I n these terms management w i l l be evaluated by employees f o r i t s a b i l i t y 
to provide and maintain high monetary rewards: management w i l l be seinctioned^ 
increasingly where i t f a i l s to guarantee secure and well remunerated employ-
ment, and where i t s organisation of the production system f a i l s to eliminate 
obstacles to t h i s end. Moreover, as Goldthorpe suggests, i t follows that 
s a t i s f a c t i o n with an employer i n these terms can be combined with an acute 
dis s a t i s f a c t i o n with individual tasks: 
"Rather, our data would indicate that attitudes towards job ( i n the 
narrow sense) and f i r m can, i n certain cases, be quite sharply 
dissociated; that unrewarding and stressful work-roles need not lead 
t o a generally negative orientation towards the enterprise as an 
employer. "^ '^^ ^ 
and 
"To the extent that workers define t h e i r employment as essentially a 
means of acquiring a certain standard and style of l i v i n g outside of 
work, i t i s clearly possible f o r them to take a negative view of the 
(27) J.H. Gtoldthorpe et a l op.cit. p.76. 
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work-tasks they actually perfoim while at the same time appreciating 
a f i r m which offers pay and conditions that can bring a valued way of 
(28) 
l i f e w i t h i n t h e i r grasp."^ ' 
Under such conditions i t i s possible, therefore, to t a l k meaningfully 
of the worker's attachment to his f i r m as being conditional upon the 
economic opportunities afforded to him by employment and managerial policies. 
Further, i t suggests that given such orientations towards work, effective 
control i s secured i n part where a congruence exists between such 
expectations from work and the level of remuneration offered by the 
organisation. 
The second l i n e of development stemming from changes i n working-class 
social consciousness relates to the manner i n which the calculative 
involvement of the "privatised" worker, expresses i t s e l f , and the implicationsii 
of t h i s f o r management-labour relatipns. I n t h i s context i t i s necessary 
to consider the impact of changing expectations of manual workers upon the 
t r a d i t i o n a l system of co l l e c t i v e bargaining i n t h i s country. Two b r i e f 
points can be made here. Broadly speaking, the substance of recent 
commentaries on the•iriciderice; of i n d u s t r i a l c o n f l i c t relates to the propensity 
of the B r i t i s h i n d u s t r i a l relations system f o r c o s t - i n f l a t i o n i n specific 
industries, a si t u a t i o n induced as much by the "strategies of independence" 
of workpeople at plant level as by the indugency of managenent. Of equal 
importance, however, as Turner suggests, i s the f a i l u r e of the t r a d i t i o n a l 
system of control to accommodate new employee expectations with regard to 
issues outside the sphere of pay-determination, issues r e l a t i n g to the 
security of employment and earnings, d i f f e r e n t i a l s between the status of 
blue and white-collared workers i n employment concerning rights and benefits, 
and p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n managerial decision-making where such decisions have a 
(28) I b i d p.79. 
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bearing upon the interests of employees. 
Such facets of the calculative involvement of the privatized worker 
are by no means inconsistent M t h what Selig Perlman claims to be 
descriptive of the psychology of the worker: a consciousness of scarcity 
of employment and a desire not only to protect, but to control and even 
"own" the Job.^^^^^ But such a l i m i t e d orientation may be more extensive 
i n scope that i s f i r s t imagined. Indeed the instrumentalism of the modern 
i n d u s t r i a l worker exhibits i t s e l f not only as a concern with the level of 
rewards, but also with t h e i r s t a b i l i t y and with the security of employment. 
The s i t u a t i o n i s aptly summarised by Turner when he notes that possible 
changes i n the .^expectations of manual workers are best expressed i n two 
ideas: that wages? should be " f a i r " i n comparative terms, and that the 
performance of a job establishes property rights i n i t . ^ ^ ^ ^ 
Such a s i t u a t i o n seems hardly surprising when the manual worker i n 
growth industries has developed expectations of, and has been accorded, 
continuing annual wage increases not unlike those received by his white-
collared counterpart. This i s not to say that wage d i f f e r e n t i a l s between 
manual and non-manual workers have necessarily narrowed, however; nor does 
i t imply that differences which exist i n respect of other conditions of 
employment between these two groups have declined. The r e l a t i v e l y 
substantial improvements i n the economic status of manual workers, therefore, 
might be described as an oblique compensation f o r a continuing i n f e r i o r i t y 
i n the d i s t r i b u t i o n of "f r i n g e " benefits, promotion p o s s i b i l i t i e s , s t a b i l i t y 
of earnings and security of employment compared with the non-manual " s t a f f " 
employee. What t y p i f i e s the contemporary manual worker above a l l i s that, 
i n spite of economic advancement, he remains, as Purstenberg notes, plant-
bound and production-bound to a r e l a t i v e l y high degree. ^'^'•''^  
(2C9) S. Perlman "A Theory of the Labour Movement" Kelley, 1949. 
(30) H.A. Turner op.cit. p. 18. 
(3-l) P. Purstenburg op.cit. 
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Moreover, i t seems unlikely , that the involvanent of the instrumentally 
oriented manual worker w i l l be s a t i s f i e d merely by a passive acceptance of 
the work s i t u a t i o n and the economic environment as t h i s i s defined f o r them 
by management i n individual plants. The educational development of 
manual workers coupled with an increasing freedom of consumer choice made 
possible by improved standards of l i v i n g may well imply an informed 
appreciation by the "privatised" worker of the benefits of economic 
development, a goal towaj^ds which they, as much as managanent, may be anxious 
to move. I n t h i s sense i t appears that such workers w i l l increasingly 
demand the r i g h t not only to be treated " f a i r l y " by comparison with other 
more privile g e d groups i n the work situation, but also w i l l expect the right 
to have some say. i n the determination of the economic future of the fir m by 
p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n a widening range of decisions with management. 
This l a s t point i s important. Allan Flanders has argued convincingly 
f o r a re-apprai',sal of classical theories of trade unions as defined, f o r 
example, by the Webbs i n terms of t h e i r role as simple bargaining 
instruments over the price of labour. Collective bargaining as a social 
i n s t i t u t i o n i s more extensive and more complex than t h i s to him; of 
par t i c u l a r importance i n his argument i s the role of the trade union as an 
i n s t i t u t i o n f o r regulating labour management and managerial discretion, and 
(V) 
f o r i t s j o i n t p a r t i c i p a t i o n with management i n job regulation.^ Flanders 
i s careful to point out that j o i n t regulation need not be ec[uated with 
j o i n t administration, f o r administration i s the unique function o f management. 
Nevertheless the crucial cfuality of the i n s t i t u t i o n of collective bstrgaining 
i s t o make possible the j o i n t determination of procedural and substcintive 
rules by management and labour both to "provide guidance i n areas of 
managerial discretion" and to"deal with the c o n f l i c t between the divergent 
interests of management and unions". When collective bargaining broadens 
(32) A. Flanders "Collective Bargaining: a Theoretical Analysis" B r i t i s h 
Journal of In d u s t r i a l Relations Vol.6, No.l March 1968, pp.1-26. 
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i t s scope from regulating markets to regulating managanent, i t changes i t s 
character because d i f f e r e n t demands are made upon i t . 
To siimmarise the discussion on the subject of changes i n the 
expectations and opportunities of manual workers, we can say that these 
focus increasingly upon the expectations of continually r i s i n g standards 
of l i v i n g , stable earnings and, underlying these, expectations as producers 
to be consulted and, where relevsint, to participate i n the making of decisions 
which have an influence upon the ways i n which these goals can be attained. 
The p o s s i b i l i t y of considering q u a l i t a t i v e changes i n the scope of 
col l e c t i v e bargaining as an instrument of control w i l l depend, therefore, 
i n part upon the analysis of the.-.ways i n which employees evaluate t h e i r 
work situations, and f o r t h i s purpose, as we have suggested, the "social 
action" approach can be u t i l i s e d . 
I f , i n fact manual workers today tend increasingly to evaluate 
employment more i n terms of t h e i r own individual needs and less i n terms of 
the social groups of which they are part, i t follows that there w i l l be a 
growing preoccupation with personal and si t u a t i o n a l l y determined problems 
at plant l e v e l . The implications f o r t h i s f o r current i n d u s t r i a l practices 
ha-s-.! been noted by the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Einployers.'' 
(33') 
Associations i n i t s report^ ' and i n the Government White Paper " I n Place 
of S t r i f e - A Policy f o r I n d u s t r i a l Relations"^"^^^ I n t h e i r discussions 
of the defects of contemporaiy B r i t i s h i n d u s t r i a l relations, both comment 
upon the inadequacy of the "formal system"_of predominantly industry-wide 
c o l l e c t i v e agreements f o r meeting matters of common concern to employees 
and employers. Paragraphs 16 and 17 of the White Paper, f o r example, 
contain the assertions that: 
(33) Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations 1965-68 
Cmnd 3623, H.M.S.O. I 968 . 
(34) " I n Place of S t r i f e - a Policy f o r I n d u s t r i a l Relations" Dept. f o r 
Employment and Productivity. Cmdn 3888, H.M.S.O. I969 . 
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"Too often employees have f e l t that major decisions d i r e c t l y concerning 
them were being taken at such a high level that the decision-makers 
were out of reach and unable to understand the human concequences of 
t h e i r actions. Decisions have been taken to close down plants 
without consultation Outdated social distinctions between hourly-
paid employees and those on s t a f f conditions have been perpetuated 
(Para. 16) 
and 
"The combined effect of such defects i s to increase the fe e l i n g of majiy 
employees that they have no real stake i n the enterprise f o r which 
they work." (Para. I7) 
Given the problem, a problem which i s l i k e l y to increase where market 
demands imply sweeping technological and administrative changes, i t i s not 
r 
surprising that "the ref d"rm of our collective bargaining system has been 
posed i n terms of an extension and formalisation of the negotiation of 
comprehensive company or plant agreements to complement national, industry-
wide agreements dealing with the settlement of basic wage rates and other, 
conditions of employment. The advantages of such a two-tier system of 
c o l l e c t i v e bargaining f o r the purposes of the present argument appear to l i e 
i n the opportunities provided by localised bargaining, and especially 
productivity bargaining, f o r instrumentally oriented workpeople to hold a 
direct stake i n the efficiency of the production system to which t h e i r 
incomes are linked. The advantages both to the employee and to the employer 
have been summarised by Ross as follows: 
"The sense of being i n control, to somefegree, of one's own terms and 
conditions of employment w i l l tend not only to develop greater 
s a t i s f a c t i o n a l l round but also to encourage a more responsible approach 
to wages issues by the parties concerned within the f i r m I n 
p a r t i c u l a r the system w i l l give greater f l e x i b i l i t y and allow wages to 
be more closely adjusted to the position of the-f irm.... .In t h i s 
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di r e c t i o n , a further advantage i s that i t w i l l tend to secure 
more ready acceptance by labour of the need f o r change and adaptation." 
(35) 
and 
"Its'advantages from the point of view of employer-employee relations... 
..spring from the fact that i t requires the provision of f u l l 
information to employees, and, thus, not only increases the sense of 
partnership i n a j o i n t enterprise, but strengthens"the forces making 
f o r more e f f i c i e n t management. ^ associating employees with 
discussions of business policy, i t heightens t h e i r f e e l i n g of 
involvement i n the A f f a i r s of the f i r m and strengthens co-operative 
attitudes on t h e i r part."^^^^ 
Perhaps the most important aspect of such developments i n the scope 
of c o l l e c t i v e bargaining, however, i s that, unlike conventional piecemeal 
agreements, productivity bargaining requires that proposed changes be 
comprehensive and mutually determined by both sides, and so formulated to 
ensure that- both sides benefit by the agreement. Such agreements, f i n a l l y , 
suggest implications f o r the v a l i d i t y of current., sociological approaches to 
i n d u s t r i a l relations which frequently assume that the d i s t r i b u t i o n of 
power, prestige and income i n business organisations i s f i x e d and scarce, 
and that a fundamental dichotomy exists between the interests of the parties 
concerned. Under the conditions which we have described above, business 
organisations may be conceptualised conversely as expanding; rather than 
s t a t i c , economies and perceived as such by both management and labour. 
Under these conditions the economic interests of both may be seen to 
converge "rather than to diverge. I t i s i n t h i s sense that the conceptual-
i s a t i o n of the enterprise inevitably as a "zero-sum" model may be questioned. 
This i s a matter to which we shall return l a t e r . 
(3-5) N. Ross "Workshop Bargaining: a New Approach" (Pabian Tract 366) 
(36i) I b i d 
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3. THE CONTEXT OF CONTROL; OCCUPATION AUD CONTROL 
The problem of control can be approached, f i n a l l y , from the standpoint 
of i n s t i t u t i o n a l influences upon individual orientations to work on the 
one hand, and i n s t i t u t i o n a l influences upon the scope of collective bargaining 
on the other. I n t h i s context the existence of occupational ideologies, 
including managerial ideologies, must be regarded as constituting a, separate 
referent f o r analysis. 
The case f o r a separate consideration of occupational and managerial 
values arises, therefore, from the consideration of how f a r occupational 
membership influences individual attitudes of job and work; how f a r , i n fact,', 
i t contributes towards a d e f i n i t i o n of the worker's self-concept of his role. 
For our purposes, i t s usefulness can be indicated i n the following ways. 
One possible l i n e of enquiry concerns the extent to which the ideology 
of the occupation (assuming i t to exist) i n h i b i t s the process of p r i v a t i s a t i o n 
or modifies the mode of i t s expression. Cannon, f o r example, suggests that: 
" I f embourgeoisement implies concern with individual interests and 
aspirations then i t i s l i k e l y to be paralleled by a reduction i n the 
influence of the working group." 
But, 
"Would i t not be possible f o r an occupation, through the social relations 
that i t encourages, to maintain i t s influence upon the ideology of i t s 
m_embers? The arguments had neglected the occupation i t s e l f as a 
variable, p a r t i a l l y determining the l i f e pattern and outlook of i t s 
(37) 
members."^ ' 
The compositor's income, expenditure patterns and aspirations appear, 
as Cajmon notes to be those of a worker undergoing embourgeoisement - yet 
his ideology, i n terms of class and p o l i t i c a l a f f i l i a t i o n s i s more radical 
than t h a t found amongst the s k i l l e d working class i n general. I n explaining 
t h i s phenomenon. Cannon draws attention to the existence of a powerful 
(37) I.e. Cannon "Ideology and Occupational Community: a Study of 
Compositors" Sociology Vol.1 No.2, 1967 p.166. 
- 84 -
occupational community whose existence depends i n part upon a favourable 
socio-technical system. The function of the occupational community here 
i s to provide a locus f o r the development of solidary primary social 
relationships, s u f f i c i e n t l y strong to offset t h e i r transfer to the community 
outside work. The same point i s made by Hamilton i n his study of the 
behaviour and values of s k i l l e d workers. Here too, Hamilton finds that the 
income of s k i l l e d workers appears unrelated to values. Such workers form 
something of an autonomous status group within a fsemi-autonomous subcommunity. 
With regard t o the American s k i l l e d worker, Hamilton suggests that with his 
own status satisfactions, r e l a t i v e job security and t r a d i t i o n a l style of l i f e , 
(38) 
such a worker has l i t t l e incentive to t r y f o r alternative sets of l i f e goals.^ 
A second l i n e of enquiry, related to the f i r s t , concerns the pervasiveness . 
of the occupational culture. I n general terms t h i s refers to the relevance 
of occupational values f o r the control of work situations, specified through 
a variety of behavioural norms covering apprenticeship, demarcation and 
manning, seniority and job r i g h t s . At the same time the existence of shared 
norms, values and beliefs may define goals concerning the types of satisfaction 
to be derived from job and work: thus the desire, f o r example, to maintain a 
cra f t culture i s reflected i n the demand f o r the retention of freedom and 
autonomy i n work and f o r the defence of a t r a d i t i o n a l sph>ere of competence i n 
spite of the requirements of market and technological change. I n t h i s sense 
the existence of an occupational subculture has crucial implications f o r both 
worker and management. The disruption of an occupational community may 
provide the source of considerable individual disatisfaction with work; from 
management's point of view, attempts to introduce changes which vio l a t e the 
values and moral codes of union members may be most severely resisted. As 
(3&) R.P. Hamilton "The Behaviour and Values of Skilled Workers" i n A. Shostak 
and W. Gomberg "Blue Collar World" Prentice-Hall I964 pp.42-57. 
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Sadler has noted i n his discussion of the outcome of the Pawley productivity 
agreement: 
"Perhaps the significant lesson of t h i s study f o r the future of 
productivity bargaining i n automated plants i s that the resistance most' 
d i f f i c u l t to overcome was resistance of a " c u l t u r a l " nature For 
example, among the c r a f t union members i t was f e l t that to defend t h e i r 
f i e l d of work against trespass was a duty rather than an act of s e l f -
i n t e r e s t . Management at Fawley recognised that resistance on such 
grounds could not be "bought o f f " and devoted a great deal of e f f o r t to 
persuasion where such issues were rsiised."^^^^^ 
On the other hand the planning, introduction and processing of changes 
i n the production system by management i n ways which permit the maintenance 
of occupational .values (expressed iri-the behaviour of work groups or trade 
unions) may well be a crucial aspect i n the s t a b i l i t y of the control process 
of the enterprise. 
A t h i r d l i n e of enquiry prompted by the analysis of occupational aspects 
of control relates to the ends pursued by the various occupational groups 
i n the enterprise and the degree of congruency which exists between these ends. 
The complex pattern of inter-occupational patterns which characterises typ i c a l 
plant social systems contains both unifying and diversifying features. Whilst 
i t i s true that a l l employees share similar goals by v i r t u e of occupying a 
common market position as' sellers of labour power, considerable differences 
exist on the basis of s k i l l , involvement i n work, disp e n s i b i l i t y to management, 
status and reward. Such differences obscure the broader ends which are 
commonly held. 
With t h i s b r i e f discussion of the occupational aspects of control we 
conclude the analysis of the control process viewed from the stand-point of the 
individual actor and his occupational group. At t h i s level of analysis we 
have sought to show that: 
(3*9) P. Sadler "Social Research on Automation" S.S.R.C., Heinemann I968 p .40 
(40) On the question of inter-occupational divisions see, f o r example, W.H. 
Scott et al "Coal and Conflict" Liverpool University Press, 1963. 
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(a) The investigation of actors' expectations of job, work and employment 
may be u t i l i s e d i n the development of propositions about the nature 
of social integration i n the business enterprise. The exploration 
of individual adjustment to work, however, requires investigation of 
the social and personal environment of the actors concerned, involving 
some appreciation of the constraining effects of the occupational, 
community and social class contexts i n which actors move. 
(b) The objective of developing propositions about the nature of social 
integration i n the enterprise i s to illuminate one important aspect 
of the process of enterprise control: how f a r the adaptation of the 
organisation to i t s external environment i s constrained by the 
behaviour of i t s members. Analysis at t h i s l e v e l , therefore, draws 
attention to the values and interests of occupational groups of 
participants as these impinge upon management's a b i l i t y to secure the 
effective achievement of the firm's productive task. I n t h i s way, 
analysis of the mode of social integration i n the organisation sheds 
l i g h t upon the wider process of system integration: the overall 
response of the enterprise to i t s environmental demands. This i s 
not to say that the quality of systemsintegration i s determined by 
the mode of social integration, since the former i s influenced by 
factors located at the level of the enterprise as a whole (technical, 
market and budgetary constraints outside the enterprise). What we 
argue i s that the t o t a l response of the organisation to i t s production 
task i s determined i n part by factors peculiar to the groups employed 
i n the enterprise whose interactions, values, interests and expectations 
are more properly discussed at the level of the social integration of 
the enterprise. 
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4. The Concept of Control; System and Social Integration 
Discussion of the two main contextual features of the control process 
so f a r - organisation and actQiP - suggests that a necessEUPy i n t e r r e l a t i o n 
exists between functional (and systems) perspectives of control on ther^ 
one hand and social action perspectives on the other. The dimensions of 
these perspectives have been outlined and introduced into the analysis of 
the interrelationships between systems and social integration i n the 
business enterprise. 
I n t h i s discussion the control process of the enterprise i s seen to 
respond to two major contextual influences: 
( a ) The f i r s t derives from environmental influences upon the enterprise as 
a whole. These influences originate i n the technical, market and 
social environment of the f i r m and function i n ways which set broad 
l i m i t a t i o n s upon the mode of systems integration possible f o r the 
successful achievement of the overall production task. Management's 
d e f i n i t i o n of what t h i s task constitutes and how best i t might be 
achieved occursf. within these parameters. Failure to observe these 
l i m i t a t i o n s may well carry cost implications f o r the business success 
of the enterprise.^^•'•^ Moreover, consideration of these enterprise 
environmental influences permits some delineation of the fvinctional 
imperatives which a l l business enterprises are required to meet. 
In t h i s context the control process refers to the arrangements made 
by management for the achievement of the production task where the 
control of work t a k e s the form of various technical and organisational 
constraints b u i l t into the role structure of the enterprise. 
(b) The second derives from environmental influences upon the individual 
actor and upon groups of actors as incumbents of work roles. I f the 
economic, technical and administrative arrangements described i n the 
(41) J. Woodward " I n d u s t r i a l Organisation" Oxford, I965. 
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previous paragraph impose l i m i t s upon social action, i t i s also the 
case that the s e n s i t i v i t y of individuals to these lim i t a t i o n s (or 
t h e i r desire to change them) i s mediated by the effects of 
membership of d i s t i n c t i v e social groupings such as community, 
occupation and social class. I n t h i s context the control process 
refers to the arrangements made between management and other 
occupational groups within the enterprise f o r the j o i n t regulation: 
of work i n line, with the expectations of the groups concerned. 
The choice of t h i s p a r t i c u l a r frame of reference i s not arbitrary. 
By emphasising systems constants.owe seek to delineate those functional 
requirements which must be met by a l l participants i f the enterprise i s to 
survive. I n t h i s sense we see the control .system as being i n part 
responsive to such systems pressures and functioning to maintain the 
organisation over time. By emphasising the role of interacting values 
between management and labour we are concerned to i l l u s t r a t e the simultaneous 
existence of converging and diverging interests between them, the former 
making f o r s t a b i l i t y of control through shared values, the l a t t e r making f o r 
change through c o n f l i c t . By emphasising the role of individual actors i n 
the system we are concerned to show how established patterns may be 
legitimised or changed from below. 
I n summary i t i s f e l t that the analysis of forces impinging upon the 
control process and subsequently influencing i t s operation must include 
explanations located at both levels of the enterprise as a system and actors 
who participate i n these systems. I n so doing we have also treated the fir m 
as a p o t e n t i a l l y expanding economy wherein the uses of power at the disposal 
of key in t e r a c t i n g groups i s directed i n part towards the solution of the 
firm's production problems i n ways which expand the j o i n t power of a l l parties 
i n a mutually rewarding way. Moreover such an analysis demonstrates the 
continued existence of sectional interests which themselves affect the extent 
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to which j o i n t goals can be pursued and thus determine the boundaries of 
j o i n t action. The f i n a l area ill-uminated by the use of t h i s frame of 
reference concerns the nature of j o i n t regulation within the control system. 
We see the control system's function as the regulation of divis i v e c o n f l i c t 
and the encoura^ng of co-operation by the allocation of power. This 
implies the view that the control process involves both areas of b i l a t e r a l 
control and areas where either management or labour has uni l a t e r a l control. 
Of p a r t i c u l a r interest here i s the extent of b i l a t e r a l rule - making as an 
important source of s t a b i l i t y i n plant control systems. Thus i f one 
important aspect of control i s i t s capacity to contain disputes without 
severe disruption i t i s necessary to examine the extent to which the mode 
of rule-making i s legitimised by participants, and the extent to which the 
process of rule-making i s inclusive of a l l p a r t i c i p a t i n g groups. Moreover 
t h i s emphasis upon the s t a b i l i s i n g features of the control system encompasses 
also the .st-ructural framework w i t h i n Which the process of control occurs; 
hence the need to locate those aspects of the technical and organisational 
system of the enterprise which f a c i l i t a t e the continuing s t a b i l i t y of the 
control system i n spite of changes i n the environmental danands of enterprise 
and actor. I t i s i n order to deal with these problems that we argue f o r 
some degree of theoretical integration i n the study of in d u s t r i a l relations. 
So f a r we have outlined the case f o r a frame of reference which integrates 
the perspectiveis of enterprise and actor; we must now expand our discussion 
of the dimensions of control to deal with the problems of consensus and 
c o n f l i c t , continuityand cheinge i n the enterprise. I f we have established 
the contextual framework of control, we have yet to describe the operation 
of the control process i t s e l f . This we shall proceed to do i n the f i n a l 
chapter of Part I . 
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CHAPTER 3 
CONSENSUS. COOPERATION AMD CONFLICT: THE PROCESS OP CONTROL • 
• I n the f i r s t chapter we sought to establish a general case f o r some 
degree of theoretical integration i n I n d u s t r i a l Sociology. By o u t l i n i n g 
a contextual framework f o r the analysis of control i n the second chapter 
the broad parameters of control were indicated, and i n t h i s way one l i n e of 
theoretical u n i f i c a t i o n between funct i o n a l i s t and social action perspectives 
suggested. I n t h i s chapter i t i s intended to consider the dynamics of the 
control process i n more d e t a i l but along lines prompted by the analysis i n 
Chapter 2. Consequently the continuities between the structural contexts 
of control and the operation of t h i s process w i l l be :emphasised but i n ways 
which w i l l suggest other areas f o r theoretical u n i f i c a t i o n between the 
levels of system and social integration i n the business enterprise. 
Our focal concerns here were introduced i n the concluding remarks of the 
previous chapter. Given that a primary functional requirement of the 
business enterprise i s to maintain i t s e l f i n existence and to grow, and 
management's task one of making s u f f i c i e n t revenue to meet l i a b i l i t i e s , i t 
follows that one function of the control process i s the management of 
environmental change. The effects of variations i n product markets upon 
organisational structure and behaviour have been assessed, for example, by 
Burns and Stalker who have demonstrated that uncertainty i n the business task 
of the enterprise and the recognition by management of the need f o r continuing 
product innovation have crucial implications f o r the development of network 
management and f l u i d systems of administrativfe control. ^''"^  However the 
process of defining the firm's overall production goals influences the 
pattern of technical and organisational constraints upon behaviour to the 
( l ) T. Burns and G. M. Stalker "The Management of Innovation" Tavistock I9 6 I . 
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level of individual work roles. I t i s i n t h i s sense that the analysis of 
system integration i n the enterprise must include some consideration of the 
appropriateness of role structure f o r the effective achievement of the firm's 
production task. 
Moreover; as we have seen, the analysis of control extends to considerat-
ions^df 'the q i i a l i t y of social integration i n the enterprise. The effectiveness 
of social integration depends i n part upon the content of work roles and i n 
part upon the rewards of employment. The levels of individual job and work 
sat i s f a c t i o n are functions of the scope of work roles, and the overall 
a b i l i t y of the enterprise to achieve i t s production task may well depend 
upon the effective adjustment of these roles along lines compatible with the 
personal and social requirements of employees. Prom management's perspective 
the necessity to secure the consent of i t s subordinates to i t s authority, to 
legitimise i t s objectives, i s cr u c i a l . I n t h i s context the achievement of 
s o l i d a r i t y between management and workers must be regarded as a prime 
functional imperative of the enterprise and i t s management. 
I t i s , however, over the vexed question of what constitutes " s o l i d a r i t y " 
w i t h i n the enterprise that opinion divides. Typically, as we have seen, the 
controversy about the degree to which the interests and values of management 
and labour are compatible distinguishes the "Functionalist" and "Human 
Relations School" on the one hand from the "Conflict of Interest" school on 
(2) 
the other. Increasingly, however, i t i s to the question of what 
conditions are conducive to a greater or lesser degree of c o n f l i c t that other 
writers have turned. As Stone puts i t : 
.";'....we need to state our theoretical problem i n studying industry not 
i n terms of polar concepts l i k e s o l i d a r i t y versus anomie, or cooperation 
versus c o n f l i c t , but rather i n terms of the processes of sociation and 
dissociation which result i n types or forms of relationships varying 
(2) See Chapter 1. 
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from one extreme of c o n f l i c t to the other extreme of s o l i d a r i t y . 
We should t a l k of both sociative and dissociative factors within the 
same general framework."^^^ 
Our view i s that the concept of s o l i d a r i t y requires refinement along 
lines which indicate how the common standards of participants coexist with 
t h e i r c o n f l i c t i n g interests to produce stable patterns of control upon which 
the enterprise depends f o r the effective achievement of i t s production tasks. 
I n t h i s chapter we shall be concerned, therefore, with the extension of the 
frame of reference to provide points of reference f o r the investigation of 
the nature of social integration i n the enterprise with particular emphasis 
upon the interrelationships between s o l i d a r i t y , power and a stable process 
of control. By focusing upon the determinants of stable control we seek to 
shed f u r t h e r l i g h t upon the relations between system and social integration, 
but t h i s time i n ways which permit the integration of " c o n f l i c t " perspectives 
with those already introduced i n the previous chapter. 
1. INTERDEPEKDENCE AED SELF-MAIMTENANCE IN SOCIAL SYSTEMS 
The question of what constitutes a stable process of control may be 
approached from at. least two directions. I n i t i a l l y i t can be argued that 
such a condition obtains where some congruency exists between the functional 
requirements of the enterprise f o r self-maintenance and growth and the 
economic, social and personal requirements of individual actors within 
d i s t i n c t i v e occupational groups. Alternatively one could say that s t a b i l i t y 
i s achieved where disruptive c o n f l i c t i s minimised and cooperation encouraged 
i n ways which permit groups of actors to maximise t h e i r own interests through 
contributing to the achievement of the firm's production goals. Effective 
control i s realised where one or both of these conditions are met. 
The attainment of a stable pattern of effective control i s necessarily 
problematical i n the context of business organisation. This stems from the 
fact that the employment relationship involves both convergent and divergent 
(3) R.C. Stone op.cit. p.l22 
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interests, and that one crucial aspect of management-worker relations implies 
a basic c o n f l i c t of interest over the d i s t r i b u t i o n of rewards, authority of 
management, work organisation and the conditions (and security) of employment. 
Conflicts of interest are endemic to, and characteristic of, such 
relationships. 
At the same time i t i s necessary f o r participants to cooperate i n order 
to achieve whatever conprises t h e i r common objectives. As Tabb and Goldfarb 
state: 
"The extent of t h e i r readiness to cooperate within the system deipends on 
the degree to which t h i s a c t i v i t y advances t h e i r self-interest and 
enables them to achieve t h e i r desired objectives. However, while each 
one i s pursuing his own objectives, they must also manage to achieve 
t h e i r common objectives."^^^ 
For some writers the need to understand what unites the objectives and 
a c t i v i t i e s of participants whose interests may well c o n f l i c t i s regarded as 
crucial i n s e t t l i n g certain ambiguities i n sociological research. Horowitz, 
f o r example, i n seeking to distinguish the concepts of consensus ajid c o n f l i c t , 
argues f o r the development of a theory of cooperation along these lines: 
"What i s required at t h i s juncture i s a more adequate sociological theory 
of cooperation; a s t i p u l a t i o n of the conditions of that minimum set of 
beli e f s about man and his social universe that i s consonant with 
continued survival and growth "^ ^^  
and 
"The concept of cooperation i s essentially the programming of common 
stajidards i n a world of c o n f l i c t i n g interests- and even dif f e r e n t 
(7) 
notions as to what constitutes interests." ' 
(4) See f o r example A. Fox "A Sociology of Work i n Industry" pp. 135-181 
(5) J« Tabb & A. Goldfarb "Workers' Participation i n Management Expectations 
and Experience" Pergamon Press, I97O p.30. 
(6) I.L. Horowitz op.cit. p.l88 
(7) I b i d p.188 . 
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This same emphasis upon the implications of cooperative action i s reflected 
also i n the work of Chamberlain and Kuhn whose concept of "conjunctive 
bargaining" describes the relationship where union and management come to 
agreement through sheer functional necessity. Thus they argue: 
"Collective bargaining i n most instances today requires that some 
agreement be reached between the parties. .However prolonged the 
s t r i k e to s e t t l e disputes over divergent interests, some agreement must 
ultimately be forthcoming i f collective bargaining continues. Thus 
neither party i s independent under collective bargaining. Neither can 
perform i t s function without the other When collective bargaining 
i s accepted the great change which takes place i s the creation of 
two organisations, i n one sense independent of each other but i n another 
sense mutually dependent. For each, the achievement of i t s own 
function i s dependent upon a working relationship with the other. This 
fact of mutual dependence cannot be overstressed, f o r i t i s perhaps the 
(8) 
most fundamental aspect of modern i n d u s t r i a l society."^ 
.1 
I n t h i s way Chamberlain and Kuhn establish the functional necessity of such 
j o i n t relationships f o r the control of work; at the same time they point to 
the implications of such relationships f o r the actors involved. Thus: 
"Neither party can secure i t s objectives without a j o i n t working 
relationship. Reciprocally the terms of that relationship define the 
extent to which each attains i t s objectives. The terms of the 
relationship, that i s to say, deal with matters of. divergent interests 
and each party secures i t s interests to the extent of i t s r e l a t i v e 
(9) 
bargaining power. 
I n t h i s sense the attainment of individual or sub-group goals i s seen to 
depend upon cooperation rather than c o n f l i c t per se. 
(8) N.W. Chamberlain and J.W. Kuhn "Conjunctive and Cooperative Bargaining" 
i n "Collective Bargaining" ed. A. Flanders Penguin 1969* p.318. 
(9) I b i d p.319 
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Moreover, these writers emphasise the crucial imperative that: 
" I n a j o i n t relationship which i s based on necessity, the extent to whichh 
either party or both parties can a t t a i n t h e i r objectives i s dependent 
upon business performance. The business performance which attaches to 
the company as a whole defines what the parties w i l l divide between 
them No matter how strong the bargaining power of one r e l a t i v e to 
the other, the advantages which each caji derive or the costs which each 
seeks to shrug o f f are dependent on t o t a l performance of. the enterprise. 
.. At the extrieme, business f a i l u r e means i t s complete incapacity to satisfy 
the objectives of both owner-managers and union member employees.^^^^ 
I n t h i s sense the scope of cooperation i s recognised to be li m i t e d by the 
efficiency of the enterprise i n meeting i t s production and commercial goals. 
Since business performance i s i t s e l f p a r t l y conditional upon the effects of 
external constraints impinging upon the enterprise, i t follows that whilst 
the success of j o i n t action i s a determinant of business performance, 
reciproe^illy the external determinants of business perfonnance also function 
to structure the nature of j o i n t action between the parties concerned. Thus: 
"Business performance fixes the boundaries within which each party can 
achieve i t s objectives, but i s i t s e l f l i m i t e d by the relationship 
existing between these parties.^'''•'•^ 
Consequently i t spears necessary to define the concept of s o l i d a r i t y and the 
nature of social integration i n the business enterprise i n ways which 
recognise the existence of j o i n t action between managonent ajid labour as an 
important prerequisite f o r s t a b i l i t y of control; further, i n ways which 
recognise the nature of cooperation as the key process by which s o l i d a r i t y 
i s achieved and maintaiiaed. Effective cooperation i s achieved not so much by 
the c l a r i f i c a t i o n of the goals of the enterprise and the motivation of actors 
(12) ~ by management to comply with i t s requirements^ rather that cooperation 
(10) I b i d p. 321. 
(11) I b i d p. 322. 
(12) This would represent the d e f i n i t i o n of s o l i d a r i t y provided by the Human 
Relations School. 
- 96 -
i s seen by actors to provide the essential means by which personal objectives 
can be attained. As Chamberlain and Kuhn put i t : 
"The basis f o r cooperative bargaining i s the fact ihat. each party i s 
dependent on the other and, as a matter of f a c t , can achieve i t s 
objectives more e f f e c t i v e l y i f i t wins the support of the other. This 
means that when one party i s seeking a change the better to secure some 
objective, i t i s more l i k e l y to succeed i n i t s design i f i t anticipates 
what objections may be raised by the other party, on whose cooperation 
i n the matter the degree of i t s own success d e p e n d s . ( t h e i T i t a l i c s ) 
The same argument to the effect that cooperation should be seen as a 
crucial aspect of the control process i s found i n the recent work of Eric 
Rhenman whose theory of i n d u s t r i a l c o n f l i c t i s based upon the notion that a 
s i t u a t i o n characterised by pure c o n f l i c t rarely occurs: 
"Much more usual i s some kind of c o n f l i c t and a need to cooperate: one 
party's chances of achieving his goals depend p a r t l y on the a b i l i t y to 
win over his opponent and par t l y on the a b i l i t y to cooperate with him." 
(14) 
Rhenman summaj:'izes his theory as follows: . 
(a) "The survival of the organisation i s a commori'-goal of a l l stakeholders.-
(b) '-This creates interdependence between .the stakeholders. • 
(c) "Coordination i s thus required and often f e l t to be urgent.' 
(d) "The.stakeholders also have c o n f l i c t i n g goals and t h i s often Leads, rto 
a conf-lict of interests - usually f e l t just as strongly. 
(e) I t f a l l s to management to arrange a resolution of these conf l i c t s so that 
the necessary coordination can be attained. To a great extent the 
resolution of c o n f l i c t has been i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d . I n other words i t 
follows d e f i n i t e rules. 
(13) N.W. Chamberlain and J.W. Kuhn op.cit. p.323-324. 
(14) E. Rhenman. op.cit. p.36. 
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( f ) "One of the most important methods f o r resolving c o n f l i c t s . . . . .is j o i n t 
decision making. "^•'•^^ 
I n passing, i t should be noted that Rhenmem's model assumes that cooperation 
i n industry functions primarily to resolve c o r i f l i c t inherent i n i n d u s t r i a l 
relations. Quite apart from the question of the u t i l i t y of c o n f l i c t as an 
agent of change or as an instrument f o r the c l a r i f i c a t i o n of issues dividing 
management ajid labour^'''^^ we prefer to view the process of cooperation as 
being responsive not only to the c o n f l i c t i n g interests of the parties 
concerned, but also as existing to enhance the achievement of certain common 
interests. I n t h i s sense the process r e f l e c t s both unifying and diversifying 
characteristics of management-labour relationships. What unifies or 
d i v e r s i f i e s the parties, however, i s a matterv.for empirical investigation 
(17) 
w i t h i n specific i n d u s t r i a l contexts; nevertheless i t would appear to be an 
important aspect of the investigation of "conjunctive bargaining" to i d e n t i f y 
the existence of these converging and diverging characteristics, the former 
making f o r s t a b i l i t y at control through shared values, the l a t t e r making f o r 
change through.conflict. 
I t i s at t h i s point that we must return to the frame of reference 
introduced i n the previous chapter. For i f f . i t i s the case that the process 
of cooperation represents the principal means by which s o l i d a r i t y i s 
achieved and an adequate level of social integration maintained, the direction 
which the process takes depends c r i t i c a l l y upon the nature of systems 
constraints operating at the level of the enterprise as well as upon the 
nature of social constraints operating at the level of actors within t h e i r 
occupational groups. I t i s of particular concern to us, therefore, to locate 
the cooperative process, as the main instrument of control, w i t h i n parameters 
at the levels of system and actor and to trace the direction of change i n 
(15) I b i d p.54 
(16) On t h i s point see, f o r example, L. Coser "The Functions of Social Conflict" 
Routledge and Kegan Paul and -'.-The Free Press, 1956. 
(17) See Part I I of t h i s thesis 
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the pattern of bargaining as the result of pressures from above (systems 
constraints) and from below (social constraints). 
I t should be noted that the expanded model of the control system 
described i n the previous paragraph i s analogous to the use of co a l i t i o n 
models of the organisation introduced i n the f i r s t chapter by reference to 
/ • I Q\ 
the work of J.A.A. Van Doorn^ . I t was noted there that the mode of 
social integration i n the business enterprise i s similar i n some respects 
to that of the p o l i t i c a l c o a l i t i o n where interdependent groups enjoy a 
much higher degree of functional autonomy that would be characteristic of 
sect types of organisations ( i . e . religious or p o l i t i c a l organisations). 
Interactions between these groups assume the form of continuous bargaining 
and the result i s an inevitably imperfectly integrated social system. 
We can also refer to the theory of organisational decision-making 
developed by Cyert and March, a theory which also u t i l i s e s the concept of 
(19) 
the organisation as a c o a l i t i o n . These vxriters are pa r t i c u l a r l y 
concerned with the process by which organisations make decisions. They are 
equally concerned with the inadequacies of theories of individual choice -
inducements/contributions theory, f o r example^^^^ i n explaining t h i s process. 
I n i t i a l l y they note: 
"Organisations make decisions. They make decisions i n the same sense 
i n which individuals make decisions: the organisation as a whole 
behaves as though there existed a central co-ordination control system 
capable of dir e c t i n g the behaviour of the members of the organisation 
s u f f i c i e n t l y to allow the meaningful imputation of purpose to the 
t o t a l system."^^^-^ 
(18) J.A.A. Van Doorn op.cit. pp.111-130 
(19) R.M. Cyert and J.G. March "A Behavioural Theory of Organisational 
Ob-jectives" i n M. Haire ed. "Modern Organisation Theory" I967 Wiley 
(20) .See, £or example, H.A. Simon "Administrative Behaviour" Macmillan 1947. . 
(21) R.M. Cyert and J.G'- March op.cit. p.76. 
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Nevertheless, whilst i t i s true that business organisations include 
individual participants with d i f f e r i n g preference orderings who, through 
bargaining, enter in t o a c o a l i t i o n agreement which specifies a j o i n t 
preference ordering f o r the c o a l i t i o n , i t i s the case, they argue, that a 
j o i n t preference ordering i s not a p a r t i c u l a r l y good description of actual 
organisational goals, or of the process by which organisations take decisions. 
Thus whilst the objectives of the c o a l i t i o n are determined by bargaining 
there i s no assumption that such agreements can be readily transposed into 
anything other than vague and sometimes ambiguously shared objectives. 
The process of determining the objectives of the coa l i t i o n , however, i s 
considered from three major aspects: 
"The f i r s t of these i s the bargaining process by which the composition 
and general terms of the c o a l i t i o n are fi x e d . The second i s the 
int e r n a l organisational process of control by which objectives are 
st a b i l i s e d and elaborated. The t h i r d i s the process of adjustment to 
experience, by which c o a l i t i o n agreements are altered i n response to 
environmental changes."^^^^ 
On the nature of the bargaining process, Cyert and March clearly reject 
the view that organisational goal specification i s somehow the sole preserve 
of the entrepreneur who pays his employees the appropriate price f o r t h e i r 
adoption of the'brganisation" goal. Such payments may take the-form of 
monetary exchanges; s i g n i f i c a n t l y though they may also take the form of 
policy commitments binding upon both parties to the bargain. Increasingly, 
they claim, labour unions demand "side payments" i n the form of such policy 
commitments, thereby entering into., the area of managerial policy-making. 
I t i s i n t h i s sense that the concept of c o a l i t i o n becomes the relevant 
instrument f o r considerations of the organisational decision-taking process. 
. On the s t a b i l i s a t i o n and elaboration of c o a l i t i o n objectives they refer 
to the means by which the bargaining process becomes i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d . 
(22) R.M. Cyert and J.G. March op.cit. p.79. 
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These take two forms. The f i r s t i s the existence of mutual control-systems 
which imply some element of reciprocity i n control between superiors and 
subordinates. The second i s the existence of precedents which: 
" remove from conscious consideration many agreements, decisions and 
commitments that might well be subject to renegotiation i n an 
organisation without a memory. Past bargains become precedents f o r 
present situations As a. result of organisational precedents, 
objectives exhibit much greater s t a b i l i t y than would t y p i f y a pure 
(23) 
bargaining si t u a t i o n . " ^ ' 
F i n a l l y they note that whilst the demands made upon coalitions are 
st a b i l i z e d i n these ways, they are also influenced by the changing expectations 
of individual members, expressed i n the form of current aspiration levels 
based upon the past achievement and the past aspiration history of the 
individual himself and his reference group. I n t h i s context Cyert and March 
refer to the interrelationships between changes i n the environment of the 
organisation and changes i n the aspiration levels of members.. Environmental 
changes operate to determine the flow of resources to the organisation, 
thereby determining the incidence of bargaining. Thus: 
"When the environment outruns aspiration-level adjustment, the 
organisation secures, or at least has the p o t e n t i a l i t y of securing, 
resources i n excess of i t s demands The excess resources would not 
be subject to very general bargaining because they do not involve 
all o c a t i o n i n the face of scarcity. 
but: 
"When the environment becomes less favourable, organisational slack 
represents a cushion. Resource scarcity brings on renewed bargaining 
and tends to cut into the excess payments introduced during plusher 
times."^^^^ 
(23) I b i d p.84 
(24) I b i d p.86 
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Moreover the demands of the enterprise environment represent?but one set 
of constraints at work hereo The notion of the "attention-focus" of 
members of organisations suggests that individuals are sensitized to make 
par-;icular demands upon the organisation at particular times.' The number 
and v a r i e t y of these depends upon t h e i r involvement i n work and on the demands 
of t h e i r other commitments. The notion i s an interesting one since i t : 
" suggests one reason why organisations are successful i n surviving 
with a large set of unrationalised goals. They rarely see the 
c o n f l i c t i n g objectives simuUaneously The sequential attention to 
goals i s a simple mechanism. A,consequence of the mechanism i s that 
organisations ignore many contradictions that outsiders see as direct 
contradictions. They are contradictions only i f we imagine a well 
established j o i n t preference ordering or omniscient bargaining. 
(25) 
Neither condition exists i n an organisation."^ ' 
I t i s our contention that the concept of c o a l i t i o n characterises the 
nature of social integration and the dynamics of the control process i n 
i n d u s t r i a l organisations much more exactly than alternative conceptualisations 
based upon the exclusive use of either order of c o n f l i c t theories, functionalist 
or social action frameworks. In t h i s sense the dements of c o a l i t i o n theory 
presented above provide the basis of a more r e a l i s t i c framework for the 
analysis of control and social integration i n the business enterprise; i n 
t h i s sense also they reinforce our previous comments on the need for a 
d i s t i n c t i v e frame of reference drawing upon various theoretical perspectives 
i n an integrated way f d r the investigation of these processes. Thusr'.it 
seems necessary to approach the problem of control i n ways which emphasise 
the following factors as these are illuminated by the concept of c o a l i t i o n : 
(a) The m u l t i l a t e r a l nature of job and work control i n industry. The 
assumption that the balance of power i s inevitably a shared balance 
of power (though i n varying proportions i n d i f f e r e n t organisations). 
(25) Ibid p.87 
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(b) The piv o t a l role of bargaining as a.kqyarea of goal determination of 
organisational objectives. 
(c) The s t a b i l i s a t i o n of the control process as the result of the existence 
of shared interests and values of a l l c o a l i t i o n members, some of 
which may be codified. 
(d) The s t a b i l i s a t i o n of the control process as the result of the co a l i t i o n 
exhibiting a d i s t i n c t i v e pattern of c o n f l i c t between members. 
Typically, coalitions exhibit "criss-crossing" c o n f l i c t patterns: 
d i f f e r e n t occupational interest groups bargain separately with 
majiagement sequentially i n i n d u s t r i a l coalitions. Moreover, as we 
have seen, t h e i r demands may d i f f e r . I n t h i s sense i t i s d i f f i c u l t 
t o t a l k of a j o i n t preference ordering of a l l participants; "united 
f r o n t s " embracing a l l employees rarely develop. Consequently 
c o a l i t i o n c o n f l i c t patterns function to enhance the s t a b i l i t y of control. 
Moreover, not only i s c o n f l i c t exhibited segmentally i n coalitions, 
but i t ;is also u t i l i s e d by members instrumentally and r a t i o n a l l y to 
apply pressure to the pursuit of individual interests without 
permanent disruption of the coal i t i o n . Conflict which permanently 
disrupts i s a p o s s i b i l i t y , but i s the exceptional case rather than 
the norm i n i n d u s t r i a l coalitions. As Van Doorn puts i t : 
"There is.....a connexion between the units whose parts enjoy a 
considerable measure of functional autonomy - the c o a l i t i o n 
(.26) 
model - and a ra t i o n a l type of c o n f l i c t . " ^ ' 
(e) The location of the process of control w i t h i n parameters defining the 
di r e c t i o n of c o a l i t i o n agreements i n terms of changes i n the flow of 
resources to the organisation from i t s environment (systems constraints) 
and changes i n the expectations of actors who are members of the coal-
i t i o n (social constraints). These parameters were described i n 
(26) J.A.A. Van Doorn op.cit. p.118. 
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d e t a i l i n the previous chapter. The location of the control process 
conceptually as a key to o l f o r the analysis of the interrelationships 
between the processes of systems integration and social integration: 
thus the mode and r e l a t i v e s t a b i l i t y of internal enterprise control 
i n defining the pattern of cooperation ^diich exists between members 
of an i n d u s t r i a l c o a l i t i o n , and, , thereby, the Arm of social 
integration, has crucial implications f o r the a b i l i t y of the enterprise 
as a whole to meet i t s system requirements. This suggests that 
there may be appropriate forms of control f o r i n d u s t r i a l units i n 
par t i c u l a r market, technical and social contexts, 
( f ) The emphasis placed upon the process of cooperation as the major 
s t a b i l i s i n g element of social control systems. Such systems, as 
we have seen, consist of both centrifugal and centripetal processes; 
the concept of cooperation provides the means of i n t e r r e l a t i n g them. 
Thus the process defines the minimum set of common values shared by 
a l l c o a l i t i o n members necessary to permit the in d u s t r i a l organisation 
to maintain i t s e l f i n existence and to adapt effectively to change; 
at the same time i t defines the divergent, interests of individual 
c o a l i t i o n members and the means which they select to secure t h e i r 
personal objectives, Since, however, the attainment of these 
objectives i s dependent upon the j o i n t working relationship implied 
by the concept of c o a l i t i o n , the character (and the changing character) 
of the process of cooperation emerges as the crucial area of analysis 
i n the investigation of the influences upon the s t a b i l i t y of control. 
With these comments we conclude our remarks on the interrelations; . 
between the nature of s o l i d a r i t y and control i n the i n d u s t r i a l enterprise. 
I t remains now only to off e r some observations upon the interrelations 
between the nature of power relations and the s t a b i l i t y of control i n these 
i n s t i t u t i o n s . 
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2. POWER RELATIONS AND THE STABILITY OF CONTROL 
In the f i r s t chapter the relevance of c o n f l i c t theory f o r the analysis 
of i n d u s t r i a l relations was b r i e f l y considered. The i n e v i t a b i l i t y of 
c o n f l i c t over the performance of functions was recognised, as was the 
concommitant existence of power relations i n social systems characterised 
by the interdependence of roles but also by the freedom of coa l i t i o n 
members to contest the control of work a c t i v i t i e s establishing the form of 
interdependence. In t h i s sense the u t i l i s a t i o n of power by coalitions 
carries important implications f o r the s t a b i l i t y of control; i t i s to t h i s 
problem that we now turn. 
I n i t i a l l y i t seems pertinent to our discussion to counter the suggestion 
i m p l i c i t i n much contemporaiy c o n f l i c t theory that the presence of dif f e r e n t 
interest groupings within the enterprise necessarily results i n the use of 
power to further objectives at variance with those of management. This 
argument, t y p i c a l l y invoked as a critique of normative theories of i n d u s t r i a l 
order, implies the view that the determination of behaviour i s resolved by 
compulsion and that power becomes a crucial variable i n t h i s process. The 
a b i l i t y to coerce provides the real basis upon which managerial authority 
i s seen to rest. The recognition that workers' interests are not identical 
with those of management, and that workers' interests can and do c o n f l i c t 
with managements'.', need not, however, prevent these parties from distinguishing 
areas of mutual interest suitable f o r j o i n t decision taking. Indeed the 
assumption that the elements of c o n f l i c t must necessarily overshadow the 
a b i l i t y t o cooperate and the existence of shared values between workers and 
management seems unwarranted i n the l i g h t of the previous discussion on the 
nature of i n d u s t r i a l coalitions. 
At the same time i t seems necessary to counter the arguments of other 
the o r i s t s , notably those encapsulated within the Neo Human Relations School, 
that "power equalisation" - where reductions i n power and status d i f f e r e n t i a l s 
between supervisors and subordinates occur as the result of managerial 
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strategies to induce changes i n employee attitudes i n l i n e with i t s own 
requirements - of f e r a more r e a l i s t i c conceptualisation of the use of 
(27) 
power i n contemporary i n d u s t r i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . ' In essence, both the 
approaches of the c o n f l i c t of interest and the power-equalisation schools 
are necessary, but inadaquate, contributions to the debate on the nature of 
power relations i n i n d u s t r i a l relations i n modem society. For whilst i t 
i s undoubtedly true that some form of c o n f l i c t i s endemic i n i n d u s t r i a l 
behaviour, and that management i s continuously required to legitimise i t s 
authority by techniques of persuasion and incentive, both sets of theories 
provide inadequate explanations of the uniqueness of the i n d u s t r i a l 
s i t u a t i o n : the fact that i n d u s t r i a l coalitions consist of integrative and 
disintegrative processes and that i n d u s t r i a l relations encompass both 
c o n f l i c t i n g and converging goals. Since the problem i s inadequately. -
formulated, i t follows that the conceptualisation of the uses of power i n 
these theories i s also misleading. 
We have already referred to one source of confusion i n the f i r s t 
chapter. This concerns the treatment of power i n terms of a zero-sum or 
"fixed-pie" model. This has been defined by Lammers i n the following terms: 
"Those who earn less and have less status and less say i n organisational 
p o l i c y than others w i l l always be inclined to suffer, i f not absolute, 
then at least r e l a t i v e deprivation. Therefore - so these c r i t i c s 
apparently argue - the l i m i t e d supply of power, prestige and income 
(2Q) 
i s f o r now and evermore a potential bone of contention." ' 
I t i s t h i s approach which i s referred to by Parsons as: 
"the dominant tendency i n the l i t e r a t u r e that there i s a fixed 
(29) 
"quantity" of power i n any rel a t i o n a l system."^ ' 
(27) On the concept of "power equalisation" see G.Strauss, op.cit. On 
forms of power allocation i n t h i s context see R.Likert "New 
patterns of Management" McGraw-Hill I96I. 
(28) C.J. Lammers op.cit. p.202 
(29) T. Parsons "On the Concept of P o l i t i c a l Power" Proc.American Phil.Soc. 
1963 107, pp.232-262 
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and i t i s to the question of whether power should be viewed as a f i x e d 
or as a variable resource that the work of Arnold Tannenbaum becomes 
relevant to our enquiry. 
Tannenbaum i s concerned with the characterisation of organisations 
i n terms of t h e i r patterns of control. The concept of control i s used 
synonymously with the notions of power and influence and i s defined by 
him as: 
process i n which a person or group of persons determines, that i s , 
i n t e n t i o n a l l y affects, the behaviour of another person, group or 
organisation."^^^^ 
In t h i s sense the control process i s represented by a cycle beginning with 
an intent on the part of one person, followed by an attempt to influence 
another person who then acts i n some way that f u l f i l l s the intent of the 
f i r s t . What distinguishes Tajmenbaum's conception of control from 
t r a d i t i o n a l analyses of the process i s the notion that, i n important 
respects, effective control requires the mutual exercise of power by a l l 
participants and that the mutual influence of members w i l l be enhanced, 
to the benefit of both individuals and the t o t a l organisation, by the 
expansion of power available to a l l groups within the organisation. 
The two major aspects of control which Tannenbaum seeks to i n t e r r e l a t e , 
namely the d i s t r i b u t i o n of control i n organisations and the t o t a l amount of 
control exercised by a l l levels of the organisation are expressed i n a 
"control graph" (Figure l ) . The horL-'Zontal base of the graph represents 
the hierarchical scale i n an organisation, and the v e r t i c a l axis the amount 
of control exercised by various hierarchical echelons. I t i s possible to 
define d i f f e r i n g control curves by reference to shape and height, where 
organisations d i f f e r both i n the amount of control exercised by various 
(30) A.S. Tannenbaum "Control i n Organisations" McGraw-Hill I968 p.12 
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F i g u r e I : Some h y p o t h e t i c a l d i s t r i b u t i o n s o f c o n t r o l . 
Amount o f c o n t r o l 
e x e r c i s e d 
A v e r y g r e a t 
d e a l 
A g r e a t d e a l 
Quite a b i t 
Some 
L i t t l e o r none h 
Top Managers Second 
Management l i n e 
s u p e r v i s i o n 
F i r s t Rank 
and 
s u p e r v i s i o n f i l e 
Source ; Tannenhaum 'Con t r o l i n Organisations'(McGraw H i l l 1968. p. 13.) 
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echelons and i n the t o t a l amount o f c o n t r o l a v a i l a b l e w i t h i n the 
o r g a n i s a t i o n . Thus a c o n t r o l curve which r i s e s w i t h hierarchy i s 
" a u t o c r a t i c " and one which deciines w i t h ascent i s "democratic"; a low 
f l a t curve which i n d i c a t e s l i t t l e c o n t r o l at any l e v e l i n d i c a t e s a 
" l a i s s e z - f a i r e " s i t u a t i o n while a high f l a t curve i n d i c a t i n g a high l e v e l 
o f c o n t r o l at a l l l e v e l s i s "polyarchic".^"^'^^ F i n a l l y , the use of the 
" c o n t r o l graph" technique permits the e x p l o r a t i o n of new measurements of 
c o n t r o l based upon the Judgements of members regarding the amount of 
c o n t r o l which various echelons a c t u a l l y h o l d as against the amount desired. 
Given these aspects o f c o n t r o l f o r consideration, how are they applied? 
P r i m a r i l y Tannenbaum i s concerned t o p o i n t up the i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s which 
e x i s t between c o n t r o l , o r g a n i s a t i o n a l e f f e c t i v e n e s s and the a t t i t u d e s of 
members towards the o r g a n i s a t i o n . Whereas the focus f o r much recent 
enquiry has been upon the d i s t r i b u t i o n of c o n t r o l and o r g a n i s a t i o n a l 
(32) 
e f f e c t i v e n e s s ^ the relevance of t o t a l amount of c o n t r o l has been 
r e l a t i v e l y ignored, or has proceeded on the assumption t h a t i n c r e a s i n g the 
i n f l u e n c e o f one group i m p l i e s decreasing the influence of others. I n 
response t o t h i s k i n d of argument, Tannenbaum r a i s e s the question of why 
s u b s t a n t i a l c o n t r o l exercised by both leaders and members would not-: 
enhance e f f e c t i v e o r g a n i s a t i o n a l performance. Curve X ( P i g . l ) i l l u s t r a t e s 
the i m p l i c a t i o n s o f the j o i n t expansion of influence of both upper and 
lower echelons, by comparison w i t h curve A which represents a t r a d i t i o n a l 
h i e r a r c h i c a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of c o n t r o l and curve B which represents a 
" d i c t a t o r s h i p of the p r o l e t a r i a t " . 
(31) See C.G. Smith and A.S. Tannenbaum "Organisational Control Stru c t u r e : 
A Comparative Analysis" Human Relations Vol.16 No.4 I963. 
(32) I n t h i s context he c i t e s the work of N.C. Morse and E. Reimer "The 
Experimental Change of a Major Organisational V a r i a b l e " Journal 
of Abnormal and Social Psychology LIDi: Jan. I956 pp.120-29. 
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As Tannenhaum puts i t : 
" I t i s amusing t o t h i n k of t h i s controversy i n terms of a d i a l e c t i c 
i n which curve A represents the t h e s i s of o l i g a r c h y and the a n t i t h e s i s , 
curve B, the d i c t a t o r s h i p of the p r o l e t a r i a t Many org a n i s a t i o n 
leaders, indeed, have seen a haunting specter i n p a r t i c i p a t i v e schemes, 
because, committed as they have been t o a f i x e d - p i e , c o n f l i c t view of 
power, these leaders could envision such schemes only as i m p l y i n g some 
degree of " r e v o l u t i o n " . A possible synthesis i n the d i a l e c t i c , curve 
X, has t h e r e f o r e been overlooked by most managerial persons, as w e l l 
as by many o r g a n i s a t i o n theorisis^iV'"^^"^^ 
I t f o l l o w s t h a t one possible source of s t a b l e c o n t r o l i n i n d u s t r i a l 
o rganisations may be l o c a t e d i n d e v i s i n g means by which the i n f l u e n c e of 
lower echelons i s increased i n ways which do not imply corresponding 
c o n t r a c t i o n s i n the i n f l u e n c e of mana^gerial groups. I t i s t h i s s i t u a t i o n 
which i s characterised by curve X. I t i s t h i s s i t u a t i o n also which, we 
b e l i e v e , f a c i l i t a t e s the process of cooperation o u t l i n e d i n the previous 
s e c t i o n o f t h i s chapter. 
The existence of high mutual i n f l u e n c e , by promoting s o c i a l i n t e g r a t i o n 
among members, i s thus seen t o enhance o r g a n i s a t i o n a l effectiveness. 
S p e c i f i c a l l y , e f f e c t i v e n e s s i s enhanced by i n c r e a s i n g the degree of t o t a l 
c o n t r o l i n the o r g a n i s a t i o n i n ways which produce a more st a b l e system of 
c o n t r o l , since a p o s i t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n appears t o e x i s t between the amount 
(34) 
of c o n t r o l , o r g a n i s a t i o n a l performance and the l o y a l t y of members 
Two examples of t h i s i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p may be c i t e d . Hammers suggests 
t h a t g r a n t i n g more power t o subordinates t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n decision-making 
may increase the j o i n t power of a l l echelons i n t h a t subordinates may be 
more w i l l i n g t o implement decisions so reached; the i n i t i a l ceding of power 
(33) A.S. Tannenbaum I968 o p . c i t . p.13. 
(34) —.../. -C. G. Smith and O.N. A r i "Organisational Control Structure 
and Member Consensus", American Journal of Sociology Vol.LXIX 1]CL,6 'I964 
pp.623-638. 
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by management f a c i l i t a t e s the more e f f e c t i v e i n t e g r a t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l goals 
as w e l l as i n c r e a s i n g the chances of managerial decisions being implemented. 
(^5) Elsewhere Smith and A r i have noted t h a t the e f f e c t s of increased 
t o t a l c o n t r o l on o r g a n i s a t i o n a l performance may derive i n part from the 
u n i f o r m i t y i n o r g a n i s a t i o n a l standards and p o l i c i e s which such patterns o f 
c o n t r o l impart. Thus they claim: 
"Our f i n d i n g s i n d i c a t e t h a t t h i s i s a tenable explanation f o r the e f f e c t s 
of c o n t r o l upon o r g a n i s a t i o n a l performance which we have found The 
s i g n i f i c a n t exercise of c o n t r o l by both members and leaders leads t o a 
high degree of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and involvement i n the o r g a n i s a t i o n . A l l 
or g a n i s a t i o n members-are motivated t o develop a set of shared p o l i c i e s 
and p r a c t i c e s , t o accept- j o i n t l y made-decisions, and t o act on behalf of 
the o r g a n i s a t i o n . The system of hi'gh mutual i n f l u e n c e which t h i s 
p a t t e r n of c o n t r o l s i g n i f i e s provides an opportunity, f o r members and 
leaders t o r e c o n c i l e t h e i r i n t e r e s t s and f a c i l i t a t e s an atmosphere of 
cooperation."^ 
C l e a r l y , what i s being i m p l i e d here i s not mere "democratic" c o n t r o l . Whilst 
members d e s i r e a more p o s i t i v e l y sloped d i s t r i b u t i o n of c o n t r o l , t y p i c a l l y 
Tajinenbaum's respondents d i d not wish t o achieve t h i s be reducing t h e c o n t r o l 
exercised by other l e v e l s . Indeed t h i s w r i t e r suggests t h a t the accumulation 
of i n f l u e n c e at one l e v e l of the hierarchy would impede high o r g a n i s a t i o n a l 
performance since i t i s o n l y under conditions of h i g h r e c i p r o c a l i n f l u e n c e 
t h a t a shared system of o r g a n i s a t i o n a l norms associated w i t h high 
performance and concerted a c t i o n appears. 
I t i s i n order t o assess the extent of t h i s r e c i p r o c i t y t h a t Tannenbaum 
introduces as one a p p l i c a t i o n o f the c o n t r o l graph technique the measurement 
of members' judgements of e x i s t i n g and desired patterns of c o n t r o l i n 
o r g a n i s a t i o n s . Not s u r p r i s i n g l y t h e m a j o r i t y of o r g a n i s a t i o n a l u n i t s studied 
(35) C.J, Lammers o p . c i t . p.204 
(36) C. Smith and O.N. A r i o p . c i t . p.638 
- I l l -
by Tannenbaum e x h i b i t e d n e g a t i v e l y sloped c o n t r o l curves im p l y i n g h i e r a r c h i c a l 
c o n t r o l . These ac t u a l p a t t e r n s of c o n t r o l , however, f a i l e d t o correspond 
w i t h the i d e a l patterns desired by members. Whilst the i d e a l p a t t e r n of 
c o n t r o l i s more p o s i t i v e l y sloped than the actual,, and the i d e a l l e v e l of 
c o n t r o l i s higher than the a c t u a l l e v e l , i t i s not t y p i c a l l y t h e case t h a t 
members wish t o reduce the amount of i n f l u e n c e exercised by other groups, 
even at t h e l e v e l of rank and f i l e members where the greatest discrepancy 
between a c t u a l and i d e a l p a t t e r n s of c o n t r o l e x i s t s . On the contrary, 
Tannenbaum f i n d s t h a t the increased c o n t r o l desired by rank and f i l e ! members 
i s u s u a l l y accompanied by an increase proposed by them f o r upper l e v e l s too. 
These considerations have c l e a r i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the s t a b i l i s a t i o n of 
c o n t r o l systems. Tannenbaum's a s s e r t i o n i s t h a t there i s a p o s i t i v e 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between the t o t a l amount of c o n t r o l , the l e v e l of morale of 
members and the o v e r a l l e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the organisation. I f t h i s i s 
accurate i t would be necessary t o consider the extent t o which c o n t r o l 
systems i n p a r t i c u l a r o r g a n i s a t i o n a l contexts a f f o r d s u b s t a n t i a l mutual 
c o n t r o l t o be exercised by both "leaders" and " f o l l o w e r s " . Given the 
existence of high r e c i p r o c a l i n f l u e n c e , moreover, i t would be possible t o 
speculate upon the d i r e c t i o n of c o n t r o l taken i n consequence. Given, 
f i n a l l y , our contention t h a t important decisions concerning the goals of 
i n d u s t r i a l organisations are taken i n c r e a s i n g l y by c o a l i t i o n s o f members, the 
u t i l i s a t i o n of power i n ways which permit the development of such patterns 
of r e c i p r o c a l i n f l u e n c e must be regarded as one possible source of s t a b i l i t y 
h i g h l y a p p r o p r i a t e i n these c o n d i t i o n s . 
The expansion of power along these, l i n e s , however, must not be taken t o 
imply t h a t c o n f l i c t s of i n t e r e s t s between p a r t i c i p a n t s w i l l not continue t o 
e x i s t . The existence of l a t e n t c o n f l i c t between p a r t i c i p a n t s i s an 
i n e v i t a b l e consequence of any attempt t o organise cooperation i n s i t u a t i o n s 
of t e c h n i c a l and economic complexity, and may manifest i t s e l f as s t r u c t u r a l 
c o n f l i c t i n v o l v e d i n the o r g a n i s a t i o n of r o l e s , c o n f l i c t over the a l l o c a t i o n 
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of scarce economic resources or over the power t o i n f l u e n c e events, or 
(37) 
c o n f l i c t a r i s i n g from a p r o t e s t against monotonous work^ I t seems 
necessary, t h e r e f o r e , t o r e l a t e the process of c o n f l i c t t o the concepts of 
cooperation and power on the one hand, ajid t o the concept of occupation on 
the other. The i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s between c o n f l i c t , power, and cooperation 
i n d i c a t e the nature of expanding power r e l a t i o n s i n i n d u s t r i a l c o a l i t i o n s 
consistent w i t h a s t a b l e system of c o n t r o l and w i t h the p a t t e r n of c o n f l i c t 
e x h i b i t e d w i t h i n s o c i a l systems characterised by a r e l a t i v e l y high degree 
of f u n c t i o n a l autonomy of t h e i r p a r t s . The i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s between the 
process o f c o n f l i c t and the. concept of occupation are i n d i c a t e d by the nature 
of c o n t r o l s over work where: 
"An occupation c o n s i s t s , i n p a r t , of a successful claim of some people 
t o l i c e n c e t o carry out c e r t a i n a c t i v i t i e s which others may not, and 
t o do so i n exchange f o r money, goods or services. Those who have 
such s o l i d a r i t y w i l l , i f they have any sense of s e l f consciousness or 
s o l i d a r i t y , also claim a mandate t o define what i s proper conduct of 
(^8) 
others towards the matters concerned w i t h t h e i r work."^ 
The development of occupational s t r a t e g i e s i n p u r s u i t of enhanced status and 
c o n t r o l over work nece s s a r i l y complicates the operation of the c o n t r o l process; 
regarded i n t h i s l i g h t i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s assume a complexity sometimes 
ignored by those vAio assert a simple dichotomy between management and labour. 
The value of occupational a n a l y s i s , t h e r e f o r e , i s found i n the examination 
of the p a t t e r n of shared and c o n f l i c t i n g i n t e r e s t s c h a r a c t e r i s i n g the 
i n t e r a c t i o n s of diverse groups w i t h i n the occupational s t r u c t u r e s of complex 
or g a n i s a t i o n s . I n t h i s way i t i s by no means inco n s i s t e n t t o argue t h a t a 
degree of homogeneity induced, f o r example, by shared o r i e n t a t i o n s t o work 
ajid common experiences of the work s i t u a t i o n can coexist w i t h a degree of 
i n t e r - o c c u p a t i o n a l c o n f l i c t a r i s i n g from disputes over the c o n t r o l of 
(37) T. Lupton "Management and the Social Sciences" Hutchinson I966. 
(38) E.C. Hughes "Men and t h e i r Work" Free Press, 1958 p.78. 
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contested areas of work and over the a l l o c a t i o n of scarce resources between 
occupations. Nor i s i t i n c o n s i s t e n t t o argue t h a t a degree of homogeneity 
i n values between management and labour induced, f o r example, by the 
expansion of power w i t h i n aji o r g a n i s a t i o n along the l i n e s suggested above 
can c o e x i s t w i t h c o n t i n u i n g c o n f l i c t over the. c o n t r o l of contested areas of 
work and over the a l l o c a t i o n of scarce resources between these groups. 
What seems t o be r e q u i r e d at t h i s juncture i s a more e f f e c t i v e 
c o n c e p t u a l i s a t i o n of the c o n f l i c t process as i t operates w i t h i n i n d u s t r i a l 
o r g a n i s a t i o n s . F o r t u n a t e l y the basis of t h i s e x i s t s i n the use of three 
concepts already introduced. These are the concepts of f u n c t i o n a l 
autonomy, c o a l i t i o n , and cooperation. The relevance of these r e f e r e n t s 
may be b r i e f l y described. 
I n i t i a l l y i t should be apparent t h a t power r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i l l be 
i n e v i t a b l e i n s i t u a t i o n s of f u n c t i o n a l interdependence, s i t u a t i o n s 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the o r g a n i s a t i o n of s o c i a l systems i n v o l v i n g the i n t e g r a t i o n 
of the p a r t s of the system i n r e l a t i o n t o c e r t a i n f o r m a l l y s p e c i f i e d goals. 
I n d u s t r i a l organisations c o n s t i t u t e a d i s t i n c t i v e type of s o c i a l system i n 
which t h e mode of s o c i a l i n t e g r a t i o n i s defined by the r e l a t i v e autonomy of 
i t s major i n t e r e s t groups. Given t h a t the process of system i n t e g r a t i o n 
i s concerned w i t h t h e i n t e g r a t i o n of f u n c t i o n s (tasks) and the process of 
s o c i a l i n t e g r a t i o n i s concerned w i t h the i n t e g r a t i o n of actors performing 
these f u n c t i o n s , the problem of c o n f l i c t I n i n d u s t r i a l organisations i s best 
viewed as t h e outcome o f a continuous process of d e f i n i n g and r e d e f i n i n g who 
does what i n work, and f o r what reward. This l a t t e r process c o n s t i t u t e s 
t h e process of cooperation, and i t occurs, as we have seen e a r l i e r , w i t h i n 
what we have described as i n d u s t r i a l c o a l i t i o n s . The i m p l i c a t i o n s of 
d i s c u s s i n g the existence of i n d u s t r i a l c o n f l i c t i n t h i s context are important; 
i t suggests t h a t t r a d i t i o n a l conceptualisations of a u t h o r i t y i n i n d u s t r y 
based upon a predominantly u n i l a t e r a l model of managerial c o n t r o l are erroneous, 
and t h a t a t t e n t i o n would be more f r u i t f u l l y directed towards the mutual 
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interdependence of management and labour. However, i n emphasising the 
development of; the j o i n t power between two or more p a r t i c i p a t i n g groups 
i n the process of i n d u s t r i a l rule-making, there i s no suggestion t h a t the 
uses of power by one group ma^^. not be used t o l i m i t the implementation 
of the purposes of another, and thereby t o c o n f l i c t w i t h i t . I n t h i s 
sense c o n f l i c t i s i n t r i n s i c t o the s t r u c t u r e of i n d u s t r i a l organisations. 
I t i s equally apparent t h a t the p a t t e r n of c o n f l i c t w i t h i n such c o a l i t i o n s 
w i l l assume a d i s t i n c t i v e form. T o p i c a l l y i t w i l l f u n c t i o n t o e f f e c t some 
k i n d of s o l u t i o n t o t h e problem of the a l l o c a t i o n of scarce resources t o 
competing groups whether i n terms of wealth, time or e f f o r t ; as such, and 
given t h e dependency of a l l groups upon the s u r v i v a l of the organisation, 
i t w i l l operate w i t h i n l i m i t s which stop short of i t s d e s t r u c t i o n . Moreover, 
the p a t t e r n o f c o n f l i c t i s u n l i k e l y t o be simply dichotomous between manage-
ment and labour, but c r i s s - c r o s s i n g t o d i v e r s i f y the labour-force i n t o a 
v a r i e t y of competing and c o n f l i c t i n g i n t e r e s t groups i n ways which f u n c t i o n 
t o s t a b i l i s e the o v e r a l l c o n t r o l of the i n d u s t r i a l o r g a n i s a t i o n by preventing 
the development of a homogeneous labour movement encompassing, f o r example, 
both s k i l l e d and s e m i - s k i l l e d employees, white and b l u e - c o l l a r workers. 
F i n a l l y t h e expression of c o n f l i c t i n i n d u s t r i a l c o a l i t i o n s may be influenced 
by the s t a b i l i s a t i o n of the c o n t r o l process along l i n e s which permit the 
extension of b i l a t e r a l c o n t r o l i n t o new areas of j o i n t concern. Indeed the 
s t a b i l i s a t i o n of c o n t r o l i m p l i e s the progressive development of i n d u s t r i a l 
r u l e making i n t h i s way. The i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s a t i o n of r e l a t i o n s h i p s between 
management and. labour, however, i s best viewed as a dynamic process, and one 
which i s always incomplete. As c e r t a i n issues become c o d i f i e d and subjected 
t o j o i n t determination, new issues a r i s e and become the new focus f o r the 
exercise of power and the subject of c o n f l i c t perhaps before compromise i s 
i n e v i t a b l y reached i n the process of conjunctive bargaining. I n these ways 
the i n t e r r e l a t i o n s " , between the uses of power, c o n f l i c t and cooperation are 
demonstrated and rehearsed by manbers of c o a l i t i o n s i n an almost r i t u a l i s t i c 
f a s h i o n . 
- 115 -
3. SYSTEM. ACTOR MB CONTROL: A SUMMARY 
I n t h i s s e c t i o n we s h a l l summarise the argument developed during the 
f i r s t t h r e e chapters. We s h a l l i n d i c a t e how t h i s argument can be applied 
t o the a j i a l y s i s of the c o n t r o l process i n one i n d u s t r i a l o r g a n i s a t i o n . 
This study w i l l be presented i n the second part of the t h e s i s . 
We have sought t o o u t l i n e t h e dimensions of a s o c i o l o g i c a l framework 
f o r t h e an a l y s i s of i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s . These dimensions were derived 
from the perspectives o f e x i s t i n g s o c i o l o g i c a l t h e o r i e s of order, c o n f l i c t 
ajid s o c i a l a c t i o n , t h e o r i e s f r e q u e n t l y posed as contending, frameworks, but 
capable i n our view of i n t e g r a t i o n i n c e r t a i n important respects. 
These p o i n t s of i n t e g r a t i o n were posed p r i n c i p a l l y i n the discussion 
of the relevance, f o r problems of i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s , of two important 
but f r e q u e n t l y confused themes i n I n d u s t r i a l Sociology. These themes are 
those of t h e nature of systems i n t e g r a t i o n and s o c i a l i n t e g r a t i o n i n 
i n d u s t r i a l o r g a n i s a t i o n s . I n seeking i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s between the operation 
of these two processes, an a n a l y t i c a l framework was established which drew 
h e a v i l y upon sociologLcal theory. This framework was applied e s p e c i a l l y 
t o the problem of c o n t r o l of i n d u s t r i a l organisations. 
The a n a l y s i s of systems i n t e g r a t i o n was d i r e c t e d towards the problem of 
c o n t r o l l i n g t h e o v e r a l l adjustment of the t o t a l o r g a n i s a t i o n t o the demands 
of i t s environment and towards the r e l a t e d problem of c o n t r o l l i n g the p a t t e r n 
of interdependencies between the major f u n c t i o n s of the or g a n i s a t i o n a l 
system. Such f u n c t i o n s as the d i v i s i o n of labour, the system of a u t h o r i t y , 
the technology, the system of rewards and status etc. may be evaluated i n 
terms of t h e i r systemic q u a l i t i e s : t h a t i s i n terms of the appropriateness 
of t h e i r i n t e r r e l a t i o n s f o r the performance of the organisation and the 
attainment of i t s business o b j e c t i v e s . 
The .a,naiysis o f s o c i a l i n t e g r a t i o n was d i r e c t e d towards the problem of 
c o n t r o l l i n g the adjustment of actors t o the demands of the t o t a l o r g a n i s a t i o n 
and i t s f u n c t i o n a l requirements, and t o each other. Just as i t seems 
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possible t o speculate upon the determination of an appropriate p a t t e r n of 
i n t e g r a t i n g f u n c t i o n s w i t h i n a system faced w i t h p a r t i c u l a r environmental 
c o n s t r a i n t s , so i t seems necessary t o -expect an appropriate mode of s o c i a l 
i n t e g r a t i o n of actors performing these f u n c t i o n s , given the nature of the 
system of f u n c t i o n s and i t s requirements and given the i n t e r e s t s of actors 
w i t h i n t h e i r s o c i a l and occupational contexts. 
Not s u r p r i s i n g l y then we f i n d the process of c o n t r o l operating at both 
l e v e l s of a n a l y s i s . The process of systems c o n t r o l implies the management 
of t h e organisation's o v e r a l l adjustment t o changing market, budgetary and 
t e c h n i c a l contexts and the determination of the optimal p a t t e r n of f u n c t i o n s 
f o r economic performance w i t h i n c o n s t r a i n t s set by the business environment. 
Social c o n t r o l i m p l i e s the management of actors and t h e i r i n t e r e s t s i n ways 
which permit the maintenance of a form of s o c i a l i n t e g r a t i o n compatible 
w i t h t h e continued existence of the org a n i s a t i o n . The linkage between 
systems and s o c i a l c o n t r o l i s thus seen t o be a r e c i p r o c a l one: the s t r a i n 
towards achieving the. o b j e c t i v e s of systems i n t e g r a t i o n places i n e v i t a b l e 
c o n s t r a i n t s upon the l a t i t u d e of actors pursuing t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s w i t h i n 
the o r g a n i s a t i o n ; at the same time, the o b j e c t i v e s of system i n t e g r a t i o n , 
namely the o p t i m i s a t i o n of f u n c t i o n s , i s achieved i n no small part by the 
eff e c t i v e n e s s of the system of s o c i a l i n t e g r a t i o n which i s found t o e x i s t . 
I n important respects, t h e r e f o r e , the problem of c o n t r o l i n i n d u s t r i a l 
o r ganisations i s best discussed as the outcome of aji i n t e r p l a y between the 
requirements of o r g a n i s a t i o n a l system and i t s environment on the one hand, 
and the requirements of o r g a n i s a t i o n a l p a r t i c i p a n t s and t h e i r environments 
on the other. Consequently changes i n the nature of demands made upon the 
system or i n the nature of the expectations of the actors w i l l be r e f l e c t e d 
i n the nature and s t a b i l i t y of the c o n t r o l process. 
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I t was w i t h i n t h i s framework t h a t we moved towards an explanatory 
framework which u t i l i s e d and brought together aspects of various types of 
s o c i o l o g i c a l theory i n the balanced discussion of problems of i n d u s t r i a l 
r e l a t i o n s . At both l e v e l s of a n a l y s i s , various concepts which r e f l e c t e d 
t h i s concern were introduced and analysed. The need f o r t h e o r e t i c a l 
i n t e g r a t i o n arose mainly from two unresolved problems: the f i r s t at the 
l e v e l of systems i n t e g r a t i o n and the second at the l e v e l of s o c i a l 
i n t e g r a t i o n . The s o l u t i o n t o each was found i n the use of " b r i d g i n g " 
concepts which succ e s s f u l l y i n t e g r a t e aspects of otherwise contending 
frameworks of a n a l y s i s . 
At t h e l e v e l of systems i n t e g r a t i o n we were concerned t o i l l u m i n a t e 
the concept of o r g a n i s a t i o n i t s e l f i n ways which emphasised the simultaneous 
existence of i n t e g r a t i n g and d i v e r s i f y i n g forces and i n d i c a t e d the manner 
i n which interdependence and c o n t r a d i c t i o n necessarily inhered i n such 
s i t u a t i o n s . Thus ;GrOuldner's concept of f u n c t i o n a l autonomy was introduced-
t o i l l u s t r a t e the dual f u n c t i o n s of " o r g a n i s a t i o n " i t s e l f : t o i n t e r r e l a t e 
p a r t s but also t o separate them and t o preserve t h e i r r e l a t i v e autonomy. 
I n t h i s sense the process of o r g a n i s a t i o n necessarily promotes c o n f r a d i c t i o n s i n 
the achievement of i t s primary o b j e c t i v e s : order, p r e d i c t a b i l i t y and 
coherence. 
At the l e v e l , of s o c i a l i n t e g r a t i o n we were concerned t o conceptualise 
the i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s between the shared values and divergent i n t e r e s t s 
of i n d i v i d u a l p a r t i c p a n t s and groups of actors employed i n i n d u s t r i a l 
o r g a n i s a t i o n s . The concept of "cooperation" was introduced t o define an 
important process of c o n t r o l i n which i n t e r e s t groups secure t h e i r 
o b j e c t i v e s w i t h i n a j o i n t working r e l a t i o n s h i p . I n t h i s sense the 
independence of any one p a r t y i s always seen t o be conditioned by i t s 
dependence upon others; t h i s j o i n t r e l a t i o n s h i p i s based upon necessity. 
I t i s t h e coexistence of shared b e l i e f s about the conduct of i n d u s t r i a l 
r e l a t i o n s (and about other aspects of the employment s i t u a t i o n ) w i t h the 
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persistence of c o n f l i c t over the attainment of i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r e s t s which 
characterises the process of s o c i a l i n t e g r a t i o n i n i n d u s t r i a l organisations, 
and which requires some degree of t h e o r e t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n between order 
and c o n f l i c t perspectives f o r i t s analysis. 
The cooperative process was located, however, w i t h i n a d i s t i n c t i v e 
s t r u c t u r e of c o n t r o l . " This r e q u i r e d the i n t r o d u c t i o n of a r e l a t e d concept: 
the c o a l i t i o n model of ; "organisation, Based upon the n o t i o n of the 
o r g a n i s a t i o n as a p l u r a l s o c i e t y and upon the manner i n which decisions are 
taken w i t h i n c o a l i t i o n s by bargaining, t h i s concept i l l u m i n a t e s the processes 
by which mutual control-systems f u n c t i o n t o determine org a n i s a t i o n a l 
o b j e c t i v e s i n important areas and the p a t t e r n of c o n f l i c t t y p i c a l l y 
associated w i t h the existence of i n d u s t r i a l c o a l i t i o n s . 
Our primary concern w i t h the nature of the c o n t r o l process extended, 
however, beyond i t s l o c a t i o n w i t h i n the parameters of systems and s o c i a l 
i n t e g r a t i o n , and, i n the case of the l a t t e r , beyond i t s l o c a t i o n w i t h i n the 
i n d u s t r i a l c o a l i t o n of management and labour. Thus we were concerned also 
w i t h the problem of the s t a b i l i s a t i o n of c o n t r o l : the enduring q u a l i t i e s 
of i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s i n s p i t e of change. I n t h i s context we suggested 
t h a t t h e extension of cooperation represented a p r i n c i p a l means by which 
s o l i d a r i t y was achieved and an adequate l e v e l of s o c i a l i n t e g r a t i o n 
maintained. The extension of cooperation i s thus seen t o be one important 
determinant of s t a b i l i t y i n s o c i a l c o n t r o l . :^ y t h i s we r e f e r t o the 
extension of b i l a t e r a l rule-making between management and labour over the 
c o n t r o l of work, or t o the existence of agreement between these p a r t i e s on 
the r i g h t of one t o take u n i l a t e r a l decisions concerning the other. 
A second determinant of s t a b i l i t y i n s o c i a l c o n t r o l was the expansion 
of power at t h e disposal of o r g a n i s a t i o n a l p a r t i c i p a n t s i n ways which 
increase t h e i r mutual i n f l u e n c e i n the determination of the c o n t r o l of work. 
E f f e c t i v e s o c i a l c o n t r o l i s enhanced under conditions where the j o i n t power 
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of a l l p a r t i e s i s expanded i n mutually rewarding ways and where the scope 
f o r cooperation i s thereby increased. 
These arguments were intended not only t o subs t a n t i a t e the case f o r a 
more informed methodological approach t o the analysis of i n d u s t r i a l 
r e l a t i o n s i n general, but also l e d t o a discussion of c e r t a i n substantive 
problems i n t h i s f i e l d , notably those concerned w i t h the question of s t a b i l i t y 
and change i n the process of i n d u s t r i a l c o n t r o l . I t was our main conclusion 
t h a t t h e most r e a l i s t i c framework f o r the analysis of problems of c o n t r o l 
was one which explained c o n t i n u i t y and change i n t h i s process as a response 
t o systems and s o c i a l c o n s t r a i n t s , and t h a t the conceptualisation of these 
c o n s t r a i n t s r e q u i r e d some i n t e g r a t i o n of f u n c t i o n a l i s t , c o n f l i c t and s o c i a l 
a c t i o n perspectives. The dimensions of t h i s framework are i n d i c a t e d i n 
Figure 2 o v e r l e a f . 
This model locates the process of pla n t c o n t r o l w i t h i n a f i e l d 
comprising f o u r i n t e r a c t i n g and interdependent v a r i a b l e s : system, actor, 
managerial and labour values. These are marked 1, 2, 3 and 4 r e s p e c t i v e l y 
i n F i gure 2. 
Given our concern w i t h the determinants of st a b l e systems of c o n t r o l 
i n . u n i t o r g a n i s a t i o n s , some f i n a l comments may now be made on the analysis 
of s t a b i l i t y i n the c o n t r o l process by reference t o the Figure:... 
I n i t i a l l y i t should be pointed out t h a t the model consists of two 
major dimensions. The f i r s t dimension i s a h o r i z o n t a l one, l i n k i n g 
managerial and labour values d i r e c t l y t o the c o n t r o l process i t s e l f , which, 
f o r a n a l y t i c a l purposes, i s l o c a t e d at the centre of the model. These values 
i t should be emphasised, r e f e r only t o those h e l d separately or j o i n t l y by 
employers, (or. managers) and representatives of labour ( i . e . trade union 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ) i n the c o n t r o l system ( i n c l u d i n g the c o l l e c t i v e bargaining 
system). They do not encompass the values of rank and f i l e employees. 
The second dimension i s a v e r t i c a l one, l i n k i n g system requirements and 
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c e n t r a l contextual f e a t u r e s of the model. Examination of system requirements 
and a c t o r expectations along t h i s dimension would include- consideration of 
the e f f e c t s of the business environment of the system and the s o c i a l 
environment ( c l a s s , community and occupation) of actors upon the s t a b i l i t y 
and e f f e c t i v e n e s s of c o n t r o l i n the o r g a n i s a t i o n . Whilst the f i r s t two 
v a r i a b l e s - managerial and labour values - define the scope and content of 
the c o n t r o l process i n the o r g a n i s a t i o n over time, the second two - system 
and a c t o r - define the parameters or c o n s t r a i n t s w i t h i n which the c o n t r o l 
process must move i f i t i s t o remain e f f e c t i v e and sta b l e . The f i r s t and 
the most important i m p l i c a t i o n of s t a b l e c o n t r o l systems i s t h a t t h e i r 
v a r i a b i l i t y over time and t h e i r d i r e c t i o n of change must be compatible w i t h 
changing systems requirements of the or g a n i s a t i o n and changing s o c i a l 
requirements of the actors involved. This i s t o say t h a t i n d u s t r i a l c o a l -
i t i o n s a t p l a n t l e v e l may take decisions a t variance w i t h system requirements 
and a c t o r s ' expectations; t o do so, however, w i l l be t o create an unstable 
and an i n c r e a s i n g l y i n e f f e c t i v e system of c o n t r o l w i t h i n c r e a s i n g economic 
and s o c i a l uoasts t o the o r g a j i i s a t i o n andits members. 
I t f o l l o w s t h a t an e f f e c t i v e system of i n d u s t r i a l c o n t r o l e x i s t s where 
the i n e v i t a b l e f l u c t u a t i o n s i n the scope, content and organisation of the 
c o n t r o l systems of u n i t organisations, induced by changes i n the a t t i t u d e s 
and power p o s i t i o n s of p a r t i e s t o i n d u s t r i a l c o a l i t i o n s , nevertheless occur 
w i t h i n bounds suggested by system and s o c i a l requirements. A st a b l e s t a t e 
of the c o n t r o l system e x i s t s where the separate, and sometimes c o n f l i c t i n g 
i n t e r e s t s of the members of i n d u s t r i a l c o a l i t i o n s are maximised through 
cooperation w i t h i n these boundaries. I t w i l l be seen, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t the 
process of e f f e c t i v e c o n t r o l represents a process towards the o p t i m i s a t i o n 
of the requirements of the system ajid i t s actors. 
Some necessary p o i n t s of c l a r i f i c a t i o n must now be made. F i r s t , there 
i s no assumption t h a t system and s o c i a l requirements change at the same r a t e , 
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i n the same d i r e c t i o n , or at the same time. Consequently the parameters of 
c o n t r o l ( v a r i a b l e s 1 and 2) may be at variance. For example, actors may 
d i f f e r i n t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of the r e a l s t a t e of the system at a given 
moment i n time. They may make decisions which reduce the effectiveness of 
the o r g a n i s a t i o n and increase i t s costs. 
Second, there i s the assumption t h a t s t r a i n w i l l e x i s t between members 
of i n d u s t r i a l c o a l i t i o n s , and t h a t c o n f l i c t w i l l characterise c e r t a i n aspects 
of the r e l a t i o n s h i p s between them, e s p e c i a l l y i n the process of cooperation 
concerned w i t h the determination of o r g a n i s a t i o n a l o b j e c t i v e s and the 
a l l o c a t i o n of resources. Such p o i n t s of tension w i l l be inherent i n 
management-union r e l a t i o n s h i p s and w i l l f r e q u e n t l y be i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d i n 
the c o n t r o l process ( i . e . the r i g h t t o s t r i k e etc.) according t o the value-
systems of the p a r t i e s concerned. Consequently s t r a i n e x i s t s between 
management and trade union bodies, and t h i s w i l l e x h i b i t i t s e l f i n the use 
of power f o r the achievement of s e c t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s . The i n t e r a c t i o n s 
between these groups ( v a r i a b l e s 3 and 4) occur at two l e v e l s of analysis. 
The f i r s t concerns i n t e r a c t i o n s between these groups at a l e v e l external 
t o t h e u n i t o r g a n i s a t i o n , at n a t i o n a l or industiy-wide l e v e l s . The second 
concerns i n t e r a c t i o n s between groups at plant l e v e l . I t i s f u r t h e r assumed 
t h a t s t r a i n may e x i s t between n e g o t i a t i n g bodies at each l e v e l , or w i t h i n 
trade union or managerial organisations at each l e v e l . The e f f e c t of t h i s 
w i l l be t o create i n s t a b i l i t e s i n p l a n t c o n t r o l systems. This i s t o say 
t h a t t h e o r g a n i s a t i o n of c o n t r o l may be p o t e n t i a l l y c o n f l i c t f u l , between 
d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s of i n d u s t r i a l c o a l i t i o n s . 
Moreover there i s the assumption t h a t the concept of i n d u s t r i a l c o a l i t i o n 
extends beyond the n o t i o n of management and labour as mo n o l i t h i c e n t i t i e s . 
Prom management's viewpoint, i t s labour f o r c e of white and blue c o l l a r s t a f f 
may w e l l • form; a d i v e r s i f i e d group i n terms of occupational s t a t u s , i n f l u e n c e 
and power. From the viewpoint of non-managerial groups management may w e l l 
c o n s t i t u t e an equally d i v i d e d group. The s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h i s i s t h a t the 
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extent to which these s o c i a l divisions are generally accepted as legitimate 
by management and labour groups, as well as by individual actors, may well 
constitute a c r u c i a l aspect of stable control. Disruptions of t r a d i t i o n a l l y 
held occupational status induced, for example, by s h i f t s i n the r e l a t i v e 
bargaining power of various groups are l i k e l y to lead to i n s t a b i l i t y i n 
plant control systems. The exploration of the value systems of different 
occupational groups within the plant labour force (management, white and 
blue c o l l a r employees at s k i l l e d , semi-skilled and unskilled lev e l s ) for 
continuities and c o n f l i c t s i n inter-occupational values represents an 
important aspect of the study of s o c i a l integration i n i n d u s t r i a l 
organisations. , . 
Fourth, there i s the assiimption that s t r a i n may exist between the 
members of industrieil coalitions (variables 3 and 4) and individual actors 
(variable 2). - This i s an a n a l y t i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n making possible the analysis 
of continuities and discontinuities i n values held by members of i n d u s t r i a l 
c o a l i t i o n s and by individual actors. Thus s t r a i n between 2-3 might a r i s e 
as the r e s u l t of the changing expectations of rank and f i l e employees for 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n new areas of decision making t r a d i t i o n a l l y reserved for 
management. Str a i n between 2-4 might a r i s e through the reluctance of 
rank and f i l e workers to accept the prescriptions of t h e i r trade union. In 
general terms,, as^we saw i n Chapter 2, the analysis of employee orientations 
to work and occupation and the extent to which ideal expectations cJf work 
are r e a l i s e d i n fact'represent important considerations i n any discussion 
of stable control. 
I t w i l l be seen, therefore, that our model .accommodates certain 
perspectives derived from key sociological theories i n order to deal 
adequately with the concepts of continuity and change, consensus and conflict, 
system and actor i n t h e i r application to problems of industrial'control. 
The components of the model provide points of reference for the analysis of 
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the meaning of control and the s t a h i l i s a t i o n of the process of control. 
Ultimately, the achievement of a stable system of control (which implies 
an orderly process of change) depends upon the compatibility of the decisions-
taken by members of i n d u s t r i a l coalitions with the system requirements of 
the organisations i n which they are located, and with the social expectations 
of the actors who are required to legitimise the decisions of ind u s t r i a l 
c o a l i t i o n s . This should not be taken to imply that actors lack the 
v o l i t i o n to change the system. Clearly they possess t h i s capability: 
organisational change i s the product of human action. An effective, 
stable system of organisation, however, w i l l exist only where the socia l 
requirements of actors and the system requirements are i n adjustment, 
al b e i t temporarily. I n the succeeding chapters which for the second part 
of the t h e s i s we s h a l l examine the determinants of stable control i n one 
unit organisation: a medium sized plant i n the North-East steel industry. 
PART I I 
THE ANALYSIS OF CONTROL 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE STABILITY OF CONTROL IN A NORTH-EAST COAST STEEL PLAMT 
In t h i s chapter we s h a l l commence the application of the model of 
control derived from Part I to the situation of one plant which we s h a l l 
c a l l I r o n h i l l , located i n the North of England and i n the North-East Coast 
section of the Iron and Steel industry i n t h i s country. In terms of t h i s 
model we s h a l l seek to explain the existence of a r e l a t i v e l y stable control 
process at the time of investigation i n t h i s plant. Where points of 
s t r a i n are detected, we .shall seek to suggest outcomes for the control 
(1) 
process.^ ' 
Many features of the Steel Industry i n t h i s country might suggest a 
somewhat unstable system of control. The industry has undergone much 
change i n post-war years. S t r u c t u r a l l y i t has been subject to three major 
revisions i n managerial organisation and corporate form (nationalisation, 
denationalisation, renationalisation); technological change has called for 
the renewal of plant and machinery and created the need for major revisions 
i n working practices; the market situation of the industry has altered 
substantially. Yet, u n t i l quite recently, the industry as a whole has 
exhibited a compsiratively low l e v e l of grievance a c t i v i t y i n the form of 
(2) 
s t r i k e a c t i v i t y between management and labour.-^ The aim of t h i s chapter 
w i l l be to consider t h i s phenomenon. 
More s p e c i f i c a l l y we argue that the influence of systems and soc i a l 
constraints have impinged themselves upon the industry i n a unique way. 
Explanations of stable control, we suggest, w i l l be found i n the assessment of 
how these constraints have influenced the values of actors i n the indu s t r i a l 
(1) See Chapters V and VI 
(2) For s t a t i s t i c s see page 147 
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relations system both i n the past and at the present time. Consequently 
attention w i l l be given to those influences which have combined to produce 
the present system of plant control i n the industry and which have contributed 
to i t s r e l a t i v e l y stable development. Consideration w i l l also be given to 
some ways i n which t h i s system i s currently faced with the need to adapt to 
change. 
Our hypothesis i s that the stee l industry owes i t s s t a b i l i t y to the 
p a r t i c u l a r form of control which has evolved over time. We are p a r t i c u l a r l y 
interested i n the form of control which e x i s t s i n the North-East Coast 
section of the industry, and i n one p a r t i c u l a r plant there. We are concerned 
to assess how f a r the t r a d i t i o n a l methods of i n d u s t r i a l rule-snaking have 
endured despite changes i n the nature of the systems and social constraints, 
and whether these influence the achievement of stable control. I t i s our 
b e l i e f that some features of the t r a d i t i o n a l system operate i n t h i s way, and 
that t h i s fact could have important implications for the orderly transition 
of the industry i n the future. In t h i s sense i t i s necessary to consider 
the ways i n which the t r a d i t i o n a l system sets l i m i t s on the shape of the 
future whilst acknowledging that the new features of control are emerging, 
such as the extension of b i l a t e r a l control. 
The model of control introduced i n Part I directs our analysis i n 
important respects. Attention i s given to both the changing systems 
imperatives of the plant and the industry (variable I cf the model), and to 
the expectations of white-collar and blue-collar employees constituting two 
main categories of actors i n our analysis (variable 2). In t h i s chapter we 
s h a l l examine the nature of systems and soc i a l influences operating upon the 
industry as a whole, but more p a r t i c u l a r l y upon the system of control at 
I r o n h i l l . I n the following two chapters (Chapters V and V l ) we s h a l l explore 
the process of s o c i a l integration at I r o n h i l l i n greater depth by considering 
the attitudes of i t s manual and non-manual employees to employment i n s t e e l . 
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I t must be admitted, however, that no attempt has been made to provide an 
exhaustive account of a l l factors contributing towards d;able control i n t h i s 
plant. For example i t was not possible to measure values of I r o n h i l l ' s 
management i n any formal sense. Consequently the views of at least one 
important category of employees i n the plant system of control are unreported. 
Nevertheless the data collected from most other sections of I r o n h i l l ' s 
labour force i s s u f f i c i e n t to indicate the existence of certain distinguishing 
features i n attitudes towards steelwork and i n d u s t r i a l relations and to 
i l l u s t r a t e the importance of considering these views i n any discussion of the 
influences upon effective control systems. I f the evidence i s incomplete, 
therefore, i t i s s u f f i c i e n t to i l l u s t r a t e the scope of our model. I n 
part i c u l a r , i t i s hoped that i n the case-study which follows some light can 
be thrown upon the following problems of interest to the Industrial Sociologist: 
(a) The extent to which joint goals exist between the members of indust r i a l 
c o a l i t i o n s i n s t e e l and the operation of the cooperative process as 
t h i s influences the s t a b i l i t y of control i n a steel plant. 
(b) The extent of sectional i n t e r e s t s between managsnent and labour, between 
white and blue-collar employees, and between white-collar employees as 
these influence the extent to which joint goals can be pursued and 
thereby to enhance the effectiveness of the control process as a whole. 
(c) The degree of status congruency between different occupational members 
of plant coalitions and the perception of occupational influence by 
employees as t h i s influences the process of cooperation and the 
effectiveness of control. 
(d) The s t a b i l i s i n g function of certain generalised features which typify 
the work situations of s t e e l employees such as the seniority system, 
the " c r a f t " status of semi-skilled work i n the industry, the group 
organisation of work and the security of employment. 
The intention throughout the case study w i l l be to demonstrate the need for a 
sociological approach to the analysis of control, and to a conceptualisation 
of the process of integration i n i n d u s t r i a l organisations emphasising the 
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simultaneous existence of converging values and divergent interests between 
management and labour and between constituent groups of the labour force. 
The degree of s t a b i l i t y and the degree of effectiveness of control systems i s 
seen to r e s t heavily upon the extent and nature of common values i n t e r l i n k i n g 
key occupational groups, as well as with the mode of conflict regulation. 
I t w i l l be shown that considerable agreement e x i s t s at I r o n h i l l between these 
groups on such matters as t h e i r joint response to such imperatives as external 
market, budgetary and technological constraints upon the plant. I t w i l l be-
shown also that value consensus e x i s t s to a marked degree on the organisation 
of i n d u s t r i a l relations and the processing of c o n f l i c t . Indeed, the strong 
preference for procedural rule-making and constitutional government of 
i n d u s t r i a l relations has been long established. I t w i l l be shown f i n a l l y 
that a high degree of consensus e x i s t s within the labour^force on the status 
d i s t i n c t i o n s between management and labour, between white and blue-collar 
workers,, and between d i f f e r i n g occupational groups within the manual worker 
group. At the same time the e f f e c t s of inter-occupational and i n t r a -
occupational differences of interest at I r o n h i l l w i l l be discussed i n order 
to d i r e c t attention to the l i m i t s of value consensus and to the potential 
s t r a i n s of these c o n f l i c t i n g i n t e r e s t s upon the control process. 
I n terms of our model we explain the existence of such values as a 
function of both systems and s o c i a l variables. I t i s to a discussion of the 
e f f e c t s of these two contrasting sets of constraints upon the control process 
that we now turn. 
1. THE. CONTEXTUAL FRAMEWORK OF CONTROL AT IRONHILL 
(a) Systems Constraints; The Socio-technical System and i t s Environment 
I r o n h i l l i s situated i n County Durham. Between I864 and I967 i t 
produced f i r s t iron and then s t e e l as an independent public company with the 
exception of a short two year period between I949 and I951 when i t was 
nationalised. I t was again nationalised i n Juiy,'1967 and has remained under 
public control to the present time. 
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The plant i s best described as an integrated steelworks. In I97O i t 
produced 1 mi l l i o n ingot tons of s t e e l ; i n the same year i t s payroll 
amounted to almost 6,000 employees. The major steel-making processes which 
w i l l be referred to i n Part I I , and existing at I r o n h i l l , are as follows:-
1. Iron Production: Blast Furnace Department 
Ore, coke, limestone and other additives are charged into three 
blastfurnaces. Hot a i r bums the coke and separates the metallic iron which 
i s tapped and transferred to the Oxygen Steel Plant. Coke i s produced from 
coal i n plant adjacent to the blast furnaces. 
2. Steel Production: Oxygen Steel Plant 
Steel production i s from three Converters. The basic oxygen steel 
making process introduced at I r o n h i l l i n I964 i s a more economical method of 
production than the t r a d i t i o n a l B r i t i s h system of manufacture i n open-hearth 
furnaces. Oxygen i s injected on the surface of molton iron mixed with 
scrap. Production of one charge of oixiinary quality stee l takes 40 minutes 
compared with approximately 12 hours i n the open-hearth furnace. On 
completion of the cycle, molton steel i s teemed into moulds to make ingots for 
transfe r to the Primary M i l l . 
3. Steel Processing: Rolling M i l l s Departments 
These Departments comprise a Primary M i l l , a B i l l e t M i l l and a Plate 
M i l l . Ingots are received i n the Primary M i l l , reheated and passed through 
a high l i f t reversing m i l l from which either slabs or blooms emerge. Blooms 
are processed further i n the B i l l e t M i l l to make steel b i l l e t s , lengths of 
s t e e l between 2"and 7" square. Slabs are passed to a plate m i l l where they 
are r o l l e d into s t e e l plates. The Plate M i l l i s r e l a t i v e l y new and 
te c h n i c a l l y advanced commencing operations i n I96O on a "greenfield" s i t e 
near the main works. 
Steel plate and b i l l e t s are the main saleable products manufactured at 
I r o n h i l l . I n addition there are brick works manufacturing refractories for 
use i n the st e e l industry and elsewhere; there are also constructional and 
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welding departmentssfabrieating steelworks units and steel pipe. These 
are located outside the main steelmaking processes and are not considered 
here. 
MARKET CONSTRAINTS 
Analysis of output shows that the overall increases i n production of 
crude s t e e l and s t e e l products over the 22 year period I946 - 68 concealed 
some wide fluctuations a f t e r 1958. Sharp reductions i n output throughout 
the plant occurred i n that year, i n I96I-2, and to a smaller extent i n 
1966-67. The downswings of 1958 and I96I indicate general recessions marked 
by abrupt changes i n Government economic policy with subsequent effects upon 
the l e v e l of investment and more p a r t i c u l a r l y upon the vehicle manufacturing 
industry. The l a t e r but smaller downswing i n I966 was indicative of the 
more t r a d i t i o n a l pattern of recession i n s t e e l : here the decline i n economic 
a c t i v i t y i s f e l t f i r s t by the ro l l i n g - s n i l l departments whose dependence upon 
customers and whose v u l n e r a b i l i t y to market changes i s f a r more acute than 
the iron and steelmaking sectors of the plant. A l l t h i s suggests an overall 
increase punctuated by fluctuations induced by the c y c l i c a l character of 
demand for s t e e l . Such a pattern has c r u c i a l implications for the business 
success of the works since the maintenance of high loadings upon plant i s 
imperatiye i f p r o f i t a b i l i t y i s to be maintained. 
These environmental demand constraints have a direct influence upon the 
production system and i t s technology. An integrated system of steelmaking 
consists of at least three sequential stages: ironmaking, steelmaking and 
r o l l i n g . A l l three share the same functional imperatives - high plant 
u t i l i s a t i o n and the continuous operation of ecpiipment. Marked demand 
fluctuations c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the industry during the l a s t decade are l i k e l y 
to induce p a r t i c u l a r d i f f i c u l t i e s at plants similar to I r o n h i l l where large 
and sustained throughputs are v i t a l to meet the high "break-even" point 
created by the r e l a t i v e cheapness of certain types of s t e e l product. Moreover 
such environmental market conditions are l i k e l y to induce d i f f e r e n t i a l s i n 
- 131 -
plant rates of technical change. I n the steelmaking sector the rate of 
technical advance has been profound. Here the r e l a t i v e savings on operating 
costs following the conversion to Oxygen Steelmaking have been considerable 
compared with the additions to capi t a l costs which i t s i n s t a l l a t i o n involves. 
This suggests that decisions to invest i n new plant i n t h i s sector are l e s s 
l i k e l y to be influenced by purely market considerations since the to t a l cost 
of production can be substantially reduced by technical changes only. I n 
ironmaking and i n s t e e l r o l l i n g , however, savings on operating costs are much 
l e s s spectacular when compared with the much h i ^ e r capital costs. 
Immediate demand conditions are l i k e l y to influence investment decisions more 
thaji purely technical c r i t e r i a . 
So f a r we have described the effects of what might be called "normal" 
market forces upon the production system. Superimposing i t s e l f upon t h i s 
t r a d i t i o n a l market s i t u a t i o n of c y c l i c a l demand during the l a s t decade, 
however, i s a new pattern of market constraint with profound implications 
for the future of I r o n h i l l and the entire industry. This pattern developed 
during the s i x t i e s as the resul t of declining international stee l prices and 
increasing world s t e e l surplus capacity together with the alarming growth of 
world competition and low cost r i v a l s i n the European Coal and Steel Community, 
Japan and the U.S.A. The immediate effects of these new market forces was to 
accelerate the introduction of technical change ajid to hasten the onset of 
massive r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n of st e e l production. The nationalisation of the 
industry i n 1967 marked the commencement of t h i s operation. 
Where did I r o n h i l l stand i n a l l t h i s ? The f i r s t signs of a serious threat 
to the survival of the works appeared i n a B r i t i s h Iron and Steel Federation 
report published i n 1966.^ "^ ^ The findings of the Benson Committee, established 
by the Federation's Executive Committee to investigate the industry's current 
(3) The Steel Industry. The Stage I Report of the Development Co-ordinating 
Committee of B.I.S.F., July I966. 
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s i t u a t i o n and i t s long term prospects, reflected the serious concern of 
B r i t i s h steelmakers with the swift deterioration i n the international 
competiveness of t h e i r industry. I t called for widespread ra t i o n a l i s a t i o n 
of e x i s t i n g plant and a rapid increase i n the industry's capacity. 
By 1975, i t was argued, t o t a l production requirements for common steel 
i n t h i s country would be 32 m i l l i o n ingot tons. This would be achieved 
mainly i n s i x or seven mammoth integrated steelworks and i n two or three non-
integrated works. Five existing steelproducing areas were proposed for 
further large scale development: South Wales, North Lincolnshire, Teesside, 
North Wales and Scotland. The f u l l exploitation of the potential e f f i c i e n c i e s 
of the favoured s i t e s was seen to be prejudiced unless at least some 9-0 
mil l i o n tons of steel produced at other s i t e s was withdrawn to ensure maximum 
loading of new plant. Significantly, I r o n h i l l was among those s i t e s not 
scheduled for further development. 
The message was clear. Whatever i t s short run cost advantages, the 
plant's s i z e and output and i t s location some distance from a tidewater 
estuary and an ore quay a l l f a i l e d to meet the c r i t e r i a set out i n the Benson 
Report f or the technical-optimum s i z e of steelmaking units of not le s s than 
35- m i l l i o n ingot tons with easy access to deepwater terminals and to output 
markets. For the f i r s t time i n its history the plant was faced with closure. 
This p o s s i b i l i t y appeared a l l the more u n r e a l i s t i c because a primary 
concern and a r e a l achievement of I r o n h i i l ' s management during the f i f t i e s 
and s i x t i e s had been to steadily increase the efficiency of i t s plant and 
manpower. By I967 i t s Managing Director, could boast: 
"We are already making a cheaper ingot than anybody else. To produce 
ordinary s t e e l , i t costs ( i r o n h i l l ) around £23 a ton compared with at 
(4) 
l e a s t £24 or £25 i n even the best conventional open hearth plants." 
(4) Newcastle Journal, October 1969. 
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Th_e Company, he went on to argue, had a major role to play i n the 
future industry simply because i t was one of the most e f f i c i e n t i n teims of 
production costs. Certainly for a Company which before 1914 had been the 
most profitable steelworks i n the country and which between 1945-64 had 
inve'sted i n new coke ovens, three blast furnaces, a new power station, new 
primary and plant m i l l s and a new steelmaking plant, the prospects for the 
future envisaged by Benson'.-were grotesque indeed. 
The industry was nationalised subsequently i n 1967* The B r i t i s h Steel 
Corporation's f i r s t annual report defined i t s aims along l i n e s which echoed 
the prescriptions of the Benson Report. The Corporation was to be: 
(a) Market-oriented, maintaining a commercial attitude to i t s operations i n 
order to make i t s e l f stronger i n the face of an increasingly 
competitive world market. 
(b) Cost-oriented, securing cost savings through improved technical efficiency, 
r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n of production f a c i l i t i e s through the longterm 
concentration of output i n large units comparable with the most 
e f f i c i e n t overseas producers. 
(c) Productivity-oriented, increasing manpower u t i l i s a t i o n through a 
productivity programme aimed at substantial economies iri'labour costs. 
I n defining these basic objectives B.S.C. had to hand the combined operating 
r e s u l t s of the 14 companies subsequently nationalised. These results 
covering the period 1957-67 showed the extent to which the ratio of profits 
( a f t e r depreciation) to cap i t a l employed had f a l l e n especially during the 
s i x year period between 1962-67 . These results are shown i n Table 1. 
Table - 1 : Ratio of-'-Prof i t s ( a f t e r depreciation) to Capital: Operating Results 
of 14 Public Steel Companies 1 9 5 8 - 6 7 ( p e r c e n t a g e ) 
1958 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 
!17.3 6 . 6 4 . 8 7 .3 6 .7 3 . 8 1 .9 
( 5 ) Annual Report and Accounts, B r i t i s h Steel Corporation, I 9 6 7 - 8 pp.-5-8 
( 6 ) Annual Report and Accounts, B r i t i s h Steel Corporation, I 9 6 7 - 8 p.7 
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I t was above a l l the need to secure much more profitable results than 
these that the Corporation set about i t s programme of rationalisation. 
Following Benson, the Corporation envisaged a much higher output of steel of 
32 m i l l i o n ingot tons annually by 1975i and a much higher rate of investment 
of the order of £ 1 , 0 0 0 million by the same year. What i s currently known of 
the Corporation's development plan i s that three large existing integrated 
steelworks are proposed for an annual output capability of 7 million tons by 
1976. These are at Port Talbot, Teesside and Scunthorpe. Two 10 million 
tons capacity steelworks w i l l be b u i l t i n addition during the period 1975-80. 
comparison with t h i s , I r o n h i l l ' s present output of around 1 million tons 
annually pales into insignificance. I t s future looks insecure. At best, 
(7 ) 
according to one writer^ steelworks l i k e I r o n h i l l may lose th e i r iron and 
s t e e l making functions ajid spend the rest of t h e i r operating l i v e s receiving 
slabs from major oxygen s t e e l plants elsewhere. For I r o n h i l l t h i s would 
iriiply^ the l o s s of i t s most profitable sectors. At worst i t could mean 
closure. 
Thus the effect of these two sets of market forces - the f i r s t traditional 
ajid predictable i n character, the second more recent and potentially 
malignant - must be seen as environmental constraints influencing the 
company's objectives and operating upon the organisation of the plant'.s 
socio-technical system of production and control. As we have suggested, the 
direction of investment was constrained by changes i n the firm's market 
situation, as was management's a b i l i t y to u t i l i s e i t s capacity to the f u l l and 
so control production costs. I n t h i s sense the increasing stringency of 
market conditions imposed severe limitations upon managerial decision-making 
while the new technical optima of modern steelmaking imposed higher thresholds 
"of s i z e ajid capacity each year. I n t h i s sense i t i s also accurate to define 
(7) K. Warren "Coastal Steelworks - A Case for Argument" The Three Banks 
Review, June, I969, No.82 pp25-38. 
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these external constraints as setting l i m i t s upon the range of v a r i a b i l i t y 
of the component parts of the plant's socio-technical system, given the need 
to maintain an adequate f i n a n c i a l return on capital investment. 
On the other hand there i s some evidence to suggest that i n the case of 
I r o n h i l l these variations were contained within the l i m i t s determined by 
external market requirements, so permitting an increasingly more effective 
adjustment of the plant to i t s changing market situation to be made. This 
i s to say that the rate and character of technical advance, changes i n the 
associated "work relationship structure" and the control of the interrelations 
between these parts were becoming s u f f i c i e n t l y well managed during the l a s t 
decade f o r I r o n h i l l to show an increasingly favourable ratio of profits to 
c a p i t a l employed. I n terms of commercial success i t became more, rather than 
l e s s , viable. This was due i n part to the ineTeasing effectiveness of i t s 
systems integration as a production unit. 
The performance of any production unit can be measured i n two ways. 
F i r s t , by i t s p r o f i t a b i l i t y evaluated by the ratio; of profits to capital 
employed. Second, by i t s productivity measured by an index of output 
produced over a given period. Data r e l a t i n g to I r o n h i i l ' s performance i n 
these respects ds: given below: 
Table 2: Ratio of Profits (after depreciation) to Capital; I r o n h i l l 1963-70^^^ 
Year P r o f i t s * Capital Employed** Ratio of Profits to Capital Employed 
£'000 £ million I0 
1963 -453 36,171 0 
1964 890 35,920 2.5 
1965 3,232 37,241 8.1 
1966 1,571 34.090 4.1 
A p r i l 1967 • 638 33,096 1.9 
Sept. 1968 503 21,017 2.3 
1970 1,670 25,038 6.6 
(8) This table i s derived from the Annual Report and Accounts of the Company 
for the years mentioned. 
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• P r o f i t s (or losses) are arrived at after charging depreciation but before 
charging interest on long term borrowings and taxation. 
**Capital employed comprises share ca p i t a l , reserves and long term borrowing. 
These figures are somewhat higher than the r e s u l t s quoted i n Table 1 for the 
years I 9 6 5 and I966 and i n l i n e with that of I 9 6 7 . ?y 1970 I r o n h i l l ' s 
performance was attracting attention i n the national press along the following 
l i n e s : 
"During the next decade B r i t i s h Steel Corporation w i l l have to decide 
whether old s t e e l plants l i k e ( i r o n h i l l ) can be kept going after I985 
Workers and management at (ironhil]) are a l l i e d i n the i r remarkable fight 
to stay a l i v e ( t h e i r p r o f i t s show a return on capital of more than 10^ 
t h i s y e a r ) . But i f t h i s f a i l s then B r i t i s h Steel Corporation w i l l have 
created a sickening s o c i a l problem i n a town t o t a l l y dependent on steel -
a problem B r i t i s h Steel Corporation must solve. 
The point to be established i s not that the average return on capital employed 
at I r o n h i l l was necessarily adequate during the period between I96O and 1970, 
but that a f t e r I966 i t moved to an above average position compared with other 
production units i n the Corporation, so that by 1970 I r o n h i l l ' s return of 
6.6^ compared favourably with the average Corporation return of 2.1^ 
This increasing commercial v i a b i l i t y of the plant was achieved to a 
substantial degree by a marked reduction i n the s i z e of working capital 
required af t e r I967 together with a more effective usage of t h i s capital 
r e f l e c t e d i n improved productivity figures. Table 3 i l l u s t r a t e s the extent 
of t h i s improvement i n two major departments of the plant: the steel-making 
plant and the plate m i l l , measured by changes i n the numbers of personnel 
employed, average weekly man-hours worked and average man hours worked per ton 
of s t e e l produced. 
(9) S. Fay "Breath of Hope for Steel - Now the Men can Talk to the Bosses" 
Sunday Times, 12th April, I97O. 
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Table 3 : Changes i n the Number of Employees. Average Weekly Man-hours 
Worked and Average Man Hours/Ton Steel Plant and Plate M i l l , 
I r o n h i l l . 1946-68. 
Department Year Number of Bnployees 
Average Hours 
' Per Man Week 
Man Hours 
Per Ton 
Steel Plant 1946 505 48 .84 3 .15 
J..' • •• 1968 225 39 .75 .50 
Plate M i l l 1946 564 45 .28 6.60 
1968 597 46 .20 3 .94 
This evidence suggests that the improved efficiency of the enterprise a^ 
the r e s u l t of i t s increased p r o f i t a b i l i t y and productivity r e f l e c t s the degree 
to which the plant's system of technical, organisational and management 
functions were becoming more eff e c t i v e l y integrated during the period under 
review. To the extent that changes i n the firm's market situation imposed 
new demands upon t h i s system we argue that the associated changes i n the plant's 
internal organisation were s u f f i c i e n t to meet these demands and to ensure that 
the firm remained i n a steady state as the result of i t s increasing pr o f i t a b i l i t y . 
ORGANISATIONAL CONSTRAINTS 
So f a r we have s a i d l i t t l e about the structure and character of the plant's 
internal organisation and i t s appropriateness for the commercial objectives 
and technical reqiiirements of the firm. I n order to do so we must now turn 
to the second component of the plant's socio-technical system: the "work 
relationship" structure of occupational roles created to meet the technical 
requirements discussed above. A breakdown of the occupational structure for 
the years I966 and I 969 gives the r e s u l t s set out i n Table 4. 
I t w i l l be noted that i n an e a r l i e r investigation of a Lancashire stee l 
plant by Scott et a l , d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n between these major categories over 
time was attributed to technical change^'''^^. There the proportion of the 
(10 ) W.H. Scott et a l "Technical Change and Industrial Relations" University 
of Liverpool 1956. 
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Table 4? DistriTjution of Labour Force by Ma.jor Occupational Categories 
Ir o f a h i l l 1969 
Occupational Category 1969 1966 
^ change 
1. Administrative, 
technical & c l e r i c a l 
17.9 -1.7 
2. Ski'lled Manual 17.3 0.0 
3. Production Workers 28.4 +6.6 
4. Unskilled Manual 13.7 -5.7 
5. Service Workers 22.7 +0.8 
•• 100.0 
working force engaged d i r e c t l y on production had declined whilst the proportion 
engaged on maintenance, service and administrative work substantially increased. 
This investigation contained details of the d i v i s i o n of labour by type of work 
















What does t h i s data t e l l us about I r o n h i l l ' s d i vision of labour and i t s 
control, given that the organisation of these functions within socio-technical 
system appeared to correlate with increasing business success? I n i t i a l l y i t 
(11) I b i d p.44 
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i s apparent thai; i n spite of the technical changes whi^ch have taken place i n 
recent years at t h i s plant, largely " t r a d i t i o n a l " methods of organising the 
social d i v i s i o n of labour continue i n existence. Thus, i n spite of a 
sizeahle capital investment programme and the replacement of much old plant 
since 1946, the scale of majiagement and administration remained r e l a t i v e l y 
small, consistent with industries possessing " c r a f t " technologies and 
(12) 
concerned with unit production Comparison of I r o n h i l l ' s r a t i o of 
administrative s t a f f as a percentage of the t o t a l lahour force with other 
industries demonstrates t h i s position clearly as indicated i n Table 5« 
Table 5? Comparison of Administrative. Technical and Clerical Staff as a 
Percentage of the Total Labour Force i n Ma.jor Manufacturing 
Industries with Steel ( i r o n h i l l ) U.K. ige?^"*"^^ 
Percentage 
A l l Manufacturing Industries 25.4 
Chemicals 37.9 
Metals 23.0; • 




Steel ( I r o n h i l l ) 18.6 
This suggests an administrative structure at I r o n h i l l i n 1967 similar to 
that found i n shipbuilding, an industry which leaves considerable discretion 
i n the job and control of work to s k i l l e d craftsmen. Lack of standardisation 
of the product i n ship construction l i m i t s the mechanisation of production: 
hence the heavy dependence upon cr a f t s k i l l s , where about two-thirds of a l l 
manual workers are s k i l l e d . 
(12) J. Woodward op.cit. 
(13) Ministry of Labour Gazette 1967 f o r a l l industries mentioned except steel. 
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comparison with" shipbuilding the steel industiy i s more highly 
mechanised. Indeed one estimate placed the steel industry within the f i r s t 
four most highly mechanised B r i t i s h industries measured by the r a t i o of 
(14) 
horse-power capacity per worker i n 1951 • This r e l a t i v e l y highly 
mechanised production system i s t y p i c a l l y located i n large plants employing 
1,000 workers or more. Moreover, the industry has a high capital/labour 
r a t i o . I n t h i s sense the industry has been described as "standing i n the 
vanguard of technical and organisation progress". ^'''^^ I t i s surprising, 
therefore, to discover that such a technically advanced industry was 
organised by a r e l a t i v e l y small administrative group and maintained by a 
smaller group of s k i l l e d craftsmen than i n other industries with comparably 
sized administrative groups at the time of the case-study. 
To explain t h i s apparent contradiction, the character of production 
work must be examined. Process work i n the Blastfurnace Departments, the 
Steelmaking Shops ajid the Rolling M i l l s i s undertaken by s k i l l e d but 
technically non-craft labour organised into teams, and within teams into 
lines of seniority and levels of responsibility f o r different aspects of 
the t o t a l task discharged by the team. Whilst the effects of technical 
change have been to reduce the physical cohesiveness of work groups, the 
p r i n c i p l e of promotion by seniority has been retained to provide a continuing 
basis f o r individual and occupational i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with work. Figure 4, 
f o r example, provides details of the organisation of management and 
production workers i n the Steelmaking plant at I r o n h i l l . 
I n t h i s department there are f i v e lines of seniority (A, B, C, D and E) 
providing f i v e d ifferent routes of advancement f o r manual workers, a l l of 
whom commenced employment as labourers. The r e l a t i v e l y l i g h t managerial 
and administrative labour force suggests that many, aspects of job organisation 
(14) J.A. Banks "Marxist Sociology i n Action", Faber and Faber 1970, p.69 
(15) I b i d p.85 
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and job control undertaken by specialists i n other industries are performed 
by groups of semi-skilled and s k i l l e d labour under the supervision of charge-
hands i n s t e e l . I n t h i s sense the steel operative i n production departments 
can entertain occupational ambitions and has opportunities f o r s e l f - r e a l i s a t i o n 
denied to many manual workers. Steelwork appears to offer p o s s i b i l i t i e s of 
achievement and to provide f o r many of i t s manual production workers the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of a career not unlike that of many white collar workers. 
Consequently the seniority l i n e functions as an important s t a b i l i s i n g element 
i n the system of control. I t acts as an effective system of ranking, 
d i v e r s i f y i n g the labour force and providing a ladder of promotion s u f f i c i e n t l y 
appealing to prevent the formation of a "lumpenproletariat" of steelworkers. 
This point was emphasised i n the e a r l i e r study of a steelplant by Scott and 
referred to previously i n t h i s chapter. He writes: 
" I n general, therefore, while i t i s true that the reactions to a specific 
technical change are composed of a complex of many factors, we have 
found i n the present instance that one - wages - seems to have 
predominated The predominance of the wages factor, however, should 
not lead us- to overlook the fact that the seniority principle was an 
in t e g r a l part of the context i n which opinions on the wage change i t s e l f 
were expressed, even when reference was made to the new method of 
calculating tonnage earnings, and that i n most cases a melter's 
evaluation of the over-all effect of technical change i s best understood 
as an expression of sat i s f a c t i o n with i t s impact on wage differentials.^ 
(our emphasis) 
I n more general terms the s t a b i l i s i n g features of seniority lines-and the 
po t e n t i a l l y disruptive effects of disturbing these lines have been referred 
to by Eldridge as follows: 
"Sociologically, the potential effect of technical change i s to challenge 
established patterns of behaviour which have t r a d i t i o n a l l y been regarded 
(l6) W.H. Scott et a l l op.cit. p.245 
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as appropriate. I n the i n d u s t r i a l setting these behaviour patterns 
have been hallowed with the phrase "custom and practice". To disturb 
custom and practice by innovation i s to disturb the authority structure 
and the nature of role expectations. This i s p a r t i c u l a r l y true i n the 
steel industry, where the social organisation of the work has been 
r e l a t i v e l y f i x e d . On the production side a number of promotion ladders 
are established w i t h i n p a r t i c u l a r departments. Once on a ladder, a man 
cannot transfer to another ladder without s t a r t i n g at the bottom. Well 
developed Job hierarchies with seniority of service as the regulating 
p r i n c i p l e of mobility have meant t r a d i t i o n a l l y that age, prestige-giving 
occupations, status and pay have been closely correlated. The plant 
bargaining process, as we shall see, reflected some of the stresses and 
(17) 
strains that occur when these features move out of alignment." 
I f I r o n h i l l provides a r e l a t i v e l y clear-cut method of allocating status to 
i t s manual workers by means of the seniority system, and of attaching men to 
steelwork, the strains which Eldridge refers to should not be overlooked. One 
disadvantage i s the job-specific nature of production work i n steel. With 
seniority, responsibility, better pay and status comes an increasing dependence 
upon a s k i l l which i s non-transferable outside the industry and highly specific 
even to a par t i c u l a r department withi n one plant. The dangers of t h i s 
dependence only vreVeal themselves with the social dislocation of technical 
change which requires the transfer of personnel between departments, and, 
i n the case of senior steelworkers, the prospect of "skidding" from a 
position at the top of one seniority l i n e to the bottom of another. I n t h i s 
sense the production worker i n steel has considerably more to fear from the 
effects of change than his craft colleagues i n the maintenance departments 
whose s k i l l s are more readily transferable. Nevertheless, i t seems that the 
sen i o r i t y system has functioned to provide an important social framework f o r 
semi-skilled production workers and one which has been positively valued by 
(17) J.E.T, Eldridge "Industrial Disputes" Routledge & Kegan Paul I968, p.177 
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both majiagement and trade unions alike. 
Indeed i t should be noted that whilst management at I r o n h i l l reserves the 
ri g h t to man a new process, t h i s i s usually undertaken i n cooperation with the 
unions concerned and the method of allocating men to tasks i s very much a 
matter of joint-determination. The necessity to take j o i n t decisions i n the 
determination of new manning arrangements represents an area of value consensus 
between management and labour. As such, i t f a c i l i t a t e s the introduction of 
change and provides a useful example of how the ceding of managerial power may 
secure the consent of those concerned to the organisation of change. Joint 
rule determination i n t h i s area i s not confined to I r o n h i l l , but appears to 
be widely and t r a d i t i o n a l l y practised throughout the industry. Scott noted, 
f o r example, that i n the planning of a new s t r i p m i l l i n one plant: 
"Agreement was also reached on the method f o r selecting individual operati-ves 
f o r p a r t i c u l a r jobs i n the new m i l l . A formula was decided which gave 
the unions the responsibility f o r drawing up a s h o r t - l i s t of foui men f o r 
every job i n the new m i l l , and the management chose one name from the four 
submitted. This, as one Branch o f f i c i a l said, was a "very crafty 
arrangement", f o r i t enabled the unions to avoid the charge of favouratism, 
whilst the f i r m avoided the charge of arbitrariness by giving the unions 
( l 8 ) 
the re s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the short l i s t . " ^ 
At I r o n h i l l the establishment of the Oxygen Steel Plant i n I964 provides 
one recent example of how t h i s kind of b i l a t e r a l control applies. Here 
management claimed i t s usual prerogative to determine the i n i t i a l manning of 
the plant and to select i t s nominees, to a l l new "supervisory" manual 
production grades. " I n i t i a l manning", i t should be noted, extends only to 
the selection of personnel: i n t h i s case management's proposals f o r the new 
job structure of the department were contested by the union and the outcome 
was a negotiated compromise which extended to a r b i t r a t i o n . Once these 
manning arrangements had been confirmed, however, the normal process of 
(18) W.H. Scott et a l op.cit. p.132 
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promotion by seniority operated. I n practice t h i s noimal process involves 
not only management and the individuals concerned, but also the trade union. 
Individual employees "out of compliance" with the union are not approved f o r 
promotion by the local branch. I n t h i s sense branch control over the promotion 
prospects of i t s manbers i s powerful and serves as an important means of 
d i s c i p l i n i n g rank and f i l e members. 
The seniority system i n steel forms one important basis of social control 
i n the industry. I^ y providing a career l i n e f o r production workers i t 
functions to attach employees to roles and to reward them with increments of 
status and pay f o r the increasing responsibilities and s k i l l s acquired with 
advancement. These re s p o n s i b i l i t i e s and s k i l l s are s u f f i c i e n t l y well-defined 
to influence the r e l a t i v e size of line-management at I r o n h i l l and could be 
associated with above-average business success i n t h i s particular pl a j i t . The 
perpetuation of t h i s system appears to accord with the values of both 
management and steelworkers themselves as the preferred method of social 
organisation i n which b i l a t e r a l control i s a central ingredient. 
To argue f o r the existence of shared values between management and 
employees i n t h i s particular area implies nothing more than the existence of 
a stable framework w i t h i n which predictable forms of i n d u s t r i a l c o n f l i c t may 
nevertheless occur. Moreover the seniority system accords well with wider 
aspects of the control process i n steel to which we must now turn. I n t h i s 
section we have been concerned to emphasise the nature of systems constraints 
and the influence of these constraints upon certain aspects of the control 
process at I r o n h i l l . I n t h i s context we have isolated the seniority system 
as one key dimension of control. Yet the s t a b i l i t y of control i n t h i s plant 
cannot be a t t r i b u t e d solely to the system of promotion, and i t i s to the 
i s o l a t i o n of other variables that we must now turn. I n so doing attention 
i s directed to the character of social integration i n steel and at I r o n h i l l , 
to the values and expectations of steelworkers themselves, and to the 
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i n s t i t u t i o n s j o i n t l y developed with management f o r the regulation of t h e i r 
mutual.relations and f o r the settlement of disputes between them. I n t h i s 
sense we suggest that the system of control as i t exists i n steel is. the 
product of both systems and social imperatives operating independently ajid 
sometimes i n c o n f l i c t i n g ways, upon the organisation of the i n d u s t r i a l 
relations process. 
M SOCIAL CONSTRAINTS; THE STEELWORKER AMD HIS ENVIROMMEMT 
Whatever the system of control has been i n the past, i t has been 
r e l a t i v e l y stable u n t i l quite recently, judged by the incidence of both o f f i c i a l 
and u n o f f i c i a l strikes i n the industry. Whilst there undoubtedly exists an 
increasing propensity to s t r i k e among steelworkers at the present time, t h i s 
has been concentrated p a r t i c u l a r l y amongst maintenance rather than production 
personnel. Published s t r i k e s t a t i s t i c s are not available f o r the industry 
per se whilst o f f i c i a l returns on i n d u s t r i a l disputes include the industry's 
performance w i t h i n the wider metals production group. 
Some general'information on t h i s subject can be obtained from s t a t i s t i c s 
published by the Department of Employment and Productivity. A comparative 
analysis of the metal producing industries, which includes i r o n and steel, 
with mining - f o r many years the industry with the highest s t r i k e record i n 
t h i s country - suggests that whilst the s i t u a t i o n has deteriorated i n recent 
years the record of metal producing industries i s reasonably good, (see table 6) 
During the period I89O-I9O6 the absence of strikes i n the industry and the 
possible reasons f o r t h i s were the subject of comment by Phelps-Brown who wrote: 
"So i t came about that down to I9O6 there had been no big stoppage...... 
Only s i x industries had had b i g stoppages There were two industries, 
moreover, where there had f o r long been no stoppage, a l t h o u ^ unions were 
strong - p r i n t i n g , and i r o n and steel The iron and steel industry 
was exposed to a l l the winds that blow, but i t paid h i ^ and r i s i n g wages, 
more than any other industry, i t offered the unskilled r e c r u i t prospects 
of advancement to r e a l l y high earnings, stoppages were disastrously costly 
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because furnaces cracked when they cooled, wages were i n any case a 
(19) 
small part of the whole cost of production."^ ' 
Table 6: Comparative Strike S t a t i s t i c s Metal and Mining Industries, U.K. 
1925-1970^^°^ 
(a) Number of Stoppages 
Metals Mining 
1925 48 174 
1935 38 233 
1945 170 1319 
1955 44 - 1784 
1970 326 165 
(b) Number of Workers (»000's) 
1925 11 138 
1935 8 201 
1945 19 244 
1955 8 142 
1970 88 118 
(c) Number of Working Days Lost ('OOO's) 
1925 96 3751 
1935 42 1384 
1945 68 644 
1955 24 431 
1970 621 1091 
During a subsequent period between I 9 I I and 1945 Knowles indicates a similar 
(21) 
picture of the stable condition of i n d u s t r i a l relations i n iron and steel. ' 
(19) E.H. Phelps Brown "The Growth of B r i t i s h I n d u s t r i a l Relations" Macmillan 
I96O, p. 1.55-6. 
(20) Sources: Ministry of Labour Gazette and B r i t i s h Labour S t a t i s t i c s 
H i s t o r i c a l Abstract I886-I968 Department of Employment and 
Productivity H.M.S.O. I 9 7 I . 
(21) K.G.J.C. Knowles "Strikes - a Study i n Indu s t r i a l Conflict" Oxford, 1952 
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He found that the industry had been the least prone to s t r i k e , and that 
apart from the industry's p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the General Strike, there had 
not been a widespread s t r i k e f o r half a century. Several explanations 
were offered by Knowles f o r t h i s outcome. These embraced the operation of 
a selling-price s l i d i n g scale l i n k i n g wage rates to market prices of steel 
over a long period down to 1940 (and thereafter by a scheme l i n k i n g wages to 
the cost of l i v i n g index); by the sober character of leadership on both 
sides of the industry; and by the inclusiveness of the industry's conciliation 
and a r b i t r a t i o n machinery. The underlying causes of i n d u s t r i a l peace i n 
steel, however, i n Knowles'; submission were the economic circumstances which 
enabled the leaders of i r o n and steel workers to a t t a i n t h e i r ends by the 
pursuit of an essentially conciliatory policy. These circumstances were 
the tendency of the selling-price sliding-scale to induce agreements between 
employers and union leaders; the effects of steadily increasing productivity 
upon wages based p a r t l y or wholly on a tonnage basis so that average wages 
had remained high compared with those of workers i n prosperous industries; 
and the p o s s i b i l i t y of maintaining earnings because wages i n the industry 
formed a r e l a t i v e l y small f r a c t i o n of t o t a l costs. 
More recent local informaition on t h i s subject f o r the period 1949-61 i s 
contained i n Eldridge's analysis of Indu s t r i a l Relations i n the North Esist 
(22) 
steel industry Here s t r i k e data was derived from an analysis of 
newspaper sources and checked against the regional aggregates of the former. 
Ministry of Labour. Both o f f i c i a l and u n o f f i c i a l strikes were included i n 
the survey, excluding only strikes which lasted f o r less than a day and those 
involving fewer than ten employees. Eldridge found that on t h i s basis very 
few str i k e s had occurred. Twenty two strikes were recorded i n a l l , averaging 
less than two a year. Of these strikes almost half were attributed to pay. 
Most were called by single unions and there was no evidence of concerted 
s t r i k e action being taken by a l l unions i n a plant at any one time. The 
numbers of employees involved i n strikes were small; i n two-thirds of them 
(22) J.E.T. Eldridge op.cit. p.197 see table XVIIIA. This area includes 
I r o n h i l l . 
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100 men or l e s s were involved. Moreover the t y p i c a l s t r i k e was of short 
duration, i n i t i a t e d largely i n single plants, and u n o f f i c i a l . On t h i s l a s t 
point, however, Eldridge observes that the s t r i k e s were characterised as 
"perishable" disputes i n which immediate redress was sought to correct alleged 
breaches i n established work practices and conventions. F i n a l l y Eldridge 
discusses the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of particular unions for s t r i k e a c t i v i t y . Given 
that there was a general absence of demarcation s t r i k e s during the period, he 
i s l e f t i n no doubt that: 
"Plainly, the craft unions were the main instigators and participants i n 
s t r i k e action. The r e l a t i v e l y large number attributed to the 
Boilermakers as compared to the other, unions i s of interest but ought 
not, perhaps to be exaggerated." (This l a s t point refers to the fact 
that a majority of s t r i k e s by Boilermakers were sympathy st r i k e s 
(23) 
occurring within one plant within the space of a few days.)^ ' 
The existence of inter-occupational d i s p a r i t i e s i n strike-proneness 
along the l i n e s of a craft-maintenance versus a production workers' division 
i n s t e e l i s also recognised by Clegg^^^^. The reasons for the perpetuation 
of such a d i v i s i o n are seen by t h i s writer to l i e i n a fragmentation of 
methods of pay determination i n the industry leading to competitive wage-
bargaining inside the plant.^^^^ Thus whilst production workers have been 
paid by r e s u l t s (by the ton of s t e e l produced), maintenance workers have been 
paid by time. Whilst increasing mechanisation has had the effect of 
increasing the proportion of craftsmen i n the labour force i t has also tended 
to increase the gap between the average incomes of both groups. 
That t h i s d i v i s i o n i s long-standing i n s t e e l i s suggested by the e a r l i e r 
conclusions of Scott whose study previously referred to was undertaken during 
the period 1953-56. He writes: 
"The rapid expansion and increased importance of the craft group has led 
(23) I b i d p.200-1 
(24) H.A. Clegg "The System of In d u s t r i a l Relations i n Great B r i t a i n " . B a s i l 
Blackwell', 1970 p. 327. 
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many craftsmen to believe that t h e i r rewards are no longer adaquate; 
and i n the absence of an effective formal.structure of management-craft 
union relations, and of t r a d i t i o n a l values l i k e those which management 
and production workers share, d i f f i c u l t i e s have arisen. Moreover there 
i s a tendency for craftsmen to evaluate t h e i r conditions i n rel a t i o n 
to other groups, and there was evidence of inter - rather than i n t r a -
(25) 
group comparison amongst junior s t a f f " . 
Given, then the r e l a t i v e l y low incidence of s t r i k e s i n t h i s area of the 
industry, and given also a concentration of grievance behaviour amongst 
maintenance craftsmen with more readily transferable s k i l l s , how can we define 
the pattern of s o c i a l constraints operating upon production operatives whose 
s k i l l s are more s p e c i f i c to s t e e l arid whose apparent unwillingness to s t r i k e 
i s a p a r t i c u l a r l y important indicator of the s t a b i l i t y of the control system-
as i t has t r a d i t i o n a l l y operated at I r o n h i l l and i n the North-East Coast area 
of the industry? 
I n i t i a l l y we should note that steelworkers at I r o n h i l l form a r e l a t i v e l y 
i s o l a t e d and homogeneous r e s i d e n t i a l community. Because the steelworks i s 
long-established and the main source of employment i n the area, the community 
of I r o n h i l l has developed around the plant and i s almost exclusively dependent 
upon i t . Steelworkers form a homogeneous group dominating other employment 
groups within the community. At the same time, as we have seen, t h i s group 
consisted p r i n c i p a l l y of non-craft operatives engaged mainly i n production as 
opposed to maintenance activitj'es. The ra t i o of manual to non-manual 
employees i n the group i n I967 was 5 to 1. I t seems reasonable to assume, 
therefore, that the community of I r o n h i l l i s predominantly working-class i n 
character, and that the s o c i a l perspectives of steelworkers i n t h i s plant, 
including t h e i r orientations to employment there, are shaped i n important 
respects by the values of that community. 
(25) W.H. Scott et a l op.cit. p.257 
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But what kind of s o c i a l constraints would such values impose upon members 
of t h i s community? To some extent we have already sought to resolve t h i s 
cpiestion i n more general terms i n an e a r l i e r discussion of the environmental 
and occupationsil constraints which influence individual orientations to work 
(26) 
and to control. ' I n many respects the community of I r o n h i l l might be 
expected to approximate i n i t s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s to that of a traditional 
working c l a s s area i n which a d i s t i n c t i v e form of soc i a l consciousness exists 
amongst i t s members. The dimensions of what Lockwood has described as 
"proletarian traditionalism" i n this-context include: 
(a) A s o l i d a r i s t i c orientation to work. Work carries i n t r i n s i c as well as 
instrumental s a t i s f a c t i o n s , but relationships with management imply 
some fundamental c o n f l i c t of interest and the role of trade unions i n 
t h i s situation i s to provide the major organisational source of 
s o l i d a r i t y for employees v i s a v i s management. I n t h i s situation the 
trade union rather than the firm i t s e l f provides the context i n whicji 
s o l i d a r i s t i c relationships are sustained. 
(b) I n wider context the c l a s s structure of society i s seen also i n terms of 
a power model i n which status distinctions are defined i n terms of a 
fundamental d i v i s i o n of interests between "us" and "them".. Manual 
workers i n general are thus held to possess interests at variance with 
those of employers and even non-manual employees. 
(c) The p o s s i b i l i t i e s of advajicement are defined i n the most limited terms. 
Security of employment rather than the prospect of promotion into f i r s t -
(27) 
l i n e management or beyond i s most valued. 
At the same time there i s some evidence to suggest that wider regional 
influences i n the North-East have operated to produce a more conciliatory work 
and community environment than i s found i n certain other regions of the country 
(26) See Chapter I I , pp. 67-86 
(27) See for example, D. Lockwood "Sources of Variation i n Working Class Images 
of Society" Sociological Review, I4 , 1966 pp.249-67 
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or suggested by Lockwood's model of proletarian traditionalism. Knowles, 
for example, contrasts the good in d u s t r i a l relations history of the North-
East with the militant traditions of South Wales i n his regional study of 
i n d u s t r i a l s t r i k e s . iE&r the use of a standardised "strike-proneness r a t i o " 
where industries are given an appropriate weight according to the i r share 
and rate of s t r i k e s whilst controlling the proportion of the occupied 
population employed during the period 191I - 4 5 , he finds that the ratios for 
South Wales and Northumberland and Durham, compared with the average for a l l 
(28 ) 
industries, are as follows:^ ' 
Strike-Proneness Ratio 
South Wales = 1.3 
Northumberland and Durham = O.4 
A l l regions = 1 ,0 
These r a t i o s cover a l l industries i n the regions. I t seems f a i r to conclude, 
therefore, that regional influences, whose sources might be found i n certain 
d i s t i n c t i v e c o l l e c t i v e s o c i a l and work experiences of the North-East, have 
played an important part i n the development of good ind u s t r i a l relations i n 
iron and s t e e l i n t h i s area, and that the absence of any major indus t r i a l 
c o n f l i c t at I r o n h i l l since the General Strike of 1926 i s due i n part to the 
c o l l e c t i v e experience of labour i n . t h i s area. 
Moreover we have noted i n our more general discussion of the nature of 
s o c i a l constraints upon individual expectations of work and control that 
occupational Values may operate i n ways which complement or conflict with the 
normative systems of the wider community. Steel-workers, for example, may 
express t h e i r attachment to employment through well defined occupational 
groups of production, maintenance and service work. These groups may share 
ce r t a i n norms related to the control of work situations and extending to a 
variety of arrangements including apprenticeship, demarcation and manning, 
(28) K.G.J.C. Knowles op.cit. p.207 
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precedent and customs, status, seniority.and job-rights. Under certain 
conditions i t seems feasible to argue that occupational norms counteract 
or reinforce community norms i n important respects, or that community norms 
themselves become modified by the pervasiveness of the occupational community 
i t s e l f . We have already ci t e d the work of Cannon whose study of the craft 
composito,T-suggests!'-that the process of p r i v a t i s a t i o n may be i n h i b i t e d by the 
(29) 
countervailing power of occupational norms.^ ' More recently. Brown and 
Brannen's analysis of social relations amongst shipbuilding workers.indicates 
that i t i s possible f o r such workers to f e e l part of a working class community 
and of a shipbuilding community, and yet act at work i n ways which appear to 
threaten the interests of that community. Thus s o l i d a r i t y arises over issues 
a f f e c t i n g particular occupational groups and t h e i r c o n f l i c t i n g interests with 
other groups i n the workplace. Indeed: 
"The work si t u a t i o n i t s e l f then generates pressures f o r both c o n f l i c t and 
cohesion among workers. The shared experience of working on a product 
the danger and tough physical conditions associated with shipyard 
work and the t i e s of friendship which exist within the yard and extend 
beyond i t i n t o the wider community would seem to argue the existence of 
a close, s o l i d a r i s t i c community. At the same time, however, the 
occupational and wage structure of the industry and the production 
process i t s e l f divide workers up into different interest groups and 
generate c o n f l i c t between them."^^^^ 
Undoubtedly the linkages between work and community at I r o n h i l l - a r e 
strong and i n certain respects mutually reinforcing. At the same time what 
constitutes a steel community has been shaped i n crucial respects by 
characteristics which are unique to the steel industry i t s e l f as well as the 
wider region i n which i t i s located. I n t h i s sense the expectations of s t e e l -
workers are similar i n some respects to those of a l l manual workers i n industry; 
(29) I . . C.Cannon op.cit. 
(30) R.K. Brown and P. Brannen op.cit. p.204 
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i n others, however, they diverge d i s t i n c t i v e l y from what one might expect 
of the "proletarian t r a d i t i o n a l " worker. So f a r as steelwork i n the North-
East i s concerned our contention i s that control at I r o n h i l l has been stable i n 
part because there exists a r e l a t i v e l y high degree of reciprocation within 
the occupational structure of the industry concerning the r e l a t i v e status to 
be accorded to each occupational group as well as a substantial degree of 
b i l a t e r a l control between management and labour over those areas of job and 
work regulation which are of j o i n t concern to these groups. At the same 
time the normative system of the local community and possibly that of the 
wider region, has reinforced those values which derive from steelwork and 
which appear to have l i m i t e d c o n f l i c t between management and labour i n t h i s 
plant. The existence of common values concerning the organisation of work, 
technical change, seniority and the processing of disputes, however, need 
not preclude the continued existence of criss-crossing lines, of interest 
between groups of employees i n terms of wage d i f f e r e n t i a l s or even .of status. 
What i s important i s that these interactions occur within an apparently stable 
framework of shsired values which accord particular importance to the 
d e s i r a b i l i t y of maintaining t r a d i t i o n a l values of cooperation between 
management and labour i n the organisation of work and to some extent i n the 
planning of change. I n t h i s context the retention of the seniority system, 
teamwork based upon a common tonnage bonus and the continuing role of the 
trade union i n selecting i t s members f o r promotion are principles of work 
organisation i n steel which are adapted to meet changing conditions. Their 
continued existence i n spite of change indicates the importance attached to 
them by both management and production workers and appears to be a crucial 
factor i n the maintenance of stable control under conditions of change. 
So f a r as I r o n h i l l i s concerned then we may conclude that the absence of 
strikes i s at t r i b u t a b l e i n no small part to both the regional, Community and 
occupational influences described above. There i s , however, a unique factor 
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which appears "to have existed i n the case of I r o n h i l l and which may have 
had a marked independent effect upon the t r a d i t i o n s and practices of t h i s 
plant and upon the values of the community and the wider region. 
I t i s the case that i n d u s t r i a l relations were better at I r o n h i l l than 
at most steelworks i n the period between I864 and 1914« For the greater 
part of t h i s p_eriod there was l i t t l e evidence of serious internal trouble. 
This record was linked with such personalities as David Dale, Joint 
Managing Director of the Company from I864 to 1873 and Chairman u n t i l his 
death i n I9O6. Dale was a pioneer of conc i l i a t i o n and a r b i t r a t i o n and was 
President of the North of England Board of Ar b i t r a t i o n and Conciliation set 
up f o r the i r o n industry i n 1869. The Board's record i n conciliation was 
outstanding. On the union side, John Kane, o r i g i n a l l y an employee at 
I r o n h i l l and l a t e r to become the leader of the Amalgamated Ironworkers Union, 
worked actively with.Dale to. establish the Board and served as i t s Secretary. 
Thus the t r a d i t i o n s of compromise and the peaceful solution of problems 
which- were l a t e r to become a hallmark, of i n d u s t r i a l relations i n the 
industry were nurtured at I r o n h i l l . The development of in d u s t r i a l peace 
i n steel during the greater part of t h i s century so f a r has at least one 
important source i n the establishment of these practices i n the North-gast 
over one hundred years ago. 
There i s indeed evidence to suggest that the existence of t h i s 
framework of shared values i s not peculiar to I r o n h i l l but does extend to 
other steelplants outside the region. Scott's study supports t h i s view. 
He writes: 
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" i t i s surprising, i n terms of experience i n other industries, that 
the formal structure of management-employee relations and t r a d i t i o n a l 
values have persisted ajid proved so effective i n l i m i t i n g c o n f l i c t i n 
the face of so many problems I t must therefore be emphasised that 
the basic technical organisation of the industry i s also important i n 
promoting the smooth assimilation of change. The industry has a high 
capital/labour r a t i o Prom the employer's point of view, therefore, i t 
i s essential to keep a plant i n continuous operation This, and the 
f a c t that wages are a r e l a t i v e l y low proportion of t o t a l costs has made 
i t both possible and desirable f o r employers to pay high wages. The 
r e l a t i v e l y high earnings and the promotion system based on seniority give 
onployees.a b i g stake i n the f i r m , and a strong d i s i n c l i n a t i o n to impede 
operations. Teamwork, and output bonus payments on a team basis, 
probably also contribute to s t a b i l i t y . . Both management and workers-are 
therefore very dependent on each other; t h i s must influence t h e i r 
readiness to compromise, as, f o r example, i n the acceptance by the 
workers of management's r i g h t to effect changes provided that good 
conditions of employment and the seniority system are maintained 
Enployees may accept the i n e v i t a b i l i t y of changes, since they recognise 
t h e i r necessity i f the f i r m i s to maintain i t s position."^'^•'"^ 
Scott's assertion that the s t a b i l i t y of high average earnings and the 
seniority system i n steel provide the basic clue to the existence of 
cooperation between managment and labour accords well with the findings of 
Phelps Brown and Knowles. S t a b i l i t y of control exists i n t h e i r interpretation 
because economic circumstances and the process of technical change operate 
t y p i c a l l y to sustain high wage expectations. Against t h i s argument, however, 
must be considered the more recent conclusions of Banks whose h i s t o r i c a l 
survey of i n d u s t r i a l relations i n steel includes data suggesting that between 
(31) W.H. Scott et a l op.cit. p.258 
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1895 and I927 wages i n the i r o n and steel industry rose by only 103^ 5 as 
against 200^ f o r the country as a whole. ^•^'^^ I n his submission the absence 
of major disputes with i n the industry and especially during the "black 
decade" 1921-31, cannot be at t r i b u t e d to the existence of j o i n t i n d u s t r i a l 
councils composed of workers' and employers' representatives established i n 
the industry after I87O with the intention of adjusting wages to fluctuations 
i n steel prices. Nor can i t be attr i b u t e d to the existence of high wage-
earning production workers motivated to resist i n d u s t r i a l dislocation to 
prevent the incursion of unskilled cheap labour into the industry. A 
comparative study oif wage levels i n I914 and I925 (luoted by Banks shows that 
whilst unskilled labourers i n steel received increases of between 56?S and 
75?^  steelmelters only received increases between 26^ and 33^, indicating a 
declining d i f f e r e n t i a l between these two groups.^^^^ I n an industry, 
therefore, where according to t h i s writer, the trend of real wages was on the 
whole unfavourable to workers i n steel at least between 1921-31, and even 
more unfavourable to s k i l l e d than to unskilled employees, where the 
unemployment rate was twice the national level and where the industry paid 
no dividends at a l l on i t s ordinary share capitals."during these years, the 
absence of i n d u s t r i a l disputes i s remarkable. 
Banks' solution to t h i s apparent contradiction i s f i r s t to reject the 
argument that technical advance operated favourably throu^out upon the 
s l i d i n g scale of wages to sustain high wage incomes and to maintain existing 
wa^e d i f f e r e n t i a l s . Instead he argues that by the 1930's the control of 
ir o n and steel enterprises had passed into the hands of salaried directors 
whose p r i o r concern, he assumes, was to maintain high plant loading and avoid 
i n d u s t r i a l dislocation by seeking working compromises vdth labour. 
(3S) E.H.P. Brown and P. Hart "The Share of Wages i n National Income" The 
Economic Journal, Vol .62, 1952, Table 1, pp.276-7V:- Quoted i n 
J.A. Banks op.cit. p.93* 
(33') Committee on Industry and Trade "Survey of Industrial Relations" H.M.S.O. 
p.79* Quoted i n J.A. Banks op.cit. p.93. 
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Clearly the fact that Scott's conclusions refer to the decade between 
1950 and I96O whilst those of Banks refer to the 1920's suggest the use of 
caution i n any comparative assessment of t h e i r work. But i f Bank's 
conclusions concerning the changing philosophy of steel management towards 
control are accurate then i t must be admitted that t h i s philosophy appears 
to p a r a l l e l to a remarkable degree that of the ^large.stl. manual workers' 
union i n the industry', the Iron and Steel Trades Confederation. I t i s t h i s 
congruency of ;,values ;: between the principal parties to control i n steel which 
appears to have been at least as important as the reasons offered by Phelps 
Brown, Knowles and Scott i n definj;ng the apparently stable pattern of 
i n d u s t r i a l relations i n the industry since the F i r s t World Wax. 
What evidence i s there to support our contention that t h i s large i n d u s t r i a l 
union's character has been shaped by a philosophy based upon co-operation 
rather than c o n f l i c t i n i n d u s t r i a l relations? One source i s found i n the 
views of Sir Arthur Pugh, fhe General Secretary of the Confederation during 
i t s formative years between 1917 and 1936. Lincoln Evans, who succeeded him, 
claims that Pugh defined the essential character of I.S.T.C. i n the following 
terms: 
"Industry was not a place where two sides were ranged against each other 
i n a state of permanent h o s t i l i t y engaged i n a ceaseless class struggle, 
but a j o i n t enterprise where divergent interests could be reconciled by 
discussion and negotiation against a backcloth of common interest."^^^^ 
and 
"Runrdng through t h i s story (of the growth of I.S.T.C.) i t w i l l be seen, 
are certain basic principles which have governed the a c t i v i t i e s of the 
union i n i t s relations with employers. F i r s t i t i s essential that when 
agreements are reached they must be honoured by those on whose behalf 
they are made Of equal importance i s the observance of constitutional 
(34) Sir Arthur Pugh "Men of Steel" I.S.T.C. (See foreward by Lincoln Evans) 
1951. 
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procedure. Where machinery f o r the settlement of disputes i s 
established through which elected representatives from the workshop take 
t h e i r f u l l part i n a l l the deliberations, the decisions reached must be 
binding on a l l the effectiveness of any j o i n t machinery, however, 
depends not on the preciseness of i t s form but on the s p i r i t 
which associates both sides i n the use of i t there i s s t i l l too 
much of the att i t u d e - and t h i s applies with eqiial i f not more force to 
the employers - that negotiations are battles to be fought rather than 
problems to be solved. "^ "^ ^^  
This desire f o r the maintenance of constitutional procedures and 
di s c i p l i n e i n the organisation of the union's a f f a i r s i n i t s relationship 
with management became and remain central features of I.S.T.C. policy. They 
have, however, much e a r l i e r roots. I n 1913 there were approximately 100,000 
trade union members i n the i r o n and steel industry. One t h i r d of these 
members were i n the dominating B r i t i s h Steel Smelter's M i l l , Iron, Tinplate 
and Kindred Trades' Association ( l a t e r to become one of three unions 
amalgamating to form I.S.T.C. i n 1917). Commenting on the leadership of 
the Smelters' Union by i t s general secretary, John Hodge, at t h i s time, Carr 
and Taplin note: 
"Hodge's outstanding leadership of the B r i t i s h Steel Smelters combined 
strength with moderation. Firm disciplinary action was taken against 
any branch which attempted to by-pass the accepted negotiating channels. 
The Union adopted an enlightened att i t u d e to technical improvements, 
and Hodge claimed that t h ^ never obstructed any new device, "my policy 
having been to advise the men not to work against the machine. 
(36) 
provided we get a f a i r share of the plunder."^ ' 
(35) I h i d p. x i - x i i 
(360 J.C. Carr and W. Taplin "A History of the B r i t i s h Steel Industry" 
Blackwell, 1962 p.277 
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Whatever congruence of values exists between management and I.S.T.C. 
derives i n no small part from a mutual interest of both parties i n 
increasing the efficiency and p r o f i t a b i l i t y of the industry. Whilst 
c o n f l i c t over the measures required to promote efficiency may undoubtedly 
exist, i t i s si g n i f i c a n t that values favourable to the maintenance of 
cooperation and the smooth assimilation of change have been a conspicuous 
feature of i n d u s t r i a l relations at I r o n h i l l and indeed throughout the steel 
industry of the North of England. Such values arise, as we have noted, from 
the involvement of both management and labour i n a d i s t i n c t i v e t r a d i t i o n of 
i n d u s t r i a l relations and i n a particular type of socio-technical system: 
a type whose system requirements are at least compatible with a pattern of 
social organisation permitting a wider than average degree of involvement and 
re s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r i t s production workers than i s found i n most other 
comparable i n d u s t r i a l situations. The result i s the existence of an 
occupational ideology amongst production steelworkers which emphasises the 
" c r a f t " status of steelwork and the j o i n t involvement of management and 
men i n effective steel-production. The norms surrounding the acceptance 
of t h i s ideology are s u f f i c i e n t l y pervasive to modify whatever traces of 
"proletarian traditionalism" might exist i n the wider residential community 
of I r o n h i l l . There i s reason to believe, moreover, that the characteristics 
of the region as a whole may influence the ways i n which "proletarianism" 
finds expression i n t h i s area and with i n the I r o n h i l l community. 
I n t h i s sense, steelworkers engaged on production as opposed to craft 
maintenance work constitute something of a "deviant case" amongst manual 
workers engaged i n basic industry. I t could be that t h i s deviation i s not 
peculiar to I r o n h i l l but i s a generalised feature of steelmaking i n the north 
of England. Scott, f o r example, i n his e a r l i e r study noted that: 
" we may say that the formal structure of management-employee relations, 
supported by t r a d i t i o n a l values favourable to the maintenance of 
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cooperation, has e f f e c t i v e l y l i m i t e d the c o n f l i c t s and problems arising 
(37) 
from technical change." 
What these dimensions of the steelworker^ ideology are, w i l l emerge more f u l l y 
i n the next chapter. Our evidence suggests that steelworkers, i n common 
with other manual workers elsewhere, are "proletarian" i n the sense that they 
are committ.edto the value of trade unionism as an appropriate instrument of 
control. I n important respects, moreover, they see t h e i r own interests as 
d i s t i n c t i v e compared with non-production groups of employees including 
management, and are prepared to defend these interests by a l l means at t h e i r 
disposal. On the other hand the role of I.S.T.C. i n management-union 
relations suggests a positive record i n the planning of change i n the industry, 
and our evidence suggests that rank and f i l e members at I r o n h i l l endorse t h e i r 
union's record i n t h i s respect. I t i s the commitment to reach suitable 
working compromises with plant management i n the planning of change which 
emerges as a pronounced feature of union policy as well as an important aspect 
of the occupational culture of steelworkers. 
Analysis of average weekly earnings at I r o n h i l l over the period 1946-68 
only p a r t i a l l y supports the assertion that high wages are the central 
determinant of stable i n d u s t r i a l relations i n steel. A comparison of the 
average weekly earnings i n a l l manufacturing industries f o r wage-eaxners aged 
21 and over with employees i n various steel production and craft maintenance 
groups indicates that not a l l steelworkers have maintained a higher level of 
average earnings than the average f o r a l l manufacturing industries over t h i s 
period (see Table 6) . Whilst a s t r i c t comparison between average earnings 
i n manufacturing industry and steel workers at I r o n h i l l i s impossible since 
the l a t t e r includes employees under 21 years of age, steelworkers i n general 
have not enjoyed a level of earnings which alone would account f o r the 
(37) W.H. Scott et a l op.cit. p.256 
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s t a b i l i t y of i n d u s t r i a l relations. 
Table 6; Comparative Indices of Average Weekly Earnings f o r a l l Manufacturing 
Industry and I r o n h i l l 1953-68 
Group 
A B C D E 
Year 
A l l manufacturing • 
industry: adults 
over 21 years only 
I r o n h i l l 
Blastfurnace 
workers: a l l 
employees 
I r o n h i l l 
Steelmelting 
workers: a l l , 
employees 
I r o h h i l l 
Rolling m i l l 
workers: a l l 
employees 
I r o n h i l l 
c r a f t 
maintenance 
workers: a l l 
employees 
1953 100 100 102 99 93 
1963 176 148 176 176 167 
1968 232 187 238 229 219 
Notes: ( l ) Index f o r a l l manufacturing industry derived from s t a t i s t i c s 
i n Ministry of Labour Gazettes. 
(2) 1953 index f o r a l l manufacturing industries = 100 
Blastfurnacemen: and craft maintenance workers at I r o n h i l l would appear 
to have produced average earnings somewhat below the mean. Steelmelters 
and r o l l e r s on the other hand were i n l i n e with the. average earnings of 
workers i n manufacturing industries. 
I n accounting f o r the apparent s t a b i l i t y of in d u s t r i a l relations at 
I r o n h i l l , therefore, our evidence suggests that some attention must be given, 
i n addition to wage trends i n the industry and the economic and technical 
conditions underlying these trends, to the character of the control system 
which affords considerable discretion to production employees to participate 
i n decision-making, and, i n wider context, to the pattern of social integration 
i n steel and i n the wider conmunity as i t has been discussed above, which appears 
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to sustain t h i s effective system of control. 
2. CONCLUSION: THE INTERACTION OF SOCIAL AND SYSTEM CONSTRAINTS 
In t h i s chapter we have sought to apply the model of control derived 
from Part I to the s i t u a t i o n of one steel plant. We have attempted to 
explain by part i c u l a r reference to the interaction of systems and social 
constraints how, i n spite of considerable changes i n the market environment 
of the plant, i t s system of control has remained r e l a t i v e l y stable with 
profound implications f o r the low level of grievance a c t i v i t y found there. 
Crucial i n t h i s exercise has been the examination of the ways i n which new 
constraints imposed by post-war market changes have been accommodated at plant" 
level by a system of social orgajiisation whose essential features derive from 
long-standing work practices highly valued by both management and production 
workers at I r o n h i l l . The evidence presented so f a r i n t h i s chapter confirms 
the view that the increasing effectiveness of the enterprise as a production 
unit was f a c i l i t a t e d to a considerable degree by the effectiveness of i t s 
pattern of social integration i n l i m i t i n g c o n f l i c t and sustaining the awareness 
that cooperation i n the planning of change was mutually beneficial and indeed 
v i t a l i f the plant were to survive. 
I t could be argued that the absence of c o n f l i c t i n t h i s plant derives 
simply from the fear of unemployment and from the absence of alternative 
jobs i n the v i c i n i t y of I r o n h i l l . Our conclusions suggest that other 
factors uniqxie to the industry and to the region exist to influence the 
level of work attachment. Some of these factors have been isolated i n 
t h i s chapter. I t must be admitted that the job-specific nature of much 
semi-skilled employment i n steel precludes mobility with the advancing 
age of many employees. At the same time i t i s remarkable that the 
- 164 -
decline i n the number of job opportunities announced by the Corporation as 
a result of plant closures and reorganisation amounting to some 19,000 out 
of a t o t a l p ayroll of 252,000 by March, I97I, should have been negotiated i n 
large measure without the resistance and c o n f l i c t which might have been 
expected. I n our opinion t h i s reaction i s i n keeping with the t r a d i t i o n a l 
interest of management and the major union, I.S.T.C. i n increasing the 
e f f i c i e n c y and p r o f i t a b i l i t y of the industry and that i n the manpower f i e l d 
t h i s can only be realised by collaboration between parties. I n t h i s context 
the acceptance by the unions f o r more f l e x i b i l i t y i n working methods i s 
reciprocated by an acceptance on the part of the Corporation that there must 
be an equitable wages structure as well as greater security and s t a b i l i t y of 
earnings. The recent conclusion of negotiations f o r the implementation of 
the Corporation's productivity programme reinforces the argument that the 
conduct of i n d u s t r i a l relations i n t h i s industry continues to command the 
support of the majority of those involved at least u n t i l the time of our 
i n q u i r i e s at I r o n h i l l i n 1970* Our argument i s that the necessary i n t e r s 
dependencies between management and labour required to f a c i l i t a t e an adequate 
level of systems integration of the enterprise are sustained i n t h i s plant by 
a complementary system of social integration t r a d i t i o n a l l y developed and 
evolving along lines which accord well with the values and expectations of 
participants. 
I n the following two chapters the results of two recently conducted 
attitu d e surveys of blue and white-collar employees at I r o n h i l l w i l l be 
presented. I n so doing p a r t i c u l a r attention i s given to the measurement of 
respondents' views about t h e i r job, employment and involvement of the system 
of i n d u s t r i a l relations i n steel. Their purpose w i l l be to i l l u s t r a t e the 
importance of assessing how f o r d i f f e r i n g categories of employees i n t h i s 
plant legitimise the present system of control and how fa r intei^occupational 
homogeneity exists w i t h i n the.labour force to sustain the process of 
cooperation and the s t a b i l i t y of control described i n t h i s chapter. Where, 
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however, strains exist between actors and the control system, these w i l l be 
discussed. I n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r context we shall indicate i n Chapter VI how 
the existence of a long-term problem i n the industry over the trade-union 
representation of white-collar workers manifests i t s e l f at the present time 
at I r o n h i l l . This w i l l serve as a timely reminder that potential strains 
i n the process of plant control may arise not merely as the result of c o n f l i c t 
between management and labour (variable 3/4 of our model) but also between 
groups w i t h i n the labour force i t s e l f , and between rank and f i l e actors and 
the control system i t s e l f which includes the o f f i c i a l trade union representatives 
of the labour force (variable 2/4 ) . 
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CHAPTER V 
ORIENTATIONS OF MANUAL STAFF TO WORK AND CONTROL AT IRONHILL 
In seeking to validate the u t i l i t y of the concept of the control 
system i n the analysis of stable patterns of i n d u s t r i a l relations, i t i s 
necessary not only to explore the nature of the relationships existing 
between management and labour and between dif f e r e n t occupational groups, 
but also to consider the conditions under which management secures the 
consent of employees to i t s r ule. I n doing so we discover something about -
the normative value system of that mass of B r i t i s h Steel Corporation employees 
who never take part i n active trade union a f f a i r s nor i n the industry's 
consultative process but whose consent to those rules of work j o i n t l y 
determined by management and the trade unions i s crucial. I n order, 
therefore to ascertain how employees respond to the organisation of job, 
work and i n d u s t r i a l relations i n steel at I r o n h i l l , attitude surveys of 
random samples of manual and non-manual workers were 'conducted i n 1970 and 
the results produced i n t h i s and the subsequent chapter. Throu^out these 
reports we shall be exploring those characteristics of job and work which, 
through the eyes of part i c u l a r groups of actors, appear to contribute 
towards the outcome of a stable system of control i n t h i s particular plant. 
1. ATTITU33E SURVEY OF MANUAL WORKERS 
This survey was conducted i n May, 1970. 240 questionnaires were 
despatched of which 186 were returned, giving a response rate of 79j5. A 
summary of respondents i s given i n Table 1. 
- 167 -
Table 1; Summary of Resondents by Occupation. 
Occupational Category 
Numbers 




Category as ^  
Labour Force 
1. Production/Service Workers 
Steelmelters, r o l l e r s , road 
and r a i l transport workers, 
crane drivers and others. 
109 58 55 
2. Blastfurnace and Cokeplant 
Workers 
33 18 12 
3. Maintenance Staff 
Boilermakers, bricklayers, 
mechanical and e l e c t r i c a l 
c r a f t s , welders. 
44 23 27 
Personal information concerning age, educational and employment 
experience of the sample produced the following results: 
Table 2: D i s t r i b u t i o n of Sample by Age. 
Age Category Number Percentage 
Under 30 44 23.7 
30 - 50 73 39.2 
Over 50 69 37.1 
Total 186 100.0 
Table 3: D i s t r i b u t i o n by School Leaving Age, 
Age at Leaving School Number Percentage 
14 or e a r l i e r 102 54.8 
15 59 31.7 
Later than 15 25 13.4 
Total 186 100.0 
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Table 4: D i s t r i b u t i o n by Educational Qualification. 
Qualification Percentage (N = 186) 
G.C.E. or C.S.E. 7.5 




Non-Re spondent s 1.6 
Total 100.0 
From these tables i t w i l l be seen that the sample broke down into 
three roughly comparable groups i n terras of age d i s t r i b u t i o n . A 
sig n i f i c a n t majority l e f t school at the age of 14 or e a r l i e r and a 
substantial majority f a i l e d to receive formal educational qualifications. 
In these terms i t approximated to what one might expect from any 
representative group of manual workers. 
Data concerning the employment experience of the sample was as follows: 
Table 5: D i s t r i b u t i o n by Length of Service. 
Years of Service Percentage (N = 186) 
Under 2 years 10.2 
Over 2 and under 
10 years 20.4 
10 years and over 68.3 
Non-Re spondent s 1.1 
Total 100.0 
A majority of the sample had experienced a long period of continuous 
employment i n the Company although other data indicated that 62.0^ had 
had previous employment experience and 43.0^ unemployment experience at sane 
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time during t h e i r working l i v e s . I n general terms, however, the sample 
was stable i n t h i s respect. 
S t a b i l i t y of employment i n the plant was matched by an equal 
d i s i n c l i n a t i o n to become detached from the residential community of I r o n h i l l 
surrounding the plant. 83^ of the respondents reported satisfaction with 
residence i n t h i s community because of family and friendship t i e s ; only 
17.0^ were intent upon leaving because better opportunities existed elsewhere. 
Whilst 38.0^ admitted that t h e i r employment i n steel was constrained by the 
absence of alternative employment opportunities i n the d i s t r i c t , 75.0J5 chose 
to maintain t h e i r attachment to steelwork either because the pay appeared to 
be reasonable _or because they found steelwork interesting and challenging. 
In these terms i t can be concluded that a sizeable majority were po s i t i v e l y 
attached to steelwork as a form of employment as the result of satisfactions 
received from job and work or, i n d i r e c t l y , as the result of membership of 
the wider I r o n h i l l community. 
Data derived from the survey suggested the i n i t i a l hypothesis that the 
effects of exposure to the work and residential cultures of I r o n h i l l were 
i n l i n e with what might be iexpected of the social attitudes of manual 
workers employed i n a basic industry and residing within a predominantly 
working-class community. Thus 71^ of the respondents rated t h e i r personal 
chances of promotion to foreman and higher as being l i m i t e d or non-existent 
(against only 29.0^ who rated t h e i r prospects as being "reasonable" or"good"). 
42.0^ admitted spending a good deal of social time outside work with 
immediate colleagues, suggesting the existence of occupational constraints 
upon mo b i l i t y i n t o mana^ment. The existence of social class constraints 
influencing the attitudes of respondents was further exhibited by t h e i r 
replies to questions concerned with opportunity and deprivation i n t h e i r 
working l i v e s . Whilst only 265S of respondents agreed with the statement 
that "the steel industry i s l i k e a ladder; you can climb to any position 
by your own e f f o r t s " , 74^ claimed that "vdiether i n private or nationalised 
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hands, steelworkers w i l l always be r e l a t i v e l y worse o f f than those who 
control industry and w i l l have to f i g h t f o r every improvement i n t h e i r 
condi t ion" . This l as t response i s compatible with what might be expected 
of membership of "prole tar ian" work and community si tuat ions wi th h is tor ies 
of co l l ec t ive opposition to employers and others i n positions of author i ty 
(a) At t i tudes towards .jobs 
Yet, as we have seen, there i s a conspicuous absence of consistent 
and overt c o n f l i c t at I r o n h i l l . I n seeking to explain, therefore, the 
apparent contradict ion between the sample's i d e n t i f i c a t i o n i n certain 
important respects wi th the characterist ics of "proletarian" manual workers 
and i t s f a i l u r e to engage i n uni ted opposition against management as might 
have been expected we are led to consider the a t t i tudes of ind iv idua l 
workers to t h e i r Jobs and work. A review of such at t i tudes provides 
important ins ights i n to the nature of stable i ndus t r i a l re lat ions i n t h i s 
p l an t . 
A number of questions were asked which sought to expose the existence 
of any p o s i t i v e l y attaching features i n the immediate job s i t ua t ion . The 
resul ts are summarised i n Table 6. 
Prom t h i s table i t can be seen that the major i ty of respondents 
believed t h e i r jobs to contain a va r i e ty of features which enhanced the 
l eve l of ind iv idua l in teres t and sa t i s fac t ion and as such f a c i l i t a t e d the 
attachment of steelworkers to t h e i r jobs. These features included 
s i g n i f i c a n t opportunities f o r choice and decision-mating wi th in the context 
of group work, as wel l as promotion wi th in the ranks of manual work i t s e l f . 
Given the f ac t that jQ.Cffo of the t o t a l sample had not served any formal 
c r a f t apprenticeship, the existence of so many factors contr ibut ing towards 
job s a t i s f ac t i on i s unusual outside purely c r a f t occupations. Indeed i t 
i s only w i t h i n the area of r e l a t i v e l y high boredom i n job routines that 
t h i s sample approximates more closely to what one might have r e a l i s t i c a l l y 
expected of manual work i n general. 
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Table 6: At t i tudes Towards Job. 
Job Category 
Agree No Fixed Opinion Disagree Total 
Nos. % Nos. % Nos. % Nos. % 
Steelwork i s in te res t ing 
because there are: 
(a) opportunit ies to work 
without close supervision 
132 77.0 19 11.0 21 12.0 172 100 
(b) opportunit ies to work 
as a team member 
147 84.0 16 9.0 11 7.0 174 100 
(c) few boring routines 69 42.0 24 15.0 73 43.0 166 100 
(d) opportunit ies f o r 
promotion ( sen io r i ty as 
you gain experience) 
131 74.0 10 6.0 35 20.0 176 100 
(e) opportunit ies f o r 
holding r e spons ib i l i t y 
and tak ing importsmt 
decisions 
111 63.0 25 14.0 41 23.0 177 100 
( f ) opportunit ies to work 
on your own i n i t i a t i v e 
where your s k i l l s can be 
used adequately 
139 78.0 11 6.0 28 16.0 178 100 
These i n t r i n s i c elements of job sa t i s fac t ion were complemented by other 
features of a more ex t r ins ic nature. When respondents were asked to rank 
t h e i r reasons f o r i n i t i a l l y selecting employment i n s teel , security and 
adequacy of pay emerged as the two most important. The prospect of the 
existence of opportunities f o r the development of s k i l l s and advancement was 
of lesser importance, suggesting that more instrumental considerations 
predominated i n the i n i t i a l choice of employment i n steel whi ls t the absence 
of a l te rna t ive employment opportunities i n the axea appeared to be a strong 
inducement i n respondents' choices. Nevertheless i t appeared that once the 
employment decision had been taken and steelwork experience obtained, new and 
possibly unexpected i n t r i n s i c sa t is fact ions emerged to sustain the level of 
attachment. Further evidence which supported the hypothesis that stable 
i n d u s t r i a l re la t ions i n steel might derive i n pajrt from the level of job 
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sa t i s f ac t i on experienced by steel employees was found i n the responses to the 
statement that "steelworkers, once t rained, are allowed to get on with t he i r 
jobs without constantly being t o l d what to do". 77.0^ of respondents agreed 
wi th t h i s ; only 23^ disagreed. Self-determination i n manual steelwork 
appears to be high. 
I t i s , however, the a b i l i t y to f i n d some autonomy wi th in the context of 
group work which was seen by many to be of par t icu la r significance as the 
f o l l o w i n g table shows:-
Table 7: At t i tudes Towards Teamwork 
Teamwork Category 
Agree No Fixed Opinion Disagree Total 
$ I0 Nos. $ 
(a) Working i n a group i s a good 
t h i n g because i t enables the 
worker to make f r i ends more 
easi ly wi th other workers 
87.0 8.0 5.0 184 100 
(b) Work groups can solve problems 
themselves without cont inual ly 
r e f e r r i n g to management f o r 
so lu t ion 
85.0 6.0 9.0 184 100 
(c) One bad th ing about group work 
i s that poor workers are carr ied 
by the rest 
88.0 4.0 8.0 185 100 
(d) Group work i s good because i t 
permits a man to develop his 
s k i l l s w i th experience 
69.0 15.0 16.0 182 100 
(e) Group work i s a handicap to 
the more able worker whose 
progress i s held back because a 
more experienced worker i s i n a 
pos i t i on above him 
55.0 16.0 29.0 181 100 
Whilst the disadvantages of group work i n permit t ing poor workers to be 
carr ied by the rest and, to a lesser extent, i n impeding the progress of more 
able workers were acknowledged, the advantages of teamwork i n f a c i l i t a t i n g 
the formation of f r iendships wi th others and i n providing a favourable 
framework f o r problem solving were seen as important a t t r ibutes of t h i s kind 
of work organisation. 
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Of pa r t i cu la r s ignif icance i n t h i s context i s the scope provided by the 
group organisation of work";for the existence of senior i ty systems and l ines 
of promotion f o r manual workers, the pr inciples of which were out l ined i n the 
previous chapter. I t w i l l be noted from Table 6 that 74«0^ of "the respondents 
(as against 6.0^ wi th no f i x e d opinion and 20^  i n disagreement) believed that 
steelwork provided important opportunities f o r promotion of th i s k ind . And 
since 87.0^ of respondents (3.0^ wi th no f i x e d opinion and 10.0^ i n disagreement) 
believed that i t was necessary to gain wide experience of a par t icu lar 
occupation associated wi th steelmaking before reaching i t s top post, i t appears 
that an important benef i t of sen ior i ty i s to confer status upon those carrying 
r e spons ib i l i t y and wi th experience of par t i cu la r occupational techniques i n 
the indus t iy . Of those respondents whose job was part of a senior i ty l i n e , 
87.0^ reported promotion w i t h i n the l i n e and only 13.0^ stated that they had 
never received any promotion whatsoever. I n more general terms 72.0^ of the 
same group believed that t h e i r l ines of senior i ty of fe red guaranteed forms of 
promotion through experience and respons ib i l i ty whi ls t only 28.0^ disagreed. 
Senior i ty l ines and teamwork exist predominantly i n the direct production 
departments employing mainly unsk i l l ed and semi-skil led labour. They do not 
exist f o r maintenance s t a f f employing craftsmen. Not surpr is ingly, therefore, 
a marked occupational d i f f e r e n t i a l appeared between maintenance and production 
respondents on the question of promotion opportunities as Table 8 shows. 
I t appears, therefore, that the social organisation of steelwork i n t h i s 
plant permits the major i ty of i t s manual employees to derive considerable 
sa t i s fac t ions from a var ie ty of job a c t i v i t i e s . Three areas i n par t icu lar 
concerned wi th the l eve l of autonomy and discre t ion i n th i s type of work, the 
prospect and actual achievement of promotion w i t h i n the ranks of production 
manual work and the team organisation of work can be isolated as key sources of 
ind iv idua l and group attachment to steel employment especially f o r the majori ty 
of production s t a f f . That t h i s attachment was stable over time i s demonstrated 
by the f a c t that some 69.0^ of respondents had been employed at I r o n h i l l f o r 10 
years or more. 
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Table 8: Occupational Att i tudes Towards Promotion 
Question: Steelwork i s in te res t ing because there are opportunities f o r 
promotion ( i . e . sen ior i ty as you gain experience). Do you agree? 
Occupational Category 
Agree No Fixed Opinion Disagree Total 
Percentage Percentage Percentage Nos. $ • 
Production 
Steelmelters 87.0 6.0 7.0 15 100 
Stee l ro l le r s 85.0 0.0 15.0 65 100 
Blastfurnacemen 84.0 5.0 11.0 19 100 
Cokeplant workers 82.0 9.0 9.0 11 100 
Maintenance 
Boilermakers 33.0 22.0 45.0 9 100 
Bricklayers 43.0 0.0 57.0 7 100 
E l e c t r i c a l Crafts 17.0 16.0 67.0 6 100 
Mechanical Crafts 61.0 11.0 28.0 18 100 
(b) At t i tudes towards work 
I t i s necessary, however, to look beyond the job at t i tudes of steelworkers 
to t h e i r wider perspectives of management and trade union axstivity at I r o n h i l l . 
To what extent i s the absence of overt c o n f l i c t the consequence of an apathetic, 
poorly organised and deprived working population wi th inadaquate a l ternat ive 
job opportunit ies and lacking the means of e f f ec t ive protest? Or to what 
extent i s i t the resul t of a r e l a t i v e l y e f f ec t ive system of i ndus t r i a l 
re la t ions at plant l eve l permi t t ing some degree of b i l a t e r a l control and based 
upon a r e l a t i v e l y high degree of normative congruence between management and 
labour and between constituent groups of the labour force on the fpnn, content 
and outcomes of the system of control? 
I n i t i a l l y , as we have noted ea r l i e r , there was a predisposit ion by the 
labour fo rce as a whole to view i t s relat ionships wi th management i n terms of 
a power s t ruggle i n which c o n f l i c t could arise over the d i s t r i b u t i o n of scarce 
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resources. Irrespective of the s ty le of ownership of the industry, 74*0^  of 
respondents claimed that they would always be worse o f f than those who 
•controlled industry and would have to f i ^ t f o r every improvement i n t he i r 
condi t ion . 80.0^ also claimed that too many decisions i n the plant were 
taken without seeking employees' points of view whi ls t 59*0^ believed that 
the worker's job simply involved taking orders and involved no respons ib i l i ty 
f o r p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the process of making rules over the control of work. 
I n these ways i t might be concluded that the basic or ienta t ion of the s t ee l -
worker to employment was compatible wi th the dichotomous social imagery 
implied i n the concept of the "proletar ian" labourer and that the absence of 
overt c o n f l i c t was the consequence of inadaquate opportunities to coerce 
management rather than a wi l l ingness- to co-operate i n the control process. 
I t i s possible, however, to f i n d evidence i n the survey which supported 
the b e l i e f that steelworkers do not conform narrowly to t h i s pat tern. 53.0^ 
of respondents (as against 15^ wi th no f i x e d opinion and 32.0^ i n disagreement) 
believed that trade unions and management at I r o n h i l l co-operated" together 
because they recognised each other 's points of view. 50.0^ (15«0^ with no 
f i x e d opinion and 35-0^ i n agreement) disagreed wi th the statement that 
"teamwork i n industry i s impossible because employers and men are r ea l ly on 
opposite sides". 92.0^ believed that the most important current common 
object ive of management and the trade unions was to achieve and maintain the 
highest labour p roduc t iv i ty . Moreover, there was convincing support f o r the 
Corporation's proposals f o r the indust ry ' s fu tu re (subsequently confirmed i n 
various agreements wi th the indust ry ' s p r inc ipa l trade unions) as indicated 
i n Table 9* 
I t can be argued then that a.measure of agreement existed w i t h i n the 
sample concerning the necessity of co-operation wi th management i n the 
attainment of cer ta in common goals. This recognition of interdependence i s 
not incompatible wi th an underlying c o n f l i c t perspective of steelworkers: i t 
i s rather an accepteince that seperate interests are best pursued i n . t h i s 
context through co-operation i n planning more ra t iona l work objectives such 
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as those described i n Table ^ . This conclusion i s supported by fu r the r 
evidence r e l a t i n g to respondents' perceptions of the ef fec ts of changing 
systems constraints upon t h e i r security and pay summarised i n Table 10. 
Table 9: At t i tudes Towards B r i t i s h Steel Corporation Proposals f o r 
Future Objectives 
Objective 
Agree No Fixed Opinion Disagree Total 
Percentage Percentage Percentage Nos. 
(a) To achieve a labour 
force which can be 
deployed f l e x i b l y 
79.0 12.0 9.0 178 100 
(b) Higher Product ivi ty 
by f u l l co-operation by 
trade unions on work 
study ajid job evaluation 
82.0 10.0 8.0 180 100 
(c) Higher p roduc t iv i ty 
by more loca l product-
i v i t y a^eements 
88.0 9.0 3.0 179 100 
(d) Removal of wage 
anomalies by loca l 
negot iat ion 
73.0 19.0 8.0 176 100 
(e) Removal of f l u c t u -
ations i n earnings i n 
favour of a more stable 
wage 
83.0 8.0 9.0 179 100 
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Table 10; At t i tudes towards Change 
Agree No Fixed Opinion Disagree Total 
$ Nos. ^ 
(a) Nat ional isa t ion i s l i k e l y 
to increase the indus t ry ' s 
p r o f i t a b i l i t y i n the long run 
62.0 14.0 24.0 180 100 
(b) Nat ional isa t ion means 
that pay w i l l increase f a s t e r 
than before 
49.0 18.0 33.0 184 100 
(c) Since na t iona l i sa t ion , the 
chances of I r o n h i l l c losing are 
very much less 
32.0 28.0 40.0 185 100 
(d) Technical change w i l l 
el iminate some of the ex i s t ing 
jobs i n t h i s plant 
75.0 11.0 14.0 180 100 
(e) This plant i s overmanned 39.0 14.0 47.0 175 100 
( f ) Technical change i n t h i s 
plant i s inev i tab le but must be 
accepted - even wi th redundajicies 
- i f conditions of employment are 
to be improved 
72.0 8.0 20.0 181 100 
(g) Because of the change I w i l l 
probably have to change jobs 
w i t h i n the industry during my 
working l i f e 
42.0 19.0 39.0 179 100 
(h) Despite technical change 
prospects are bet ter than before 
na t iona l i sa t ion f o r those who 
remain i n the industry 
64.0 15.0 21.0 179 100 
Clearly there was some degree of general agreement that i ndus t r i a l re-organis-
a t ion culminating i n na t ional i sa t ion was inevi table i n economic terms. I t 
was accepted that such changes must implicate rank and f i l e employees through 
redeployment or even redundancy and the d i s t i nc t p o s s i b i l i t y of the long-term 
closure of I r o n h i l l was wel l recognised. Expressed i n another way i t 
appeared that the major i ty of respondents shared a common picture of the 
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implicat ions f o r themselves of necessary changes i n the plant and i n the 
wider indust ry . What i s important, however, i s that the- solut ion was not 
seen by the major i ty of these respondents i n dichotomous terms, but rather 
i n ways which included some recognit ion of management's problems and some 
wil l ingness to cooperate wi th i t i n the amelioration of what appeared to be 
a common predicament. I n spi te of perceived d i f f i c u l t i e s and the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of f u t u r e personal hardship, the f ac t that 93.0^ of respondents reported that 
the indus t ry ' s i n d u s t r i a l re la t ions record wsis good or about average - as 
opposed to only 7.0^ who thought i t bad - i s outstanding, though i t must be 
admitted qui te compatible wi th the h is tory of i ndus t r i a l relat ions i n t h i s 
p lan t . 
The a t t i tude; of respondents to t h e i r own management's and trade union's 
performance at I r o n h i l l was r e f l ec t ed i n more de t a i l i n the replies sought to 
other questions. 65.0^ of respondents agreed and 22.0JS disagreed wi th the 
proposi t ion that " I r o n h i l l management i s good because i t i s prepared to l i s t e n 
to complaints and consider suggestions". 54.0^ agreed and 30.0^ disagreed 
wi th the statement that "one strong point about the unions i s that they are 
democratic and consider a l l members'- points of view". On the other hand 
there were some misgivings about the loca l competence of I r o n h i l l management 
and unions. 54.0^ of respondents believed that I r o n h i l l management was less 
e f f e c t i v e than i t might be because i t s autonomy was constrained by executive 
management decisions at Div is iona l and Head Of f i ce levels ; 52.0^ claimed 
that p l an t - l eve l i n d u s t r i a l re la t ions suffered because problems concerning pay 
and conditions were not se t t l ed wi th s u f f i c i e n t speed. Nevertheless comparative 
data presented i n the next table concerning respondents' estimated d i s t r i b u t i o n 
of ex i s t ing and ideal amounts of influence over what went on at I r o n h i l l by 
d i f f e r e n t s t ra ta i n the plant hierarchy tended' t o support the be l i e f that the 
steelworker's view of the system of control there was not simply dichotomus, 
but one which, under ideal conditions, would sustain a high leve l of 
reciprocal inf luence . 
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Table 11: Orientations to Control; Perceived Di s t r i bu t ion of .Influence 
Over Control at I r o n h i l l under Exis t ing and Ideal Conditions 
Degree of Influence 
Posi t ion i n Plant Hierarchy Great 
Deal 
Quite a 
b i t 
Very 
L i t t l e 
None at 
a l l 
Numbers Numbers Numbers Numbers 
(a) Perceived d i s t r i b u t i o n 
of inf luence at the present 
time 
B r i t i s h Steel Corporation 
Top Management 
114 43 16 5 
Divis iona l Management 109 59 8 10 
I r o n h i l l Management 58 81 32 2 
I r o n h i l l Foremen 7 56 82 25 
I r o n h i l l Trade Union 
O f f i c i a l s 
28 78 54 17 
I r o n h i l l Shop Stewards 13 80 65 17 
I ronhi l l -Manual Workers 7 32 69 68 
I r o n h i l l C le r ica l S ta f f 3 40 67 62 
(b) Perceived d i s t r i b u t i o n 
of inf luence i n ideal 
circumstances 
B r i t i s h Steel Corporation 
Top Management 
69 70 23 7 
Divis iona l Management 85 74 9 2 
I r o n h i l l Mangagement 135 33 6 0 
I r o n h i l l Foreman 18 100 37 10 
I r o n h i l l Trade Union 
O f f i c i a l s 
63 92 14 4 
I r o n h i l l Shop Stewards - 34 108 19 10 
I r o n h i l l Manual Workers 24 91 40 11 
I r o n h i l l ' C le r ica l Workers 8 72 60 28 
An average weighted score f o r respondents' judgements of the d i s t r i b u t i o n 
of inf luence over control at I r o n h i l l was derived from the data obtained i n 
Table 11 f o r each l eve l of the hierarchy described. The t o t a l number of 
respondents' judgements i n each of the four main categories of influence 
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(Great Deal, Quite a B i t , Very L i t t l e and None at a l l ) were mul t ip l i ed by 
a f a c t o r of 3, 2,-1 and 0 respectively and divided by the t o t a l number of 
respondents i n each of the three main occupational branches. The results 
are shown below: 
Table 12: Orientations to Control: Average Weighted Perceived Dis t r ibu t ion 
of Control at I r o n h i l l under Exis t ing and Ideal Conditions 
Index 
(a) Perceived d i s t r i b u t i o n of influence 
at the present time 
B r i t i s h Steel Corporation Top Management 
Div is iona l Management 
I r o n h i l l Management 
I r o n h i l l Foremen 
I r o n h i l l Trade Union O f f i c i a l s 
I r o n h i l l Shop Stewards 
I r o n h i l l Manual Workers 
I r o n h i l l C le r ica l Workers 
(b) Perceived d i s t r i b u t i o n of influence 
i n ideal circumstances 
B r i t i s h Steel Corporation Top Management 
Div is iona l Management 
I r o n h i l l Mangagement 
I r o n h i l l Foremen 
I r o n h i l l Trade Union O f f i c i a l s 
I r o n h i l l Shop Stewards 
I r o n h i l l Manual Workers 

















These weighted indices are p lo t t ed on a control graph (see f i g u r e 3) 
3-^ 
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This data indicates that respondents' perceptions of the exis t ing 
inf luence over control at I r o n h i l l allocated most influence to management, 
and, to a lesser extent, f u l l - t i m e trade union o f f i c i a l s . Within the ranks 
of management, B r i t i s h Steel Corporation top management and d iv i s iona l 
management were perceived to wield greater influence at the present time than 
plant management at I r o n h i l l . Within the ranks of labour, f u l l - t i m e trade 
union o f f i c i a l s were seen to be more i n f l u e n t i a l than shop stewards. Foremen 
were judged to be less i n f l u e n t i a l than shop stewards whils t rank and f i l e 
manual and c l e r i c a l s t a f f were seen to be least i n f l u e n t i a l i n the current 
s i t u a t i o n . The pat tern of ex i s t ing influence, therefore, suggested some 
degree of b i l a t e r a l inf luence between management and labour. Whilst the 
heaviest concentration of influence i s seen to rest i n managerial hands, the 
minor peak of labour influence i s s i g n i f i c a n t . 
Respondents' judgements on the ideal pattern of the d i s t r i b u t i o n of 
inf luence, however, indicated a desire f o r a control p r o f i l e wi th important 
implicat ions f o r the ways i n which a stable pattern of i ndus t r i a l relat ions 
might be sustained. These respondents c lear ly sought an increase i n the 
t o t a l amount of influence available to a l l echelons of the hierarchy. But 
whi l s t more influence was sought f o r such subordinated groups as trade 
union o f f i c i a l s , shop stewards and rank and f i l e workers,- t h i s was not 
desired at the expense of management, but rather that the influence of 
cer ta in managerial and labour groups should be j o i n t l y increased. Even here, 
however, managerial influence was seen to be necessarily greater than the 
influence of labour i n ideal circumstances. What i s demonstrated i s a 
desire f o r a greater degree of shared control wi th management rather than a 
p a r i t y of con t ro l . Only i n two areas could i t be said that respondents 
sought changes i n the d i s t r i b u t i o n of influence under ideal conditions from 
those which current ly existed, as opposed to the desire f o r an increase i n 
the t o t a l amount of influence which was c lear ly exhibited. Thus under ideal 
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circumstances, respondents sought an expansion of plant management influence 
at the expense of both di-visional and top management. This could be 
in terpre ted as a r e f l e c t i o n of the d i s sa t i s fac t ion of manual respondents 
wi th the decl ining importance of I r o n h i l l ' s own management i n the control 
system -vis a v i s higher echelons of the managerial hierarchy introduced 
since the na t iona l i sa t ion of the industry. I n ideal circumstances also, 
respondents desired more influence f o r rank and f i l e manual workers than f o r 
c l e r i c a l s t a f f . 
A l l t h i s seems to indicate a desire f o r wider cooperation wi th management 
i n control but w i t h i n the framework of exis t ing i ndus t r i a l relat ions machinery 
invol-ving f u l l - t i m e and lay trade union a c t i v i t y rather than more direct 
onployee involvement. What emerges most c lear ly from the data i s the be l i e f 
by the major i ty of respondents that the system of control at I r o n h i l l i s one 
which, under ideal circumstances, could and should sustain a high level of 
mutual inf luence . 
This scheme of expectations, moreover, accorded well wi th responses to 
other questions concerned wi th the nature of order and control i n the wider 
society ind ica t ing that opportunities f o r inf luencing broader social issues 
outside the workplace existed i n the judgement of these respondents. Their 
opinions about the nature of social order were as, fo l lows : 
Table 13: At t i tudes Towards Social Order and Control 
Control Category Percentage (N = 186) 
(a) We l i v e i n a f a i r society 49.0 
(b) There i s i n j u s t i c e i n our society 
but t h i s can be corrected by 
making reforms 
33.0 
(c) No matter what we do, the kind of 
society we l i v e i n w i l l always be 
unjus t . The only so lu t ion i s a 
new kind of society 
11.0 
Non-Respondents 7.0 
To ta l 100.0 
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Thus the a t t i tudes of the sample towards the development of b i l a t e r a l control 
i n the plant are not inconsistent wi th a wider be l i e f that the nature of 
current methods of social control are acceptable but capable of being 
influenced where necessary changes are required. 
These questions concerned wi th the exis t ing and ideal d i s t r i b u t i o n of 
inf luence between s t ra ta of the plant and i ndus t r i a l hierarchy, however, 
reveal l i t t l e about the content of b i l a t e r a l cont ro l : the areas i n which 
j o i n t control exists or would be valued. Respondents were asked to indicate 
how much influence they believed t h e i r occupational groups had wi th I r o n h i l l 
management i n each of a number o f work control categories both currently and 
i n an idea l s i t ua t i on . The resul ts are shown i n Table 14 a,nd p lo t ted on a 
control graph (see f i g u r e 5). An average weighted index f o r respondents' 
judgements was derived f o r each control category along the l ines previously 
discussed (see page 179). 
These resul ts indicate a measure of control at the present time over 
most of the work areas l i s t e d i n Table I4. I n cer ta in areas t h i s was 
substant ia l , especially i n respect of workpacef,safety, pay rates and 
select ion of personnel to positions w i t h i n senior i ty l i ne s . Only i n the 
areas of general f i n a n c i a l pol icy matters, recruitment and purchases of new 
equipment were low indices derived. The h i ^ e s t ideal indices were also 
obtained i n areas where ex is t ing influence appeared to be substantial 
suggesting a f a i r l y stable pattern of responses across the l i s t of control 
categories out l ined i n the table on the fo l l owing page. The greatest 
discrepancy between present and ideal indices appeared to exist over the 
f i x i n g of work standards by such techniques as job evaluation and work study. 
This l a s t response i s qui te compatible wi th the negotiations which were being 
conducted on t h i s subject i n the industry at the time the survey was 
administered* 
The resul ts derived from Table 14 are p lo t t ed on a control graph (see 
f i g u r e 5 ) . 
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Table 14: Orientations to Control: Average Wei^ted Perceived Dis t r ibu t ion 
of Control between Key Work Control Categories under Exis t ing 
and Ideal Conditions 




(a) The pace at which members of 
the group have to work 
2.0 2.3 
(b) Safety matters 2;o 2.6 
(c) Financial po l icy matters 0.7 1.6 
(:d) Reducing departmental costs by 
suggesting economies i n 
operations 
1.3 2.0 
(e) D i s c i p l i n i n g of employees 
inc luding dismissals 
1.2 1.8 
( f ) Pay rates and bonuses 1.5 2;4 
is) Amount of overtime available 1.4 2.0 
(h) F ix ing work standards by job 
evaluation and method study 
1.1 2.2 
( i ) Cont ro l l ing the recruitment 
of newvemployees 
0.8 1.7 
( j ) The handling of redundancy 
problems . 
1.3 2.2 
(k) Transfer of men between 
departments as a resul t of 
technical change 
1.2 2.1 
(1) The select ion of men to positions 
w i t h i n the sen ior i ty l i n e 
1.5 2.2 
(m) Purchasing new machines and 
equipment 
0.7 1.4 
The e-vidence presented so f a r i n t h i s section, therefore, suggests that 
steelworkers are attached to t h e i r work by a number of fac tors , a l l of which 
tend to minimise the development of a dichotomous social imagery which m i ^ t 
preclude the p o s s i b i l i t y of cooperation wi th management and t he i r own trade 
union o f f i c e r s i n the determination of common objectives and i n the planning 
of change. Whilst steelworkers, i n common with most other manual workers. 
- i O O -
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"believe that they must " f i g h t f o r every improvement i n t h e i r conditions", 
other values which appear to be widely shared by steelworkers channel the 
d i r e c t i o n i n which they organise what d.s f o r them the most appropriate 
means of protecting t h e i r interests. These shared values provide a common 
framework w i t h i n which the process of plant control occurs and i s legitimised. 
The result i n t h i s case i s the s t a b i l i s i n g of control i n ways which minimise 
the existence of recurrent and disruptive i n d u s t r i a l c o n f l i c t . Thus a 
r e l a t i v e l y high degree of consensus -^existed within t h i s sample on the state 
of the plant's current and prospective economic condition and the implications 
of t h i s f o r individual security and advancement; on the effectiveness of 
local management and trade union performance i n plant i n d u s t r i a l relations and 
the impediments to satisfactory relationships created by the enlargement of 
the managerial hierarchy beyond I r o n h i l l ; and on developments i n the t o t a l 
amount and d i s t r i b u t i o n of b i l a t e r a l control between different groups of 
s t a f f and between di f f e r e n t work areas. I n the l a t t e r case the proposed 
developments were seen as extensions of t r a d i t i o n a l work practices rather 
than r a d i c a l l y new departures so that the successful planning of change was 
f a c i l i t a t e d by the retention and adaptation of established practices i n the 
new situations. Moreover, these developments i n the system of plant control 
permitting the growth of mutual influence between management and labour 
complemented respondents' judgements about the quality of social control i n 
the wider society. These factors, together with the effectiveness of the 
social organisation of steelwork referred to i n the previous section of t h i s 
chapter permitting a r e l a t i v e l y high level of autonomy i n job organisation, 
the prospect and actual achievement of promotion within the ranks of production 
work and the teamwork basis of job organisation, attached these steelworkers 
p o s i t i v e l y to t h e i r job and work situations and account, i n our opinion, f o r 
the s t a b i l i t y of control i n t h i s plant. 
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(c) Attitudes Towairds Occupation 
The level of individual attachment to job and work constitutes one 
important means of measuring the s t a b i l i t y of control i n i n d u s t r i a l 
organisations. Such an approach, however, tends to conceal the extent to 
which occupational influences constrain individual Judgements over the 
effectiveness of control. I n an attempt to remedy t h i s deficiency and i n 
order to throw some l i g h t upon occupational differences i n the individual 
assessment of job satisfaction, work status and occupational influence, 
information was sought from respondents on these cpiestions. The results 
provide some useful insights on the extent of occupational homogeneity i n 
steel and on the extent to- which occupational d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n sets l i m i t s on 
the level of s t a b i l i t y of plant control systems. As such, occupational 
analysis serves as a useful corrective to the uniformly optimistic results 
which have emerged i n the case study so f a r . 
I n i t i a l l y respondents were asked to indicate how much influence they 
believed t h e i r own occupational group possessed i n dealing with management 
at I r o n h i l l . Each respondent was asked to indicate how much influence he 
thought other occupational groups possessed (ignoring his b.wn group). The 
results are shown i n Table 15. Prom t h i s table i t w i l l be observed that four 
groups of high influence emerged: steelraelters and st e e l r o l l e r s , mechanical 
and e l e c t r i c a l craftsmen. Three groups of r e l a t i v e l y low influence were 
also defined as being c l e r i c a l workers, cokeplant and transport workers. Of 
the remaining four occupational groups with intermediate influence, blast-
furnacemen were perceived to be more i n f l u e n t i a l than boilermakers and 
bricklaying craftsmen, and cranedrivers. The v a l i d i t y of occupational 
assessment i n these terms appeared to be established since several occupations 
located at di f f e r e n t points on the ranking scale were linked within the same 
trade union. Thus blastfurnacemen and cokeworkers share a common membership 
of the National Union of Blastfurnacemen; steelmelters and r o l l e r s , cranedrivers 
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Table 15'- Evaluation of I n t e r - Occupational Influence 




than your own 
group 
Total 
Percentage Percentage Percentage Nos. % 
Steelmelters 65.1 30.3 4.6 152 100 
Mechanical Crafts 63.1 32.6 4.3 141 100 
Steelrollers 60.0 35.2 4.8 145 100 
Electricians 59.1.. 32.9 8.1 149 100 
Blastfurnac emen 43.8 39.4 16.8 137 100 
Boilermakers 40.3 49.3 10.4 144 100 
Bricklayers 29.5 52.3 18.1 149 100 
Cranedrivers 26.3 46.1 27.6 152 100 
Clerical Workers 19.3 42.7 38.0 150 100 
Cokeplajit workers 11.3 59.6 29.1 141 100 
Transport workers 9.7 50.7 39.6 144 100 
c l e r i c a l workers and transport s t a f f are members of I.S.T.C. Of particular 
interest here i s the high status accorded to production workers i n steelmelting, 
r o l l i n g and blastfurnace work by respondents outside these occupations. A l l 
three groups appear w i t h i n the f i r s t f i v e occupations i n terms of status; 
only cokeplant s t a f f rank low i n influence comparable with service workers i n 
transport and c l e r i c a l grades. Whilst mechanical and e l e c t r i c a l crafts rank 
high i n the scale, other c r a f t groups carry considerably less status so that 
c r a f t status i n general i s much more attenuated. Clerical work i s seen by 
a l l these manual respondents to be much i n f e r i o r i n influence to most manual 
occupations suggesting that, i n steel, while-collar non-managerial s k i l l s are 
not rated h i ^ l y , compared with the prestige accorded to the manual production 
occupations. 
The possible implications of t h i s status d i f f e r e n t i a l dividing the 
occupational structure were explored by attempting to measure the strength of 
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occupational attachments i n the plant. Respondents were asked to indicate 
t h e i r attitudes to the proposition that "there i s no such person as a 
steelworker; only blastfurnacemen, melters, r o l l e r s , welders, f i t t e r s etc." 
The extent of the occupational division over t h i s particular issue i s 
established when occupations are grouped into three major categories 
comprising a l l production and service s t a f f w i t h i n the f i r s t category. - with 
the exception of blastfurnace and cokeplant workers who are located i n the 
second category - and craflt maintenance s t a f f i n the t h i r d . The advantage of 
t h i s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n i s not only to permit some investigation of possible 
divisions between production/service and maintenance s t a f f , but also to 
indicate the nature of possible divisions between production workers themselves. 
Table 16 indicates the pattern of presponses obtained to t h i s question. 
Table 16: Analysis of Occupational Attachment by Major Occupational Categories 
Question: "There i s no such person as a steelworker; only blastfurnacemen, 
melters, r o l l e r s , welders, f i t t e r s etc." Do you agree? 
Occupational Category Numbers Agree No Fixed Opinion Disagree 
Production/Service 108 37.0 7.0 56.0 
Blastfurnacemen/ 
Cokeplant s t a f f 
30 70.0 3.0 27.0 
Craft Maintenance 41 66.0 12.0 22.0 
These results suggest that production/service employees whose s k i l l s are highly 
specific to the steel industry and who form the largest category of employees 
both at I r o n h i l l and i n the industry generally are least l i k e l y to view t h e i r 
attachment to work i n narrow occupational terms. On the other hand, bla s t -
furnace/cokeplant-employees emerge as a deviant group amongst production 
workers i n t h e i r high degree of occupational i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ; i n t h i s respect 
they compare most strongly with the c r a f t maintenance group whose sense of 
occupational attachment i s not surprisingly well developed. 
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This conclusion was further substantiated by the replies received to a 
statement that "teamwork i n industry i s impossible because employers and men 
are r e a l l y on opposite sides". Table 17 indicates the pattern of responses 
received. 
Table 11: Analysis of Occupational Attitudes Towards Management by Major 
Occupational Categories 




Pro duct i on/S ervi ce 110 27.0 18.0 55.0 
Blastfurnacemen/ 
Cokeplant s t a f f 
32 47.0 9.0 44.0 
Craft Maint-enance 40 50.0 10.0 40.0 
The predisposition to oppose managerial prescriptions i s thus more highly 
concentrated amongst craft maintenance s t a f f than production/service. Amongst 
production workers i n general, moreover, blastfurnace/cokeplant s t a f f were 
more l i k e l y to agree with the proposition than were others i n t h i s category.-
These results suggest something of a continuum of responses by major 
occupational category, with production/service s t a f f potentially more l i k e l y 
to view t h e i r relationships with majiagement i n more cooperative and less 
dichotomous terms than craft maintenance, blast and cokeplant s t a f f . 
What emerges i s the existence of some degree of occupational d i v e r s i f i c a t -
ion i n response to these questions; i n both cases the plant's I.S.T.C. 
production workers and service s t a f f diverge i n t h e i r responses from those of 
cr a f t workers i n the maintenance departments. I n these respects I.S.T.C. 
members' responses are compatible with the ideology of t h e i r union outlined 
i n the previous chapter. But the benefits of unity i n labour a c t i v i t y and 
teamwork i n management-labour relations appear to be more doubtful objectives 
to respondents i n the maintenance, blastfurnace and cokeplants department 
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than elsewhere. I n these terms we reach the l i m i t s of consensus at I r o n h i l l : 
c l e a r l y occupational influences were l i k e l y to d i s t i n c t l y demarcate the 
boundaries of coll e c t i v e behaviour and cooperation. Where and how these 
boundaries are drawn, of course, has clear implications f o r the s t a b i l i t y 
of control at I r o n h i l l . 
But i n order to define just how much normative consensus existed between 
the three occupational groups, further analysis was directed towards the 
examinatign of, f i r s t l y , common orientations to steelwork and social 
opportunities i n the wider society, and secondly to more specific issues 
concerned with the d i s t r i b u t i o n of control at I r o n h i l l . 
(d) Opportunity.and Control i n Steel 
On the subject of common orientations to work, respondents were asked 
to indicate which of two statements concerned with opportunity i n the industry 
and i n the wider society they most i d e n t i f i e d with. The results are 
summarised i n Tables l8 and 19. 








Nos. Percentage^ Nos. Percentage Nos. Percentage 
The steel industry i s 
l i k e a ladder. You 
can climb to any 
position by your own 
e f f o r t s . 
26 26.0 6 22.0 12 31.0 
Whether i n private 'or 
i n nationalised hand% 
steelworkers w i l l 
always be r e l a t i v e l y • 
worse o f f than those 
who control industry 
and w i l l have to fight 
f o r every improvement 
i n t h e i r condition. 
74 74.0 22 78.0 27 69.0 
Total 100 100.0 28 100.0 39 100.0 
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Nos. Percentage Nos. Percentage Nos. Percentage 
(a) We l i v e i n a f a i r 
society 
59 56.0 15 53.0 18 45.0 
(b) There i s i n j u s t i c e 
i n our society, but 
t h i s can be corrected 
by making reforms 
35 33.0 10 36.0 17 43.0 
(c) No matter what we 
do, the kind of 
society we l i v e i n 
w i l l always be unjust. 
The only solution i s 
a new kind of society. 
12 11.0 3 11.0 5 12.0 
Total 106 100.0 28 100.0 40 100.0 
These results indicate a high degree of occupational homogeneity on the 
subjects of opportunities i n steel and i n the wider society. A l l three 
categories exhibited a marked s i m i l a r i t y i n the need f o r concerted action i n 
the improvement of employment conditions f o r the labour force. There was also 
a substantial amount of agreement on the nature of opportunity i n the wider 
society; r e l a t i v e l y small minorities i n each category believed that radical 
changes were necessary. 
Two f u r t h e r sets of statements were included to permit investigation of 
occupational attachments to steel employment and residence i n I r o n h i l l . The 
results are shown i n Table 20. 
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(N = 108) 
Percentage 
(N = 30) 
Percentage 
(N = 41) 
(a) I work i n steel because 
there's nothing else to do 
i n the area 
31 . Q : . 53.0 20.0 
(b) I work i n steel because 
the pay's not bad f o r the 
kind .of work I do 
42.0 27.0 41.0 
(c) Even though there are. 
grumbles about aspects of 
the job, I f i n d steelwork 
i n t e r e s t i n g and challenging 
27.0; 20.0 39.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 








(N = 105) 
Percentage 
(N = 30) 
Percentage 
(N = 39) 
(a) I am happy li^ving i n the 
i r o n h i l l area because I have 
family and friendship t i e s 
here 
82.0 90.0 82.0 
(b) I intend leaving I r o n h i l l 
i f I get the chance - there 
are better opportunities 
elsewhere 
18.0 10.0 18.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
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So f a r as attachment to steel employment was concerned the major source 
of attachment f o r both production and craft workers was the adaquacy of pay 
f o r the l e v e l of s k i l l employed. For blastfurnace and cokeplant crews, 
however, the main source of attachment appeared to be negative i n the absence 
of alternative employment opportunities. I t w i l l be noted also that craft 
maintenance workers were more l i k e l y to be attached by i n t r i n s i c factors such 
as job interest and challenge whilst the balance of production workers were 
divided almost equally between negative attachment as the result of poor 
alternative employment opportunities and positive attachment as the result of 
interest and challenge i n the job. On the other hand whilst there was a 
high degree of homogeneity on the subject of satisfaction with residence at 
I r o n h i l l , blastfurnace and cokeplant workers i f anything tended to be most 
f i r m l y attached to the community. 
With regard to more specific questions concerning the extent of normative 
consensus i n the area of i n t r i n s i c satisfactions i n steelwork attachment, the 
results indicated a substantial degree of occupational d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n under 
certain items as given i n Table 22. 
These results indicate that production crews were highly s a t i s f i e d with 
a l l job sat i s f a c t i o n items with the exception of ( c ) . Boredom i n production 
work routines was marked and of concern to t h i s group. Craft maintenance 
workers were also concerned about boring work routines, but more concerned 
about the absence of promotion opportunities. Of a l l three occupational 
categories t h i s group tended to exhibit somewhat higher rates of job d i s s a t i s -
f a c t i o n . Blastfurnace and cokeplant workers on the other hand reported the 
lowest rates of dissatisfaction with the level of boredom i n work but were 
most anxious about the absence of opportunities f o r holding responsibility 
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At the same time, i t was apparent that the three occupational groups 
derived considerable satisfaction from a variety of common factors associated 
with the organisation and performance of t h e i r jobs. These factors concerned 
the existence of good opportunities to work without close supervision, to work 
as a member of a team, and to exercise i n i t i a t i v e and the adaquate use of 
s k i l l s i n employment. The area of consensus over what constitutes a 
sat i s f y i n g job i s even higher i f the production group as a whole (melters, 
r o l l e r s , blastfumacemen and cokeplant workers etc.) .is. considered. I t i s 
apparent, f o r example, that a l l employees with the exception of craft 
maintenance workers were highly s a t i s f i e d with the opportunities which exist 
i n steel production work f o r promotion. Taken together, the existence of 
a wide area of agreement on what constitutes a satisfying job i n steel must 
be considered as contributing i n no small part to the s t a b i l i t y of work 
control i n t h i s plant. 
On the other hand, the somewhat higher rates of occupational d i s s a t i s -
f a c t i o n exhibited by craftsmen must be'regarded as possible indicators of 
i n s t a b i l i t y given the predisposition of t h i s group f o r interesting and 
challenging work shown by maintenance s t a f f (see Table 20). 
I t can be argued, therefore, that whilst a high degree of normative 
consensus existed to unite respondents i n a common orientation to steel 
employment on the subjects of personal opportunities i n steel and i n the 
wider society, occupational influences d i v e r s i f i e d the sample i n other 
respects, p a r t i c u l a r l y with regard to questions of the quality of work 
attachment, i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with management and occupation, and on attitudes 
towards i n i t i a l employment i n steel. The qua l i t y of these distinctions i s 
s u f f i c i e n t l y marked i n certain areas to suggest implications f o r the s t a b i l i t y 
of control at I r o n h i l l . 
I t w i l l be noted, f o r example, that the responses of production and 
service workers (members of I.S.T.C.) suggested a r e l a t i v e l y stronger 
measure of individual commitment to steelwork and a more positive approach to 
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the effectiveness of exi s t i n g systems of control i n the industry. Within 
t h i s category there appeared to be a well developed sense of awareness of 
the p o t e n t i a l l y disruptive effects of an independent pursuit of strategies 
by seperate occupations withi n the industry as well as a much higher level 
of acceptance that the level of pay offered was commensurate with the level 
of s k i l l deployed. At the same time respondents i n t h i s f i r s t group were 
most l i k e l y to acknowledge an interest i n steelwork because i t offered 
valued i n t r i n s i c rewards such as opportunities to work without close 
supervision, to work as a member of a team, to receive promotion with 
seniority, to use i n i t i a t i v e and s k i l l s as well as providing opportunities 
f o r holding r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and taking decisions. Finally, respondents i n 
t h i s category exhibited a high level of satisfaction with continued residence 
i n the I r o n h i l l conraiunity. Taten together, these results suggest a pattern 
of l argely f u l f i l l e d expectations of employment. Of a l l workers, t h i s group 
appeared most l i k e l y to legitimise the existing system of control i n t h i s 
plant. 
How then do the responses of the other members of the other categories 
compare with this? Craft maintenance employees, f o r example, were more 
emphatic i n the b e l i e f that the primary allegiance of the individual must 
be to a p a r t i c u l a r occupation rather than to the wider group of steelworkers 
as a whole: i n t h i s respect occupational attachment was noticeably stronger 
Of a l l three categories, however, craftsmen were most l i k e l y to view 
employer^mployee relations i n dichotomous terms and most l i k e l y to f i n d 
specific aspects of job organisation unsatisfactory. Craft maintenance 
workers, therefore, were an occupationally homogenous category but much more 
l i k e l y to express t h i s homogeneity s t r a t e g i c a l l y to advance t h e i r own 
interests as a d i s t i n c t i v e group. 
To some extent a degree of occupational d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n might be 
expected between production and maintenance workers i n t h i s industry. As we 
have already seen the status of the craftsman i n steel i s ambiguous: his 
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prestige as a craftsman appears to be challenged by the importance attached 
to production s k i l l s and by the higher monetary rewards to be obtained from 
the most important types of production work. There i s evidence, moreover, 
to suggest that these differences are not peculiar to I r o n h i l l and are of a 
longstanding n a t u r e W h a t emerges from t h i s study i s the indication 
that the attachment of craftsmen to steel employment and steel management 
i s l i k e l y to be more problematical than that of the production group, and 
that the resolution of the problem i s more l i k e l y to be sought by 
independent occupational means than by united action with other steelworkers. 
This raises the question of how f a r I r o n h i l l management would be sanctioned 
by t h i s group i f i t f a i l e d to recognise the separate occupational expectat-
ions of craftsmen i n the plant. To t h i s extent i t would be u n r e a l i s t i c to 
expect a united labour response to emerge, f o r exajnple, as a solution to the 
long-term problems seen by a l l respondents to exist i n the industry at the 
present time. For craftsmen at any rate these solutions w i l l be posed much 
more overtly i n occaipational rather than i n d u s t r i a l terms. 
Of equal interest i s the existence of a second deviant group of 
s u f f i c i e n t size and importance to suggest that a significant division 
between types of production workers occrurs within t h i s plant. Blastfurnace-
men and cokeplant workers are engaged i n key areas of direct production 
a c t i v i t i e s , and yet i n many respects the responses of t h i s group were 
incongruent with other production s t a f f . Thus the sense of occupational 
attachment was much more strongly developed and compatible i n terms of i t s 
i n t e n s i t y with that exhibited by craft workers. Like craft workers also, 
blastfurnacemen and cokeplant workers were l i k e l y to view employer-employee 
relations i n more dichotomous terms than other production s t a f f . I t was, 
however, i n terms of t h e i r responses to questions on attachment to steel 
employment and to residence i n the local community that t h i s group diverged 
most clearl y from other groups. Whilst the group reported the highest 
( l ) W.H. Scott op.cit. 
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level of satisfaction with residence i n the I r o n h i l l community, i t also 
exhibited the highest degree of negative attachment tosbeel employment as 
the d i r e c t . r e s u l t of an.absence of alternative employment opportunities i n 
the area. Given, however, a range of responses to tests of jpb satisfaction 
somewhere between the more favourable attitudes of I.S.T.C. production s t a f f 
and the less favourable attitudes of craft workers (see Table 22) i t appeared 
that the source of t h i s group's discontent was i n the poor extrinsic as 
opposed to the relatively good i n t r i n s i c rewards derived from work. One 
explanation f o r the group's negative attachment to work, therefore, might 
be found i n the existence of the pay d i f f e r e n t i a l between other production 
workers and themselves referred to i n the previous chapter. I f t h i s were 
the case then the low level of attachment to steel employment could reflect 
the b e l i e f that t h i s type of production work carried rewards of such poor 
q u a l i t y as to sustain only a marginal attachment. Yet, as we have seen, 
the status ascribed to the group i s by no means low; moreover i t s members 
demonstrate a well developed sense of occupational awareness. 
I t i s the case that blastfumacemen and cokeplant workers i n common 
with other production employees occupy roles within the industry which; .are 
relatively specific and not readily transferable. Moreover the particular 
s k i l l s of blastfurnace work suggest that once located i n a seniority l i n e 
these workers w i l l f i n d i t progressively more d i f f i c u l t to transfer to other 
parts of the plant without serious loss of seniority and i t s associated 
rewards. Certainly the d i f f i c u l t i e s of job mobility within the I r o n h i l l 
area are most keenly perceived by t h i s group. Faced with these apparently 
intractable problems, and given the strength of t h e i r occupational 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , i t i s perhaps surprising that blastfurnace workers have 
accepted t h e i r r e l a t i v e l y deprived condition without complaint over such a 
long period. 
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(e) Occupational influence over control 
F i n a l l y , i n order to test the extent to which occupational differences 
existed over actual and ideal perceptions of the d i s t r i b u t i o n of influence, 
occupational orientations to the d i s t r i b u t i o n of control between key strata 
of the i n d u s t r i a l hierarchy and between key areas.of work control were 
measured. The results are shown i n Table 23. 
An average weighted score f o r respondents' judgements of the 
d i s t r i b u t i o n of influence of control between key strata of the occupational 
hierarchy was derived from the data i n Table 23. The results are shown 
i n Table 24. These scores axe plotted on a control graph (see figure 6). 
I t w i l l be observed that occupational orientations towards the existing 
and ideal d i s t r i b u t i o n of influence over the control of work tended to 
move i n similar directions, i n d i c a t i n g a r e l a t i v e l y high degree of value 
consensus i n t h i s area. Clearly a l l three occupational categories sought 
an expansion i n the existing d i s t r i b u t i o n of control over work organisation 
f o r a l l ranks of the occupational hierarchy including management. The 
p r o f i l e s of ideal d i s t r i b u t i o n indicate considerable support f o r some 
form of b i l a t e r a l control. Even under ideal circumstances, however, 
managerial influence i s perceived to be considerably higher than the 
influence to be accorded to trade union representatives. Nevertheless two 
d i s t i n c t i v e peaks of influence are sought i n ideal terms f o r management 
(but especially plant maneigement) and f u l l time trade union o f f i c i a l s . I t 
w i l l also be noted that i n the case of a l l three occupational groups the 
influence of c l e r i c a l s t a f f i s rated under ideal circumstances as lower 
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Table 24: Orientations to Con-trol; Average Weighted Perceived Distribution 
of Influence over Control between Key Strata of the Occupational 
Hierarchy at I r o n h i l l under Existing and Ideal Conditions 








Index Index Index 
B r i t i s h Steel Corporation 
Management 
2.6 2.5 2.3 
Divisional Management 2.6 2.6 2.6 
I r o n h i l l Management 2.1 2.1 2.1 
Foremen 1.3 1.0 1.3 
Trade Union O f f i c i a l s 1.7 1.7 1.6 
Shop Stewards 1.5 1.6 1.5 
Manual Workers 0.9 0.6 0.9 
Cle r i c a l Workers 1.0 0.6 0.9 








Index Index Index 
B r i t i s h Steel Corporation 
Management 
2.2 1.1 2.2 
Divisional Management 2.4 2.4 2.5 
I r o n h i l l Management 2.7 2.9 2.6 
Foremen 1.8 1.7 1.8 
Trade Union O f f i c i a l s 2.3 2.3 2.1 
Shop Stewards 2.0 2.1 1.9 
Manual Workers 1.8 1.8 1.6 
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I n spite of t h i s troad convergence of occupational orientations to 
control, one important difference emerged to distinguish blastfurnace/ 
cokeplant s t a f f from the rest. Whilst a l l three occupations sought a 
considerable increase i n influence i n the hands of local plant management 
and a contraction of influence i n the hands of the higher echelons of the 
industry's management, t h i s was much more pronounced i n the case of 
blastfurnace/cokeplant respondents. 
An average weighted score f o r respondents' judgements of the 
d i s t r i b u t i o n of influence over the control of particular work a c t i v i t i e s 
was derived from the data obtained i n Table 25. The results are shown 
i n Table 26. 
I t w i l l be apparent from these tables and from the control graph that 
occupational perceptions of existing influence show important s i m i l a r i t i e s 
and indicate a r e l a t i v e l y high degree of value consensus i n t h i s area. 
I f comparisons are made between the three groups on the basis of t h e i r 
perceptions of the most important areas of control at the present time, the 
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Table 27: Comparative analysis of the most important areas of work control 
at the present time 
Areas of high existing influence; 
Production/Service Blastfumacemen/Cokeplant Craft Maintenance 
(1) Workpace ' 
(2) Safety 
(3) Selection of men to 
positions w i t h i n 
s e n i o r i t y lines 
(1) Workpace 
(2) Safety 
(3) Selection of men to 




(3) Pay rates 
Fixing work standards 
by job evaluation and 
work study 
Workpace, safety and selection to positions within seniority lines are 
the main work areas i n which production workers rate t h e i r existing influence 
as high. Indeed control over workpace emerges as the most important area f o r 
a l l three occupational groups. Craftsmen diverge s l i g h t l y only i n respect of 
t h e i r t h i r d choice which i s shared equally between r e l a t i v e l y high control 
over pay rates and the f i x i n g of work standards by such techniques as job 
evaluation and work study. 
S i m i l a r l y a comparison of the work areas perceived to be most important 
under ideal circsumstances reveals a high degree of common i d e n t i f i c a t i o n 
between the three occupational groups, as i s shown below: 
Table 28: Comparative analysis of the most important areas of work control 
under ideal circumstances 
Areas of high ideal influence 
Production/Service Blastfurnacemen/Cokeplant Craft Maintenance 
(1) Safety 
(2) Worfcpace 
(3) Selection of men to 
positions w i t h i n 
s e n i o r i t y l i n e s 
(1) Safety 




(3) Pay rates 
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The implications of these results f o r the quality of individual attachment to 
steel employment, as well as the s t a b i l i t y of work control are important. I t 
w i l l ' be^noted^ that the major areas of desired influence over control are 
similar to those i n which existing control i s also high, especially i n the 
areas of workpace, safety and selection. Of equal interest i s the extent to 
which both ex i s t i n g and ideal preferences overlap occupational boundaries. 
Quite c l e a r l y the level of intej>-occapational agreement upon what constitutes 
the present and ideal d i s t r i b u t i o n of influence over work control i s extremely 
high and provides a well-defined series of common reference points and c r i t e r i a 
f o r evaluating both the present and the future arrangements f o r the control 
of work i n t h i s plant. 
On the other hand, the data which can be extracted from control graph 
analysis i n t h i s area provides important insights i n t o possible areas of 
s t r a i n and i n s t a b i l i t y i n the control system. Table 29 outlines the results 
of an inte>-occupational comparison of the differences between existing and 
ideal perceptions of the d i s t r i b u t i o n of influence over control of selected 
work areas. 
I t w i l l be observed i n i t i a l l y that the differences reported by production/ 
service employees are somewhat lower than those reported by the otho-occupational 
groups. This would suggest the p o s s i b i l i t y that production workers are some-
what more s a t i s f i e d with existing arrangements than blastfurnace/cokeplant 
and c r a f t maintenance crews. With, regard to particular areas of s t r a i n , 
however, i t appears that wide inter-occupational variations exist over the 
transfer of labour between departments as the result of technical change, the 
selection of men to positions within seniority lines and the puTchasing of 
departmental items of machinery and equipment. • In the f i r s t two cases, 
craftsmen exhibited a d i s t i n c t i v e l y high index whilst i n the t h i r d both craft 
and blastfumace/cokeplant groups diverged markedly from production/service 
groups. Elsewhere on the subjects of overtime eind recruitment, divergencies 
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Table 29: Comparative analysis of differences between existing and ideal 









Index Index Index 
Workpace a 0.3 0.6 0.4 
Safety b 0.6 0.6 0.8 
Finance c 0.9 0.9 0.9 
Suggestions d 0.5 0.5 0.7 
Discipline e 0.6 0.8 0.8 
Pay rates f 0.9 1.1 1.0 
Overtime g 0.6 0.4 1.0 
Work study h 1.1 1.1 0.9 
Recruitment i 0.9 1.2 0.8 
Redundancy j 0.6 0.9 0.8 
Transfer k 0.6 0.6 1.1 
Selection 1 0.6 0.4 1.0 
Purchases m 0.4 1.4 1.1 
For a f u l l description of the work areas see Table 14 
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appeared between craftsmen and the rest i n the f i r s t case, and between 
blastfurnace/cokeplant workers and the rest i n the second. The existence 
of s t r a i n i n these areas indicates either marked divergencies i n work 
practices between occupations, or differences i n expections, or both. 
Whatever the cause i t i s apparent that potential sources of inteivoccupational 
c o n f l i c t over these d i f f e r e n t i a l s exist and that these may be expressed i n the 
form of grievance a c t i v i t y either with management or with other occupations 
wi t h i n the same labour force. What i s important i n the last analysis i s to 
demonstrate the co-existence of both areas of value consensus u n i t i n g the-
labour force (and even labour with management i n certain respects) with areas 
of possible c o n f l i c t within the same system of control. 
Conclusion 
I n t h i s chapter we have been concerned with the analysis of the results 
of the manual workers survey at I r o n h i l l . Particular attention has been 
given to the ways i n which the measurement of attitudes to steelwo^rk by 
manual workers and the application of control graph techniques to the 
measurement of the perceived d i s t r i b u t i o n of influence over work control 
complement the wider analysis i n Chapter IV of the interaction of social and 
system constraints i n the development of stable and effective control systems 
i n i n d u s t r i a l organisations. 
I t w i l l be recalled that the dimensions of an analytical model which 
conceptualised the pattern of constraints influencing the process of control 
were outlined i n the concluding section of the t h i i d chapter. There we 
argued that the most r e a l i s t i c framework f o r the analysis of the control 
process was one which explained continuity and change i n t h i s process as a 
response to both systems and social constraints. Whilst the f i r s t two 
variables of the model-^nanagerial and labour values - defined the scope and 
content of the control process over time - the second two - system and actor -
defined the parameters withi n which the control process must move i f i t i s 
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to remain stable and ef f e c t i v e . I t followed that s t a b i l i t y would be achieved 
where variations i n the scope and content of the control process remained, 
compatible with the changing systems requirements of the organisation and the 
changing social requirements of the actors involved. I t followed also that 
a stable state of the control system existed where the separate, and sometimes 
c o n f l i c t i n g , interests of the members of i n d u s t r i a l coalitions were maximised 
through cooperation with i n these boundaries. 
To some extent the data derived from the survey and the analysis of t h i s 
data provide; useful insights i n t o both the nature of management-labour and 
the actor components of t h i s model. In the f i r s t part of t h i s chapter i t 
was argued that the conduct of management-labour relations at I r o n h i l l were 
conducted w i t h i n a framework of shared values which had the effect of 
minimising recurrent and disruptive i n d u s t r i a l c o n f l i c t . I t was noted, f o r 
example, that a r e l a t i v e l y high degree of consensus existed within the labour 
force on the state of the plant's current and prospective business performance, 
and the implications of t h i s f o r individual security. At the same time 
considerable agreement existed amongst respondents about the nature of the 
e x i s t i n g and ideal p r o f i l e of work control as well as the desirable level of 
pa r t i c i p a t i o n of parjbicular groups i n the plant hierarchy i n the control 
system. Perhaps the major conclusion to emerge was the b e l i e f of most 
respondents that the plant system of control at I r o n h i l l was capable under 
ideal conditions of sustaining a high degree of reciprocal influence. Of 
particnilar importance also was the fact that the most significant:, areas.?of 
desired work control were those i n which a substantial degree of control 
already existed i n the present si t u a t i o n . In t h i s respect i t can be argued 
with some conviction that the effectiveness and s t a b i l i t y of the control process 
i n t h i s plant resulted predominantly from the existence of a d i s t i n c t i v e 
pattern of management-labour relations i n which the control of work was 
essentially b i l a t e r a l i n character. This particular pattern was observed 
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to exist i n the present situation and was clearly seen to form the basis of 
future developments i n i n d u s t r i a l relations practices i n t h i s plant. 
At the same time i t i s our contention; that the character of the control 
process at I r o n h i l l has been shaped i n important respects by the pattern of 
relationships l i n k i n g actors to t h e i r jobs, occupations and residential 
communities. Whilst i n some respects the steelworker was orientated towards 
employment "dichotomously", the predisposing features isolated i n the job and 
work situations of most respondents appeared to counteract, or at least to 
retard, the development of two monolithic and opposed management and labour 
organisations. The social and occupational values deriving from a form of 
work a c t i v i t y i n which individual discretion and autonomy appeared to be high 
and which offered unusually good promotion prospects within the ranks of 
manual work constrained and defined the most appropriate means f o r these 
steelworkers to protect t h e i r interests. Whilst steelworkers, i n common with 
most other manual workers, believed that they must " f i g h t f o r every improvement 
i n t h e i r conditions", the rules governing t h i s " f i g h t " were not only well 
understood and accepted by the participants but also were j o i n t l y derived by 
both management and unions i n those areas which were seen to be crucial to 
the interests of both parties. I t i s our contention that the process of 
b i l a t e r a l rule-snaking i n certain important areas of steelwork i s not peculiar 
to I r o n h i l l , but i s true of the steel industry i n general. Moreover what we 
have described i s not new: i n many inspects i t i s a t r a d i t i o n a l and long-
standing technique of control i n t h i s industry. The successful planning of 
change at I r o n h i l l and i n the wider industry has been achieved i n no small 
part by the retention and adaptation of these work practices i n new technical 
and organisational situations. 
What we can demonstrate, therefore, i s the existence of a d i s t i n c t i v e 
attachment to steel-employment by the employees whose attitudes have been 
considere/d. We can also point to the existence of sin equally d i s t i n c t i v e 
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process of control i n which j o i n t rale-snaking has been, and w i l l continue 
to be, a central feature. These unifying features of steel employment 
and i t s system of control, however, do not operate with equal i n t e n s i t y upon 
the occupational structure of I r o n h i l l or, presumably, the wider industry. 
I t was i n the occupational analysis of respondents' attitudes that the l i m i t s 
of consensus at I r o n h i l l were reached. 
The evidence derived from the occupational analysis i n the second half 
I 
of t h i s chapter indicated that whilst production/service employees reported 
high job and work satisfaction and a cooperative relationship with I r o n h i l l 
management, cr a f t maintenance and blastfurnace/cokeplant crews diverged i n 
certain important respects. On the subjects of occupational i d e n t i f i c a t i o n 
and cooperation with management, f o r example, these two "deviant" categories 
produced similar results although not perhaps f o r similar reasons. Both 
c r a f t and blastfurnace/cokeplant groups were more occupationally conscious 
of themselves; both groups were less l i k e l y to view management-labour 
relations i n terms of teamwork. The li n e of s t r a i n between craft and semi-
s k i l l e d employees i s long-standing f o r the reasons discussed i n t h i s chapter: 
c r a f t workers are not employed i n the main production operations of a steel 
plant. Hence t h e i r rewards are lower than the average earned by many semi-
s k i l l e d non-apprenticed employees. Moreover production workers move within 
s e n i o r i t y l i n e s : craftsmen i n steel do not. The pressure upon craft unions 
to close t h i s d i f f e r e n t i a l i s powerful and a constant source of potential 
i n s t a b i l i t y i n plant i n d u s t r i a l relations. 
The l i n e of s t r a i n between blastfurnace/cokeplant crews and other 
production workers i s equally important and po t e n t i a l l y disruptive. These 
employees also receive average wage rewards which are lower than those paid 
to some other production grades; at the same time t h e i r attachment to steel 
employment appears to more tenuous. I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t , f o r example, that the 
majority of respondents i n t h i s category admitted accepting steel employment 
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because of the absence of better Jobs elsewhere. Of a l l three groups t h i s 
category appears most unstable i n terms of i t s re l a t i v e deprivation compared 
with other production workers. Surprisingly, however, there i s l i t t l e 
evidence of manifest c o n f l i c t between W.U.B. members, management or other 
occupations at I r o n h i l l . Indeed blastfurnacemen are rated qiiite highly i n 
terms of occupational prestige by other employees. The explanation may l i e 
i n the comparative data summarised i n Tables 24 and 26. Here i t w i l l be 
noticed that blastfurnace/cokeplant workers rate the amount of influence 
wielded by manual workers i n both existing and ideal situations as lower 
than that indicated by the other occupational groups (Table 2 4 ) . In table 
26 i t w i l l be observed that blastfurnace/cokeplant respondents consistently, 
produce a lower weighted indices over most of the work areas described 
compared with production and craft groups i n both existing and ideal conditions. 
This implies the p o s s i b i l i t y that blastfurnace/cokeplant N.U.B. employees are 
attached to t h e i r jobs and to the plant by more li m i t e d expectations and 
aspirations, reinforced by t h e i r r e l a t i v e l y lower ratings of existing 
influence over many work areas at I r o n h i l l . I f t h i s were the case i t would 
explain the apparent aquiescence of t h i s group i n i t s present work situation. 
Why blastfurnacemen should exhibit more lim i t e d expectations i s not clear. 
This question calls f o r more research. 
What we have sought to discuss i n t h i s chapter i s the extent to which 
j o i n t goals exist between management and labour at I r o n h i l l and the extent 
to which the cooperative process i n t h i s steelplant e f f e c t i v e l y stabilises 
the system of work control. We have established that within the ranks of 
labour there i s a widely shared understanding of the need f o r , and the 
value of, j o i n t rule-making with management. Our evidence suggested that 
b i l a t e r a l control over a range of work areas already existed between 
management at I r o n h i l l and trade unions or work groups, and was l i k e l y to 
develop f u r t h e r i n future. At the same time the l i m i t s upon labour consensus 
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i n cooperation with management could be drawn i n occupational terms and the 
sources of future i n s t a b i l i t y i n the control system isolated. 
I n the next chapter we shall explore the problem of s t a b i l i t y and 
i n s t a b i l i t y i n the system of control at I r o n h i l l from a different standpoint -
that of the non-manual employee i n steel. So f a r ..we have sought to show how 
a plant system of control may remain stable over time providing the level of 
inter-occiipational agreement over i t s u t i l i t y and equity remains high or 
because certain occupational groups are s u f f i c i e n t l y powerful to maintain 
the status qiio i n t h e i r favour. Our conclusion i s that i n the case of 
I r o n h i l l the level of normative agreement amongst manual workers about the 
scope, content and p a r t i c i p a t i o n of labour i n the control process was 
s u f f i c i e n t l y high to prevent the latent differences between the occupational 
categories from expressing themselves i n the form of overt c o n f l i c t . I n 
the next chapter, however, we shall explore the problems of s t r a i n between 
members of the same occupation at I r o n h i l l arising over t h e i r relations with 
t h e i r trade union. I n t h i s way we shall consider an important source of 
potential c o n f l i c t w i t h i n I r o n h i l l ' s control system - intra-occupational 
c o n f l i c t a r i s i n g over the effectiveness not of management, but of trade union 
representation with i n the control system. 
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CHAPTER VI 
ORIENTATIONS OF NON-MAMUAL STAFF TO WORK MP CONTROL 
AT IRONHILL 
I n t h i s f i n a l chapter of the case-study i t i s intended to pay 
par t i c u l a r attention to the position of c l e r i c a l employees i n the control 
system at I r o n h i l l . I n so doing we shall extend the discussion of 
employee orientations commenced i n the previous chapter to the ranks of 
non-flianual s t a f f . More p a r t i c u l a r l y , however, we shall be concerned with 
the extent to which the members of one occupation - in d u s t r i a l clerks at 
I r o n h i l l - diverge over t h e i r perceptions of the quality and status of 
c l e r i c a l work and the effectiveness of control i n t h i s plant. I n 
consequence the analysis which follows permits not only the further 
exploration of occupational attitudes i n i t i a t e d i n the previous chapter 
(but t h i s time i n t r a as opposed to inter-occupational attitudes), but also 
the consideration of an important source of potential s t r a i n within the 
control system i t s e l f . This arises over the existence of a substantial 
d i v i s i o n of c l e r i c a l opinion on the appropriateness and effectiveness of 
th e i r present trade union representation. 
The review of the clerk's position at I r o n h i l l , and i n the wider industry, 
serves to i l l u s t r a t e the nature of relationships between manual and certain 
non-manual employees i n steel and the existence of a substantial area of 
s t r a i n between members of one indust-rial c o a l i t i o n i n I r o n h i l l ' s control 
system: manual and c l e r i c a l members of the same trade union - I.S.T.C.^ '''^  
However, the problem of ef f e c t i v e l y attaching c l e r i c a l employees to an 
industrial-based union whose membership consists mainly of manual workers has 
( l ) The material i n t h i s chapter i s derived from a paper by Peter Bowen and 
Monica Shaw on "Patterns of White Collar Unionisation i n the Steel 
Industry" I n d u s t r i a l Relations Journal Vol . 3 No.2 1972 pp.8-35 
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f a r wider implications than the steel industry. The numbers.of white-
c o l l a r workers i n steel and i n other industries w i l l increase rapidly 
during the remaining years of t h i s century. Indeed the question of how 
such employees w i l l react to trade unions i s l i k e l y to prove one of the 
more urgent issues facing the labour movement during t h i s period. 
The examination of c l e r i c a l attitudes at I r o n h i l l allows f o r some 
consideration of both these local and more general problems. I n addition 
i t serves to illuminate certain conceptual issues previously raised i n t h i s 
case study. These concern, f i r s t , the effects of social class membership 
upon trade union attitudes, and thereby upon involvement i n the plant system 
of control and, second, the impact of work and community values upon 
occupational i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . 
I t must be emphasised, however, that the focal concern of t h i s chapter 
i s to indicate the nature of a serious latent s t r a i n i n the control system. 
The i n t e n t i o n i s not, therefore, to provide a complete p r o f i l e of c l e r i c a l 
attitudes to a l l aspects of job and work at I r o n h i l l , but rather to 
document the existence of potential s t r a i n within the c l e r i c a l labour force, 
and to consider i t s wider implications f o r the s t a b i l i t y of the control 
system of the industry as a whole. I n one sense the chapter may be seen 
simply as a continuation of the occupational analysis commenced i n Chapter V. 
I n another i t can be taken as providing a particular example of latent s t r a i n 
i n the control^stem which i l l u s t r a t e s the prime importance of analysis 
between rank and f i l e actors (variable 2) and the values of formal trade 
union organisations representing the interests of actors (variable 4) i n 
the control system. I n t h i s way we are able to consider a useful example 
of potential intra-occupational c o n f l i c t arising over the effectiveness not 
of management, but of trade union representation within the control system. 
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1. ATTITUDE SURVEY OF CLERICAL WORKERS 
This survey was conducted i n May, 1970. On the basis of a p i l o t 
survey, questionnaires were administered to a one i n f i v e sample of clerks 
s t r a t i f i e d by age and sex. The response rate was high consisting of 85^ 
completed questionnaires representing the views of 149 clerks. 
After 1967 a l l c l e r i c a l employees at I r o n h i l l who. were not members of 
I.S.T.C. were required to j o i n i n l i n e with B r i t i s h Steel Corporation policy. 
I n fact I.S.T.C. has been representing clerks at I r o n h i l l f o r some t h i r t y 
years and had a majority membership of c l e r i c a l s t a f f p r i o r to nationalisation. 
A l l clerks were therefore members of a predominantly manual workers' trade 
union when t h i s study was conducted. General information concerning the 
sample i s as follows: 
Table 1: D i s t r i b u t i o n of Sample by Age and Sex 
Age Category 
Number 
Male Female Total i n sample 
Total i n 
labour force 
15 - 20 16 • 11 27 100 
2 0 - 2 9 19 24 43 162 
30 - 39 14 14 28 48 
40 - 49 20 14 34 55 
50 - 59 10 26 1 45 52 
60 - 65 - 9 ] 16 
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(a) The Values and Class I d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the Clerk at I r o n h i l l 
Before considering the question of c l e r i c a l attitudes to, and involvement 
i n , work and the system of control at I r o n h i l l i t i s worthwhile examining the 
origins and background of t h i s category of employee and the effects of 
membership of the I r o n h i l l community upon the values of these workers. 
The steel clerk i n t h i s area seemed l i k e l y to have working class origins 
and to hold working class values. I n a steeltown l i k e I r o n h i l l situated i n 
aji area with long t r a d i t i o n s of mining and steel, the value of manual work, 
the pride i n steelmaking and the craft status of senior production manual 
workers i s evident. I n t h i s context the status of the working class 
i n d u s t r i a l clerk can be expected to be r e l a t i v e l y low. At the same time his 
close proximity to manual workers i n work and i n the community i s l i k e l y to 
encourage favourable attitudes towards trade union membership. The choice 
of an isolated steel community, therefore, permitted some assessment of how 
f a r steel clerks comply with the well defined and widely shared norms governing 
social behaviour which can be expected to exist i n such a community. The 
expected relationshipr between the clerk and the steel community was summarised 
to suggest that c l e r i c a l employees at I r o n h i l l would i d e n t i f y more with 
working class than with middle class values; that working class clerks would 
be committed members of a predominantly manual workers' union; and that these 
clerks would be s a t i s f i e d with t h e i r jobs and with c l e r i c a l work, less 
concerned with personal advancement than with security and holding low 
expectations of status. 
The results confirmed the working class origins of clerks at I r o n h i l l . 
of...their fathers were manual workers and 79^ of t h e i r fathers had worked 
i n steel or mining. The majority of respondents had li v e d a l l t h e i r l i v e s 
i n the I r o n h i l l community and had only experienced c l e r i c a l employment i n t h i s 
plant. There was l i t t l e evidence to suggest that clerks aspired to move 
away from housing which ensured a continuing residential attachment to manual 
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workers. I n fact 68% of those expressing an opinion about the I r o n h i l l 
community said they were happy l i v i n g i n i t because of family and friendship 
t i e s . Further questions dealing. with the leisure a c t i v i t i e s of clerks 
indicated that t h e i r reference groups consisted of the family and friends 
drawn from the working class. When asked to consider these leisure a c t i v i t i e s 
which he had. i n common with management or manual workers or both, the clerk 
was more l i k e l y to i d e n t i f y his range of leisure pursuits with those of manual 
workers (see Table 2) . 
Table 2: Perceived I d e n t i f i c a t i o n of Clerks with Leisure Pursuits of 
Management ajid/or Manual Workers 
(N = 141) 
Clerks with management 24.0 
Clerks with manual workers 58.0 
Clerks with both management 17.0 
and manual workers 
Clerks as a separate group 2.0 
100.0 
The effect of the main influences emerging from the social surroundings of 
I r o n h i l l , and which we have interpreted as working class influences, were 
seen to operate both upon the clerk's educational achievements and upon the 
value which he at t r i b u t e d to education. 
With regard to academic achievement our results are comparable with those 
of Dale who noted the generally low achievement of in d u s t r i a l c l e r k s . 4 6 ? ^ 
of clerks at I r o n h i l l l e f t school at 15 years or ear l i e r and while there was 
an obvious tendency f o r younger clerks to stay on longer at school t h i s was 
not a very pronounced pattern.." I f we compare the youngest age group of 
15 - 20 years with an older age group of 41 - 50 years, i t i s interesting to 
note that almost the same proportion i n each l e f t school after 15 years. 
Further evidence on (jua l i f i c a t i o n s suggests that those who did stay on at 
school only did so f o r one year. 
(2) J.R. Dale "The Clerk i n Industry" Liverpool University Press, I962. 
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Table 3: Qualifications Obtained at School 
City and Gfuilds C e r t i f i c a t e and other 
qua l i f i c a t i o n s 
* GCE O/L, ONC or School C e r t i f i c a t e 
* GCE A/L or Higher School Certificates 
CSE 






The data shows that only nine clerks achieved A/L or Higher School Certificate. 
Those who went on to further education after leaving school did so on a 
purely instrumental basis to achieve a q u a l i f i c a t i o n d i r e c t l y related to t h e i r 
work i n such areas as typing or book-keeping. 73^ were no longer pursuing 
any form of education and analysis of the data showed that educational 
experience af t e r school was not related to age. Further questions concerning 
the clerk's attitudes to education showed that he saw i t largely i n terms of 
expediency and had a somewhat narrow view of i t s u t i l i t y . Further education 
was valued only as a vehicle f o r "getting on" i n c l e r i c a l work. 
Further evidence of working-class influences i s shown by the attitudes of 
clerks to promotion. I n general they seem curiously passive about t h e i r 
promotion prospects. 
Table 4? Promotion Prospects 
-
Good No Fixed Opinion Bad Totals 
No. % No. No. No. ^ 
For Clerk himsiel-f 21 15.00 6.5 45.00 55 40.00 141 100.00 
For Clerks generally 19 13.00 63 44.00 61 43.00 143 100.00 
at I r o n h i l l 
* Ordinary Level, Advanced Level 
- 227 -
As table 4 demonstrates the majority admitted either that chances of promotion 
were low f o r themselves and f o r c l e r i c a l workers generally at I r o n h i l l or they 
said they didn't know. Very few saw t h e i r chances of promotion as good. 
Yet when given the opportunity to l i s t ideal characteristics of a job, "good 
promotion prospects" appealed low i n order of p r i o r i t y . This data would seem 
to reinforce the view that the clerk was not concerned with advancing up the 
hierarchy into management. That the clerk i d e n t i f i e d more closely with 
manual workers than with management can be seen frpm data i n table 5 concerning 
the clerk's d e f i n i t i o n of how much say or influence various occupational 
groups including his own should have over decisions at I r o n h i l l . The majority 
of clerks placed themselves at a respectful distance from managment and on a 
par with rank and f i l e manual workers. 
Table 5'- D i s t r i b u t i o n of Ideal Control between Clerks and Manual Workers at 
I r o n h i l l as Perceived by Clerks 
Greal Deal Some Very L i t t l e None Total 
No. . ^ . No. ^ No. ^ Nai % No. ^ 
Rank and 
F i l e Manual 
Employees 
13 10.00 56 42.00 43 32.00 22 16.00 134 100.00 
Clerks 14 11.00 62 46.00 42 31.00 16 12.00 134 100.00 
I t seems clear from the data presented so f a r that clerks had been successfully 
socialized w i t h i n t h i s t i g h t l y - k n i t community. Clerks accepted the prevailing 
norms and tr a d i t i o n s of I r o n h i l l which derived from the predominance of manual 
work. I n short the data supports the view that we were studying a group of 
working class clerks i n terms of t h e i r social origins and present values. 
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(b) The Clerk and Trade Unionism at I r o h h i l l 
Some writers would argue that the real test of working class i d e n t i f i c a t i o n 
i s the extent to which c l e r i c a l employees f e e l they have common interests with 
manual employees which separate them from management and which are expressed 
i n t h e i r f i r m attachment to trade unionism. '^^^ I n the case of the steel 
clerk, however, i t could be contended that a more r e a l i s t i c measure would be 
the extent to which c l e r i c a l employees at I r o n h i l l either adhere to or resist 
the norms of a well established manual workers' union which provides an 
important fr^ame of reference f o r c l e r i c a l attitudes to trade unionism. Since 
we know that I.S.T.C. has a history of co-operation rather than c o n f l i c t with 
management i n representing manual workers, i t would seen that c l e r i c a l 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with the working class cannot be measured by a willingness f o r 
m i l i t a n t action so f a r as t h i s industry i s concerned. The data from the 
survey indicates that the most important reason given by clerks f o r j o i n i n g a 
trade union was the b e l i e f that " c l e r i c a l workers l i k e any other workers should 
be represented by a trade union". There was no evidence here of clerks 
r e s i s t i n g trade union membership or trade union values. When asked to specify 
three ideal characteristics of a union f o r c l e r i c a l s t a f f , particular 
importance was attached to the value of pay negotiations, collective bargaining 
and to co-operation rather than c o n f l i c t with management as table 6 indicates. 
Table 6; Three Most Important Characteristics of a Trade Union f o r Clerks 
No. Percentage 
(1) Negotiating levels of pay 133 31.00 
(2) Pursuing a policy of co-operation 70 16.00 
with management i n the planning of 
change i n the industry 
(3) Stressing collective bargaining with 54 13.00 
management 
(4 ) M i l i t a n t action 40 9.00 
(5) Other - (5 more possible choices) 131 31.00 
Total 428 100.00 
(3) D. Lockwood "The Blackcoated Worker" Allen & Unwin, I966 p. 137 
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I n a separate qiiestion 62?S of the clerks disagreed with the statement "that 
strikes are on the increase these days and t h i s i s evidence of increasing 
i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y on the part of employees". I t would seem f a i r to say that 
the clerk was not against m i l i t a n t action per se, but that i t was not a 
relevant form of action f o r him. This cannot be taken as evidence f o r a 
re j e c t i o n of "working classness", but rather supports the view that the 
prevailing values of trade unionism i n the steel industry were successfully 
internalised by clerks at I r o n h i l l . However, while accepting the u t i l i t y of 
a trade union as the most appropriate expression of t h e i r social class and 
occupational interests, c l e r i c a l opinion divided on the form which union 
representation should take. 
Of those who expressed an opinion, 140 respondents out of the total-
sample of 149f 70 clerks were s a t i s f i e d with membership of a. predominantly 
manual workers' union and 70 clerks would'have preferred completely separate 
white-collar union representation. I n reply to the question "Do you think 
that membership of a predominantly manual workers' union ( i . e . I.S.T.C.) 
provides adequate representation of the interests of c l e r i c a l s t a f f ? " the 
following d i s t r i b u t i o n of responses was obtained:-
(a) Yes - the c l e r i c a l branch of I.S.T.C. i n t h i s 51 
plant e f f e c t i v e l y represents the special 
interests and needs of clerks. 
(b) Yes - the interests of manual and non-manual 19 
workers are id e n t i c a l and both are 
adequately represented by I.S.T.C. 
(c) No - the clerks have suffered adversely compared 70 
with majiual workers i n obtaining better 
conditions of work. Completely separate 
representation would be preferable. 




For the purpose of making comparisons between the two groups i t was 
decided to label those s a t i s f i e d with I.S.T.C. representation as 
A f f i l i a t e s . Those who preferred separate representation were labelled 
Non-Affiliates. Since the problem of appropriate trade union 
, representation i s long standing i n steel i t was important to examine the 
s i m i l a r i t i e s and differences between A f f i l i a t e s and Non-Affiliates. I n 
many respects the two groups were i d e n t i c a l . They were comparable i n 
terms of age, sex and income dis t r i b u t i o n s , educational achievement, 
promotion prospects and social class membership. Nor was there any 
evidence to suggest that those seeking separate white-collar representation 
did so i n order to express aspirations of mobility into the rajiks of 
management and the middle class. One example w i l l suffice here. Analysis 
of data concerning the perceived i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of clerks with the leisure 
pursuits of management or manual workers showed that Non-Affiliates were 
much more l i k e l y to i d e n t i f y themselves with manual workers than with 
management: 
Table 7: I d e n t i f i c a t i o n of A f f i l i a t e s and Non-Affiliates with Leisure 
Pursuits of Management and/or Manual Workers 
A f f i l i a t e s Non-Affiliates 
No. No. 
Clerks with Management 26 38.8 7 10.4 
Clerks with Manual Workers 28 41.7 51 76.1 
Clerks with both Management 
and Manual Workers 
13 19.4 9 13.4 
Clerks as a separate group - - - -
Totals 67 99.9 67 99.9 
Neither can i t be argued that the Non-Affiliates consisted largely of a 
group of reluctant joiners of the trade union at the time of nationalisation, 
since there was no difference as regards length of membership of I.S.T.C. 
between the two groups. 
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There were, however, important differences. Analysis of salary 
d i s t r i b u t i o n s showed that whilst the groups could not be distinguished 
i n terms of earnings t h e i r levels of satisfaction with existing pay 
d i f f e r e d considerably. On the subject of the adequacy of present pay 
fo r the individual clerk's s k i l l and effort, A f f i l i a t e s were much more 
l i k e l y to regard t h i s as satisfactory as Table 8 shows. 
Table 8; Opinions on the Adequacy of Pay f o r own S k i l l and Eff o r t 
A f f i l i a t e s Non-Affiliates 
Number Percentage Number Percentage 
Good 31 45.58 9 13.23 
No f i x e d opinion 26. 38.23 17 25 
Bad 11 16.17 42 61.76 
Totals 68 99.98 . 68 99.99 
Evidence suggesting that these differences extended beyond individual 
d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with pay i s found i n Table 9. A f f i l i a t e s showed 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y more satis f a c t i o n with the adequacy of existing pay f o r 
a l l c l e r i c a l employees at I r o h h i l l . 
Table 9: Opinions on the Adequacy of Pay f o r a l l Clerical Bnployees 
at I r o n h i l l 
A f f i l i a t e s Non-Affiliates 
Percentage Percentage 
(N = 67) (N = 69) 
Good 52.00 19.00 
No f i x e d opinion 37.00 25.00 
Bad 11.00 56.00 
Totals 100.00 100.00 
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I t was also significant that when respondents were asked to outline possible 
improvements i n features of the work situation, Non-Affiliates placed the 
issue of pay higher on t h e i r order of p r i o r i t i e s . The question now 
arises as to whether the Non-Affiliates were simply more instrumental 
( i . e . purely concerned with monetary rewards) i n t h e i r attachment to work. 
I f t h i s were so the desire f o r separate union representation would derive 
from di s s a t i s f a c t i o n with the present level of earnings. 
However, the general evidence from the questionnaire did not support 
the view that the Non-Affiliates held a set of d i s t i n c t i v e l y instrumental 
values. Like the A f f i l i a t e s they did not favour a d u l l job with high 
rates of pay as compensation f o r uninteresting work, or an undemanding 
job o f f e r i n g more leisure time. The anxiety which the Non-Affiliates 
expressed about earnings could not then be taken as evidence of purely 
e x t r i n s i c values such as attachment to work simply by pay. Rather the 
issue was bound up with concern about the status of t h e i r occupation vis 
a v i s manual workers which they saw as undervalued i n terms of the payment 
i t received. Clearly Table 10 i l l u s t r a t e s considerable discrepancies 
between the A f f i l i a t e s and the Non-Affiliates i n terms of perceived 
ex i s t i n g income trends. I n par t i c u l a r a much larger percentage of the 
Non-Affiliates believed that manual workers' incomes were increasing more 
rapidly than t h e i r own. 
Table 10: Opinions on Present Trends i n Clerical and Manual Workers' Incomes 
A f f i l i a t e s Non-Affiliates 
Percentage Percentage 
(N = 65) (N = 69) 
( l ) Both r i s i n g 26.00 6.00 
(2) Both r i s i n g but manual workers' 52.00 84.00 
incomes are increasing more 
rapidly 
(3) Both r i s i n g but clerks' incomes are 6.00 -
increasing more rapidly 
(4) Both are stable 16.00 10.00 
100.00 100.00 
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Given these results i t was not surprising to f i n d that a similar 
divergence of c l e r i c a l opinion existed concerning ideal income, trends. 
As Table 11 demonstrates the A f f i l i a t e s were more l i k e l y to propose 
increases f o r both manual and non-manual groups. Non-Affiliates were 
more in c l i n e d to advance the income of c l e r i c a l workers at the expense of 
manual workers as items 3 and 4 of t h i s table show. 
Table 11: Opinions on Ideal and Trends i n Clerical and Manual Workers' 
Incomes 
A f f i l i a t e s Non^Affiliates 
Percentage 
(N = 66) 
Percentage 
(N = 69) 
( l ) Both should r i s e 45.00 25.00 
(2) Both should r i s e but manual workers' 
incomes should increase more 
rapidly 
6.00 6.00 
(3) Both should r i s e but clerks' incomes 
should increase more rapidly 
32.00 44.00 
(4) Manual workers' incomes should 
remain stable f o r a while 
17.00 25.00 
100.00 100.00 
Satisfaction or dissatisfaction with occupational status has wider 
implications, however, than consideration of pay. Our evidence suggests 
that d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with status influences judgements about the 
effectiveness of plant i n d u s t r i a l relations as a whole. Table 12 provides 
one example of the extent to which A f f i l i a t e s and Non-Affiliates diverge 
over attitudes towards management and trade unions. I t would appear 
from t h i s data that A f f i l i a t e s rated the effectiveness of certain aspects 
of both managerial and trade union performance i n t h i s plant at a higher 
lev e l than did the Non-Affiliates. 
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Table 12: A t t i t u d e s towards Trade Unions and Management: A f f i l i a t e s 
and N o n - A f f i l i a t e s 
Statements 
• Agree Disagree Totals 
No. ^ No. % No. % 
(1) I r o n h i l l management i s good 
because i t i s prepared t o 
l i s t e n t o complaints and 
. t o consider suggestions 
A f f i l i a t e s 60 91.0 6 9.0 66 100.0 
N o n - A f f i l i a t e s 31 47.0 35 53.0 66 100.0 
(2) The unions i n t h i s p l a n t 
t e n d t o be c o n t r o l l e d by 
cl i q u e s so i t i s d i f f i c u l t 
f o r t h e ordinary member t o 
make h i s views known 
A f f i l i a t e s 29 46.0 34 54.0 63 100.0 
N o n - A f f i l i a t e s 53 78.0 15 22.0 68 100.0 
I n wider context, however, both groups recognised the importance of 
the complementary r o l e s of I r o n M l l management and trade unions i n the 
maintenance of s t a b l e i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s . For c l e r k s a t I r o h h i l l a 
de s i r a b l e p a t t e r n of i n f l u e n c e over the c o n t r o l or r e g u l a t i o n of work 
a c t i v i t i e s appeared t o be one which accorded a higher degree of mutual 
i n f l u e n c e between managers and trade union o f f i c i a l s than was seen t o 
e x i s t at t h e present time. This i n f o r m a t i o n i s summarized i n the graph 
on t h e f o l l o w i n g page. 
I t w i l l be observed t h a t both groups, but p a r t i c u l a r l y the A f f i l i a t e s , 
sought an expansion of i n f l u e n c e f o r I r o n h i l l management at the expense of 
senior management e s p e c i a l l y at the Head O f f i c e l e v e l . S i m i l a r l y both 
groups sought an expansion o f i n f l u e n c e f o r f u l l - t i m e trade union o f f i c i a l s 
and shop stewards, but again t h i s was more pronounced by the A f f i l i a t e s . 


















A f f i l i a t o i 
Non-oflil 
_ L - i . - I 
B.S.C. B.S.C.. Ironhill Ironhill Full-time Ironhill Ironhill Ironhill 
Top Oiviiionol Monegs- Foremen Trade Shop Monuol CIcrkt 
Manega- Moncsa- ment Union Stowordt Workers 
ment ment Officials 
HIERARCHICAL LEVELS OF CONTROL 
Figart 8 CeaSrol Graph: perceived atlual and ideal distribution ofinftutnce by affiliates and non-affiliates. 
MethodaSoskal note: The coatrol ffraph io ploncd on poinis ohich icpreaent weighted averages of CGcnts Kross a four poiai 
Bcole—Good Daal, Quite a K t , Very Littie, None—for each item. The technique of meosurina control in this paper follotni 
that of A. S. Tonimibaum in Ctatril in Orgeniiotimu, McGntr-Hili, 1968. 
- 236 -
was found "to e x i s t over the current i n f l u e n c e of trade union o f f i c i a l s . 
The A f f i l i a t e s ' judgement was based on the b e l i e f t h a t t h e i r trade 
union was responsible and e f f i c i e n t and t h a t s t e e l ' s good i n d u s t r i a l 
r e l a t i o n s record was a t t r i b u t a b l e t o the p o l i c i e s of I.S.T.C.. On the 
other hand N o n - A f f i l i a t e s were more c r i t i c a l of both e x i s t i n g I r o n h i l l 
managerial and trade union performance i n t h e i r j o i n t f a i l u r e t o secure 
quick settlements of issues at plant l e v e l . More p a r t i c u l a r l y the absence 
of uniform pay and conditions of employment f o r c l e r i c a l s t a f f i n the 
i n d u s t r y was a r e a l source of anxiety t o N o n - A f f i l i a t e s . 
One f i n a l observation may be made i n conclusion. The graph i n d i c a t e s 
t h a t t h e A f f i l i a t e s rated t h e i r own occupational i n f l u e n c e over what went 
on at I r o n h i l l at a higher l e v e l than the N o n - A f f i l i a t e s . Given the 
N o n - A f f i l i a t e ' s ansiety over pay v i s a v i s manual workers, together w i t h 
h i s b e l i e f t h a t c l e r i c a l i n f l u e n c e at I r o n h i l l i s r e l a t i v e l y low, i t i s 
not s u r p r i s i n g t h a t one expression of h i s d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n i s found i n 
negative a t t i t u d e s towards h i s . e x i s t i n g trade union representation. 
(c) The Clerk and h i s Job i n Steel Employment 
How f a r d i d the Non-Affiliatete d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h the l e v e l of 
payment o f f e r e d f o r h i s s k i l l and e f f o r t and h i s weaker attachment t o 
I.S.T.C. c o r r e l a t e w i t h other a t t i t u d e s towards h i s job and work s i t u a t i o n s ? 
I t was p r e d i c t e d t h a t c l e r k s at I r o h h i l l would be s a t i s f i e d w i t h t h e i r 
jobs and work, but less concerned w i t h promotion i n t o management than w i t h 
s e c u r i t y of employment. I n a d d i t i o n i t was f e l t t h a t clerks working i n 
such a community and work environment would not expect a high status t o be 
conferred upon t h e i r occupation. 
The data i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e s e c u r i t y of c l e r i c a l employment was seen 
by most c l e r k s t o be one of i t s most a t t r a c t i v e f e a t u r e s . Once again, 
however, a d i v i s i o n of o p i n i o n appeared between A f f i l i a t e s and N o n - A f f i l i a t e s 
on aspects of job and work s a t i s f a c t i o n . The Non-Affiliates c l e r k believed 
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t h a t o p p o r t u n i t i e s e x i s t e d f o r using i n i t i a t i v e i n problem-solving and 
accepted t h a t adequate r e c o g n i t i o n was given \yy supervisors. But they 
r a t e d o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r v a r i e d and i n t e r e s t i n g work, l e a r n i n g new s k i l l s , 
promotion as w e l l as pay, as "goodo The A f f i l i a t e s however, r a t e d a l l these 
aspects of work, except promotion o p p o r t u n i t i e s , as bad. Some examples 
of these d i f f e r e n c e s are shown i n Table 13. 
Table 13: A t t i t u d e s towetrds Job at I r o n h i l l : A f f i l i a t e s and N o n - A f f i l i a t e s 
A f f i l i a t e s 
Percentage 
N o n - A f f i l i a t e s 
Percentage 
C l e r i c a l work o f f e r s o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r : 
Promotion Good 
No Fixed Opinion 
Bad 
Learning new s k i l l s Good 
No Fixed Opinion 
Bad 
Varied and i n t e r e s t i n g 
work 
Good 
















(N = 68) (N = 68) 
A s i m i l a r p a t t e r n h e l d w i t h regard t o aspects of the wider work s i t u a t i o n . 
Both groups be l i e v e d t h a t hours of work and holidays were good at I r o n h i l l 
and t h a t t h e r e were s a t i s f a c t o r y o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r making f r i e n d s h i p s . 
The number of N o n - A f f i l i a t e f ^ c l e r k s who agreed t h a t these features of work 
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were good were, however, always fewer. I n general terms the A f f i l i a t e s 
seemed more s a t i s f i e d w i t h most aspects of t h e i r job and work s i t u a t i o n . 
The evidence i n d i c a t e d , moreover, t h a t the d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n which the 
N o n - A f f i l i a t e d c l e r k expressed about h i s pay, job and work and h i s union 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n was bound up w i t h a more generalised anxiety about the 
st a t u s of c l e r i c a l work at I r o n h i l l . I t was p r e d i c t e d t h a t a l l c l e r k s 
at I r o n h i l l would not expect a h i g h status f o r t h e i r occupation because 
of the value placed on production work i n t h i s i n d u s t r y . The data 
supports t h i s p r e d i c t i o n as the f o l l o w i n g t a b l e shows: 
Table 14: A t t i t u d e s towards Job at I r o n h i l l ; A f f i l i a t e s and N o n - A f f i l i a t e s 
A f f i l i a t e s 
Percentage 
N o n - A f f i l i a t e s 
Percentage 
Nowadays c l e r i c a l work no longer 
provides o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r a 




Neither management nor manual 
workers value c l e r i c a l work 
very h i g h l y because they see i t 




The c l e r k i s i n a b e t t e r p o s i t i o n 

























(N = 70) 
This t a b l e i l l u s t r a t e s the i n f l u e n c e of powerful norms a c t i n g upon the 
c l e r k ' s d e f i n i t i o n of the status of h i s occupation. I t w i l l also be 
observed t h a t i n the l a s t two items of t a b l e 14 the N o n - A f f i l i a t e s r a t e d 
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the present status o f c l e r i c a l work at a much lower l e v e l than d i d the 
A f f i l i a t e s . Indeed f a r t h e r questions dealing w i t h the status of c l e r i c a l 
work compared w i t h other occupational groups showed t h a t the A f f i l i a t e s 
b e l i e v e d i t t o c a r i y higher status than the N o n - A f f i l i a t e s , Thus the 
c l e r k ' s a b i l i t y t o i n f l u e n c e management v i s a v i s other groups was 
construed d i f f e r e n t l y by the two groups as Table 15 shows: 
Table 15: C l e r i c a l I nfluence w i t h Management Vis a Vis other 
Occupational Groups at I r o n h i l l 
A f f i l i a t e s N o n - A f f i l i a t e s 




Crane D r i v e r s Steel R o l l e r s 
Steel Melters 
Crane D r i v e r s 
Same Influence as Clerks 
S t e e l R o l l e r s Plumbers 
Stee l Melters E l e c t r i c i a n s 
Plumbers Transport Workers 
E l e c t r i c i a n s 
Less In f l u e n c e than Clerks 
Transport Workers N i l 
I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o note t h a t both groups o f c l e r k s saw c e r t a i n groups 
o f manual workers as having more influence than themselves, but t h a t the 
N o n - A f f i l i a t e s perceived t h e i r i n f l u e n c e w i t h management to be lower v i s 
a v i s other groups than d i d the A f f i l i a t e s , Thus .the anxiety which the 
N o n - A f f i l i a t e s expressed concerning pay d i f f e r e n t i a l s between themselves 
and manual workers seemed t o be r e l a t e d t o the view t h a t the c l e r i c a l 
occupation was g e n e r a l l y undervalued. This does not imply t h a t the Non-
A f f i l i a t e s were s t r i v i n g f o r a h i g h status v i s a v i s other groups of 
workers at I r o n h i l l . I d e a l l y they wanted p a r i t y w i t h manual workers i n 
terms of i n f l u e n c e . The A f f i l i a t e s ' a s p i r a t i o n s were s i m i l a r , as Figure 8 
showed, but the gap between what they saw e x i s t i n g and what they i d e a l l y 
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wanted was much narrower. Thus the A f f i l i a t e s were more s a t i s f i e d and less 
anxious about the status of t h e i r occupation. While both groups valued a 
working environment where a l l occupational l e v e l s would have more in f l u e n c e 
on p o l i c y , and where c l e r k s would have e q u a l i t y w i t h manual workers, the 
two groups obviously assessed the e x i s t i n g s i t u a t i o n very d i f f e r e n t l y . 
I t seems cle a r from the data t h a t attachment t o the e x i s t i n g trade 
union v a r i e s w i t h a t t i t u d e s towards job and work. One group of c l e r k s , 
the A f f i l i a t e s , enjoys a f i r m attachment t o a predominantly manual workers' 
union and appears t o be r e l a t i v e l y s a t i s f i e d w i t h the rewards and status, 
a l b e i t low s t a t u s , which t h i s type of work c a r r i e s i n the I r o n h i l l community, 
To t h i s extent the A f f i l i a t e ' s r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h h i s job, work, trade union, 
employer and community are consistent and s t a b l e . The A f f i l i a t e i s not 
simply the acquiescent, uninvolved c l e r k . He i s involved i n h i s union's 
a f f a i r s and he would l i k e more s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n i n work. I n t h i s context 
i t was found, f o r example, t h a t the A f f i l i a t e s reported a s i g n i f i c a n t l y 
higher r e c o r d of attendances at union branch meetings as Table 16 i n d i c a t e s . 
Table 16: Attendance at Branch Meetings 
A f f i l i a t e s N o n - A f f i l i a t e s 
Percentage Percentage 
Always 15.00 6.00 
Frequently 32 .00 23.00 
I n f r e q u e n t l y 40.00 38.00 
Never 13.00 33.00 
100.00 100.00 
(N = 69) (N = 69) 
I n t h i s case the gap between h i s perception of actual and. i d e a l rewards from 
work i s not s u f f i c i e n t l y wide t o creat general d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h h i s 
s i t u a t i o n . I n many respects the A f f i l i a t e conformed t o our o r i g i n a l 
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expectations of how the working class c l e r k i n s t e e l might respond. The 
second group of c l e r k s , the Non-^flSffiliates, are d i s t i n g u i s h e d by t h e i r 
desire f o r separate occupational trade union representation. The Non-
A f f i l i a t e ' s weaker attachment t o membership of a manual workers' union 
c o r r e l a t e s p o s i t i v e l y w i t h a general d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h job and work. 
Thus h i s responses, l i k e the A f f i l i a t e ' s , are e q u a l l y consistent but represent 
a much more c r i t i c a l view o f the e x i s t i n g s i t u a t i o n o f cle r k s a t I r o n h i l l . 
By no s t r e t c h o f the imagination can i t be said t h a t c l e r k s at I r o n h i l l form 
a homogeneous group. 
•2. CLEEKS AND THE CONTROL SYSTEM AT IRONHILL 
The problem o f what constitues an e f f e c t i v e form of w h i t e - c o l l a r trade 
union r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n a basic i n d u s t r y l i k e s t e e l i s complex. The study 
demonstrates t h a t working-class c l e r k s i n t h i s p l a n t d i f f e r i n t h e i r 
assessments of what form trade union r e p r e s e n t a t i o n should take f o r themselves 
although there i s agreement on the d e s i r a b i l i t y o f trade union membership.-, • 
I t might be argued t h a t the r e s o l u t i o n of the problem l i e s i n the growth 
o f separate w h i t e - c o l l a r unions. Conversely i t might be argued t h a t the 
p a r t i c u l a r problems of the N o n - A f f i l i a t e c l e r k would not be overcome by 
t h i s s o l u t i o n on the grounds t h a t simple s t r u c t u r a l changes i n the p a t t e r n 
of union o r g a n i s a t i o n would not a l l e v i a t e s tatus anxiety which derives from 
c l e r i c a l work. The data, however, suggests t h a t both arguments are 
inadequate. I t must be remembered t h a t 50?5 of the sample were s a t i s f i e d 
members of a predominantly manual worker's union. Thus arguments t h a t 
c l e r i c a l work i t s e l f produces status a n x i e t y and t h a t separate w h i t e - c o l l a r 
union representation i s necessary are obviously l i m i t e d . The problem of 
how t o improve the attachment of the N o n - A f f i l i a t e c l e r k t o h i s e x i s t i n g 
union t h e r e f o r e i s best approached by recognising the real source of h i s 
s t a t u s a n x i e t y . This l i e s i n the comparison he makes w i t h manual workers 
who share membership o f the same union but who appear t o him t o be more 
e f f e c t i v e l y represented i n terms of the rewards they o b t a i n . 
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The f i n d i n g moreover th a t c l e r k s i n one s t e e l p l a n t and i n one 
r e l a t i v e l y homogeneous community were d i v i d e d on what c o n s t i t u t e d an 
e f f e c t i v e form of union representation i s not i t s e l f s u r p r i s i n g . One 
could reasonably expect such d i f f e r e n c e s t o emerge over attachment t o any 
large and complex o r g a n i s a t i o n . What i s of i n t e r e s t , however, i s the 
f i n d i n g t h a t a r e l a t i o n s h i p e x i s t s between the l e v e l of trade union 
attachment and the l e v e l of job and work attachmemto Whilst a l l c l e r k s at 
I r o n h i l l agree on what should c o n s t i t u t e an i d e a l job and work s i t u a t i o n 
f o r themselves (a f i n d i n g i l l u s t r a t i n g the cohesive e f f e c t of l i v i n g i n a 
homogeneous community organised aroxmd a s t e e l p l a n t ) there i s a marked 
d i v i s i o n o f o p i n i o n about the present status of t h e i r work and the rewards 
t o be d e r i v e d from i t . I n the case of the N o n - A f f i l i a t e c l e r k , where the 
gap between perceived current rewards and i d e a l expectations i s greatest, 
here the a n x i e t y over occupational status i s most keenly experienced and 
here the disenchantment w i t h the e x i s t i n g form of trade union representation 
i s most profoundly expressed. 
An h i s t o r i c a l a n a l y s i s o f w h i t e - c o l l a r u n i o n i s a t i o n i n the s t e e l 
i n d u s t r y over the l a s t 50 years i n d i c a t e s t h a t the existence of a l a t e n t 
s t r a i n amongst c l e r k s at I r o n h i l l over trade union representation i s by 
no means new. The d i r e c t i o n of w h i t e - c o l l a r u n i o n i s a t i o n i n s t e e l has 
been c l e a r l y towards the recruitment of c l e r i c a l workers w i t h i n an i n d u s t r y -
based union covering both manual and non-manual employees. Nevertheless, 
s p e c i a l i s t w h i t e - c o l l a r unions have always bad a f o o t h o l d i n s t e e l and 
occupational unionism i s w e l l entrenched f o r c e r t a i n groups, notably c r a f t 
employees. The competition between manual and s p e c i a l i s t w h i t e - c o l l a r 
unions for . i t h e c l e r k ' s membership i s longstanding. Yet i t would be 
misleading t o say t h a t the c l e r k has had much freedom of choice. Indeed 
the i n f l u e n c e of s t e e l employers and steelworkers' unions has been c r u c i a l 
i n d e f i n i n g the d i r e c t i o n o f w h i t e - c o l l a r representation i n the i n d u s t r y . 
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C l e a r l y the persistence o f such s t r a i n s at I r o n h i l l , and i n the wider 
i n d u s t r y over a long p e r i o d , has serious i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the s t a b i l i t y 
and e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f the p l a n t system of c o n t r o l . A sizeable number of 
rank and f i l e c l e r i c a l employees are d i s s a t i s f i e d w i t h the effect i v e n e s s 
o f t h e i r present union representation and the source of t h i s d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n 
appears t o l i e i n t h e i r attachment t o a union c o n s i s t i n g predominantly of 
manual workers. At the same time we noted t h a t the d i s i n c l i n a t i o n of the 
working-class N o n - A f f i l i a t e c l e r k t o accept attachment t o I.S.T.C. was not 
based upon f e e l i n g s of a n t i p a t h y t o manual work i t s e l f or t o i d e n t i f y i n g 
w i t h working-class membership. Rather i t was the serious undervaluation 
o f h i s occupational s t a t u s v i s a v i s t h a t o f manual work i n terms o f pay 
and i n f l u e n c e w i t h management t h a t appeared t o generate the desire f o r 
separate trade union representation. I t would appear t h a t the s o l u t i o n 
t o the development of e f f e c t i v e representation f o r s t e e l c l e r k s must involve 
more sympathetic understanding o'f the occupational i n t e r e s t s of t h i s group 
of employees whose needs have a l l too f r e q u e n t l y been overlooked. C l e r i c a l 
acceptance o f a trade union depends i n no small p a r t on trade union 
recognition o f t h e i r worth ( e s p e c i a l l y where union membership contains both 
manual and non-manual employment). 
At the time of the survey i t was concluded t h a t what was required would 
be the development o f a n a t i o n a l s a l a r y and graded job p o l i c y f o r a l l 
c l e r i c a l employees i n the i n d u s t r y . This requirement was subsequently met 
by n e g o t i a t e d agreements w i t h i n the various d i v i s i o n s of the B r i t i s h Steel 
Corporation, These agreements provide f o r such a graded salary s t r u c t u r e 
c o n t r o l l e d by j o i n t committees of management and trade unions. I n the 
North-East coast area o f the i n d u s t r y the scheme was implemented i n 1971 
some twelve months a f t e r t h i s study was completed. On the basis of these 
f i n d i n g s , such a p o l i c y should s u b s t a n t i a l l y a l l e v i a t e the status a n x i e t i e s 
o f N o n - A f f i l i a t e c l e r k s at I r o n h i l l . 
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This case-study of s t e e l c l e r k s provides some u s e f u l i n s i g h t s i n t o the 
various i n f l u e n c e s o p e r a t i n g t o s t r u c t u r e c l e r i c a l attachment t o trade union 
membership and t o t h e system of c o n t r o l a t I r o n h i l l . Community infl u e n c e s 
were undoubtedly iimportaitt".. i n s t r u c t u r i n g p o s i t i v e a t t i t u d e s towards 
working-class and trade union i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . Whilst occupational 
i n f l u e n c e s s e n s i t i s e d respondents t o t h e value of t h e i r c l e r i c a l s k i l l s , t he 
l o c a t i o n of these s k i l l s w i t h i n a p a r t i c u l a r type of community s e t t i n g appeared 
t o modify t h e c l e r k ' s s e l f - d e f i n i t i o n of t h e status of h i s work compared w i t h 
t h a t o f manual workers. I n s p i t e of a general acceptance of the low status 
of c l e r i c a l work i n t h i s s t e e l community, however, i t was the b e l i e f by some 
t h a t the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the rewards of manual and non-manual work had now 
become unacceptable and i t was t h i s d e t e r i o r a t i o n which accounted f o r the 
s t r a i n between the A f f i l i a t e and N o n - A f f i l i a t e c l e r k , and u l t i m a t e l y between 
the manual and non-manual members of I.S.T.C. 
These r e s u l t s r e i n f o r c e the u t i l i t y of the model o u t l i n e d i n Chapter IV 
f o r t he ana l y s i s of the determinants, of sta b l e patterns of pla n t systems of 
c o n t r o l . Undoubtedly the e x i s t i n g p a t t e r n of c o n t r o l i n s t e e l has been 
shaped i n important respects by the a c t i v i t i e s and values of formal managerial 
and manual t r a d e union representatives i n the i n d u s t r y ( i n c l u d i n g I r o n h i l l ) 
over many years. The mutual involvement of s t e e l employers and manual unions 
( v a r i a b l e s 3 and 4) i n promoting the i n c l u s i o n of c l e r i c a l employees i n 
predominantly manual workers' unions i n t h i s i n d u s t r y has e f f e c t i v e l y determined 
the choice of union a v a i l a b l e t o c l e r k s . At the same time analysis of the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s between rank and f i l e o p inion ( v a r i a b l e 2) and the c o n t r o l 
system - r e f l e c t i n g the e x i s t i n g values of management and labour organisations 
and t h e i r representatives - reveals the existence of the l a t e n t s t r a i n s we 
have detected. That t h e locus of such s t r a i n i s found between rank and f i l e 
employees and t h e i r t r a d e union r a t h e r than mangement i n t h i s case emphasises 
the need f o r the approach we have suggested and f o r the model which we have 
sought t o apply i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r study. 
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CONCLUSION 
At the outset we suggested t h a t the f o c a l i n t e r e s t of t h i s study was 
concerned w i t h the discussion of one simple p r o p o s i t i o n . This was t h a t the 
achievement of an e f f e c t i v e system of s o c i a l c o n t r o l i n i n d u s t r y depended 
upon the c o m p a t i b i l i t y of the decisions taken by;;members of i n d u s t r i a l 
c o a l i t i o n s w i t h the system requirements of the o r g a n i s a t i o n i n which they 
were l o c a t e d and w i t h the s o c i a l expectations of the actors who were 
r e q u i r e d t o l e g i t i m i s e the decisions of i n d u s t r i a l c o a l i t i o j i s . I n t h i s 
concluding s e c t i o n we s h a l l summarise the f i n d i n g s of the case study and 
seek t o assess t h e i r relevance f o r the t h e o r e t i c a l statement of c o n t r o l i n 
i n d u s t r i a l organisations o u t l i n e d i n the f i r s t p art of t h i s work, a f a i r 
summary of which would appear t o be contained i n the previous senteJice. 
Our i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the data presented i n the study of I r o n h i l l suggested 
t h a t environmental changes i n the market and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s i t u a t i o n of t h i s 
s t e e l p l a n t had been su c c e s s f u l l y accommodated by the r e t e n t i o n and adaptation 
of a p a t t e r n of s o c i a l o r g a n i s a t i o n and work p r a c t i c e s h i g h l y valued by both 
management and the great m a j o r i t y of i t s s t e e l employees. The improved 
business e f f i c i e n c y of the works as a production u n i t was f a c i l i t a t e d t o a 
considerable degree by t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s of t h i s p a t t e r n i n l i m i t i n g 
i n d u s t r i a l c o n f l i c t and i n s u s t a i n i n g the o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r i n d i v i d u a l s and 
groups f o r job r e g u l a t i o n and work involvement. At the same time the data 
derive d from the survey of rank and f i l e a t t i t u d e s of manual workers i n d i c a t e d 
t h a t the s o c i a l o r g a n i s a t i o n and c o n t r o l of steelwork had developed, and was 
s t i l l e v o l v i n g , along l i n e s which accorded w e l l w i t h the occupational and 
wider s o c i a l values of these respondents. 
I n more general terms i t appeared t h a t the achievement of an optimal 
a r t i c u l a t i o n of the system requirements of the o r g a n i s a t i o n w i t h the i n t e r e s t s 
and s o c i a l requirements of i t s members represented a stable, though by no 
means s t a t i c , s i t u a t i o n of c o n t r o l . This represents, however, sin i d e a l 
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p o s i t i o n against which the r e a l states of organisations, the conditions of 
t h e i r members and the effectiv e n e s s of t h e i r c o n t r o l processes can be 
measured. I n our view such an a n a l y t i c a l approach could w e l l form the 
basis of a wider t h e o r e t i c a l framework f o r the analysis of i n d u s t r i a l 
behaviour than t h a t c u r r e n t l y advanced by the advocates of the o r i e s of s o c i a l 
a c t i o n i n I n d u s t r i a l Sociology. 
What c o n s t i t u t e d the dimensions of t h i s approach formed the subject matter 
of the f i r s t p a r t of t h i s study. I n i t i a l l y we were concerned t o show how a 
balanced treatment of e x i s t i n g s o c i o l o g i c a l t h e o r i e s might be u t i l i s e d i n the 
d e f i n i t i o n of a contextual framework f o r the analysis of how such systems 
and actors might be e f f e c t i v e l y c o n t r o l l e d . The two major contexts i s o l a t e d 
were those o f the environmental c o n s t r a i n t s of the organisation a c t i n g upon 
i t s s o c i o - t e c h n i c a l system, and the environmental c o n s t r a i n t s of the actor 
a c t i n g upon h i s o r i e n t a t i o n t o work and h i s adaptation t o the requirements 
of h i s occupational r o l e . These two r e c i p r o c a l forces were seen t o 
i n f l u e n c e t h e degree of s t a b i l i t y and the l e v e l of effectiveness of the 
c o n t r o l process. 
The l o c a t i o n of the c o n t r o l process w i t h i n these p a r t i c u l a r parameters, 
moreover, prompted the use of a d i s t i n c t i v e l i n e of enquiry. I f t h i s 
process was responsive t o both systems and s o c i a l imperatives, what were 
t h e i r e f f e c t s ? The f i r s t step of the analysis, t h e r e f o r e , was t o consider 
the i n f l u e n c e of environmental e f f e c t s upon the work or g a n i s a t i o n per se, 
upon the arrangement of i t s technology, i t s d i v i s i o n of labour and i t s 
system of a u t h o r i t y . I n so doing we pursued a l i n e of reasoning already 
w e l l advanced w i t h i n one branch of I n d u s t r i a l Sociology: t h a t e f f e c t i v e 
o r g a n i s a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e s and processes of i.-.manufacturing f i r m s are causally 
r e l a t e d t o t h e i r technologies and thereby t o the manifold requirements of . 
t h e i r business environments. The i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h i s approach are t h a t 
e f f i c i e n t organisations cannot merely react t o t h e v a r i e t y of o b j e c t i v e s , 
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pursued by t h e i r members. They must also be appropriate i n the arrangement 
and c o n t r o l of t h e i r f u n c t i o n s t o the task requirements of the e n t e r p r i s e . 
F a i l u r e t o observe these l i m i t a t i o n s c a r r i e s c o s t - i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r t h e i r 
business success. 
The second step of the analysis was t o consider the separate but r e l a t e d 
problem of s o c i a l i n t e g r a t i o n i n i n d u s t r i a l organisations. This derived 
from a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of how the values of employees concerning the 
arrangements made f o r the c o n t r o l of t h e i r work might be formed through 
exposure t o the normative systems of t h e i r occupations and r e s i d e n t i a l 
communities, and as members of the wider society. Here too we pursued 
aji equally w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d but somewhat opposed school of thought t o t h a t 
o u t l i n e d i n the previous psiragraph. By considering the values of rank smd 
f i l e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n i n d u s t r i a l organisations and the sources of these 
values we are l e d t o an e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t but eqpially important set of 
l i m i t a t i o n s upon the process of c o n t r o l : those stemming from the i n d i v i d u a l 
and c o l l e c t i v e experiences of employees themselves. 
This i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the contextual framework by the methods described 
i s necessary but incomplete: we need t o know more about the i n t e r r e l a t i o n s 
between these systemic and s o c i a l influences and t h e i r e f f e c t s upon the 
content of the c o n t r o l system i t s e l f . This formed the t h i r d step i n the 
sequence o f our a n a l y s i s . 
Thus we argued t h a t w h i l s t every e n t e r p r i s e must meet the primary end 
of an acceptable adjustment w i t h i t s environment i f i t i s t o survive, the 
means by which t h i s may be achieved are several. I t s eventual form i n each 
case depends i n no small part upon the outcome of what amounts t o a 
continuous process of b a r g a i n i n g between the representatives of various 
i n t e r e s t groups, most notably those of the employer (or management) and 
labour. An importajit l i n k a g e between the analysis of systems and s o c i a l 
c o n s t r a i n t s was found t h e r e f o r e i n t h i s area. Since actors are r e q u i r e d 
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t o perform interdependent f u n c t i o n s s p e c i f i e d by the system requirements of 
the o r g a n i s a t i o n , but need not agree on the form which t h i s interdependence 
should take, t h e c o n t r o l of these f u n c t i o n s and of t h e i r r o l e incumbents 
i s p r o b l e m a t i c a l . Nevertheless the outcome of the bargaining process t o 
resolve who does what and f o r how much i n work, and indeed the whole 
character o f the r e l a t i o n s h i p between management and unions, has obvious 
i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the a b i l i t y of the or g a n i s a t i o n t o make e f f e c t i v e adjustments 
t o changes i n i t s environment. 
We d e f i n e d the fundamental character of t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p t o be 
co-operative. This i n no way i m p l i e d unanimity o f i n t e r e s t s o r the absence 
of c o n f l i c t . I t suggested merely t h a t n e i t h e r p a r t y could expect t o 
achieve i t s p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t s without a j o i n t working r e l a t i o n s h i p and 
t h a t t h i s mutual dependence acted as a formidable c o n s t r a i n t upon the 
independent actions of management and labour. The concept of co-operation 
was introduced, t h e r e f o r e , t o express the importance of t h i s interdependent 
working r e l a t i o n s h i p , a r e l a t i o n s h i p which r e q u i r e d the d e r i v a t i o n of c e r t a i n 
common standards i n order t o permit the p u r s u i t of separate and f r e q r i e n t l y 
c o n f l i c t i n g i n t e r e s t s . 
I t f o l l o w e d t h a t the f o u r t h and f i n a l stage of analysis was concerned 
w i t h the form of co-operation between management and labour most l i k e l y t o 
promote a s t a b l e and e f f e c t i v e process of c o n t r o l consistent w i t h the system 
and s o c i a l requirement of the o r g a n i s a t i o n and i t s rank and f i l e members. 
I n order t o deal w i t h t h i s question i t was necessary t o introduce a new 
concept: the c o a l i t i o n model of o r g a n i s a t i o n . Based upon the not i o n of 
the o r g a n i s a t i o n as a p l u r a l s o c i e t y , i t was argued t h a t w h i l s t the 
orga n i s a t i o n s of management and unions represented i n t e r e s t groups w i t h a 
r e l a t i v e l y h i g h degree of autonomy, t h e i r e s s e n t i a l interdependence r e q u i r e d 
the development of a d i s t i n c t i v e form of co-operation which was described as 
b i l a t e r a l rule-making. This represented an e f f e c t i v e means of extending 
co-operation w i t h i n i n d u s t r i a l c o a l i t i o n s of management and labour and ones 
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most l i k e l y t o accord w i t h the s o c i a l expectations of rank and f i l e 
employees e s p e c i a l l y where t h i s i n v o l v e d the widening of the range of work 
areas and p r a c t i c e s subjected t o j o i n t r e g u l a t i o n by management and unions. 
•Under these con d i t i o n s e f f e c t i v e s o c i a l c o n t r o l ajid o r g a n i s a t i o n a l performance 
would be enhanced where the j o i n t power of both the p a r t i e s was expanded i n 
vo l u n t a r y and mutually rewarding ways. Indeed t h e existence of o p p o r t u n i t i e s 
f o r t r a d e unions and rank and f i l e employees t o in f l u e n c e job and work 
r e g u l a t i o n i n ways which do not imply corresponding contractions i n the 
i n f l u e n c e o f management appears t o be an important p r e r e q u i s i t e of stable 
p l a n t c o n t r o l systems. I n these respects we suggest t h a t t r a d i t i o n a l 
c onceptualisations of a u t h o r i t y i n i n d u s t r y based upon e i t h e r a model of 
predominantly unilateral...control, by. management or a predominantly dichotoraous 
model of management-union r e l a t i o n s are erroneous. A t t e n t i o n would be more 
u s e f u l l y d i r e c t e d towards t h e conditions under which these p a r t i e s come t o 
i n t e r a c t on t h e basis of high r e c i p r o c a l i n f l u e n c e i n the r e g u l a t i o n of jobs, 
t h e c o n t r o l of work and the planning of change. 
These f o u r stages of analysis were applied t o the s i t u a t i o n of I r o n h i l l 
i n t h e case-study. The adaptiveness of t r a d i t i o n a l patterns of work 
o r g a n i s a t i o n t o the changing t e c h n i c a l and market requirements of the plant 
was noted. I n p a r t i c u l a r t h e d i s t i n c t i v e f u n c t i o n of c o n t r o l l i n g the 
d i v i s i o n of labour by a r e l a t i v e l y l i g h t l oading of managerial r o l e s together 
w i t h the r e t e n t i o n of s e n i o r i t y l i n e s of promotion f o r manual workers 
appeared t o be one important f a c t o r c o n t r i b u t i n g t o both a s a t i s f a c t o r y 
business performance and t o the s t a b i l i t y of s o c i a l c o n t r o l i n t h i s p l a n t . 
The adaptiveness of the steelworkers at I r o n h i l l t o the necessity f o r 
o r d e r l y change i n t h e i r i n d u s t r y was also noted. The evidence suggested 
t h a t t h i s response was not the simple expression of a compliant labour 
f o r c e deprived of a l t e r n a t i v e employment o p p o r t u n i t i e s . Steelworkers i n 
common w i t h other well-organised t r a d e u n i o n i s t s are w e l l aware of the 
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need to protect t h e i r interests against the employer. But steelworkers at 
I r o n h i l l , despite-the homogeneity of t h e i r working-class community, h'ave 
not comhined to express these interests d i v i s i v e l y at the expense of 
management, and i n t h i s they appear to have much i n common with steelworkers 
elsewhere. 
Our findings emphasised that the social and occupational expectations 
of the majority of I r o n h i l l ' s labour force found some positive expression 
and recognition i n the opportunities afforded to them by the tj-pe of socio-
technical system existing i n t h i s plant at the time of the study and by the 
form of co-operation characterising i t s plant process of control. Undoubtedly 
the capital-intensive character of the industry and the necessity to 
maintain high levels of plant loadings has had an important effect upon 
the pattern of stable i n d u s t r i a l relations both at I r o n h i l l and elsewhere. 
I n t h i s respect the industry's performance approximates to that of others 
operating r e l a t i v e l y advanced technologies. That labour costs are a 
r e l a t i v e l y low proportion of t o t a l costs has clearly permitted steelworkers 
some degree of l a t i t u d e i n the negotiation of wsige rates and some abili-ty to 
compensate employees i n real terms f o r t h e i r co-operation i n programmes of 
r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n involving technical change. Our findings, however, 
indicated that wage levels alone were unlikely to explain the absence of 
i n d u s t r i a l c o n f l i c t at I r o n h i l l . Comparisons of the re l a t i v e sizes of 
management i n t h i s plant with others of similar technical complexity 
suggested that the t r a d i t i o n a l and contemporaiy role of s k i l l e d manual labour 
i n steel was d i s t i n c t i v e . I n t h i s sense the openness of the social 
organisation of tasks to individual and group involvement, and the openness 
of the system of social control to mutual influence by both management and 
labour contributed to the maintenance of s t a b i l i t y i n employer-employee 
relationships over a long period. 
At the same time the i n t e r and intra-occupational strains which were 
located indicated the continuing existence of latent and manifest c o n f l i c t 
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i n areas of the relations between management and employees, between manu'al 
and non-manual workers, between groups of manual workers and within 
p a r t i c u l a r occupational groups of production and c l e r i c a l s t a f f . I n the', 
case of the l a s t group the occupational anxiety detected amongst c l e r i c a l 
s t a f f was directed towards the effectiveness of representation,by t h e i r 
trade union w i t h i n the control system. With these examples we were led 
to define the boundaries of value consensus within .the labour force and to 
consider the pattern at I r o n h i l l of the inevitable l i m i t a t i o n s upon the 
achievement of an i d e a l l y effective and stable system of i n d u s t r i a l control. 
What, hopefully, we can demonstrate i s that i n terns of our model of 
control and i t s application to the s i t u a t i o n of i n d u s t r i a l organisations l i k e 
I r o n h i l l , , - e x i s t i n g sociological theories of systems and social integration 
can be u t i l i s e d successfully i n the consideration of the determinants of, 
and constraints upon, stable systems of i n d u s t r i a l control. 
I t i s our b e l i e f that the exploration of the process of i n d u s t r i a l control 
along these lines m i ^ t well constitute a worthwhile point of departure fo r a 
more grounded I n d u s t r i a l Sociology. 
The need f o r further enquiry i n t h i s area i s urgent. The experience 
of large organisations i n many f i e l d s of social a c t i v i t y such as education, 
the social services, r e l i g i o n , law and p o l i t i c s indicates the existence of 
acute pressures f o r e n t i r e l y new forms of control to meet the new requirements 
of organisations and t h e i r memberships. Nowhere have these pressures been 
more keenly experienced i n recent years than i n industry. Ou*- findings 
suggest that rniich can be learned from existing practices i n the steel industry 
about the pattern of i n d u s t r i a l relations most l i k e l y to succeed i n the 
remaining years of the twentieth century. 
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APPENDIX A 
NEWCASTLE UPON TYNE POLYTECHNIC 
Department of Behavioural Studies 
A. PERSONAL DETAILS 
Please r i n g the number corresponding to your answer. 
A.I What i s your age? 
Under 30 1 
30-50 2 
Over 50 3 
A.2 When di d your f u l l - t i m e schooling finish? 
At 14 years or e a r l i e r 1 
At 15 2 
Later than 15 3 
A.3 Have you gained any educational qualifications? 
School C e r t i f i c a t e 1 




I f other please specify- belows 
A.4 Have you ever attended any courses while you've been working i n 
the steel industry? 
Trade Union courses 1 
Management run courses 2 
WEA courses 3 
Technical College courses 4 
None 5 
- 2 -
B. EMPLOYMENT DETAILS 
B.I How long have you been i n continuous employment at I r o h h i l l ? 
Under 2 years 1 
2 years but under 10 2 
10 years and over 3 
B.2 Have you ever been employed elsewhere than at I r o n h i l l ? 
Yes 1 
No 2 
I f you answered I'No' to Question B.2 please go on to Question B.4. 
B.3 Considering only the l a s t job held before working at I r o n h i l l , please 
describe b r i e f l y the kind of work (e.g. "faceworker, mining") 





B.5 What i s your present job called, which department i s i t i n , and i n 
which section of the department are you employed? (e.g. "Operative, 
Blast Furnace, Furnace Bottom") 
T i t l e of Job Department Section 
B.6 What i s your present main area of work? Please r i n g the appropriate 
number. 





















(c) Maintenance Work Non Craft 
Burner 10 
Machinist 11 
Operator ^ 12 
Slinger 13 
(d) A n c i l l a r y or Service Work 
Crane dr i v i n g 14 
Power Station E l e c t r i c i a n 15 
Rail Transport 16 
Road Transport 17 
(e) Labouring 
Production ( f o r example Plate M i l l , Oxygen Steel Plant) 18 
Maintenance ( f o r example Foundry, Test Shop) 19 
Ancill&cy^ or Service Work (for example Labour Gang 
Water Department) 20 
(Question 7 - 1 1 apply only to workers whose .1ob i s part of a seniority 
l i n e and excludes maintenance workers and labourers). 
B.7 I f your present job i s part of a l i n e of seniority, have you ever had 
promotion w i t h i n the line? 
Yes 1 
No 2 
B.8 Whereabouts i n the seniority l i n e i s your present job located? 
Top of the l i n e 1 
Near the top 2 
About the middle 3 
Near the bottom 4 
Bottom of the l i n e 5 
B.9 Have you ever i n your period of employment at I r o n h i l l worked i n 
another sen i o r i t y l ine? 
No 1 
One other 2 
Two other 3 
More than two 4 
B. 10 I f you have transferred between seniority lines was t h i s because of: 
( r i n g more than one number i f necessary). 
Technical change affe c t i n g or removing your old job 1 
Lack of security through short time working i n your 
old job . , 2 
Dissatisfaction with pay i n old job 3 
Better working conditions ( i . e . less noise, heat, d i r t ) 
i n new jobo 4 
Personal reasons ( i . e . d i s l i k e of foreman etc. i n 
old job) 5 
Health reasons g 
- 4 -
Age ( i . e . no longer able to manage a job because 
of age 7 
Domestic reasons 8 




B.12 I t has been said that the lines of seniority i n some sections of the 
Industry o f f e r the worker guaranteed forms of promotion through 




C. TRADE UNION MEMBERSHIP 
C.I Which union do you belong to? -
ISTC (or BISAKTA) 1 
Blastfumacemen 2 
Transport. and General Workers 3 
AEF \ 4 
EES!U/PTU (Electricians and Plumbers) ^ 5 
Boilennakersi* Society 6 
.Building Trade Workers 7 
General and Municipal Workers 8 
C.2 Have you ever held union office? 
No ^ 1 
I n the past', but not at present 2 
At present 3 
C.3 I f you have held or now hold any union o f f i c e please t i c k as 
appropriate: 
(Ring more than one number i f necessary) 
BEahch o f f i c i a l (e.g. chairman, secretary, treasurer) 
Branch committee member 
Departmental representative (e.g. shop steward, delegate) 
Any other position (e.g. d i s t r i c t committee N.E.C.) 
( I f you ticked the l a s t alternative, please specify which position 
i t was). 
- 6 -
D. ATTITUDES TOWARDS WORK 
D.I We would l i k e you to consider the following statements made about work 
i n the steel industry, and give us your opinion of each statement by 
ringing the appropriate answer. 
iilSHS^ Agree Disa^ee Strongly Agree- ' opinion ^^^^^^ Disagree 
Steel work i s in t e r e s t i n g 
because there are: 
(a) opportunities to wsrk 
without close supervision: 1 2 3 4 . 5' 
(b) opportunities to work as 
a member of a team; 1 2 3 4 5 
(c) few boring routines; 1 2 3 4 5 
(d) opportunities f o r 
promotion ( i . e . seniority) 
as you gain experience; 1 2 3 4 5 
(e) opportunities f o r 
holding r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and 
taking important decisions; 1 2 3 4 5 
. ( f ) opportunities to work 
on your own i n i t i a t i v e where 
your s k i l s can be used 
adequately 1 2 3 4 5 
D.2 We would now l i k e you to think about the following statements and decide 
which most nearly f i t your own reasons f o r wanting to work i n the steal 
industry. Ring as many answers as appropriate. 
The pay's not bad i n steel 1 
I d i s l i k e d my previous job 2 
There are good opportunities to develop sifcills and 
get on 3 
There was insecurity i n my previous job either through 
redundancy or short time 4 
My father encouraged me to follow him to work i n 
steel 5 
Steel work offers reasonably secure employment 6 
There i s nothing else to dq; i n the area 7 
D.3 Below are a number of statements comceming changes i n the industry. 





No f i x e d Dis__j.ee S t r o n g 
®^ Opinioln SiSSSS^ Disagree 
,(.a) Nationalisation i s 
l i k e l y to increase the 
industry's p r o f i t a b i l i t y 
i n the long run 1 
(b) Nationalisation means 
that pay w i l l increase faster 
than before. 1 
(c) Since nationalisation, 
the chances of closing are 
very much less 1 
4 
(d) Technical change (new 
machines; new processes) w i l l 
eliminate some of the existing 
jobs at t h i s plant 1 2 3 4 5 
(e) This plant i s overmanned 1 2 3 4 5 
( f ) Technical change i n t h i s 
plant i s inevitable but must 
be accepted-even with 
redundancies - i f conditions 
of employment are to be 
improved. 1 2 3 4 5 
(g) Because of t h i s change, 
I w i l l probably have to 
change jobs with the industry 
during my working l i f e . 1 2 3 4 5 
(h) Despite technical change 
prospects are better than 
before nationalisation f o r t^iose 
that remain i n the industry 1 2 3 4 5 
The following statements have been made about group work. We would l i k e 
you to give us your opinion abbut them, even though you personally may 
not be a member of a group. 
Strongly 
Agree ^ • 




(a) Working i n a group i s 
a good thi n g becuase i t 
enables the worker to make 










(b) Work groups can solve 
most problems themselves 
without continually r e f e r -
r i n g to management f o r 
solution. 
(c) A l l members of the 
group must p u l l t h e i r 
weight i f the grouji's 
work i s to be done 
e f f i c i e n t l y . 
(d) One bad thing about 
group work i s that poor 
workers are carried by the 
r e s t . 
(e) Group work i s good be-
cause i t permits a man to 




( f ) Group work i s a handicap 
to the more able worker whose 
progress i s held back because 
a more experienced worker i s 
i n a position above him. 1 4 
Below are a series of statements about work. Please indicate whether 
you think that bhathfe .?rh9lhe, they are true or false by ringing the 
appropriate number i n each case. 
True 
(a) I n steelwork, a steelworker can use his s k i l l s and 
get on i n ways which would be impossible i n 
: " factory work. 1 
(b) Steelwork has l i t t l e to o f f e r apart from the money 1 
(c) Steelworkers, once trained, are allowed to get on 
with t h e i r jobs without constantly being t o l d what 
to do. 1 
(d) I n s t e e l , jobs usually contain some variety and so 





E. ATTITUDES TOWARDS OCCUPAOICTT 
E.I You have indicated i n question B.6 what your present area of work i s . 




Under 1 year 
1 year but under 2 
2 years but under 5 
5 years but under 10 






Below are a number of statements dealing with experience, t r a i n i n g , 
and specialisation i n occupational areas. We would l i k e you to r i n g 
the number which best f i t s your answer. 
Strongly No fi x e d j)ig Strongly 
— opinion ^ Disagree 
(a) I t i s necessary to 
gain wide experience i n 
a p a r t i c u l a r occupation 
before reaching the top 
post i n that occupation 
(b) Because of the 
changing nature of the 
industry, new entrants 
i n future must be t r a i n -
ed i n a much wider range 
of s k i l l s than at present 
(e.g. craftsmen hot ;•. 
melters, r o l l e r s etc.) 
(c) "There i s no such 
person as a steelworker; 
only blastfumacemen, 
melters, r o l l e r s , welders, 
f i t t e r s etc. etc." 
(d) One of the obstacles 
to a united e f f o r t by a l l 
workers i n the industry 
i s the existence of 
separate occupational 
groups, each pvirsuing i t s 
own iifcerests. 4 
Some people say some occupations have more prestige ( i . e . are rated more 
highly by steelworkers generally) than others. Irrespective of the 
occupational group to which you belong, please tank the following 
occupations i n order of prestige, thinking only of the most s k i l l e d 
men i n eaxsh occupation. 
Please number the occupations i n order, with 1 to the most and 10 to 
the least. 
- 10 -
Elastfumacemen and Cokeworkers oe 
Boilermakers, Burners and Welders 
Bricklayers ..•« 
C l e r i c a l Workers 
Crane Drivers 
E l e c t r i c i a n s 
Engineers ( e o g e Turners, F i t t e r s etc.) 
St e e l Melters 
St e e l Rollers 
Transport Workers 
E.4 A l i t t l e e a r l i e r ( i n question D. l ) you gave us your opinion on the 
opportunities for holding responsiMlity and taking decisions that 
exi s t for manual workers i n s t e e l . We would now l i k e you to consider 
how the importance of manual workers^* decisions compares which those 
taken "by other cl a s s e s of workers i n the industry. 
Which group takes the most important decisipns for the industry^ 
Please rank from 1 to 5i with 1 to the most important. 
Senior and experienced manual workers 
C l e r i c a l S t a f f 
Assistant plant managers 
Foremen 
S p e c i a l i s t s t a f f (e.g. refractory and designers 
engineers). 
E.5 We would now l i k e you to give us your opinion ahout how much say or 
influence your own occupational group has with management. Ring the 
numher whicSh most clo s e l y r e f l e c t s your point of view, for each of the 
items mentioned "below. 
A Qiiite „ .^ , „ None „ . No.tjiVery , Great a i , , i . T • j . I n , T , .. Much L i t t l e deal h i t a l l 
(a) The pace at which memhers of 
the group have to work 1 2 3 4 5 
( T d ) Safety matters' 1 2 3 4 5 
(c) reducing departmental costs hy 
suggesting economics i n operations 1 2 3 4 5 
(d) general f i n a n c i a l policy matters 
( l i k e the al l o c a t i n g of money to new 
projects or withdrawing i t from 
douhtful ones) 1 2 3 4 5 
(e) d i s c i p l i n i n g of employees ( i n c l -
uding dismissals) 1 2 3 4 5 
( f ) pa-y rates and "bonuses 1 2 3 4 5 
(g) the amount of overtime availalsle 1 2 3 4 5 
(h) f i x i n g work standards such 
things as joh evaluation and method 1 2 3 4 5 
study 
- 11 -
^ '^^ '^ ^ Not Verv Great a / ^ f ^ at , T Much L i t t l e deal t i t a l l 
( i ) Controlling the recruitment 
of new employees .1 2 3 4 5 
( j ) the handling of redundancy 
problems 1 2 3 4 5 • 
(k) transfer of men between departments 
when required as the r e s u l t of technical 
change 1 2 3 4 5 
( l ) the selection of men to positions 
within the seniority l i n e 1 2 3 4 5 
(m) purchasing new machines and 
, equipment for your department 1 2 3 4 5 
E.6 Thinking about your own occupational group's negotiations with management, 
how much influence would you i d e a l l y l i k e i t to have over the following 
aspects of work. Ring the number which most clo s e l y r e f l e c t s your point 
of view for each of the items mentioned. 
A Quite Not Very None 
Great a Much L i t t l e at 
deal b i t a l l 
(a) the pace at which members of the 
group have to work 1 2 3 4 5 
(b) safety matters 1 2 3 4 5 
(c) reducing departmental costs by 
suggesting economics i n operations 1 2 3 4 5 
(d) purchasing new machinery and 
equipment for your d§partment 1 2 3 4 5 
(e) general f i n a n c i a l policy matters 
( l i k e the allo c a t i n g of money to new 
projects or withdrawing i t from 
doubtful ones) 1 2 3 4 5 
( f ) d i s c i p l i n i n g of employees (including 
dismissals) 1 2 3 4 5 
(g) rates and bonuses 1 2 3 4 5 
(h) the amount of overtime available 1 2 3 4 5 
( i ) f i x i n g work standards by such 
things as job evaluation and method 










L i t t l e 
None 
at 
a l l 
( j ) Controlling the recruitment of 
employees 
(k) the handling of redundancy 
prohlems 
( l ) t r a n s f e r of men between departments 
when required as a r e s u l t of technical 
changef 
(m) the selection of men to positions 
within the seniority l i n e 1 
You may f e e l that other groups have different amounts of influence from 
-your own when i t comes to dealing with management ahout the issues already 
mentioned. We would l i k e you to t e l l us how much say or influence you 





Boilermakers, Burner & Welders 
Bricklayers 
C l e r i c a l Workers 
Cranedrivers 
Cokeworkers 
E l e c t r i c i a n s 
Engineers ( F i t t e r s , turners etc.) 
Steel Hnelters 





























In general, how much say or influence do you feel each of the following 
groups had on what goes on i n I r o n h i l l at the present time? Please ring 




a h i t 
Not 
Much 
(a) B.S.C. management (London) 
(h) D i v i s i o n a l management (General 
S t e e l s ) 
(c) I r o n h i l l management 
(d) Foremen 
(e) F u l l time trade union o f f i c i a l s 
( f ) Delegates and shop stewards 
(g) Rank and f i l e employees 

































E.8 I n general, how much say or influence do you f e e l each of the groups 
i d e a l l y ought to have over what goes on at I r o n h i l l ? Please ring the 







A/Go0d:'i Quite Not None None 
B.S.C. Management (London) 
Divis i o n a l management 
I r o n h i l l management 
Foreman 
P u l l time trade union o f f i c i a l s 
Delegates and shop stewards 
Rank and f i l e employees 
C l e r i c a l workers 
a b i t Much L i t t l e at cill 






























F. AQTriTUDES TOWARDS MANAGEMNT AND THE TRADE UNION 
F.I We would now l i k e you to give us your opinion of the following st a t e -
ments about trade unions and management. Please ring the number that 
corresponds nearest to your answer for each item 
Strongly No fl^ced j j ^ ^ Strongly 
agree ° opinion ^ Disagree 
(a) Trade Unions and 
Management co-operate 
together i n t h i s plant 
because they see each 
othe4*s point of view 1 2 3 4 5 
(b) Teamwork i n industry 
i s impossible because 
employers and men are r e a l l y 
on opposite sides 1 2 3 4 5 
( c ) I r o n h i l l management i s 
qxiite good because i t i s 
prepared to l i s t e n to 
complaints and consider 
suggestions 1 2 3 4 5 
(d) I r o n h i l l management i s 
l e s s e f f e c t i v e than i t might 
be because i t must be cons-
t a n t l y rooking over i t s 
shoulder at the B r i t i s h Steel 
Corporation 1 2 3 4 5 
(e) The unions i n t h i s plant 
tend to be controlled by 
cliques so it,»s different for 
the ordinary member to make 
h i s views known 1 2 3 4 5 
(P) A strong point about 
the unions i s . t h a t they are 
very democratic and consider 
a l l member,s* point of view. 1 2 3 4 5 
(g) I n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s i n 
the s t e e l industry aire good 
because problems concerning 
pay and conditions can be 
se t t l e d quickly at the l o c a l 





What do you think about the s t e e l industryl's i n d u s t r i a l relations 








We should l i k e you now to comment on some of the proposals for the 
industrys's future as specified by B.S.C., and which have been - S>r 
may be - the subject of agreements between management and the trade 







(a) The most important 
common objective of manage-
ment and the trade unions 
at present i s to achieve and 
maintain the highest labour 
productivity 1 2 3 
(b) To achieve a labour 
force which can be developed 
f l e x i b l y 1 2 3 
(c) High productivity 
requires f u l l co-operation 
by the unions on work study 
and job evaluation 1 2 3 
(d) High productivity 
requires much more l o c a l 
productivity agreements 1 2 3 
(e) Wa^e anomalies (e.g. 
unequal overtime premiums) 
must be removed by l o c a l 
negotiation 1 2 3 4 5 
( f ) Removing fluctuation i n 
earnings i n favour of a more 
stable wage 1 2 3 4 5 
I n exchange for co-operation by the unions i n increasing productivity 
and reducing costs the i'following items represent possible improvements 
which have been - or might be - made. Please rank i n order of importance, 
giving one to the most important improvement you fe e l should be made, 
and nine to the l e a s t . 
4 
(a) Increase i n holiday pay 
(b) Improvement i n guaranteed week from 4 s h i f t s to 
5 
(c) Consolidating cost of l i v i n g i n basic pay 
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(d) Introduction of annual s a l a r i e s for manual workers 
to improve ['social status' 
(e) Estahlishment of industry wide pension scheme 
for manual workers 
( f ) Estahlishment of uniform time conditions throughout 
the s t e e l industry 
(g) Personal earnings protection i n cases of required 
changes i n j o h 
(h) Better sickness benefits 
( i ) Better redundancy pay when plants close 
F.5 We would l i k e you now to give us your opinion on the following 
statements concerning participation. Please ring the appropriate 
answers. 
Strongly No fixed r^^^.^ Strongly 
Agree ^ opinion ^ Disagree 
(a) The s t e e l industry's 
work director scheme 
successfully puts the 
voice of the worker on the 
Board of management 1 2 3 4 5 
(h) Too many decisions i n 
t h i s plant axe taken without 
seeking employees' points of 
view 1 2 3 4 5 
(c) Ihere are increasing 
opportunities today for 
workers to participate with 
management i n the setting of 
production standards ( i . e . 
productivity bargaining) 1 2 3 4 5 
(d) the workerss job 
involves taking orders: i i i ' s 
not h i s job to make the rules 1 2 3 4 5 
(e) Workers should have more 
say i n how t h e i r employment 
can be safeguarded (e.g. 
d i s c i p l i n i n g , redundancy) 1 2 3 4 5 
( f ) I f workers f e e l bad 
management i s responsible 
for poor performance they 
should be able to do some-
thing about i t 1 2 3 4 5 
- 17 -
strongly No fixed Strongly 
Agree opinion ^^agree j^^^^^^ 
(g) Employees need more 
education about work 
study i n order to help 
them negotiate e f f e c t i v e l y 1 2 3 4 5 
- 18 -
G. ATTITUDES TOWARDS SOCIAL LIFE 
G.I How do you rate the chances of manual workers generally for eventual 




Not much 3 
Non existent 4 
G.2 How do you rate your own personal chances of promotion to foreman and 
possibly higher? Please r i n g the appropriate number. 
Good 1 
Reasonable 2 
Not much 3 
Non existent 4 
G.3 I f there were no obstacles i n your path, would you idea l l y l i k e to be 
promoted into management? 
Yes 1 
No 2 
G.4 On the whole, do you spend a good deal of your s o c i a l time outside 
work ( i . e . clubs, pubs etc.) with colleagues with whom you work 
clo s e l y ? 
Yes 1 
No 2 
G.5 Which of the following statements about the industry most closely 
represent your point of view. Please ring as appropriate. 
(a) I work i n s t e e l because there;*s nothing else to do 
i n the area 1 
(b) I work i n s t e e l because the: payi»s not bad for the 
kind of work I do 2 
( c ) Even though there are grumbles about aspects of the job 
I fin d steelwork interesting and challenging 3 
G.6 Which of the following statements about I r o n h i l l as a town most closely 
represents your point of view? Please ring as appropriate. 
(a) I am happy l i v i n g i n the I r o n h i l l area, because I have family 
and friendship t i e s here. 1 
(b) I intend leaving I r o n h i l l i f I get the chance - there 
are better oppoiptunities elsewhere " 2 
- 19 -
G.7 Which of these three statements about society do you most agree 
with? 
(a) We l i v e i n a f a i r society 1 
(b) There i s i n j u s t i c e i n our society, but t h i s can be 
corrected by making reforms 2 
i(c) No matter what we do, the kind of society we l i v e 
i n w i l l always be unjust. The only solution i s a 
new kind of society, 3 
G.8 Which of these two statements about the steel industry do you most 
agree with? 
(a) The s t e e l industry i s l i k e a ladder. You can climb 
to any position by your own efforts 1 
(b) Whether i n private or nationalised! : hands, s t e e l -
workers w i l l always be r e l a t i v e l y worse off than 
those who control industry and w i l l have to fight 
for every improvement i n t h e i r condition. 2 





NEWCASTLE UPON TYNE POLYTECHNIC 
Department of Behavioural Studies 
Where do you l i v e ? Please t i c k as appropriate. 
Within 2 miles at I r o n h i l l . 
Within 5 miles of I r o n h i l l 
Over 5 miles from I r o n h i l l 
2. How long have you l i v e d there? Please t i c k as appropriate. 
0 - 4.years 
5 - 1 9 years 
20 years and over 
Please s e l e c t from the following groups of friends 
the three groups whom you spend most time with. 






( f ) 
is) 
(h) 
Immediate family i . e . I f you are married, wife and 
children; i f you are not married parents 
brothers and s i s t e r s . 
Other family contacts i . e . Cousins, 
aunts, uncles, grandparents etc. 
Friends from work who are also clerks , 
Friends from work who are manual workers^. 
o 
Friends from work who are members of 
management. . 
Relatives who work at I r o n h i l l and are 
manual workers. . 
Relatives who work at I r o n h i l l and are 
members of management. . 
Friends who are not employed at I r o n h i l l . 
but who l i v e i n the same area as yourself 
Please specify other groups of friends 










Theatable below provides an opportunity to give your opinion 
on the ways i n which cle r k s (people l i k e yourself), managers 
and manual workers might prefer to spend t h e i r l e i s u r e time. 
Where you think an a c t i v i t y i s appropriate to only one group 
e.g. mansigers, t i c k only the box for Managers. Where an 
a c t i v i t y i s appropriate for two groups e.g. Clerks and Managers 
tick'-the two boxes marked Clerks and Managers. Where an 
a c t i v i t y seems appropriate to a l l three groups, t i c k a l l 










Belonging to a Working 
Me4»s Club 








a c t i v i t i e s ) 
Managers Clerks Manual Workers 
5. What is/was your father's preaent/last occupation? 
6. Has he ever worked or does he s t i l l work in either the steel] 
or mining industries? 







When did your full-time schooling f i n i s h ? 
Please t i c k as appropriate. 
E a r l i e r than I4 years 
At j14:.years 
At 15 years 
Later than 15 years 
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Did you obtain any q u a l i f i c a t i o n s at school? 
Please t i c k as appropriate. 
Yes .... 
No o . .• 
I f yes please indicate by t i c k i n g as appropriate what 
qu a l i f i c a t i o n s are. Tick appropriate column i n each case. 
C i t y and Guilds C e r t i f i c a t e 
< G.CiE:; 'B* l e v e l , O.N.C. or 
School C e r t i f i c a t e 
G.C.E. I'A;' l e v e l or Higher School 
C e r t i f i c a t e 
C.S.E. 
Please state any others belows-
. o « . e 
Have you obtained any further q u a l i f i c a t i o n s since leaving 
school? 
Please t i c k as appropriate. 
Yes 
No. .... .... 










. O S . 
Are you continuing your education i n any way at the present 
time? 
Please t i c k as appropriate. 
Yes .... 
No .... 
I f YES i s t h i s education d i r e c t l y related to your job or 
to outside i n t e r e s t s ? 
Please t i c k as appropriate. 
D i r e c t l y related to job 






















Which of the following statements about I r o n h i l l as 
a town most c l e a r l y represents your point of view? 
Please t i c k one of the following statements i f you 
l i v e i n I r o n h i l l , 
(a) I am happy l i v i n g i n I r o n h i l l because I have 
•family and friendship t i e s here. 
(b) I intend leaving I r o n h i l l i f I get the 
chance - there are better opportunities 
elsewhere. 
(c) I don't know - I have never r e a l l y thought 
about i t . . • J . .. 
Please l i s t below any previous jobs you held before 
coming to I r o i i h i l l . 
We would now l i k e you to think about your reasons for 
deciding to join the s t a f f at I r o n h i l l , I f you came 
to the s t a f f at I r o n h i l l from previous employment either 
inside or outside the company please complete both tables 
below. I f you have worked only on the s t a f f at I r o n h i l l 
please complete Table 2 only. ' 
Please t i c k the appropriate statements - more than one 
i f necessary. 
Table I 
My reason(s) for leaving my previous job was/were 
D i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with pay 
Lajck of security 
Poor working conditions (other than pay 
e.g. general f a c i l i t i e s ) 
Poor opportunities for promotion 
Poor opportunities for using s k i l l s 
Too closely supervised (e.g. unable to 
use i n i t i a t i v e or take decisions) 
Bad management 
Work load too heavy 
Redundancy 
Please specify any other reasons 




















Table I I 
My,v reasor](s) for selecting c l e r i c a l work at I r o n h i l l 
was/were 
The pay seemed at t r a c t i v e 
I t offered secure employment , 
Promotion opportunities seemed good 
Domestic reasons (e.g. wished to remain 
i n t h i s area) 
No other opportunities 
Better opportunities for using s k i l l . 
and i n i t i a t i v e 
Encouraged "hy father, family and friends, 
Bie reputation of I r o n h i l l as an employer 
was good 
Working conditions seemed att r a c t i v e 
We are interested i n obtaining your opinions about 
your own job at I r o n h i l l . Please indicate against 
each statement below whether the standard of the 
following c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s i s good or bad. Please 
t i c k as appropriate. 
( 1 ) Opportunilies for E t 
the pace of your own work 
(not too closely supper-
vised) 
( 2 ) Opportunities for 
influencing your super-
v i s o r s i n making decisions 
( 3 ) Opportunities for 
varied and interesting 
work 
( 4 ) Adequacy of pay for 
your s k i l l and effort 
( 5 ) Opportunities for 
using your own i n i t i a t i v e 
i n problem solving 
( 6 ) Opportunities for 
learning new s k i l l s 
( 7 ) Offers secure 
employment 
( 8 ) Adequate recognition 
from supervisor for good 
job performance 
( 9 ) Offers prospects for 
promotion for you. 
Good No fixed opinion Bad 


























We are now in-terested i n your opinions atout c l e r i c a l 
work as a whole at I r o n h i l l . Please indica-te against 
each statement whether the standard of the following 
items i s good or had at I r o n h i l l . Please t i c k as 
appropriate. 
Pay 







(5) Technical q u a l i t y 
of supei^sor ( i . e . s k i l l 
and knowledge) 
(6) Technical q u a l i t y 
of Management ( i . e . s k i l l 
and knowledge) 
(7) Social quality of 
management ( i . e . social 
p o l i c i e s which take 
account of technical 
decisions on employees) 
(8) Promotion prospects 
(9) Opportunities f o r 
making friends 
Good No fixed opinion Bad 
I f you cuuld choose three characteristics to go towards 
creating an ideal .1oh situ a t i o n which 3. of the following 
would you select. Plaase t i c k as appropriate. 
(1) Opportunityefor setting the pace of your 
own work i . e . without close supervision. 
(2) Varied work which avoids a 'bbring outline 
(3) Opportunity to develop s k i l l s and learn new 
s k i l l s of the J oh. TJJ.:.' 
(4) Demanding work which requires e f f o r t and 
involvement 
(5) Good promotion prospects 
(6) Security 

























(7) A l e v e l of pay adequate f o r your s k i l l and 
e f f o r t 
(8) Getting recognition f o r satisfactory work 
f o r superiors and colleagues 
(9) Work which i s not too demanding and allows 
plenty of time f o r out of work a c t i v i t i e s ..... 
I f you could choose ideal work conditions which two of 
the following would you select as most important to you. 
Please t i c k as appropriate. 
(1) Working under supervisors who give 
reasonahle and clear directives 
(2) Opportunity to influence supervisors i n 
making decisions ..... 
(3) A congenial working atmosphere which 
enables you to make friends 
(4) Working f o r a technical ly.-cpmi)etent 
management i . e . making s k i l l f u l and informed 
decisions 
(5) Working f o r a management who pursues social 
p o l i c i e s that show concern f o r the effects of 
i t s technical proposals on employees 
(6) Working i n a company which offers good 
social f a c i l i t i e s i . e . canteens, social 
cluhs, good o f f i c e accommodation. 
Below i s a series of statements ahout work. Please indicate 
whether you think that on the whole they are true of 
false "by t i c k i n g the appropriate hox i n each case. 





( 1 ) People can put up with anything 
providing the money i s r i g h t 
(2) Nowadays people might just as well 
go f o r good money and not "bother atout 
education and o f f i c e johs. 
(3) C l e r i c a l work i s more at t r a c t i v e than 
manual work because i t offers more secure 
employment. 
(4) Nowadays c l e r i c a l work no longer 
provides opportunities f o r a close 
relatio n s h i p with management 
(5) The clerk i s i n a better position 






(6) The s k i l l s of c l e r i c a l work are 
s u f f i c i e n t to give i t higher status 
than manual work 
True False 
Below i s a series of statements ahout c l e r i c a l work i n 
the steel Industry. Please indicate whether you think 
that, on the whole, they m,e true or false hy t i c k i n g 
the appropriate hex i n each case. 
(1) Narrowing income d i f f e r e n t i a l s hetween 
clerks and manual workers i s an important 
cause of unrest amongst the s t a f f . 
(2) Neither management nor manual work-
ers value c l e r i c a l work very highly 
because they see i t as less important 
than production work 
(3) Clerks are more aware than manual 
workers of management's point of 
view because c l e r i c a l work oran lead to . 
a managerial position 
(4) Nowadays there are no ispecial s k i l l s 
required to become a clerk 
(5) The manual worker deserves more 
money than the clerk because of the 
type of work he does. 
(6) Further education i s s t i l l a 
value means of getting on i t c l e r i c a l 
work 
(7) One of the obstacles to a united 
e f f o r t by clerks i n t h i f i plant i s t h e i r 
dispersion over a wide area 
(8) Wherever they are situated i n t h i s 
pl a j i t clerks have similar interests 
and share a common point of view 
True False 
i 















Now we would l i k e you to give your opinion about 
the following statements;-
Please t i c k against each item which answer you think 
i s most appropriate. 
(a) Since nationalisation 
the chances of I r o n h i l l 
closing are very much less. 
(b) The future of I r o n h i l l 
depends very much on how 
well management and employ-
ees can co-operate together 
to solve common problems 
(c) Technical change-new 
machines, new processes -
w i l l eliminate Bbme of the 
e x i s t i n g jobs at the plant. 
(d) This plant i s over-
manned 
(e) Technical change i n t h i s 
plant i s inevitable but must be 
accepted, eveniith redundancies, 
i f conditions of employment are 
to be improved 
Agree No fixed Opinion Disagree 
Some people say that some occupations have more prestige 
than others. Please rank the following occupations i n your 
industry i n order of prestige giving 1 to the highest ( i . e . 











We would now l i k e you to give us your opinion about how 
much say and influence your own occupational group has 
with management. Tick the column which most closely 
r e f l e c t s your point of view, against each of the items 
mentioned below:-





















(a) reducing departmental 
costs hy suggesting econ-
omics i n operations. 
(b) improving produc-
t i v i t y hy suggesting 
ch^ges i n working 
practices. 
(c) purchasing new 
machinery and equipment 
f o r your department. 
(d) general fi n a n c i a l 
policy matters ( l i k e 
the a l l o c a t i n g of money 
to new projects or w i t h -
drawing i t from doubt-
f u l ones). 
(e) d i s c i p l i n i n g of 
employees (including 
dismissals). 
( f ) pay rates and 
bonuses. 
(g) assigning employees 
to p a r t i c u l a r jobs. 
(h) f i x i n g work stand-
ards by such things as 
job evaluation and 
method study 
( i ) the r i g h t t> organ-
ise work as the group -LM •; 




a. b i t 
Very 
L i t t l e 
None 
at a l l 
2 
23. Thinking about your own occupational group's negotiations 
with management, how mucn influence would you ideally l i k e 
i t t6 have over the following aspects of work. 
Tick the column which most closely r e f l e c t s your point of 
view on each of the items, mentioned below. 
A great Quite Very None 
deal a b i t L i t t l e at a l l 
(a) Reducing departmental 
costs hy suggesting econ-
omies i n operations. 
Office use only 
GD B VL N 
1 1 1 1 
2 2 2 2 
3 3 3 3 
4 4 4 4 
5 5 5 5 
6 6 6 6 
7 7 7 7 
8 8 8 8 
9 9 9 9 
CO 41/44 
GD QB. VL N 
1 1 1 1 
- 11 -
(b) improving productivity 
by suggesting changes i n 
working practices 
(c) Purchasing new mach-
inery and equipment f o r 
your department 
(d) General fi n a n c i a l policy 
matters ( l i k e the allocating 
of money to new projects or 
withdrawing i t from doubtful 
ones) 1 
(e) D i s c i p l i n i n g of employ-
ees (including dismissals) 
( f ) Pay rates and bonuses 
(g) Assigning employees to 
pa r t i c u l a r jobs 
(h) f i x i n g work standards 
by such things as job eval-
uation and method study 
( i ) The r i g h t to organise 




a b i t 
Very 
L i t t l e 
None 
at a l l 
24. You may fe e l that other groups have d i f f e r e n t amounts of 
influence from your own when i t comes to dealing with 
management about the issues already mentioned. We would 
l i k e you to t e l l us how much say or influence you think 















i n f l u -
ence 
Office use only 
GD QB VL N 
2 2 2 2 
3 3 3 3 
4 4 4 4 
5 5 5 5 
6 6 6 6 
7 7 7 7 
8 8 8 8 
9 9 9 9 
cc 45/48 
































i n f l u -
ence 
I n general, how much say or influence do you feel each of 
the following groups has on what goes on i n I r o n h i l l at 
the present time? 
(a) B.S.G. management 
(London) 
(b) Divisional management 
(General Steels) 
(c) I r o n h i l l management 
(d) Foremen 
(e) F u l l time trade 
union o f f i c i a l s 
( f ) Delegates and shop 
stewards 






a b i t 
Very 
L i t t l e 
None 
at a l l 
• 
I n general, how much say or influence do you feel each of 
the. groups i d e a l l y ought to have over what goes on at 
I r o n h i l l . 
(a) B.S.C. management 
(London) 
(b) Divisional management 
(c) I r o n h i l l management 
(d) Foremen 
(a) F u l l time trade union 
o f f i c e s 
A Good . 
deal 
Quite 
a b i t 
Very 
L i t t l e 
None 
at a l l 
Office use only 
MI S L I 
8 8 8 
9 9 9 
CO 49/53 
GD QB VL N 
1 1 1 1 
2 2 2 2 
3 3 3 3 
4 4 4 4 
5 5 5 5 
6 6 6 6 
7 - 7 7 7 
8 8 8 8 
cc 54/58 
GD QB VL N 
1 11 1 1 
2 2 2 2 
3 3 3 3 
4 4 4 4 
5 5 5 5 
- ?3 -
( f ) Delegates and shop 
stewards 






a b i t 
Very 
L i t t l e 
None 
at a l l 
27. What are your opinions on the following Social issues? 
Please t i c k the appropriate box. 
(a) "The Welfare State has been beneficial to 
our Society" 
Strongly Agree • 
Agree • Undecided 
Disagree a Strongly Disagree 
(b) "The intervention of Government i n many aspects 
of our l i v e s has been an obstacle to individual 
i n i t i a t i v e " 
Strongly Agree 1 ! 
Agree • Undecided 
Disagree • Strongly Disagree 
(c) "Nationalisation of major industries i s a bad thing 
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p QB VL N 
6 6 6 6 
^ ^ 1 1 


















28. How long have you been a member of BISAKTA? 
Please t i c k as appropriate. 
0 - 5 years 
6 - 1 4 years 
1 5 - 2 4 years 
25 years and over 
29. Have you ever held an o f f i c e i n your lo c a l branch, ( i . e . 
Committee Member, Secretary, Representative). 
Please t i c k as appropriate. 
Yes ..... 
No 
30. How often do you attend Branch Meetings? 





31. What was/were your reason/s f o r joi n i n g BISAKTA? 
Please t i c k as appropriate. 
(a) Because my father was a member of 
a trade union. ..... 
(b) Because i t seemed a good thing to belong 
to a union which represents the point of 
view of manual workers. 
(c) Because although I d i d not want to j o i n 
I was expected to j o i n . 
(d) Because I believed that c l e r i c a l workers, 
l i k e any other workers, should be 
represented by a trade union. 
(e) because I believe that i t was the only 
way to get better wage. 
32. Given the opportunity, which one of the following would 
you prefer? 
Please t i c k as appropriate. 
(a) To remain i n my present type of union 
( i . e . one which r e c r u i t s c l e r i c a l , 
supervisory, and manual employees i n 
the steel industry). 
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(b) To belong to a union which recruited 
only c l e r i c a l s t a f f i n the steel 
industry. 
(c) To belong to a union which r e c r i t e d only 
clerks, supervisors and middle management 
i n the steel industry 
(d) To belong to a union which recrit.ed a l l 
ranks i n white-collar work including 
managers, supervisors and c l e r i c a l s t a f f 
i n several d i f f e r e n t industries. 
33. jfdeally what would be the three most important characteristics 
of a trade union f o r c l e r i c a l s t a f f . Please t i c k the cthree-
characteristics you consider most important. 
(a) Negotiating levels of pay 
(b) Stressing co l l e c t i v e bargaining with 
management. 
(c) Maintaining pay and status d i f f e r e n t i a l s 
between manual and non-manual employees. 
(d) M i l i t a n t action ( i . e . prepared to s t r i k e ) 
(e) Maintaining a i'closed shop' policy of 
reczoiitment. 
( f ) Operating a I'non-closed shop,' policy of 
recruitment. 
(g) Pursuing a policy of co-operation with 
management i n the planning of change i n 
the. industry. 
(h) Setting q u a l i f i c a t i o n standards f o r admission 
int o the occupation or profession. 
( i ) Paying careful attention to i t s image with 
the general public. ..... 
Do you think that membership of a predominantly manual workeii's 
union ( i . e . BISAKTA) provides adequate representation of 
the i n t e r e s t s of c l e r i c a l s t a f f ? 
Please t i c k one of the following which you consider to 
be most appropriate. 
(a) Yes - the c l e r i c a l branch of BISAKTA i n 
t h i s plant e f f e c t i v e l y represents the 
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35. 
(b) Yes - the i n t e r e s t s of manual and non-
manual workers are i d e n t i c a l and both 
are adequately represented by BISAKTA 
(c) No - the clerks have suffered adversely 
compared with manual workers i n obtaining 
better conditions of work. Completely 
separate representation would be preferable 
Some people say that s t r i k e s are on the increase these 
days and that t h i s i s evidence of increasing i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
on the part of employees. Do you agree with t h i s statement? 
Please t i c k as appropriate. 
Yes 
No 
36. We would l i k e you to give us your opinion of the following 
statements about trade unions and management. Please t i c k 
the answer which seems most appropriate for each item 
below. 
(a) Trade Unions and Management 
co-operate together i n t h i s 
plant because they see each 
otheii's point of view. 
(b) I n t h i s plant, trade unioiB spend 
too much time getting on with 
management and not enough time 
' promoting t h e i r memberSJi 
i n t e r e s t s 
(c) I r o n h i l l management i s quite good 
because i t i s prepared to l i s t e n 
to complaints and consider 
suggestions 
(d) I r o n h i l l management i s l e s s 
e f f e c t i v e than i t might be 
because i t must re f e r decisions 
to the B r i t i s h S t e e l Corporation 
(e) The Unions i n t h i s plant tend to be 
controlled by cliques so it|'s 
d i f f i c u l t for the ordinary member 















( f ) I n d u s t r i a l relations i n the steel 
industry are good because problems 
can be settled quickly at the 
lo c a l l e v e l . 
(g) There i s too much independence 
at plant level and not enou^ 
uriformity of pay and conditions 
- hence the need f(5'r national 
agreements 
Agree Disagree 
What do you think about the steel industryi's i n d u s t r i a l 





Some people suggest that the Steel Industry has a good 
i n d u s t r i a l relations record. We would l i k e yoiii to 
arrange t h e i r reasons i n order of importance (even i f you 
-.do not agree that I n d u s t r i a l Relations are' good). 
Please arrange the reasons i n order of importance from 
1 f o r the most important to 5 f o r the least. 
Effective industry-wide machinery exists 
f o r negotiation and consultation. 
Management i s always available and ready 
to l i s t e n to complaints. 
The Unions are responsible and e f f i c i e n t 
There i s effective machinery at plant l e v e l 
f o r the quick settlement of disputes. 
Supervision i s good. ..... 
We should l i k e you now t o comment on some of the proposals 
f o r the industry's future as specified by B.S.C., and which 
haYe been - or may be - the subject of agreements between 
management and the trade unions. 














(a) The most important common objective 
of management and the trade unions 
at present i s to achieve and 
maintain the highest labour product-
i v i t y . 
(b) To achieve labour force which can 
be deployed f l e x i b l y 
(c) High productivity requires f u l l 
co-operation by the unions on 
work study and job evaluation 
(d) High productivity requires much 
more l o c a l productivity agreements 
(e) Trade Unions should participate 
with management l o c a l l y i n 
s e t t i n g target manning reductions 
( f ) Inconsistencies i n overtime 
premiums and other wage anomalies 
must be removed by l o c a l 
negotiations 
Agree Disagree 
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A D 
40. I n exchange f o r cooperation by the unions i n increasing 
productivity and reducing costs, the following items 
represent improvements which have been - or might bev- made. 
Please t i c k the three most important items f o r I r o n h i l l . 
(a) 






Increase i n holidays .... 
Reduction i n hours of work .... 
Betjber redundancy pay when plants close .... 
Introduction of annual salaries f o r manual workers 
to improve t h e i r "social status". .... 
Improvements i n pay d i f f e r e n t i a l s between 
clerks and manual workers (i.e.,clerks 
shojuld receive more pay) 
Establishment of industry-wide pension 
schemes f o r a l l employees .... 
Est|ablishment of uniform time and salary 
con'ditions f o r d i f f e r e n t categories of 
clerks i n the steel industry .... 
Better sickness benefits for.Tjnanual workers .... 
Are there any other improvements you would l i k e to see 
















We would l i k e you now to give us your opinion about the 
following slatements. Please t i c k the answer which seems 
most appropriate f o r each item mentioned below. 
(a) The steel industry's's worker-
director scheme successfully 
puts the voice of the worker 
on the Board of management 
(b) Too many decisions i n t h i s 
plant are taken without seeking 
the employees' points of view 
(c) It''s management^'s job to manage; 
the trade unions must s t i c k to' 
g e t t i n g higher wages 
(d) A trade unionist must be able 
to t a l k about costs and p r o f i t s 
more..than i n the past i n order 
to make the best bargain possible 
f o r the c l e r i c a l s t a f f . 
(e) I t ' s not enough to be advised 
a f t e r a decision has been taken -
there are many aspects of work 
where work-people ought to 
participate i n the making of 
decisions. 
Agree Disagree 
42. What i s your present gross annual salary? Please t i c k 
as appropriate. 
Under £500 ' 
£500 - £600 
£700 - £900 
£1,000 - £1,200 
£1,300 - £1,500 
Above £1,600 
43. I n your opinion which of the following represent trends i n 
c l e r i c a l and manual worker's incomes i n the steel industry? 
Please t i c k appropriate statement/s. 
(a) Both are r i s i n g . 
(b) Both are r i s i n g but manual workersincomes 
are increasing more rapidly 
(c) Both are r i s i n g but clerks' incomes are 
increasing more rapidly. 
(d) Both are stable. 



















44. I n your opinion which of the following trends of incomes 
fo r clerks and manual workers i n the steel industry would 
represent an ideal state of a f f a i r s . 
(a) Both should r i s e . 
(b) Both should r i s e but manual workersi 
incomes should increase more rapidly because 
of the importance of production work to the 
industry, ..... 
(c) Both should r i s e but clerks' incomes should 
increase more rap i d l y because they are not paid 
adequately f o r the work they do. .... 
(d) Manual workers' incomes should remain stable 
f o r a while because clerks' incomes have 
lagged behind. .... 
45. What i s your age? 
Please t i c k as appropriate. 
1 5 - 2 0 years .... 
21 - 30 years .... 
3 1 - 4 0 years .... 
41 - 5Q years .... 
51 years and over 
Thank you f o r your help i n completing t h i s questionnaire. 
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